Extreme narcissistic organizations are unable to behave ethically because they lack a moral identity. While such organizations are not necessarily unethical intentionally, they become self-obsessed and use a sense of entitlement, self-aggrandizement, denial, and rationalizations to justify anything they do. Extreme narcissistic organizations might develop formal ethics programs, but such programs will have little effect on behavior.

The term narcissism is normally used to describe an infatuation with the self so extreme that the interests of others are ignored. However, argues C. Fred Alford, psychoanalytic theory also implies that narcissism can be construed in a positive way, as a striving for perfection wholeness, and control over self and world. In this book, Alford applies the psychoanalytic theory of narcissism to the philosophies of Socrates and Frankfurt School members Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and (...) Jurgen Habermas, contending that it can illuminate basic philosophical issues such as the nature of the ideal society, the integrity of the self, and the role of reason in human affairs. (shrink)

Although narcissism is an important factor influencing entrepreneurial activity and outcomes, not much research has been conducted on the relationship between narcissism and entrepreneurship. To summarize the current literature on this relationship and provide an agenda for further in-depth research, a systematic review was conducted based on the PRISMA guidelines using Web of Science, Elsevier ScienceDirect, and EBSCO host databases. Accordingly, 33 articles have been identified as being eligible for the final synthesis. The findings of the present study (...) showed, in general, that (1) life history theory, person-environment fit theory (P-E theory), and career choice theory were mostly used to explore the topic of narcissism and entrepreneurial intention, social exchange theory was used to analyze narcissistic entrepreneurs' entrepreneurial motives and attitudes, and upper echelons theory (UET) was applied to research on the relationship between narcissism and entrepreneurial outcomes, (2) Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) and narcissistic sub-dimension of the Dark Triad were frequently used self-report scales among 23 identified empirical studies, and (3) narcissism has both bright and dark sides to entrepreneurial activities and outcomes. While narcissism makes potential entrepreneurs have higher entrepreneurial intentions and greater willingness to take risks, it also prevents entrepreneurs from discovering opportunities, acquiring resources, and learning from failure. Besides, results also showed that relations between narcissism and entrepreneurial intentions and performance are more complex. For a deeper understanding of this complex relations and advancing research on narcissism and entrepreneurship, more research is necessary to explore the relations between narcissism and entrepreneurship-related variables from a temporal perspective and at the team level, examine the relationship between narcissism and entrepreneurship ethics, and investigate the interaction effects of narcissism and other personalities. (shrink)

Narcissistic personality disorder describes people who demonstrate an exaggerated sense of entitlement, lack empathy and crave admiration. But philosopher Simone de Beauvoir argued that, even if a person isn't a pathological narcissist, narcissism can be a strategy that some people use to help them cope with being undervalued. Through examples such as singer-songwriter Taylor Swift, I show how Beauvoir's philosophy gives us a framework to understand some narcissistic behaviour and possibilities for more authentic ways of being in the world.

Organizational participants learn that "getting ahead" in organizational life comes from dramatizing a fantasy about the organization's perfection. The fantasy is the return to narcissism, in which the organization and its highest participants are seen as the center of a loving world. Since the return to narcissism is impossible, orienting the organization to the dramatization of this fantasy means that the organization loses touch with reality. The result is organizational decay-a condition of systemic ineffectiveness. Organizational decay is illustrated (...) through the case of General Motors. Specific dimensions considered are: commitment to bad decisions; advancement of participants who detach themselves from reality and discouragement of reality-oriented participants who are committed to their work; creation of the organizational jungle; isolation of management; development of a hostile orientation to the environment; transposition of work and ritual; loss of creativity; dominance of the financial staff; development of cynicism or the loss of reality; and overcentralizatior. Organizational decay may be compared with the consequences of hubris. (shrink)

