This paper outlines limitations to integrating social meaning into cognitive models of speech production and processing. The authors remind the reader that acoustic space is not the same as articulatory or auditory space and they point to the benefits of using relatively uncommon dynamic methods of acoustic analysis. Further, the authors argue in favor of a more complex and socially‐informed conception of ‘style’ than is typically used in work on language cognition.

What precisely, W. J. T. Mitchell asks, are pictures (and theories of pictures) doing now, in the late twentieth century, when the power of the visual is said to be greater than ever before, and the "pictorial turn" supplants the "linguistic turn" in the study of culture? This book by one of America's leading theorists of visual representation offers a rich account of the interplay between the visible and the readable across culture, from literature to visual art to the (...) mass media. (shrink)

Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also (...) show that by accepting this thesis we can explain relevant features of evaluative understanding. (shrink)

In her paper “Human Flourishing and Technology Affordances”, Avigail Ferdman argues that our descriptions and analyses of the relationship between digital technology, and the capacities approach to human flourishing, can be enriched by building ‘affordances’ into those descriptions and analyses. This commentary article serves as a supplement to Ferdman’s paper. Here I argue that, in building affordances into the capacities approach, Ferdman has developed the foundations of a method by which perfectionist ethics can be built into action-theoretic accounts of technical (...) function. However, this is possible only if she is willing to expand the ambit of her theory beyond digital technologies and into technology more generally. (shrink)

According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.

It is an increasingly influential view that personal identity across time is in part a matter of the attitudes or desires of the entities that constitute persons. Thus some talk of “person-directed practices”—practices of reasonable self-regard that entities have for some of their continuants. In some versions, these practices are social as well as personal. On these views a person’s identity over time is, at least in part, determined by the various person-directed practices of the individual and/or of the community. (...) These practices include the attribution of blame and reward for past actions, encouragement for future actions, the transmission of property, the attitude of anticipation or self-regard for future continuants and so forth. On this view someone survives some event just if, given her person-tracking practices, or those of her community, the being that exists prior to the event is treated in the same person-directed way as the being that exists after the event. Yet had these practices been somewhat different, she would have failed to survive the event even though, as it was, she did survive. We will sometimes call these person-directed practices ‘conventions of identity’, and later come back to discuss whether ‘convention’ is exactly the right term. If these practices are conventions, then it seems that personal identity is sometimes, at least in part, a matter of convention. Call such a view conventionalism about identity. The job of this paper is to defend the coherence of this view, and in particular to defend it from some important recent criticisms by Trenton Merricks. (shrink)

Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: unpleasant pains essentially involve a proprietary intentional mode—what I call (...) affective-interoception—and a distinctive kind of evaluatively qualified sensory content. The resulting view is Affective-Evaluativism. (shrink)

The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading (...) serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state. (shrink)

Both patients and clinicians frequently report problems around communicating and assessing pain. Patients express dissatisfaction with their doctors and doctors often find exchanges with chronic pain patients difficult and frustrating. This chapter thus asks how we could improve pain communication and thereby enhance outcomes for chronic pain patients. We argue that improving matters will require a better appreciation of the complex meaning of pain terms and of the variability and flexibility in how individuals think about pain.We start by examining the (...) various accounts of the meaning of pain terms that have been suggested within philosophy and suggest that, while each of the accounts captures something important about our use of pain terms, none is completely satisfactory. We propose that pain terms should be viewed as communicating complex meanings, which may change across different communicative contexts, and this in turn suggests that we should view our ordinary thought about pain as similarly complex. We then sketch what a view taking seriously this variability in meaning and thought might look like, which we call the “polyeidic” view. According to this view, individuals tacitly occupy divergent stances across a range of different dimensions of pain, with one agent, for instance, thinking of pain in a much more “body-centric” kind of way, while another thinks of pain in a much more “mind-centric” way. The polyeidic view attempts to expand the multidimensionality recognised in, e.g., biopsychosocial models in two directions: first, it holds that the standard triumvirate—dividing sensory/cognitive/affective factors—needs to be enriched in order to capture important distinctions within the social and psychological dimensions. Second, the polyeidic view attempts to explain why modulation of experience by these social and psychological factors is possible in the first place. It does so by arguing that because the folk concept of pain is complex, different weightings of the different parts of the concept can modulate pain experience in a variety of ways. Finally, we argue that adopting a polyeidic approach to the meaning of pain would have a range of measurable clinical outcomes.Clinical Implications: First, by making a subject’s tacit beliefs about pain explicit it will be possible to create a more open, shared space for pain communication and support a move away from purely quantitative measures of pain towards more discursive pain narratives. Secondly, the polyeidic view might provide a mechanism for predicting who will do well or badly from cognitive interventions for pain management, allowing more efficient use of healthcare resources. Finally, the polyeidic approach might also contribute to the creation of more nuanced cognitive interventions by elucidating the pre-conscious beliefs that influence a subject’s experience of pain. (shrink)

