In their paper ‘The “serious” factor in germline modification’, Kleiderman, Ravitsky and Knoppers rightly highlight the ambiguity in the oft-utilised term ‘serious’ in legal discussions of human germline genome modification.1 They suggest interpretation of this term may benefit from a framework based on human rights rather than solely objectivist or constructivist frameworks. In this response, I show the authors provide a narrow and hasty dismissal of objectivist frameworks by defining objectivism broadly as ‘based on biological facts’ early on but later (...) criticising genetic treatment lists, a single narrow implementation of only some of the facts. Furthermore, I will show their consideration of the right to science is biassed towards the material innovations of science, the authors succeed in recognising but fail in elaborating on the knowledge gained from scientific progress; knowledge which may ultimately update moral intuitions and change the nature of ethical conversation across cultures. (shrink)

16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always (...) a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas . . . which was trans 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl. (shrink)

In this paper Schlick's use of the term "concept" is analyzed and also secondarily the term "content." An unambiguous and straightforward use of such a basic term as "concept" which is of great importance in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in part should determine the value of Schlick's philosophical writing. Concepts are, for Schlick, either pure thought objects or signs. As thought objects, they do not exist at all. I t is shown that as thought objects concepts can be interpreted as sets and (...) that as signs they must be understood as physical designators. Concepts are thought by conceptual functions which Schlick compared with Brentano's intentions. A critical interpretation of conceptual functions is given. Additionally Schlick's theory of defining concepts is analyzed. (shrink)

In this paper Schlick's use of the term "concept" is analyzed and also secondarily the term "content." An unambiguous and straightforward use of such a basic term as "concept" which is of great importance in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in part should determine the value of Schlick's philosophical writing. Concepts are, for Schlick, either pure thought objects or signs. As thought objects, they do not exist at all. I t is shown that as thought objects concepts can be interpreted as sets and (...) that as signs they must be understood as physical designators. Concepts are thought by conceptual functions which Schlick compared with Brentano's intentions. A critical interpretation of conceptual functions is given. Additionally Schlick's theory of defining concepts is analyzed. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a renewal of interest in Meinong's work; but since the bulk of it is still encased in his quite forbidding German, most students are limited to the few available translations and to secondary sources. Unfortunately Meinong has been much maligned - only in a few instances with good reason - and has consequently been dealt with lightly. Meinong stood at a very important junction of European philosophical and scien tific thought. In all fields - (...) physics, chemistry, mathematics, psychology, philolo- revolutionary strides were being made. Philosophy, on the other hand, had run its post-Kantian course. New philosophical thinkers came from different disciplines. For example, Frege and later Russell were mathematicians, Boltzmann and Mach were physicists. Earlier Bolzano and then Brentano were originally theologians, and Meinong was a historian. 1 The sciences with their new insights and theories offered an enormous wealth of information which needed to be absorbed philosophically; but traditional philosophy could not deal with it. Physics presented a picture of reality which did not fit into the traditional schemes of empiricism or idealism. Ontological and epistemological questions became once again wide open issues. For example, atoms at first were still considered to be theoretical entities. (shrink)

In loser Anlehnung an Meinong wird untersucht, ob sich in unserem Denken apriorische Elemente finden. Solche Elemente können nur abstrakt, das heißt, begrifflich sein. Der Aufsatz beleuchtet dieses Thema anhand zweier Fragenkomplexe: (1) der Frage, ob es apriorische Begriffe gibt. Diese Frage wird anhand der drei Aspekte Abstrakfion, „naturgemäß" apriorische Begriffe, zusammengesetzte oder durch Definifion konstruierte Begriffe diskufiert. Und (2) anhand apriorischer Überlegungen, die keinen Anspruch auf Wissen erheben, aber dennoch die Annahme apriorischer Elemente nahelegen: Diese Überlegungen können sich auf (...) den wissenschaftlichen Bereich beziehen, aber auch nur auf den der Fiktion. (shrink)