Universities around the world are undergoing a marketisation process in order to respond to consumer-oriented demands. Despite priority shifts, universities have remained traditionally hierarchical and elitist. Moreover, a new and growing generation of academic researchers has found it increasingly difficult to integrate in academia. Systems and patterns of behaviour breeding cultural narcissism, intended as a value and cultural system characterised by an investment in false self-projections backed by Machiavellian attainment, exist and appear to thrive in academic institutions. This organizational (...) adaptation for survival is now embedded in higher education and interlinked with mobbing, workplace bullying and academic misconduct. The problematics we are witnessing today in many academic settings (high rates of mental health issues, widespread research misconduct scandals and loss of credibility of academic research) are a by-product of an organizational narcissistic culture. Amidst economic shifts, it might seem reasonable to adopt measures aimed at increasing assets, invest in highly entrepreneurial academics who attract financial resources to universities and use any means to salvage the reputations of educational institutions. Yet these strategies might be promoting and perpetuating value systems that are undermining academic integrity, and therefore contributing to the scientific credibility crisis and failure of these institutions. (shrink)

Building on the emotion-centered model of voluntary work behavior, this research tests the relations between leader narcissism, followers’ malicious and benign envy, and supervisor-targeted counterproductive work behavior. Results across five studies, two experimental studies, and two field surveys indicate that leader narcissism relates positively to followers’ negative emotions, which in turn mediates the positive relation between leader narcissism and supervisor-targeted CWB. Proposed negative relations between leader narcissism and positive emotions were only partly supported. Our findings advance (...) the understanding of envy and the detrimental impact of leader narcissism on organizational functioning. (shrink)

Normal narcissistic functioning has to do with the regulation of a coherent set of metarepresentations of the acting agent. That set of meta-representations has its own interior architecture and dynamics. Normal narcissistic functioning is an adaptive form of interpsychic processing which can be given a general account by integrating views of it drawn from the clinical traditions of psychoanalysis, empirical psychology, and contemporary cognitive and neurosciences. This is not to be confused with any form of organized psychopathology, though pathological forms (...) of narcissism are relevant to understanding normal narcissism. Neural correlates of normal narcissism, as also the characteristic emotions and pleasures/displeasures that accompany its operations, are also explored. It is proposed that this allostatic regulatory system plays a prominent role in a wide range of human behaviors. It also closes the gap between social norms governing such behaviors and the minds of the agents performing them. This integrative interpretation of the scientific material is offered as an exercise in “philosophy in cognitive science” and belongs to the tradition of naturalistic philosophical accounts of the human mind. (shrink)

Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama (...) of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion. (shrink)

This essay explores the theoretical implications of Freud's notion of `the narcissism of minor differences' - the idea that it is precisely the minor differences between people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them. A comparative survey shows that minor differences underlie a wide range of conflicts: from relatively benign forms of campanilismo to bloody civil wars. Freud's tentative statements link up with the insights of Simmel, Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss, Dumont, Elias, (...) and Girard. Especially helpful is what Bourdieu writes in Distinction: social identity lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat. An outline of a general theory of power and violence should include consideration of the narcissism of minor differences, also because its counterpart - hierarchy and great differences - makes for relative stability and peace. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 99 - 117 In a large sample of adult Americans, we examined trait narcissism among those who identify as nonreligious, traditionally religious, or “spiritual but not religious”. Our study reveals that: 1) those who identify as traditionally religious and those who identify as SBNR exhibit fairly similar levels of narcissism; 2) contrary to conventional wisdom, nonreligious Americans are lower in narcissism than religious/spiritual Americans ; and 3) higher levels of church (...) attendance are not associated with lower NPI scores, though higher levels of church attendance are associated with higher NPI scores in SBNR individuals. (shrink)

This is one of several papers by the author that seek to throw light on the psychology of philosophers. In this paper, certain of the defining properties of clinical narcissism are discussed in their application to the ideological position-taking character of many philosophers and the philosophies they propound. ●●●●● -/- 2022 UPDATE: The approach of this paper has been updated and developed further in Chapters 1 and 2 of the author’s 2021 book _Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility (...) and Meaning_. The book is available both in a printed edition (under ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6 from Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and other booksellers) and an Open Access eBook edition (available under the book's title through Philpapers and other philosophy archives). (shrink)

