Retracing the way I have followed since the beginning of my philosophical studies, I focus on the main issues that have guided my teaching and research: Time, Death, and Nothingness, all of which take place in the domain of what I have called “negative philosophy”. My first interest was in the problem of language and logic in their relation to temporality, a special privilege being granted in this respect to poetry; subsequently I concentrated my work on the thematic of (...) death and finitude, in order to show that mourning and relation to absence are what establish a fundamental difference between the human being and the animal; and finally, the critique of Western ontology has brought me to concentrate my research on Eastern thinking, with a special engagement with the thematic of nothingness in Indian and Japanese Buddhism. All my work in philosophy has been guided by Heidegger’s question of the relation between Being and Time. (shrink)

Schelling’s late philosophy is characterized by its division of philosophy into a “negative” and a “positive” approach. After developing positive philosophy, Schelling goes back in his last work (Darstellung der reinrationalen Philosophie) to a negative philosophy that is to play a critical role within Schelling’s late system by showing pure rationally the limits of pure reason. This critical task requires the failure and crisis of negative philosophy. In the article, I show why Schelling understands his (...) late negative project as a radicalization of Kantian criticism, undertaken by recourse to Aristotle and his notion of actuality. By taking the Aristotelian inspiration into account, I propose a new way of understanding two problems of Schelling scholarship: the need for a late negative philosophy, and the problem of the transition from negative into positive philosophy. (shrink)

Over the last four decades, environmental ethics has become an increasingly significant field of philosophy. Yet, many of its practitioners question its goals and effectiveness. Above all, environmental philosophers voice uncertainty about the extent to which the field has been able to influence action, behaviour, and policy in relation to the environment. What are the reasons behind this meagre influence and what kind of contrasting philosophical approach might enable transformative action? The goal of this paper is to answer these (...) questions by drawing on Schelling’s late philosophy. I argue that Schelling’s critique of philosophical logicism reveals the ways in which certain ways of doing philosophy fails to enable ethical and behavioural transformation. By contrast, I show that Schelling’s “positive philosophy” can offer important insights into our current situation and illuminate a way forward for a sustainable environmental ethics. (shrink)

T. Adorno stands out among the theorists of the Frankfurt School for his interest in profound philosophical problems. For many years he actively participated in the work of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and at one time also headed it. Among his associates he occupies not only a very typical, but in a certain sense an exclusive position.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Production of Arbitrary Differences Conflictual Ontological Oppositions Negativity Différance, Difference, and Contradiction Glas Conclusion.

Starting with Kant’s undeveloped proposal of a “negative science,” the author describes how philosophy may be developed and strengthened by means of a systematic approach that seeks to identify and eliminate a widespread but seldom recognized form of systemic and propagating conceptual error. ¶¶¶¶¶ -/- The paper builds upon the author’s book, CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: HORIZONS OF POSSIBILITY AND MEANING (Studies in Theory and Behavior, 2021). ¶¶¶¶¶ -/- The author’s purpose is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize (...) the boundaries of what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. By realizing these objectives, the boundaries of possible meaning are determined. (shrink)

What has philosophy become after computation? Critical positions about what counts as intelligence, reason, and thinking have addressed this question by reenvisioning and pushing debates about the modern question of technology towards new radical visions. Artificial intelligence, it is argued, is replacing transcendental metaphysics with aggregates of data resulting in predictive modes of decision-making, replacing conceptual reflection with probabilities. This article discusses two main positions. While on the one hand, it is feared that philosophy has been replaced by (...) cybernetic metaphysics, on the other hand it is claimed that only the coconstitution of philosophy and automation challenges modern transcendental reason and colonial capital. As Donna Haraway pointed out, cybernetic circuits of communication have constructed counterfactual ontologies against the master narrative of the human. This article addresses recent attempts at redeveloping a critique of natural philosophy that explains cybernetic metaphysics beyond the universal master narratives of mechanicism and vitalism. This article suggests that the recursive system of nature and technology also needs to account for the problem of philosophical decision, which will be explored in terms of mediatic thinking, instrumentality, and automation. This article follows insights from the movie Get Out (2017) to argue that the model of philosophical decision relies on a servomechanic understanding of the medium of thought, based on the colonial abstraction of value in the prosthetic extension of the slave-machine. It explores the nonphilosophical envisioning of automation in terms of a counterfactual theorisation of the negative negation of the medium and argues for a nonoptical darkness entering the space of thinking. Philosophy and automation are neither coupled nor set in opposition as if in a ceaseless mirroring. Instead, both philosophy and automation must transform their self-determining axiomatics in order to host the heretic activities of machine propositions. (shrink)