In loser Anlehnung an Meinong wird untersucht, ob sich in unserem Denken apriorische Elemente finden. Solche Elemente können nur abstrakt, das heißt, begrifflich sein. Der Aufsatz beleuchtet dieses Thema anhand zweier Fragenkomplexe: (1) der Frage, ob es apriorische Begriffe gibt. Diese Frage wird anhand der drei Aspekte Abstrakfion, „naturgemäß" apriorische Begriffe, zusammengesetzte oder durch Definifion konstruierte Begriffe diskufiert. Und (2) anhand apriorischer Überlegungen, die keinen Anspruch auf Wissen erheben, aber dennoch die Annahme apriorischer Elemente nahelegen: Diese Überlegungen können sich auf (...) den wissenschaftlichen Bereich beziehen, aber auch nur auf den der Fiktion. (shrink)

Elements of Ethics examines Meinong's value theory from an epistemological standpoint and gives a critical exposition of Meinong's first attempts at a deontic logic; special consideration is given to the Law of Omission. For that purpose his theory of the a priori is examined, which is entwined with his theory of objects. The book begins with an epistemological and ontological consideration and simplification of Meinong's universe. In consequence of the mathematical development of his time, especially non-Euclidean geometries, Meinong developed the (...) notion of precision objects and precision concepts. They are discussed along with the so-called `incomplete objects' and problems associated with them. These discussions are relevant for understanding various technical terms, particularly concepts of values and valuations. These discussions also assist in assessing the possibility of knowing these concepts a priori, and in understanding the logical relationships between them and actual valuations. We find in Meinong's ethical writings a mixture of experiential and a priori knowledge. A translation is included of the fragment Ethische Bausteine (Elements of Ethics), together with Meinong's own notes and those of the editors of the text. Vocabulary and Index are attached. (shrink)

16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always (...) a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas... which was trans 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Rudolf HALLER: Zwei Vorworte in einem. Evelyn DÖLLING: Alexius Meinong: "Der blinde Seher Theiresias". Jaakko HINTIKKA: Meinong in a Long Perspective. Richard SYLVAN: Re-Exploring Item-Theory. Francesca MODENATO: Meinong's Theory of Objects: An Attempt at Overcoming Psychologism. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Ways of Dealing with Non-existence. Karel LAMBERT: Substitution and the Expansion of the World. Terence PARSONS: Meinongian Semantics Generalized. Reinhardt GROSSMANN: Thoughts, Objectives and States of Affairs. Peter SIMONS: Meinong's Theory of Sense and Reference. Barry SMITH: More Things in (...) Heaven and Earth. Michele LENOCI: Meinongs unvollständige Gegenstände und das Universalienproblem. Maria E. REICHER: Gibt es unvollständige Gegenstände? Dale JACQUETTE: Meinong's Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing. Herbert HOCHBERG:s, Functions, Existence and Relations in the Russell-Meinong Dispute, the Bradley Paradox and the Realism-Nominalism Controversy. Jacek PA_NICZEK: Are Contradictions Still Lurking in Meinongian Theories of Objects? Marie-Luise SCHUBERT KALSI: Apriorische Elemente im Denken. Liliana ALBERTAZZI: Forms of Completion. Johann Ch. MAREK: Zwei Gegenstände und ein Inhalt. Zur Intentionalität bei Meinong. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Some Varieties of Thinking. Reflections on Meinong and Fodor. Alberto VOLTOLINI: Is Meaning Without Actually Existing Reference Naturalizable? Markus S. STEPANIANS: Russells Kritik an Meinongs Begriff des Annahmeschlusses. Nenad MIŠ_EVI_: Imagination and Necessity. R.D. ROLLINGER: Meinong on Perception: Two Questions Concerning Propositional Seeing. Wolfgang G. STOCK: Die Genese der Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion der Grazer Schule. Rudolf HALLER: Über Meinongs Wissenschaftstheorie. Alfred SCHRAMM: Meinongs Wahrscheinlichkeit. Karl SCHUHMANN: Der Wertbegriff beim frühen Meinong. Wilhelm BAUMGARTNER: Wertpräsentation. Ursula ZEGLÉN: Meinong's Analysis of Lying. Seppo SAJAMA: Hitting Reality: France Veber's Concept of Zadevanje. Matja_ POTR_: Sensation According to Meinong and Veber. Róbert SOMOS: Zwei Schüler Brentanos: Ákos von Pauler und Meinong. J.C. NYÍRI: Palágyis Kritik an der Gegenstandstheorie. David M. ARMSTRONG: Reaction to Meinong. (shrink)