Unlike many other studies which assumed narcissism to be equivalent to overt narcissism, the purpose of this study is to empirically examine how covert and overt narcissism affect counterproductive work behaviors, a type of unethical behavior that can be discussed by ethical ideology. Furthermore, this research tests whether the relationship between managerial position and CWBs is direct or mediated by narcissism. The population of this study consisted of managers and nonmanagerial employees in 10 relatively small Iranian (...) firms. Questionnaires were used to collect the required data. The results indicated that most of the Iranian managers show both types of narcissistic behaviors specifically overt type, covert narcissism is a stronger predictor of interpersonal and organizational CWBs than overt narcissism, and managerial position does not seem to have a direct effect on CWBs, but has an indirect effect mediated through covert narcissism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narcissism A Focal Point for Examining the Interrelatedness of Psychology and PhilosophyLydia Amir, PhD (bio)In a groundbreaking article, Aleksandar Fatic challenges the view that mental health is to be dissociated from morality or ethics. His argument targets cluster B personality disorders, such as Borderline and Narcissistic Personality Disorders, but focuses mainly on narcissistic disorders, whether diagnosed or not. Although these persons are not exempt of moral and legal (...) responsibility, they are diagnosed by and relegated to the mental health system, which is often ineffective in treating them. Fatic suggests that addressing their faulty morality is the best policy. In my commentary of his article, I further probe the viability and desirability of doing so. I point to narcissism as a focal point for examining the necessary impact of psychology and philosophy insofar as psychologists may be considered experts in emotions and philosophers in normative ethics. I question the interest in any ethics that does not also supply the means of its implementation and suggest that narcissists may have a morality of their own, ethical egoism.As psychiatrist Bennett Simon notes, Socrates did not inquire into the mental health field; his presence is missed as the questions, “what is mental illness?” and “what are psychiatry and psychiatrists?” are not addressed. It follows that it is up to us, as Simon attempts to do in the first chapter of Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry (1978), to define the psychiatrist’s proper area of professional competence (p. 28). That which makes matters even more confusing, he notes, is that psychiatrists are only one group of professionals who deal with the “mentally ill” and that they are “far from unanimous” about which problems “pertain to their particular sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). He thus lists a variety of problems which “a glance at both popular and professional literature…reveals that at one time or another, psychiatrists have claimed [End Page 169] (sometimes by public demand) for their proper sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). Among them is the issue that Fatic’s break grounding article tackles: “Psychiatrists at times consider it their proper task to deal with people who are excessively selfish and self-centered (narcissistic personality disorder)” (Simon, 1978, p. 29).Thus, Simon sees as a matter of controversy whether narcissism is a psychiatric issue, and defines the disorder in moral terms (“selfish,” “self-centered”). Fatic broadens the argument: he questions the validity of the psychological approach not only to narcissism as a personality disorder, but also to narcissistic traits, and the effectivity of this approach given that this is an area in which therapists usually do not have much success even if the patients look for help, which is rare. Fatic suggests that these personalities, either those with narcissistic traits or those with full-fledged narcissistic personality disorder, should be better understood (and maybe also addressed, although this point is not explicitly made) when viewed through moral lenses. In doing so, Fatic not only questions the validity of one form of personality disorder––still a controversial category––but re-kindles the view that correlates aspects of mental health with virtue, a view that was valid up until the nineteenth century and that made of philosophers (and priests) doctors of the soul.1That which made of philosophers’ teachings an important part of one’s life before the advent of scientific psychology has been often associated with this view, that the virtuous are also the healthy. Without going as far as to suggest that philosophers should teach virtue to narcissists, which could be a further argument in favor of the new field of philosophical practice and a broadening of its legitimate concerns, Fatic notes that moral categories are better suited to approach those who are plagued by narcissism.One way to explain the historical role that psychology played in relation to the traditional one upheld by morality is that psychology stepped in to explain the origins of failures in morality. If the narcissist is to be judged according to moral categories (a judgment that he necessarily fails in so far as right emotions as relevant to morality), what might be the consequences?Ascribing... (shrink)