An important question in Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and its associated literature is how OOO relates to its competitor theories. This article is a meta-philosophical investigation into OOO and its grounding, which hopes to fully theorise this relation, deriving ultimately a “negative dialectic” that emphasises the irreducible differences between OOO and non-OOO. Beginning by analysing the use of OOO as a “starting point”, I consider Althusser’s various contributions to meta-philosophical debates. This leads me to focus on Harman’s notion of “hyperbolic reading”, (...) and on how attempts to hyperbolically ground OOO force it to immanently include its competitors. Finally, I apply these insights to systematise both the negative dialectical relation between OOO and non-OOO and the becoming-OOO of thinking, by applying Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy. (shrink)

This paper tries to reconstruct Ernst Cassirer's potential reception of the EPR argument, as exposed by Einstein in his letter to Cassirer of March 1937. It is shown that, in conformity with his transcendental epistemology taking the conditions of accessibility as constitutive of the quantum object, Cassirer would probably have rejected the argument. Indeed, Cassirer would probably not have subscribed to its separability/local causality presupposition (which goes against his interpretation of the quantum formalism as a self-suf!cient condition constitutive of the (...) quantum object, without any reliance on spatial intuition), nor to its completeness requirement (as his partial endorsement of Bohr's complementarity, and his rejection of the Kantian "idea of complete determination", illustrate). By rejecting both of its premises, Cassirer's philosophy of physics thus enables to escape the EPR dilemma, and exhibits what, in Kantian terms, might be called a "negative utility" with respect to physical science. A further investigation of the anti-reductionist utility of Cassirer's systematic philosophy with respect to physics and other "symbolic forms" is !nally suggested. (shrink)

Negativity is a crucial term in Classical German Philosophy. Whilst for Fichte the negation of the ‘I’ is constitutive for self-consciousness and Schelling terms transcendental philosophy “negative philosophy,” the full-blown concept of the negative arises in Hegel’s thought. In recent Cassirer scholarship, we witness a new endorsement of Hegelian interpretations of Cassirer’s works that are methodological in the sense of Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel’s impact on Cassirer has been noticed from the first wave of his reception in (...) the US onward and has been investigated in comparison with the impact of Kant more than once throughout the ongoing global “Cassirer-renaissance”. The attempt to actually read Cassirer through the eyes of Hegel is, however, a rather new phenomenon. In Hegel, the concept of the negative is significant in regard to the concept of reality, the concept of (in)finity, the concept of subjectivity and the concept of relatedness. But first and foremost–and this will be decisive in this paper–the negative, in the form of the concept of negation, plays a major role in Hegel’s dialectic method. It is on this point that this paper will question the legitimacy of such strong Hegelian readings of Cassirer’s main works. (shrink)

