This article critically considers calls for the precautionary principle to inform judicial decision making in a private law context in light of the Hoffman litigation, where it is alleged that the potential for genetic contamination from genetically modified (GM) crops causes an unreasonable interference with the rights of organic farmers to use and enjoy their lands, giving rise to an actionable nuisance. Applying the precautionary principle in this context would likely privilege non-GM land uses over GM uses, given the latter's (...) uncertain environmental impacts. Through a comparison of the institutional characteristics and respective roles of public and private regulation, the authors argue that the private law context, which lacks democratic accountability and has a limited ability to address complex scientific issues, is poorly suited to apply the diffuse, policy-based risk allocation considerations raised by the precautionary principle. (shrink)

This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.

The wide-ranging content of Places in Man represents the entire Hippocratic Corpus: anatomy, physiology, pathology, medical ideology, clinical instruction, traditional love, gynaecology. Despite this wide and varied scope, the work is conceptually coherent and stylistically consistent. In this new edition of the Greek text with translation and commentary, the language and content of the work are studied in relation to other treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus, and to fragmentary early medical writings. It is argued that while there are `Koan' and (...) `Knidian' elements, a West Greek origin is probable; and that this may be the earliest work in the Corpus. (shrink)

Some people argue that the distribution of medical resources should be sensitive to agents’ responsibility for their ill-health. In contrast, others point to the social determinants of health to argue that the collective agents that control the conditions in which agents act should bear responsibility. To a large degree, this is a debate in which those who hold individuals responsible currently have the upper hand: warranted appeals to individual responsibility effectively block allocation of any significant degree of responsibility to collective (...) agents. We suggest that a different understanding of individual responsibility might lead to a fairer allocation of blame. Scaffolded agency is individual agency exercised in a context in which opportunities and affordances are structured by others. Appeals to scaffolded agency at once recognize the role of the individual and of the collective agents who have put the scaffolds in place. (shrink)

I defend hedonism about moral value by first presenting an argument for moral skepticism, and then showing that phenomenal introspection gives us a unique way to defeat the skeptical argument and establish pleasure's goodness.

McKenna’s critique (rather than criticisms) of idealized approaches to epistemology is an important contribution to the literature. In this brief discussion, I set out his main concerns about more idealized approaches, within and beyond social epistemology, before turning to some issues I think he neglects. I suggest that it’s important to pay attention to the prestige hierarchy in philosophy, and to how that hierarchy can serve ideological purposes. The greater prestige of more abstract approaches plays a role in determining what (...) issues and what voices we attend to. (shrink)

This book highlights the philosophical and creative basis of knowledge co-production by all citizens regardless of socio-economic background in contrast with neoliberal ideology. Exploring beginning, transitional and theorised practices, the book is a memoir of the author's extensive personal and educational experience. Each topic is discussed in relation to a number of pragmatist themes that run throughout to illustrate how the process of dialectical emergence underpins and substantiates meaningful human living. Building on the work of American Pragmatism, this is a (...) systematic and detailed reintroduction of pragmatism to educators worldwide for progressive educational change. (shrink)

Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called ‘deviant’ causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality (...) constraint on causation. I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains. (shrink)

This article explores whether and how research into biological influences on gender identity can and should inform Christian ethical reflection on gender diversity and gender nonconformity. First, the current state of genetic and neuroscientific research on gender identity is surveyed. While the scientific findings are as yet preliminary, tentative, and sometimes contradictory, researchers argue that they already give grounds for thinking that many biological factors have some influence on gender identity through complex interactions with many social and environmental factors. Next, (...) the article offers some general remarks about how natural scientific findings should—and should not—inform Christian theological and ethical reflection. Finally, three specific proposals are developed for how scientific research can and should inform Christian ethical reflection on gender identity. The article offers both a contribution to this Christian ethical reflection and a case study of how the natural sciences may be used in Christian ethics. (shrink)

Time passes; sometimes swiftly, sometimes interminably, but always it passes. We see the world change as events emerge from the shroud of the future, clandestinely slinking into the past almost immediately as though they are reluctant to meet our gaze: children are born, old friends and relatives die, governments once full of youthful enthusiasm wane. If the Earth were sentient, it might feel itself being torn apart as tectonic plates diverge, and chuckle as it outlived species upon species of transient (...) parasites. How could anyone possibly deny that time passes? (shrink)

Craik published only one complete work of any length, this essay on The Nature of Explanation.