Ismael aims for an understanding of the nature of an embedded perspective of agents in a world. If successful, this would explain a cluster of ways in which from an embedded perspective, we experience the world in an array of temporally asymmetric ways. Moreover, these are ways that have led many philosophers to rather metaphysically inflationary views about the nature of time, according to which time itself really is dynamical, and is characterized by the movement of an objectively (i.e., non-perspectival) (...) present. Ismael aims to explain these features of our experience without positing any such metaphysical picture. She argues that there are constraints which prevent us from taking this Olympian conception of the world and our place in it, and that these, jointly, explain why we experience the world in these temporally asymmetric ways. We take up two related questions. First, what it would mean to say that these constraints are not merely epistemic, and second, how far these constraints get us in explaining why we experience the world in these ways. (shrink)

This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along (...) the lines of, judgements, perceptions, or other mental states. (shrink)

This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...) it captures some distinctive features of meta-emotions—specifically their normative dimension—while locating them within the domain of occurrent affective experiences. (shrink)

Abstract: How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense- perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are – I call this the horizonality of (...) visual experience. Existing accounts of these horizonal references are unsatisfactory. In providing a satisfactory account, this paper argues that the content and structure of the visual experience of complete three-dimensional objects is as follows: the object is presented as being perceptible from yet-to-be-determined alternative points of view. As part of the content of visual experience, this motivates non-propositional attitudes of anticipation. Explicating this proposal is the central positive aim of this paper. (shrink)

Psychological construction represents an important new approach to psychological phenomena, one that has the promise to help us reconceptualize the mind both as a behavioral and as a biological system. It has so far been developed in the greatest detail for emotion, but it has important implications for how researchers approach other mental phenomena such as reasoning, memory, and language use. Its key contention is that phenomena that are characterized in (folk) psychological vocabulary are not themselves basic features of the (...) mind, but are constructed from more basic psychological operations. The framework of mechanistic explanation, currently under development in philosophy of science, can provide a useful perspective on the psychological construction approach. A central insight of the mechanistic account of explanation is that biological and psychological phenomena result from mechanisms in which component parts and operations do not individually exhibit the phenomena of interest but function together in an orchestrated and sometimes in a complex dynamical manner to generate it. While at times acknowledging the compatibility of the mechanist approach with constructionist approach (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012), proponents of the constructionist approach have at other times pitched their approach as anti-mechanist. For example, Barrett (2009) claims that the psychological constructionist approach rejects machines as the primary metaphor for understanding the mind, instead favoring a recipe metaphor; constructionism also purportedly rejects the “mechanistic” picture of causation, which it portrays as linear or sequential in nature (see also Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, in press). While some mechanistic accounts do fit this description, we will see that the mechanisms generating phenomena can be complex and dynamic, producing phenomena far less stereotypic and more adaptive than people often associate with machines. Our goal, however, is not just to render constructionism and mechanism compatible. Philosophers of science have been examining the nature of mechanistic explanation in biology with the goal of gaining new insights into the operation of science. We will identify some of the places where the mechanistic account can shed new light on the constructionist project. (shrink)

Can poem and picture collaborate successfully in a composite art of text and design? Or does one art inevitably dominate the other? W.J.T. Mitchell maintains that Blake's illuminated poems are an exception to Suzanne Langer's claim that "there are no happy marriages in art—only successful rape." Drawing on over one hundred reproductions of Blake's pictures, this book shows that neither the graphic nor the poetic aspect of his composite art consistently predominates: their relationship is more like an energetic rivalry, (...) a dialogue between vigorously independent modes of expression. W.J.T. Mitchell is Professor of English and Art and Design at the University of Chicago and editor of Critical Inquiry. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

An outline is given of the proof that the consistency of a κ⁺-Mahlo cardinal implies that of the statement that I[ω₂] does not include any stationary subsets of Cof(ω₁). An additional discussion of the techniques of this proof includes their use to obtain a model with no ω₂-Aronszajn tree and to add an ω₂-Souslin tree with finite conditions.

