In this paper1 i intend to elucidate a thesis that lies at the heart of Fichte’s theory of rights. This thesis states that rights are the essential foundation of rational political order not only because they govern relations among human beings but also because they help them to realize themselves as free agents. In Fichte’s words, rights are the “conditions” under which human beings can become aware of themselves as “self-positing subjects.”2 This thesis calls for the rejection of the claim (...) central to natural rights theories that the main task of rights is to protect liberties that human beings have by virtue of their “natural” or “God-given” qualities.3 This is because Fichte’s thesis implies that .. (shrink)

This is the introductory chapter I co-authored with professor Kaya Sahin for our edited book, Political Thought in the Ottoman World (oxford University Press, 2024).

This chapter is an attempt to resolve two sets of disagreements on Fichte’s theory of right. One disagreement concerns the content of Fichtean property rights, and the other is about the role of coercion in the formation of the Fichtean social order. With respect to the first disagreement I argue that it stems from the mistaken assumption that Fichte is committed to a particular universally applicable right to property. Once this assumption is dropped, it is possible to appreciate the variety (...) of such rights that his theory can support. With respect to the second disagreement I argue that Fichte does not see a necessary conflict between coercion and freedom; in fact, he believes coercion is conducive to the formation of rightful relations among free persons. (shrink)