How may we characterize the intrinsic structure of physical quantities such as mass, length, or electric charge? This article shows that group-theoretic methods—specifically, the notion of a free and transitive group action—provide an elegant way of characterizing the structure of scalar quantities, and uses this to give an intrinsic treatment of vector quantities. It also gives a general account of how different scalar or vector quantities may be algebraically combined with one another. Finally, it uses this apparatus to give a (...) simple intrinsic treatment of Newtonian gravitation. (shrink)

cognitive, neuropsychological, and neurophysiological studies of both memory and consciousness. Before proceeding further, some discussion of terminology is necessary. It comes as no surprise to state that "consciousness" is one of the ...

This book challenges the view that bad beliefs - beliefs that blatantly conflict with easily available evidence - can largely be explained by widespread irrationality, instead arguing that ordinary people are rational agents whose beliefs are the result of their rational response to the evidence they're presented with.

We explain and explore class-theoretic potentialism—the view that one can always individuate more classes over a set-theoretic universe. We examine some motivations for class-theoretic potentialism, before proving some results concerning the relevant potentialist systems (in particular exhibiting failures of the $\mathsf {.2}$ and $\mathsf {.3}$ axioms). We then discuss the significance of these results for the different kinds of class-theoretic potentialists.

For more than 60 years, Chomsky has been an intellectual Colossus bestriding the worlds of language, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences, and focusing attention on the whole field and emphasizing the crucial importance of domains overlooked by the mainstream. One such area is the study of first‐language acquisition. This chapter considers “atypical acquisition” to cover two conceptually related situations. First, it covers a variety of cases where there is an obvious “poverty of the stimulus” in that children either receive or (...) perceive no linguistic input at the essential early stages referred to as critical periods. Second, it covers where there is rather the opposite situation. The chapter presents atypicality in language acquisition that stems from the learner's atypical neurological profile rather than environmental or input properties. It focuses on Developmental Language Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorder, and the case of the polyglot‐savant Christopher to exemplify atypical acquisition. (shrink)

This book was written with my University of Mississippi "Philosophy of Religion" students in mind. Many of them have no prior experience with philosophy. That is why Chapter One begins with a crash course in philosophy, with an emphasis on the basic concepts in logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. While not all students may need to cover that material, quite a few will. And for the rest, a refresher never hurts. I am sure this applies to many "Philosophy of Religion" courses (...) taught elsewhere. With that in mind, instructors are advised to begin with Chapter One. The subsequent chapters have been arranged in sequence, with each chapter building on the prior ones. However, the chapters are not that tightly bound, so instructors could cover the chapters out of sequence without much disruption. Key terms are underlined. Sometimes the key terms also occur with an associated hyperlink. Other terms have a hyperlink without a corresponding key term. In the print the hyperlink is included as a footnote, in the ebooks the term is hyperlinked [Production - check the ebooks will have hyperlinbks - amend wording here if not]. In general, the hyperlinks follow a pattern. First, key terms are often linked to entries in online academic encyclopedias - either The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, or The Encyclopedia Britannica. [Students are recommended also to consult The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967), edited by Paul Edwards; it is still an excellent resource and has entries corresponding to many key terms. Almost every university library has a copy.] Second, named individuals are sometimes linked to an encyclopedia entry. In both sorts of cases, the URL is provided in an endnote at the end of each chapter. No other description of the contents of the web page will be given. In most other cases, a short description of the contents of the web page is provided in the endnote. Each chapter includes an annotated bibliography for more advanced material. Helpful material is also available on the website for this book. This material includes a glossary, a sample syllabus (with recommended readings), study questions, and a test bank, among other features. (shrink)

This book rethinks the discussion of sport as a cinematic subject. Arguing for the vitality of the sports film as distinctively 'modern' genre, the book looks at its innovative potential to capture twentieth- and twenty-first-century sport in all its complexity. Written in an accessible style and illustrated throughout, the book integrates work and ideas from film studies with thinking from sports psychology, philosophy, data theory and ecocriticism. In its detailed analyses of a wide-ranging group of films, the book shows how (...) film, from fictional works to biopics to experimental documentaries, can illuminate individual sporting experience, as well as sport's wider place in modern life. (shrink)

