The problem of knowledge in German Idealism has drawn increasing attention. This is the first attempt at a systematic critique that covers all four major figures, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The book offers a fresh and challenging analysis.

The dissertation contrasts Kant's epistemological assertiveness with his ontological skepticism as a central issue in the development of the discourse in German Idealism. Fichte's phenomenological demarche essentially amplifies this problem but, at the same time, allows him to advance a path breaking critique of formal logic and to stress the importance of contradiction. Schelling, by restoring metaphysics, attempts to overcome Fichte's contrast between ontological dualism and epistemological monism. Finally, it is Hegel who directly addresses the need for a non-formal cognitive (...) logic. The author analyzes Hegel's deduction in the Phenomenology, invokes current genetic epistemology, and reads the Science of Logic as a genetic theory of systematic knowledge and as circular epistemology. Emphasizing the unity between the logical and the historical, the distinction between intellectual and rational explanation, and the cognitive importance of contradiction, the dissertation argues for the possibility a coming-to-be totality of reflective scientific reason. (shrink)

This paper will examine a cardinal problem, yet one seldom raised in the existing bibliography of Hegelian philosophy: that of the distinction between reason and understanding. Portraying the objective path of the development of thought, this distinction is pertinent to any cognitive development, ontogenetic and phylogenetic, and can illuminate a number of epistemological puzzles of Hegel’s doctrine, such as the construction of totality, the appreciation of contradiction, and the relationship between logic and dialectic. I will begin by locating the problem (...) in the development of German Idealism and showing Hegel’s response, based on his metaphysical assumptions that are often overlooked in recent scholarship. In the second section, I will address a number of existing interpretations that do not account for Hegel’s dynamic portrayal of thought as thought that is coming to be. The latter problem will be the focus of the final two sections that deal with a realistic reconstruction of the triad sense-understanding-reason and emphasize the unity between concept and intuition. (shrink)

This paper looks at the Kantian background in the development of the views on formal logic and contradiction in German Idealism. Assuming the post-Kantian view, I examine what Kant advanced and what he left unsettled, provoking thus the subsequent debate. I start by showing (§1) that already the pre-critical Kant questions the effectiveness of formal logic in philosophical discourse andclaims that the laws of identity and non-contradiction fall short of explaining change, opposition, and contradiction, all these being parts of reality. (...) Turning then to the first Critique, I discuss (§2) the introduction of transcendental logic as the (meta)logic of truth, consider how the tension between formal and transcendental logic is displayed in Kant’s exposition of the antinomy of pure reason (§3), and arrive at the conclusion (§4) that Kant, despite his criticism, and unlike the other great German Idealists, allows formal logic to dominate his exposition of transcendental logic. (shrink)

The book is noteworthy first of all because it locates itself within a very specific and rarely encountered question amidst the ocean of publications on Hegel, the question of an epistemological interpretation of his philosophy. Such is the abandonment of epistemology on behalf of dialectics, that in any discussion about epistemology, formal logic and the Verstand arise as the only devices.

The book is noteworthy first of all because it locates itself within a very specific and rarely encountered question amidst the ocean of publications on Hegel, the question of an epistemological interpretation of his philosophy. Such is the abandonment of epistemology on behalf of dialectics, that in any discussion about epistemology, formal logic and the Verstand arise as the only devices.

Pinkard ambitiously situates one hundred years of one of the most intense and profound periods in the history of philosophy in less than 400 pages. Although the broad grasp of this volume could make the analysis seem sketchy, Pinkard’s mastery and encyclopedic sense are impressive. He demonstrates the sort of universality that the current ‘division of labor’ turns into a disappearing species—even within philosophy, the inquiry that historically has had, par excellence, universal grasp.

The author has two goals: first, to demonstrate the importance and profundity of Marx the philosopher, and second, to demonstrate the intimate relationship between Marx and Hegel. The predominantly political and ideological comprehension of Marxism has led to a paradoxical situation. A thorough knowledge of Hegel, as essential for understanding Marx, has been undervalued by Marxists in the same way in which Marx’s philosophy, as a central continuation of Hegel, has been neglected by Hegelians. This paradox becomes more grotesque given (...) the enormous amount of existing literature on both authors. In fact, Rockmore writes, not only is Marx an Hegelian, but also Hegel’s most profound student. In stressing this point, Rockmore argues that if idealism is to be understood as the claim about the activity of consciousness in creating the picture of the world, then Marx could be classified as an ‘idealist’. (shrink)