The term ἀλλοίωσις appears in Plato's Republic, 381, as a verb, when Socrates speaks about the fact that the brave and wise soul is the least disturbed and changed by external influences. This term as a noun, in its Latin rendering, alienatio, occurs in St. Augustine, as we shall see presently. Plotinus' description of the relationship between contemplation and the soul's loss of knowledge of herself, is of decisive importance in this context. When the soul is immersed in pure contemplation (...) it loses itself, or if we may freely employ this term, achieves the stage of alienation. Plotinus uses the term ἀλλοίωσις, as well as a term connoting the loss of all concepts and forms by the contemplating mind. It is from this rendering of the term alienation and the description contained in it, i.e., the soul's immersion of itself and the concurrent achievement of the immersion in the divine that St. Augustine uses the expression "alienatio mentis a sensibus corporis.". (shrink)

This book is concerned with the exploration of the concept of human dignity. This concept is taken as the ultimate basis of the entitlement of man to his special position in the interhuman context and also as what can be described as the metaphysical orbit. The thesis of the book is that the concept is eclectic, so that it is mandatory to explore its various components, analyzed here: man and morality and eventually the attribution of sancity to human life as (...) such. The method pursued explores these various aspects by analyzing the most prominent expressions of the various views of philosophers, and adding critical comments to the analysis. (shrink)

By and large, shame is not a neutral situation as, for instance, a malady can be. One can be ill without being aware of it, while shame implies both a painful emotion and an awareness that the source of that emotion is in one's own deeds or character, the perception that the cause of that painful emotion is in one's own acts or state which, as such, are improper.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bergson and the Transformations of the Notion of Intuition NATHAN ROTENSTREICH THE CONCEPT "INTUITION",like many other concepts referring to the particular or the singular mode of philosophic cognition, is by no means a univocal concept. In different philosophical systems this concept was given different meanings and directions in accordance with the general trend of the system at stake. We are about to attempt to understand the meaning of the (...) concept of intuition in Bergson's system against the transformations that concept underwent in some major philosophical world-views. Let us observe in the first place: the term 'intuition' derives from the root intu~rL Like several other concepts in the philosophical vocabulary referring to modes of knowledge this term too denotes seeing, a mode of cognition brought about by a direct visual encounter with the world. It belongs to a family of concepts like theoria, speculatio, contemplatio. It is a conjecture that the first use of the term 'intuition' connoting a singular mode of knowledge appears in the mystical literature. The mystic conception stresses the mode of seeing whereby the light is seen; pursuing the Platonic notion, the light of vision makes the very seeing possible. From the mystical literature the concept intuition was absorbed into the philosophical vocabulary.1 Intuition is a mode of knowledge. Yet it conveys a particular ingredient in the sum-total of knowledge, making this mode of knowledge different from other modes. The ingredient conveyed is that of the certainty of the achievement reached by knowledge. From this point of view 'intuition' denotes the position of knowledge in terms of its ultimate consummation, taking consummation as being different from the procedure leading to the final outcome. This component characteristic of 'intuition' is present in Bergson's doctrine, though possibly does not occupy a central place in it. From here we can proceed to the discernment of an additional meaning of 'intuition', a meaning which to some extent seems to be the most common one. 1 Shlomo Pines, translator's Introduction to Maimonides' The Guide oJ the Perplexed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963),p. Iv. [335] 336 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 'Intuition" is knowledge which takes place directly, without mediation. As such it does not stand in a need of a method, since every method is a way leading to knowledge as well as a wall between the step taken and the final objective of knowledge. A method is essentially a mediation, as a way is a mediation between the point of departure and the destination. Knowledge acquired through a method is thus different from knowledge acquired directly or immediately. We do not confine the notion of method to any particular method, whether experimental or analytic. Any method is reasoning, comparison, verification and a procedure for deriving conclusions. Against these aspects of method intuition is presented precisely as seeing. Seeing is that visual encounter with objects which does not take on a methodical character. It might be preceded by methodological knowledge, but the act of seeing per se is trans-methodical. A close reading of Bergson's text will show that this aspect of intuition again is present in his doctrine, but it is by far not the most prominent aspect of his own rendering of intuition. It can be said in a general way that in different philosophical systems we find a kind of a conjunction of the first meaning of 'intuition' in terms of certainty with the second meaning in terms of directness. Different philosophers in different contexts maintained the view that the unqualified certainty of knowledge can refer only to the ultimate stratum of reality or to God, and that this stratum or God can be known directly. Plato's view (to look to the absolute and eternal) could be a paradigm of this trend. 2 This view re-emerges in Spinoza. The mode of knowledge which is the highest and most certain achievement on the ladder of modes of knowledge, as Spinoza puts it, is true and necessary: "He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived." 3 This mode of knowledge is adequate to its... (shrink)