Negativity in Psychoanalysis examines the role of negativity in psychoanalytic theory and its application in clinical settings. While theories around negativity and death drive have become routinized within philosophical interpretations of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, they often mask an inherent positivity. This volume assembles highly esteemed psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians for an in-depth discussion on the topic. It features comprehensive introductions to Freudian and Lacanian perspectives, alongside contemporary clinical and cultural issues. The book also investigates how psychoanalytic (...) negativity influences and is influenced by social, theological, and philosophical dialogues. This work will prove invaluable for practicing psychoanalysts and those in training, while also appealing to academics and scholars in critical and cultural theory, continental and post-continental philosophy, and sociology, especially those whose research intersects clinical and theoretical traditions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article examines Heidegger's assessment of negativity and finitude in the late 1930s and his enlargement of these issues in the name of a leap from one type of philosophy, one type of beginning, to a wholly other beginning. The guiding concerns of this article are negativity, finitude and the leap, and how these overlapping concerns coalesce around Heidegger's attempts to move towards a wholly other type of philosophy; in fact, one which no longer understands itself (...) to be philosophy at all. The article concludes with a discussion of the role of death, sacrifice, and mourning in Heidegger's thought in the 1930s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Negative Capability Reclaimed: Literature and Philosophy Contra PoliticsIhab HassanI began a few years ago to try to make space in my reckoning and imagining for the marvellous as well as the murderous.Seamus HeaneyTwo concerns cross in this essay: the first, explicit, regards the current condition of the academic humanities, their idioms and axioms, especially in America; the second, implicit, regards my own need to confront criticism, its abstractions (...) that now enable, now disable, the profession and even more the experience of literature. Such concerns must mix speculation and autobiography, mix the pride with the pathos of mind.But I should admit it from the start: my title cries paradox. Negative capability reclaimed? Can reclamation dwell in “uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason,” as Keats thought, and can a critic aspire to the condition of a poet, in whom the “sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates consideration”? 1Mine, I repeat, is a hybrid critical discourse, touched by exasperation more than mystery. Yet negative capability can still serve us as emblem of certain qualities, attitudes, dispositions that we bring to literature, without turning that happy phrase into yet another slogan. Beyond the arrogance of transient ideologies, beyond the mawkishness of self-regard, negative capability may offer us a kind of patience, perhaps ascesis, the intellectual and, yes, spiritual equivalent of discipline in our moment. [End Page 305]IStated baldly, my proposition, which I will need continually to texture and qualify, is this: the prevalence of politics, the obsession with power, the unrelieved pressure of both in the university, skew our language, thought, values. Thus the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, between Homer and Plato, now cedes the field to a nastier agon between both and politics as GRIM (my acronym for the Great Rumbling Ideological Machine) grinds on. These are no abstractions; the clamorous evidence is all about, indicative even in its triviality, banality.Take a book blurb. Kathy Acker endorses a new, and quite intelligent work, entitled Male Matters, thus: “Calvin Thomas is able to hint at a way out of the prisonhouse of straight male identity.” Granted, this is but an ad in a university press catalogue. But what does the language reveal about the assumptions of academic discourse? “Prisonhouse,” really, for all unfortunate, straight males? Is a generalization of this kind permissible when blander generalizations about other groups raise such a hue and cry? Will straight African-American or Native American males feel “offended” by the statement? Or is it all a matter of restitution, categorical loyalty, political commitment? And when will that supreme fiction, the white, straight, bourgeois, rational male “subject” cease to prop up every ideological complaint?Thought blends into hype; words writhe; stereotypes become as transparent as the stereotypes they once repugned. But let us consider an example worthier of criticism. In his Inaugural Lecture as Robert Wallace Professor at the University of Melbourne, entitled “The Departure of English?” (the question mark risks disingenuousness), Professor Simon During inelegantly states: “The academic appropriation of the avant-garde transfiguration of values is happening as what I am calling the departure of English—in the relative decline of literary studies and cultural studies’ emergence.” 2 Professor During thus assumes, on behalf of cultural studies, the mantles of Friedrich Nietzsche, Arthur Rimbaud, Alfred Jarry, Hugo Ball—where is Antonin Artaud?—and Walter Benjamin, though none really had a mantle to bequeath. For a moment, the mind reels: Nietzscheans and poètes maudits, Pataphysicians and Dadaists, as apostles of cultural studies, of political correctness, group think, and GRIM? Involuntarily, the lines of William Butler Yeats, in “The Scholars,” sing out: “Lord, what would they say / Did their Catullus walk that way?” [End Page 306]We are all free, of course, to reinvent our ancestors and to derive later authority from what an earlier generation derided—free, this side of ludicrousness. But Professor During’s argument, a sort of academic conceit, discourages mere ridicule; it has pedagogical consequences. Thus he continues: “I am certainly not claiming a causal relation between modernism circa 1900 and academic cultural studies today. Rather I want to argue that cultural studies... (shrink)