In this article the causes and features of a shift from neurosis to narcissism and then autism were investigated. Moreover, special attention is paid not so much to the psychological or even psychiatric aspects of the problem, but to changes in the general features of a human being. Thus, when speaking of the transition from narcissism to autism, one is focusing on true autism, which is characterized by veracity, sincerity and authencity, which reveal themselves in the form of (...) a special kind of infantility, a kind of mature infantility. A suitable example of such infantility is found in the animated film Shrek, a certain barbarism of which is not so ironic or even knowing ironic, but to a greater extent it is warm, earnest and serious although childish. Among other infantile practices, it is worth noting the situationalist-lettrist practice of organizing a text in the form of an ABC alphabet book, a hornbook, which is actualized in a digimodern context. True autism and to some extent pseudoautism in a certain sense become a way to cope with the trance and amnesia of pseudomodernism and leave a hope for the future. Thus, paradoxically, wholeness that was lost is restored through desocialization and sociopathy. This article also draws parallels between digimodernism and speculative realism, conceptualization of interpassivity as well as automodernity. It is emphasized that personal autonomy and automation can be achieved through the use of devices as a means of achieving productive loneliness, which should be distinguished from alienation. In this case, the widespread use of sensory experience as a way of communication is especially important, as an example of which Hope Sandoval’s mode of being and work are considered. It suggests that the high-tech / high-touch approach is best released in DIY activities. The above considerations allow to conclude that true autism is one of the most actual post-postmodern modes of subjectivation. (shrink)

In this essay I describe how primary and secondary narcissism are the underlying and motivating psychological states for fundamentalist religious belief. I describe the psychodynamics that produce such a belief state and I make the case that the "fundamentalist personality" is best understood as a form of barely sublimated pathological narcissism. Given the brutality of the human condition, it is understandable why this psychological-metaphysical option is an enticing one, but I follow Ralph Ellis in the conclusion that the (...) consequences of such belief systems produce much more harm than benefit for individuals and humanity at Iarge. (shrink)

Some of the best instances of bioethics are applications of ethical conceptual analysis to real-world cases that is done in a way that prompts both reflection on the part of the practitioners involved in the real-world case and reflection by the bioethicist on the way in which the field of bioethics understands the concept in question. Buth et al ’s paper in this issue is a fine example of just this. Their paper brings together three important concepts that straddle the (...) worlds of politics and ethics and are to some extent under-theorised in applied settings. These three concepts – moral narcissism, moral complicity and dirty hands – raise particular problems for the activities of researchers, aid workers and others from richer countries working in poorer or conflict-torn parts of the world. Buth et al set out a general account of these concepts and their relationship. Their focus is substantially on complicity largely because Médecins Sans Frontières have been accused of it in each of the three cases they go on to discuss. These three cases involve MSF interventions in Myanmar, Libya and on the border between Syria and Jordan. Each are importantly different: from the involvement of MSF with the wrongdoers varies from not speaking out and continuing to operate in other parts of the country to being used as a coercive pawn providing aid. The situations are complex and, in the end, Buth et al see the analysis of them in terms of complicity as a useful first step but that is all. There are some important nuances embedded in the paper that are worth bringing out. First, moral narcissism as they define it, comes about at the point at which “an appropriate concern for one’s own moral integrity turns into moral self-indulgence” or a …. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to social and economic problems and pose a threat to most of enterprise. Faced with crisis and challenge, effective leaders and devoted employees are important factors for enterprises to overcome difficulties. We propose a moderated mediation model wherein narcissistic leader predicts subordinate’s followership through leader self-interest behavior perceived by subordinates, with organizational identification of leader acting as the contextual condition. Two-wave data collected from 303 employees in the manufacturing and technology industry in China supported our (...) hypothesized model. We found that narcissistic leader has negative impact on subordinates’ followership due to their perception of leader’s self-interest behavior. Further, organizational identification of leader plays a moderate role in the relationship between narcissistic leader and subordinates’ followership. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. We also offer several promising directions for future research. (shrink)