_Supervision of Sandplay Therapy_, the first book on this subject, is an internationally-based volume that describes the state of the art in supervision of sandplay therapy. Recognizing that practitioners are eager to incorporate sandplay therapy into their practice, Harriet Friedman and Rie Rogers Mitchell respond to the need for new information, and successfully translate the theories of sandplay therapy into supervision practice. The book provides a meaningful connection and balance between theoretical principles, practical application, and ongoing therapeutic encounter involved (...) in sandplay. Divided into six sections, contributors cover: original supervision models contemporary supervision models special challenges in supervision international sandplay supervision supervision of special groups connections with other arts therapies. _Supervision of Sandplay Therapy _expands the vision of what is possible in supervision and will be vital reading for those studying supervision and sandplay therapy, as well as for those wanting to provide a depth-oriented approach during supervision. (shrink)

This book focuses on multiculturalism, racism and the interests of nonhuman animals. Each are, in their own right, rapidly growing and controversial fields of enquiry, but how do multiculturalism and racism intersect with the debate concerning animals and their interests? This a deceptively simple question but on that is becoming ever more pressing as we examine our societal practices in a pluralistic world. Collating the work of a diverse group of academics from across the world, the book includes writing on (...) a wide range of subjects and addressing contemporary issues in this critical arena. Subjects covered include multiculturalism, group rights and the limits of tolerance; ethnocentrism and animals; racism and discrimination and non-Western alternatives to animal rights and welfare. The book will be of interest to researchers, lecturers and advanced students as well as range of social justice organisations, government institutions, animal activist organisations and environmental groups. (shrink)

A key claim of classical phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other classical phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is labelled the 'inner horizon'. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for (...) thinking that affective-evaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant experiences, in which particular objects' values are presented as either an ideal 'ought to be' or an ideal 'ought not to be'. (shrink)

In The Wager of Lucien Goldmann, Mitchell Cohen provides the first full-length study of this major figure of postwar French intellectual life and champion of socialist humanism. While many Parisian leftists staunchly upheld Marxism's "scientificity" in the 1950s and 1960s, Lucien Goldmann insisted that Marxism was by then in severe crisis and had to reinvent itself radically if it were to survive. He rejected the traditional Marxist view of the proletariat and contested the structuralist and antihumanist theorizing that infected (...) French left-wing circles in the tumultuous 1960s. Highly regarded by thinkers as diverse as Jean Piaget and Alasdair MacIntyre, Goldmann is shown here as a socialist who, unlike many others of his time, refused to portray his aspirations for humanity’s future as an inexorable unfolding of history’s laws. He saw these aspirations instead as a wager akin to Pascal’s in the existence of God. “Risk,” Goldmann wrote in his classic study of Pascal and Racine, The Hidden God, “possibility of failure, hope of success, and the synthesis of the three in a faith which is a wager are the essential constituent elements of the human condition.” In The Wager of Lucien Goldmann, Cohen retrieves Goldmann’s achievement—his “genetic structuralist” method, his sociology of literature, his libertarian socialist politics. Originally published in 1994. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Control theory is a popular theoretical framework for explaining cognitive domains such as motor control and “mindreading.” Such accounts frequently characterize their “internal models” as “simulating” things outside the brain. But in what sense are these “simulations”? Do they involve the kind of “replication” simulation found in the simulation theory of mindreading? I will argue that some but not all control -theoretic appeals to “simulation” involve R-simulation. To do so, I examine in detail a recent computational model of motor control (...) and action perception based in control theory. I argue that the architecture does not use R-simulation during motor control, but does during action perception. A novel result of this analysis is that the forward model—the control - theoretic mechanism most often described as performing simulation—is not well characterized in terms of R- simulation. I conclude with some lessons for research on the mechanisms of mindreading. (shrink)