Now in paperback, Jean-Luc Marion's groundbreaking philosophy of human uncertainty. In Negative Certainties, renowned philosopher Jean-Luc Marion challenges some of the most fundamental assumptions we have developed about knowledge: that it is categorical, predicative, and positive. Following Descartes, Kant, and Heidegger, he looks toward our finitude and the limits of our reason. He asks an astonishingly simple—but profoundly provocative—question in order to open up an entirely new way of thinking about knowledge: Isn’t our uncertainty, our finitude, and rational limitations, (...) one of the few things we can be certain about? Marion shows how the assumption of knowledge as positive demands a reductive epistemology that disregards immeasurable or disorderly phenomena. He shows that we have experiences every day that have no identifiable causes or predictable reasons and that these constitute a very real knowledge—a knowledge of the limits of what can be known. Establishing this “negative certainty,” Marion applies it to four aporias, or issues of certain uncertainty: the definition of man; the nature of God; the unconditionality of the gift; and the unpredictability of events. Translated for the first time into English, Negative Certainties is an invigorating work of epistemological inquiry that will take a central place in Marion’s oeuvre. (shrink)

An analysis of how Adorno's "pure" philosophy can be seen to provide a justification of the rationality required by critical theory.

In this paper, I argue that the topic of skepticism is central to Hegel’s philosophical work. However, I contend that in returning to the subject of skepticism throughout his career, Hegel does not treat skepticism simply as an epistemological challenge to be overcome on the way to truth, as some commentators suggest, but as part of the very truth which it is philosophy’s task to explain. I make this case by considering three texts through which Hegel develops the connection (...) between skepticism and the ‘negative’ or ‘dialectical’ dimension of reality: “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” (1802), the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), and the Encyclopedia Logic (1817). In this, I also demonstrate how the topic of skepticism informs the development of Hegel’s speculative metaphysics throughout his career and, thus, present a problematic that sheds light on the important continuity between these different phases of Hegel’s project. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to show that the issue of death is central in Hegel’s philosophy and it has a strong relationship with the notion of negativity, which is not intended as a “trick” of the system, but as a moment of life, that is a central concept in his meditation. At a later stage, I will shed light on the inner teleology into every organic nature, understanding that this allows Hegel to preserve the notion of (...) negativity through the concept of “lacking” being (die Tätigkeit des Mangels). In this sense, the strive to connect Philosophy of Nature and Logic shows that in the Hegelian system there is no place for the “long night of nothingness”, but only for the Life that becomes Spirit: the promise of philosophy is the path the lead from the deepest desperation to the strongest Hope. (shrink)

In this volume, scholars draw deeply on negative theology in order to consider some of the oldest questions in the philosophy of religion that stand as persistent challenges to inquiry, comprehension, and expression. The chapters engage different philosophical methodologies, cross disciplinary boundaries, and draw on varied cultural traditions in the effort to demonstrate that apophaticism can be a positive resource for contemporary philosophy of religion.