This paper contrasts the notion of “willing” in Heidegger’s politics with the notion of “dawning” in Heidegger’s philosophy. It argues that, in the political text, the attunement of Dasein to what-is is centred in the notion of Dasein’s “willing” of what-is, while in the philosophical text it is centred in the notion of what-is “dawning” on Dasein. It maintains that the attitude to anxiety essential to a “dawning” of what-is is not reached in Heidegger’s “The Self-Assertion of the German University”. (...) It concludes by maintaining that, rather than being attuned to what-is, the will in the “The Self-Assertion of the German University” is attuned to its own relationship to what is in a narcissistic rather than a philosophical way; that is, it territorializes “dawning” as a relation to “what is”, and makes “dawning” of “what-is” its “own” in the same way as any nationalism makes a culture, a language or a geographical region its own. In contrast to the narcissism of nationalism, philosophy, as outlined by Heidegger in the essay “What Is Metaphysics?”, is the experience of allowing what-is to “dawn” on Dasein rather than a preoccupation with “willing” of “dawning” as one’s own relation to Being. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narcissism, Empathy and Moral ResponsibilityRonald W. Pies, MD (bio)Professor Fatic’s timely and wide-ranging essay demonstrates how the topic of narcissism has undergone a resurgence of interest in recent decades. This may owe, in part, to the controversial claim that narcissism is on the rise in the United States, at least among American college students (Twenge & Foster, 2010). As I discuss presently, the term “narcissism” (...) is open to many interpretations, and differs somewhat from the specific designation, Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As Fatic rightly notes,Narcissism as a personality structure may or may not be diagnosed as NPD, depending on various criteria, perhaps most importantly on whether the narcissistic person actually encounters functional and emotional difficulties and shows up for diagnosis and evaluation.As Professor Fatic’s essay clearly shows, narcissism (variously defined) has important “ethical ramifications.” Fatic is primarily interested in exploring the relationship between what he calls the narcissist’s “emotional incompetence” and that person’s degree of moral responsibility. To oversimplify Fatic’s complex set of interlinked arguments, Fatic concludes that “emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not.” Drawing on the moral theories of Philip Pettit and Michael Slote—in particular, Slote’s “sentimentalist ethics” with its emphasis on empathy (Slote, 2004)—Fatic argues that narcissism is both “a moral failure and a psychopathology.” Nevertheless, for Fatic, narcissists remain “fully morally responsible for their insensitivity and interpersonal emotional incompetence.” Why? Because they have the moral duty “to acquire the moral and emotional competence required for the making of moral choices.”Some Philosophical ConcernsAs I understand Fatic’s argument, he is asserting that the narcissist ought to be held responsible for a kind of self-education process that will ameliorate his or her emotional incompetence. Fatic writes,[W]e develop our morality through constant moral education and testing, which we receive both through socialization and through our own efforts later in life, as autonomous human beings. [End Page 173]We are thus responsible for what kind of moral actors we are and are becoming based on our way of life, and have a moral duty to improve our own moral senses and sensibilities by constantly working on the development of virtues.It seems to me that this line of reasoning assumes that all, or most, narcissists possess the capacity to seek and acquire this “moral education.” Perhaps so—but I am not sure Fatic has demonstrated this. It seems at least plausible that, in virtue of the adverse developmental and perhaps even neurological factors that may generate the narcissistic personality (Fan et al., 2011), some narcissists may lack the capacity to modify their psychopathology by means of “moral education.” This leads me to wonder whether Professor Fatic has adequately explored the very heterogeneous nature of narcissism. Indeed, Fatic’s thesis seems to point toward a kind of Platonic “essence” of narcissism, conveyed by his frequent allusion to “the narcissist”—one of whose defining or essential features is said to be a lack of empathy.But, as I will suggest presently, this is at best an oversimplification of narcissism as psychiatrists understand the term. Indeed, there are degrees and varieties of narcissism, differing in their capacity for empathy—which is itself a psychologically complex term. Recent research suggests that “narcissistic personality disorder symptomatology does not reflect a “narcissist” category but rather a continuum of narcissistic pathology” (Aslinger, Manuck, S. Pilkonis, Simms, & Wright, 2018).Furthermore, Professor Fatic’s thesis seems to view “moral responsibility” as a binary construct; i.e., either one possesses, or does not possess, full moral responsibility. But as I have argued elsewhere, moral responsibility may be viewed as lying along a continuum that reflects varying degrees of voluntariness for any given individual (Pies, 2007).Consequently, in my view, any valid assessment of the “the narcissist’s” moral responsibility must consider both the heterogeneity of narcissism and the non-binary (i.e., continuous) nature of moral responsibility.One way of conceptualizing this “two-track” model is... (shrink)