Offers a historical study of the world that contends that history is continually created and recreated by conscious, collective human action. Faulkner argues that the struggles of the common people--slaves, serfs, handloom weavers, mine workers, women fighting oppression, black people fighting racism, colonized people fighting imperialism--these struggles, occasionally fusing into mass revolutionary upsurges, drive the historical process. He states that this is an approach to history that emphasizes agency, contingency, and the existence of alternatives; an approach that rejects the view (...) that war and empire are inevitable, that there is no alternative to the market, and that greed, bullying, and violence are universal. In other words, Faulkner contends that the course of history is not predetermined, its outcome is not inevitable; it can go in different directions according to what human beings do. (shrink)

Making Sense of the World: Living, Learning and Teaching with Radical Philosophy of Education proposes that human knowledge arises from an integrated physical and metaphysical experience involving the continuing social acts of personal and community cultures and languages. It seeks to provide a means of thinking about and acting with the philosophical nature of human existence, so that the daily activities and achievements of all are respected and taken into account. Given the dominance of neoliberal politics and economics in many (...) countries, it is unusual to find the work of educators and practitioners being framed generally by an explicit philosophy of knowledge. (shrink)

One of the hardest parts of being a leader is handling disagreements about values. The skills required to do this are increasingly important in polarized societies where there is pressure for businesses and organizations to have a sense of purpose and "do the right thing." Our book helps readers address these challenges. To do this, we don''t give a simplistic cookie-cutter recipe for what is right and wrong. Rather, we guide readers on a journey to rigorously explore their values and (...) better understand the values of others. We discuss the human psychology that drives conflicts over values as well as the philosophical frameworks that have guided people for millennia. We provide strategies, based in research from psychology and the behavioral sciences, whichthat readers can use to implement their values in their lives and their organizations. Topics covered include moral intuitions, self-serving biases, situational pressures, social norms, the role of business in society, consequentialism/utilitarianism, motives, perspective-taking, justice, fairness, and liberty. (shrink)

Informally rigorous mathematical reasoning is relevant. So too should be the premises to the conclusions of formal proofs that regiment it. The rule Ex Falso Quodlibet induces spectacular irrelevance. We therefore drop it. The resulting systems of Core Logic C and Classical Core Logic C+ can formalize all the informally rigorous reasoning in constructive and classical mathematics respectively. We effect a revised match-up between deducibility in Classical Core Logic and a new notion of relevant logical consequence. It matches better the (...) deducibility relation of Classical Core Logic than does the Tarskian notion of consequence. It is implosive, not explosive. (shrink)

I defend ethical hedonism, the view that pleasure is the sole good thing, by arguing that it offers the only answer to an argument for moral skepticism. The skeptical problem arises from widespread fundamental moral disagreement, which entails the presence of enough moral error to undermine the reliability of most processes generating moral belief. We know that pleasure is good through the reliable process of phenomenal introspection, which reveals what our experiences are like. If knowing of pleasure’s goodness through phenomenal (...) introspection is the only reliable way to form our initial moral beliefs, we should accept ethical hedonism. (shrink)

Neil Levy presents a new theory of freedom and responsibility. He defends a particular account of consciousness--the global workspace view--and argues that consciousness plays an especially important role in action. There are good reasons to think that the naïve assumption, that consciousness is needed for moral responsibility, is in fact true.

Our regimentation of Goodman and Myhill’s proof of Excluded Middle revealed among its premises a form of Choice and an instance of Separation.Here we revisit Zermelo’s requirement that the separating property be definite. The instance that Goodman and Myhill used is not constructively warranted. It is that principle, and not Choice alone, that precipitates Excluded Middle.Separation in various axiomatizations of constructive set theory is examined. We conclude that insufficient critical attention has been paid to how those forms of Separation fail, (...) in light of the Goodman–Myhill result, to capture a genuinely constructive notion of set. (shrink)

Epistemic akrasia can be rational. I consider a lonely pragmatist who believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, and also believes on pragmatic grounds that she should believe in him. She rationally believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, rationally follows various sources of evidence to the view that she should believe in him to end her loneliness, and rationally holds these attitudes simultaneously. Evidentialism suggests that her ambivalent epistemic state is rational, as considerations grounded in the value of truth (...) justify her beliefs. (shrink)