Among the biggest challenges facing the contemporary human condition, and therefore also education, is responding to the climate crisis. One of the sources of the crisis is assumed to be _absent-mindedness_, presented by Leslie Dewart as a distortion of the development of human consciousness. Dewart’s poorly-known philosophical consciousness study is presented in this paper in broad outline. The problems in the study of consciousness, the most important of which are the qualitative representations—qualia—and the question of free will, are also briefly (...) discussed. These problems are then examined transcendental analytically, with the question of what one must assume in order to allow the emergence of these phenomena. From the resulting conception of causal relationship, we proceed to the circular causality as a prerequisite for life, namely the homeostatic systems and negative feedback. An organization of action that is essential to animals and humans is presented, using William Powers’ perceptual control theory (PCT), and the role of consciousness in this organization is drafted according to the studies of Martin Taylor. Action is seen as continuous problem solving, in which negative feedback is used to bring perceptions into line with the goals. The fundamental function of consciousness is revealed as the direction and enhancement of learning. Based on PCT, it can be shown that the main practical problems in animal and, especially, human action, are related to adverse side effects of action and the resulting various conflicts. The climate crisis is a typical example of the problematic side effects of collective action. Dewart’s concept of absent-mindedness can therefore be defined as an inability to responsibly account for the side effects of action. Thus, the main task of education is to forestall, through negative feedback and in cooperation with learner consciousness, absent-mindedness and the problems it causes. (shrink)

In this article, we propose to question the accuracy of Jean Wahl’s definition of Vladimir Jankélévitch’s Philosophie Première (1953) as one of the “ultimate efflorescences of negative theology.” In fact, we maintain that—although conceiving the apophatic discourse as a necessary (but insufficient) stepping-stone to the absolute—the aforementioned work constitutes, if anything, an effort to overcome it by means of what we shall call a tesiphatic philosophy, i.e., one that identifies the first principle, not as the absolute negation of being, (...) but as the absolute position of being. To defend our thesis, we shall start by discussing the meaning of the five divine names that Jankélévitch bestows upon his absolute, namely, (1) the “totally-other-order,” (2) the “super-truth,” (3) “the itself,” (4) the “I-know-not-what,” and (5) the “almost-nothing.” In this section of our paper, we will try to show how Jankélévitch’s discourse is, in fact, shaped by the whole negative theology tradition (from Plotinus to Nicholas of Cusa). Finally, in the last part of our paper, we will strive to reflect upon Jankélévitch’s interpretation of the limits of a apophatic metaphysical discourse, questioning whether his Philosophie Première effectively overcomes negative theology’s conception of the absolute. (shrink)

Gregor Moder’s Hegel and Spinoza: Substance and Negativity is a lively entry into current debates concerning Hegel, Spinoza, and their relation. Hegel and Spinoza are two of the most influential philosophers of the modern era, and the traditions of thought they inaugurated have been in continuous dialogue and conflict ever since Hegel first criticized Spinoza. Notably, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German Idealists aimed to overcome the determinism of Spinoza’s system by securing a place for the freedom of the subject within (...) it, and twentieth-century French materialists such as Althusser and Deleuze rallied behind Spinoza as the ultimate champion of anti-Hegelian materialism. This conflict, or mutual rejection, lives on today in recent discussions about materialism. Contemporary thinkers either make a Hegelian case for the productiveness of concepts of the negative, nothingness, and death, or in a way that is inspired by Spinoza they abolish the concepts of the subject and negation and argue for pure affirmation and the vitalistic production of differences. Hegel and Spinoza traces the historical roots of these alternatives and shows how contemporary discussions between Heideggerians and Althusserians, Lacanians and Deleuzians are a variation of the disagreement between Hegel and Spinoza. Throughout, Moder persuasively demonstrates that the best way to read Hegel and Spinoza is not in opposition or contrast but together: as Hegel and Spinoza. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify a debate on philosophical method, and to give a probabilistic argument vindicating armchair philosophy under a wide range of plausible assumptions. The use of intuitions by so-called armchair philosophers has been criticized on empirical grounds. The debate between armchair philosophers and their empirical critics would benefit from greater clarity and precision in our understanding of what it takes for intuition-based approaches to philosophy to make sense. This paper discusses a set of rigorous, probability-based (...) tools for determining what we can and cannot learn from intuitions in various conditions. These tools can tell us whether beliefs can be justified by armchair practices, and what empirical findings would have to show to undermine the use of intuitions in philosophy. Using these tools, the paper shows that armchair philosophy makes sense in a broad range of situations, and that it is quite plausible that we are in those situations at the moment. (shrink)