U mnogim etnickim konfliktima i gradjanskim ratovima u XX veku kulturne razlike izmedju sukobljenih strana su bile veoma male. Krvavi sukobi Srba, Hrvata i Bosnjaka tokom raspada Jugoslavije su jedan takav slucaj. Ovaj uvid je neke istrazivace vodio zakljucku da nedostatak objektivnih kulturnih markera izmedju grupa moze pogodovati izbijanju nasilja: kada se clanovi dve grupe tesko razlikuju, pribegava se nasilju da bi se stvorile identitetske granice medju njima. Jedna posebna verzija ove teorije poznata je pod imenom "narcizam malih razlika". Taj (...) izraz potice od Sigmunda Frojda koji ga je primenjivao kako u individualnoj psihologiji, tako i u svojoj filozofiji kulture. Ovaj koncept su u velikoj meri ignorisali psihoterapeuti-prakticari, ali su ga tokom poslednjih decenija otkrili novinari i drustveni naucnici i vise primenjivali u objasnjenju kolektivnog nego individualnog nasilja. U ovom radu ispitani su neke od studija i knjiga u kojima se koristi koncept "narcizma malih razlika" da bi se ocenila snaga i slabosti te teorije.. (shrink)

Grandiose narcissistic traits refer to exploitative and arrogant attitudes, while vulnerable narcissistic traits entail hypersensitivity to judgment and low self-esteem. Little is known about how individuals with narcissistic traits can improve their attitudes toward themselves and others. The current research puts self- and other compassion forward as possible targets to alleviate some of destructive patterns of narcissism. Generally, self-compassion has previously been associated with beneficial effects on psychological wellbeing, while other compassion is advantageous for interpersonal relationships. This study explored (...) the relationship between narcissistic traits and the efficacy of experimental compassion inductions. Student and community participants completed grandiose and vulnerable narcissistic trait, SC and OC state questionnaires, and either an SC or OC induction. It was expected that individuals with higher narcissistic traits would benefit from the inductions and show higher SC after but would have greater difficulty showing meaningful increases in OC. The results indicated that individual differences in grandiose and vulnerable narcissistic traits are related to the magnitude of improvements following the inductions: the theorized lack of SC in individuals with vulnerable oversensitivity to judgment traits seems possible to be counteracted through different types of compassion exercises. Moreover, higher grandiose exploitativeness–entitlement and global vulnerable narcissistic traits related to less increases than others. However, directly inducing OC in individuals with these traits was linked to greater OC improvements than improvements after inducing SC. Overall, the present findings suggest that self-compassionate behavior can be improved in individuals with high oversensitivity and that other compassionate behavior could potentially be increased if, specifically, other compassion exercises are utilized when higher levels of certain narcissistic traits are present. (shrink)