This book focuses on the nature and importance of harm by providing a sustained defense of the counterfactual comparative account, in particular by extending the account to allow for a certain kind of plural or collective harm. According to the counterfactual comparative account, an event harms a person provided that she would have been better off had it not occurred. On the account defended in this book, there are cases in which some events harm a given individual even though none (...) of them by itself harms the individual. This account aims to solve the most serious problem facing the counterfactual comparative account, a problem involving cases of preemption. In such cases, an intuitively harmful event does not make the victim worse off, since if it had not occurred, another event would have had a similar adverse influence on the victim’s well-being. The book also contains discussion of various competing accounts of harm, and it replies to other challenges to the counterfactual comparative account. It argues, moreover, that an action that would harm a person does not thereby have a strong moral reason against it; if there is a strong moral reason against a harmful act, the reason is due primarily to some of the act’s other features. (shrink)

What is the basis of our capacity to act morally? This is a question that has been discussed for millennia, with philosophical debate typically distinguishing two sources of morality: reason and sentiment. This collection aims to shed light on whether the human capacity to feel for others really is central for morality and, if so, in what way. To tackle these questions, the authors discuss how fellow feeling is to be understood: its structure, content and empirical conditions. Also discussed are (...) the exact roles that relevant psychological features - specifically: empathy, sympathy and concern - may play within morality. The collection is unique in bringing together the key participants in the various discussions of the relation of fellow feeling to moral norms, moral concepts and moral agency. By integrating conceptually sophisticated and empirically informed perspectives, Forms of Fellow Feeling will appeal to readers from philosophy, psychology, sociology and cultural studies. (shrink)

Emerging from the confusion and chaos of neoliberal economic systems around the world, this book brings together a collection of major philosophical ideas from previous centuries and applies them to the practice of education. The book argues that pragmatist philosophy is the most appropriate to guide the organisation of curriculum, pedagogy and assessment. It outlines a number of philosophical dilemmas, exploring these in relation to particular philosophers and offers philosophical insights for educational practice. Further, the book proposes Critical Praxis Bricolage, (...) an epistemological framework articulating a view that education practices are embedded in a social context. This reshapes formal education from being dominated by the market forces of neoliberalism, into a way of ethical life that respects the dignity and knowledgeability of each person and community regardless of background. Written in a narrative style, Pragmatist Philosophy for Critical Knowledge, Learning and Consciousness provides a philosophical paradigm of experience, culture and inquiry that actively connects with human interests of the everyday and with the distinctiveness of being human. This work will be of interest to researchers and higher degree students of education and philosophy of education. (shrink)

Abstract: This entry elucidates causal and constitutive roles that various forms of imagining play in human action. Imagination influences more kinds of action than just pretend play. I distinguish different senses of the terms “imagining” and “imagination”: imagistic imagining, propositional imagining, and constructive imagining. Each variety of imagining makes its own characteristic contributions to action. Imagistic imagining can structure bodily movement. Propositional imagining interacts with desires to motivate pretend play and mimetic expressive action. And constructive imagination generates representations of possibilities (...) and actions on the basis of which we choose what to do. [Version archived here is a penultimate draft.]. (shrink)

How does our language relate to reality? This is a question that is especially pertinent in set theory, where we seem to talk of large infinite entities. Based on an analogy with the use of models in the natural sciences, we argue for a threefold correspondence between our language, models, and reality. We argue that so conceived, the existence of models can be underwritten by a weak notion of existence, where weak existence is to be understood as existing in virtue (...) of language. (shrink)

Neil E. Williams develops a systematic metaphysics centred on the idea of powers, as a rival to neo-Humeanism, the dominant systematic metaphysics in philosophy today. Williams takes powers to be inherently causal properties and uses them as the foundation of his explanations of causation, persistence, laws, and modality.