Defining a nurse as literate is disciplinary and contextual, linked to professional identity formation, and an issue impacting patient safety. Literacy and language proficiency are concepts assessed through examining skills in four pillars: reading, writing, speaking, and listening. This article explores how literacy is not only a practice issue but inextricably intertwined with issues of race, equity, diversity, and inclusiveness in our profession—both in regulatory policy and classroom pedagogy. In making the argument that language is a proxy for race, three (...) cases of language and literacy will be presented. First, the deficit discourse of multilingual student struggle is stereotyped to the presence or absence of an accent, with multilingual student needs often treated homogeneously in disregard of population heterogenous abilities. Second, regulatory policies for language testing internationally educated nurses are discriminatory with testing context bearing little relationship to the language needs of nursing practice. Third, that the myth of “one standard English” results in racist evaluation practices of student academic performance. Recommendations are made for reframing how language and literacy are viewed in nursing education and regulation of practice with a focus on acknowledgment of one's personal relationship to racial issues and emphasizing the need for a change in mindset toward racialized multilingual students and writers. (shrink)

‘I can't believe that,’ said Alice. ‘Can't you?’ the Queen said in a pitying tone. ‘Try again: draw a long breath and shut your eyes.’ Alice laughed. ‘There's no use trying,’ she said. ‘One can't believe impossible things.’ ‘I dare say you haven't had much practice,’ said the Queen. ‘Why sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.’.

By ruling out questions of impairment from the social critique of disability, Disability Studies analyses establish a limit point in the field. Of course the setting of “limits” enables possibilities in multiple directions as well as fortifies boundaries of refusal. For instance, impairment becomes in DS simultaneously a productive refusal to interpret disabled bodies as inferior to non-disabled bodies and a bar to thinking through more active engagements with disability as materiality. Disability materiality such as conditions produced by ecological toxicities (...) serve as active switch-points for creative corporeal navigations of the interaction between bodies and environments.In fact in this paper we want to propose a more “lively” definition of disability materiality to existing definitions of impairment as limiting expressions of non-normative bodies. We have no useful ways of explaining disability as adaptation and it’s time we begin the process of theorizing more active ideas of materiality that extend existing ideas of disability beyond simplistic conceptions of socially rejected biologies made available by social constructivist thought. (shrink)

Reading the animal text in the landscape of the damned looks at the diverse texts of our everyday world relating to nonhuman animals and examines the meanings we imbibe from them. It describes ways in which we can explore such artefacts, especially from the perspective of groups and individuals with little or no power. This work understands the oppression of nonhuman animals as being part of a spectrum incorporating sexism, racism, xenophobia, economic exploitation and other forms of oppression. The enquiry (...) includes, physical landscapes, the law, women’s rights, history, slavery, language use, economic coercion, farming, animal experimentation and much more. Reading the animal text in the landscape of the damned is an academic work but is accessible, theoretically based but robustly practical and it encourages the reader to take this enquiry further for both themselves and for others. (shrink)

Mitchell signaleert aan de hand van de 'Zak-affaire' de afwezigheid van een gedeelde taal of grammatica in de muziek in het midden van de twintigste eeuw. Hij staat stil bij de speciale problemen die de bijzondere geschiedenis van de twintigste eeuw de muziek nagelaten heeft.

Mitchell, W.J., An infinitary Ramsey property, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 57 151–160. We prove that the consistency of a measurable cardinal implies the consistency of a cardinal κ>+ satisfying the partition relations κ ω and κ ωregressive. This result follows work of Spector which uses the same hypothesis to prove the consistency of ω1 ω. We also give some examples of partition relations which can be proved for ω1 using the methods of Spector but cannot be proved (...) for cardinals κ>+ without a much stronger hypothesis. (shrink)

Mitchell, Patricia Review of: Meaning, Self and the human potential: An appeal for humanism, by Kristine Millar, Janus Publishing Company Led London 2013.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 204 Seiten: 419-428.

Maudemarie Clark is best known among Nietzsche scholars for two monographs, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy and The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, the second coauthored with David Dudrick. The focus of these works was metaphysical-cum-epistemological, in the first instance distinguishing Nietzsche’s views on truth from the popular association with postmodernism, in the second providing an “esoteric” rereading of book 1 of BGE in an attempt to rebuff central aspects of naturalistic readings like that of Brian Leiter. The (...) present collection of... (shrink)

Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.

Well-Being as Value Fulfillment: How We Can Help Each Other to Live Well By TiberiusValerieOxford University Press, 2018. xii + 214 pp.