PRECISELY BECAUSE OF ITS RICHNESS, Richard's Rorty's latest book evokes the question: Is there any relation between the three components of its title, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity?

This paper seeks to delineate everyday usage of the two concepts--Will and reason--In order to identify the systematic transformation these concepts underwent in kant's system. It has been observed that even in our everyday interpretation and parlance there are different meanings or nuances or meanings attributed to the phenomenon of will and perhaps also, To a lesser extent, To the phenomenon of will serve as the point of departure of kant's characterization of the concept "will" which is, In the first (...) instance, Congruent with its ordinary usage. Yet in other instances, As we shall see, Kant's characterization of the will is imbued with systematic meaning which has to be seen in the context of his philosophy in general and of his philosophy of practice in particular. (shrink)

The idea of historical progress, despite its many variations, is anchored in a coherent structure of thought which implies a cumulative advance toward an all -encompassing encounter with a universal norm and its realization. The phenomenological structure of history is, however, inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions on which the idea of progress is based. Because meaning is not immanent in history but introduced by human beings, no total merger between reality and meaning is possible. The fact that equality, freedom, and (...) humanity have all been suggested as the ultimate goal of historical progress illustrates that the very idea of a universal norm oversimplifies the complex structure of history. Furthermore, those who try to parallel scientific advancement with historical progress do not recognize that historical deeds cannot be depersonalized like natural events. (shrink)

There is a common distinction between two aspects of history: history as the object dealt with and history as the way of dealing with the object. Within the “objective” aspect of history one may distinguish between the attempt to define the object as man and the attempt to define it as process. Within the “subjective” aspect there is the prevailing tendency to put forward the nature of the onceptual method as one employing individual concepts.

Confidence or trust is obviously a sort of reliance or dependence. Confidence is related to fiducia , which in turn is related to fido and to the Greek peitho . The latter term implies persuasion or persuasiveness. If we follow, as we should, the nuances hidden in these terms, we may assume that confidence is a reliance stemming from persuasion or accompanied by it. Confidence may be related to a person, including oneself, and in this sense we speak of self-confidence; (...) or it may be related to another person, either in the singular or in the plural, or even perhaps to the course of events at large, to history, to the cosmos, to God etc. It is in this sense that confidence is the opposite of or contradictory to fear. And Aristotle indeed placed the brave man between the two poles of fear and confidence. The man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. (shrink)

CHAPTER ONE TRANSMUTATIONS OF THE CONCEPT Over the ages the term "alienation" has been used with different and even contradictory meanings, ...

Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)

Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)

Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of (...) the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Common Sense and Theological 9 9 Exper_,ence on the Bas s o,f Franz Rosenzweig's Philosophy NATHAN ROTENSTREICH The position of Franz Rosenzweig's thinking within the framework of presentday philosophy is difficult to ascertain. Though he was deeply rooted in the philosophical tradition, his chief work, The Star o] Redemption (Der Stern der Erlgsung, 1921), was conceived outside the main discussions of the philosophical controversy in the twenties. He formulated (...) his ideas side by side with the trends of German philosophy, but not by way of keeping pace with these trends. Yet his polemic against traditional philosophy in general, and against idealism in particular brings Rosenzweig close to the character of the rebellion represented by Existenz-Philosophie. 1 I The question of grounding a philosophical system or a set of philosophical ideas with an objective toward faith clearly poses the difficulty, in terms of the ultimate authority, of maintaining the validity of such a system of ideas. Could that authority be reason, which as a source of ideas and confirmation is outside faith while having consequences or expressions within the scope of faith? Or is faith, asserting the existence of God and his relations to world and man, an independent source? In case faith is an independent source, does it have the guarantee of its validity in its own boundaries, or does it still point to a source of validity which is outside faith and yet is not reason? It seems that Franz Rosenzweig was willy-nilly in his concern with this question. As said before the first approach would have been to construct a system along rational lines. This, however, would have done violence to a basic anti-rationalistic trait in Rosenzweig's thinking that can be clearly discerned in his The Star o] Redemption, in his Kleinere Schri]ten and in his small book, Understanding the Sick and Healthy, published until now in English only. Rosenzweig's criticism of rationalism may be summed up as follows: a) Reason strives for a unified conception of the world; and in support of this monistic fiction its assimilative energy is ready to seize upon all arguments that militate against the doctrines and practices of faith. b) Reason tends to ignore the existence of the individual which it regards as 1On the relation between Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger, see Karl LSwith, "M. Heideggerand F. Rosenzweigor Temporality and Eternity," Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch,III (Sept., 1942),53-77. [353] 354 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY merely one of the variations of an all-inclusive unity. The question of the relation of the particular to the general or of the individual to the whole, which has engrossed philosophers since time immemorial, has no place in rationalistic systems. c) Since reason places the understanding above the things to be understood (and hence also above the data of religious experience, including the existence of God), we find that from a speculative and historical point of view rationalism has a strong bias against religion or theology. The other way open to Rosenzweig was to rely on the principle of Revelation, but he could not adopt this principle as the basis of his system for the following reasons" a) The first reason can be understood from Schelling's paradox: He who adheres to Revelation does not philosophize, and he who philosophizes finds Revelation inadequate for his purposes. Since Rosenzweig was basically a philosopher --despite his protestations to the contrary--he was precluded by that very fact from appealing to the evidence furnished by Revelation. On the contrary, he sought to find a non-rational basis for Revelation itself. b) The second reason that precluded Rosenzweig from taking the traditional course of relying on Revelation is implicit in that principle itself as Rosenzweig understood it. Revelation in his system has no enlightening or cognitive significance, or what is called in Christian theology Kerygma, instructive knowledge. In Revelation, he says, God reveals only revelation; He reveals himself to man and to man alone.2 In his view, then, Revelation does not transmit informative content and hence has no dogmatic significance. It is a dialogue that posits the existence of the participants, the existence of God, and (highly important for... (shrink)

Let us start with a short description of the phenomenon of will, and in this we shall naturally take advantage of Aristotle’s analysis. Let us say in the first place that will has two basic features. It is a factor or an actor bringing about effects. As such, it is a factor inside the agent, moving the agent, giving momentum to his attitudes or approaches, as well as giving direction to his attitudes and their manifestation in action. Will also connotes (...) a choice and, thus, is close to a decision focusing on a certain course or objective. The actions or the deeds are in this sense a manifestation of will as both a driving force and a choice or decision. From the point of view of the manifest action, will is closer to being a disposition, not in the passive sense, but one which is an active attitude. In so far as objectives of action or will are concerned, the question arises—and as we shall see, this is the crux of the controversy—whether objectives are only pursued or whether they are also set and posited. There is the additional question whether will is spontaneous, that is to say, is its own source; or whether, as an activity directed towards an objective, it in turn is motivated, bewaring from the pitfall of an infinite regression. (shrink)