It is well known that the nature of consciousness is elusive, and that attempts to understand it generate problems in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience. Less appreciated are the important – even if still elusive – connections between consciousness and issues in ethics. In this chapter we consider three such connections. First, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding an entity’s moral status. Second, we consider the relevance of consciousness for questions surrounding moral responsibility for action. (...) Third, we consider the relevance of consciousness for the acquisition of moral knowledge. (shrink)

It is often claimed that humans are rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral creatures. What these characterizations may all have in common is the more fundamental claim that humans are normative animals, in the sense that they are creatures whose lives are structured at a fundamental level by their relationships to norms. The various capacities singled out by discussion of rational, linguistic, cultural, or moral animals might then all essentially involve an orientation to obligations, permissions and prohibitions. And, if this is (...) so, then perhaps it is a basic susceptibility, or proclivity to normative or deontic regulation of thought and behavior that enables humans to develop the various specific features of their life form. This volume of new essays investigates the claim that humans are essentially normative animals in this sense. The contributors do so by looking at the nature and relations of three types of norms, or putative norms-social, moral, and linguistic-and asking whether they might all be different expressions of one basic structure unique to humankind. These questions are posed by philosophers, primatologists, behavioral biologists, psychologists, linguists, and cultural anthropologists, who have collaborated on this topic for many years. The contributors are committed to the idea that understanding normativity is a two-way process, involving a close interaction between conceptual clarification and empirical research. (shrink)

To understand how Richard Rorty's “redescription” of transcendental arguments works against the realist interpretation – and in particular against the notion that philosophy can provide an answer to the quaestio juris – it is helpful to turn to a little history. In Anglophone philosophy, the development of the anti‐skeptical and antireductionist potential of transcendental arguments is usually ascribed to the work of P. F. Strawson and other philosophers influenced by the later L. Wittgenstein. According to Rorty, the following condition is (...) sufficient for designating an argument “realist”: a distinction is made between scheme and content. A transcendental argument against realism is an argument to the effect that attempts to make sense of a notion of justification that would do the work of legitimation required is parasitic on what can be gleaned from the methods of confirmation/inferential relations that we use in practice. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Right and Wrong Ethics and Legislation Morality and the State The Origin, Foundation and Purpose of the State Political Obligation and the Social Contract The Theory of Punishment Jurisprudence The Value of the State Conclusion References.

As it turns out, accounting for the mechanics of willful wrongdoing has been a major problem for ethics from the beginning, and it has led to some very strange theories. Socrates and Plato simply deny the possibility. What does this mean for DungeonsDragons (DD)? First of all, it means that nobody chooses evil for the sake of evil, what some people call diabolic evil. The primary sources of evil are indifference and self‐deception. Both lead me to a life of convention, (...) simply living up to the code of conduct given by society. It is much more comfortable to think of evil as something done by villains in movies. There is something rather disturbing about the thought that one can become evil gradually. Because of the influence of bad habits, much about the moral life feels grey and fuzzy. (shrink)

Michael Slote has long been one of the foremost contributors to discussions in moral theory. Both his work on consequentialism and his particular version of virtue ethics have been highly influential. In recent years, Slote has developed a distinctive and original voice, placing his various theoretical endeavours under the title of “sentimentalism”. His key ethical work in this context is Moral Sentimentalism, which, uniquely, defends versions of both a metaethical and aretaic sentimentalist theory. The present volume is an extended discussion (...) of that work, containing eight original commentaries and a substantial response by Slote, which provide fresh insights into his position. The collection will be of significant value to anyone interested in contemporary debates in meta-ethics or normative ethics. (shrink)

The one-page 1978 informal proof of Goodman and Myhill is regimented in a weak constructive set theory in free logic. The decidability of identities in general (⁠|$a\!=\!b\vee\neg a\!=\!b$|⁠) is derived; then, of sentences in general (⁠|$\psi\vee\neg\psi$|⁠). Martin-Löf’s and Bell’s receptions of the latter result are discussed. Regimentation reveals the form of Choice used in deriving Excluded Middle. It also reveals an abstraction principle that the proof employs. It will be argued that the Goodman–Myhill result does not provide the constructive set (...) theorist with a dispositive reason for not adopting (full) Choice. (shrink)

This magisterial analysis of human history combines the insights of earlier generations of Marxist historians with radical new ideas about the historical process. Reading history against the grain, Neil Faulkner reveals that what happened in the past was not predetermined. Choices were frequent and numerous. Different outcomes - liberation or barbarism - were often possible. Rejecting the top-down approach of conventional history, Faulkner contends that it is the mass action of ordinary people that drives great events. At the beginning (...) of the 21st century - with economic disaster, war, climate catastrophe and deep class divisions - humans face perhaps the greatest crisis in the long history of our species. The lesson of A Marxist History of the World is that, since we created our past, we can also create a better future. (shrink)