Exploring the risks, ambiguities, and unstable conceptual worlds of contemporary thought, Crossover Queries brings together the wide-ranging writings, across twenty years, of one of our most important philosophers.Ranging from twentieth-century European philosophy—the thought of Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Levinas, Janicaud, and others—to novels and artworks, music and dance, from traditional Jewish thought to Jain andBuddhist metaphysics, Wyschogrod’s work opens radically new vistas while remaining mindful that the philosopher stands within and is responsible to a philosophical legacy conditioned by the negative.Rather (...) than point to a Hegelian dialectic of overcoming negation or to a postmetaphysical exhaustion, Wyschogrod treats negative moments as opening novel spaces for thought. She probes both the desire for God and an ethics grounded in the interests of the other person, seeing these as moments both of crossing over and of negation. Alert to the catastrophes that have marked our times, she exposes the underlying logical structures of nihilatory forces that have been exerted to exterminate whole peoples. Analyzing the negationsof biological research and cultural images of mechanized and robotic bodies, she shows how they contest the body as lived in ordinary experience.“Crossover Queries brings together important essays on a remarkable range of topics by one of our most insightful cultural critics. Commenting on philosophical and theological issues that have shaped the recent past as well as scientific and technological questions that will preoccupy us in the near future, Wyschogrod consistently alerts us to the urgency of problems whose importance few recognize. To avoid the challenge these essays pose is to avoid responsibility for a future that appears to be increasingly fragile.”—Mark C. Taylor, Columbia University. (shrink)

This chapter examines the notion of philosophical truth that Adorno, in Negative Dialectics, believes to be possible by means of his changed conception of philosophy. What that examination finds is that philosophical truth, as Adorno recommends it, is realized through “singular” philosophical experiences. The critical question is that of how the truths that are conveyed through “singularity” can be understood to have persuasive force over us, Adorno's readers. Also examined is the relationship between the philosophically authentic “singularity” approach and (...) the critical endeavors evident, in the same book, through Adorno's engagements with a range of figures from the modern philosophical tradition. (shrink)

The larger philosophical world has on the whole turned from a mix of averted gaze and outright antipathy toward x‐phi, to a mix of grudging acceptance and enthusiastic embrace. This chapter explains that the experimental philosophy is relevant, and that it is dangerous, and explains some ways that people can do more to remain both. Experimental philosophy's semi‐official sigil of the burning armchair has advertised its dangerousness for the past decade and a half as well. The chapter explains (...) that it is a threat that is every bit as potently present in positive program x‐phi as it is in negative program work. To explore the idea that experimental philosophy's positive contributions will still be primarily negative in nature, the chapter interrogates the passage from Timothy Williamson. It focuses on the wheat‐from‐chaff project of separating signal from noise in the evidence produced by intuitions and the like. (shrink)

Negative capability--paintings (non si vede quasi niente) -- Negative capability (dissonanza feroviaria) -- Orrizzonte -- (Finestre).

Against the common supposition that Adorno’s thinking remains caught in a distressing form of pessimism rendering it impotent in the face of modern capitalism and the fungibility of subjects, the article argues that the operation of negative dialectics inherently contains a productive moment that suggests the promise of a qualitatively different philosophy. Through an analysis that employs the multivalent senses of play at work in Adornian thinking — and particularly the notions of gamble, risk and chance — as its (...) primary interpretive key, the article shows that this promise for a philosophy ‘to come’ is at work in the use of parataxis and the practice of constellating concepts; in the invocation of metaphysical experience and affective language; and in the descriptions of critical philosophy as engaged in a practice of ‘critique and rescue’ or ‘wounded healing’. (shrink)