Against a thinker like Martin Heidegger who takes restraints on individual freedom and the promotion of authoritarianism as implicit features in the ongoing development of technology, Andrew Feenberg argues for a “democratic rationalization” of modern technology whereby people effectively choose their own futures, not in spite of their tools, but increasingly because of them. Acknowledging the Web’s democratic potential, I believe that a new threat—far different from authoritarian regimes or structures—has emerged: a rampant and multifarious narcissism that threatens to (...) drown democratic ideals in a wave of self-obsession and self-promotion. (shrink)

The process by which auditors consider fraud risk in assessing management’s motivation and character remains under-addressed. This is problematic given the rising tide of narcissism, as well as recent research documenting that both self- and other-perceptions of narcissism influence an array of judgments. While a skeptical attitude is fundamental to the auditor’s gatekeeper role, it remains unclear how auditors form and act on perceptions of client narcissism. With a large sample of experienced accountants as participants, we leverage (...) insights from current narcissism and perceiver effects research to predict (and find) that auditor skepticism responds in a divergent manner to both the auditor’s (1) own antagonistic versus agentic narcissism and (2) perceptions of the client’s antagonistic and agentic narcissism. We discuss the observed opposing behavioral externalities related to these distinct forms of grandiose narcissism, particularly in dynamic interactions between clients and auditors. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty, or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or (...) not. My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgment, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, namely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psycho-pathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic. (shrink)

In this study, researchers examined the assumption that senior-level undergraduate students from private colleges universities possess higher levels of moral and ethical development than students from public institutions. In addition, the researchers sought to determine (a) if there was a relationship between narcissistic personality traits and the level of moral reasoning, and (b) there was a difference in the level of narcissistic personality tendencies of business students from private vs. public institutions based on demographic and textual variables. A cluster sampling (...) approach was used in the sample selection. The sample was limited to students majoring in general business at seven public and six private universities in North Dakota and Minnesota. A total of 269 subjects participated in the research project: 145 at private institutions and 124 at public institutions. The Defining Issues Test version 2 (DIT-2) and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) were used to collect data at seven public and six private institutions. Students from public and private universities scored similarly on the DIT-2. A significant difference between the NPI scores of the private college students and the public college students was found. No significant relationship was found between the NPI score and level of moral reasoning. Business educators should be concerned that an increase in the number of business ethics courses completed did not significantly impact students' moral reasoning or narcissistic traits. (shrink)

This study discusses narcissism and problems of the self from the perspective of psychoanalysis. The contributors define the major differences between the interpersonal viewpoint and other schools of psychoanalysis in terms of both diagnosis and treatment.

This article disputes Freud's reading of “The Sandman,” in which he seeks to explain the text's uncanniness primarily with reference to his theory of the castration complex. Rather than abandon Freud altogether, however, I demonstrate how the uncanny effects of Hoffmann's tale are best understood with reference to Freud's concept of “total narcissism.” Specifically, I argue that the ambiguities surrounding this notion are profoundly interwoven with the uncanniness of “The Sandman's” “doubles.” Finally, using these analyses as a foundation, I (...) present my own interpretation of “The Sandman's” subtextual narrative, arguing that the tale effectively dramatizes the self-destructive tendencies of the individual dominated by total narcissism. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 21 This essay asks whether a pragmatist philosophy of history can make sense of the notion of historical facts. It is tempting to think it cannot, since pragmatists insist, as James puts it, that the trail of the human serpent is over everything. Facts, by contrast, are typically thought of as something untouched by the human serpent, something impervious to what we think and do. I argue, however, that there is a way of understanding facts that (...) is perfectly at home in pragmatist philosophy of history. Drawing on work by Robert Brandom, I propose that facts be interpreted inferentially. On this view, to call something a fact, or to say that the facts make my beliefs true, is simply a shorthand way of saying that a particular sort of relationship exists among certain sentences. I further show that this inferential understanding of facts is fully compatible with the distinctive features of historical inquiry. In particular, it is compatible with history’s irreducibly narrative character, and with the way different narratives can reveal radically different facts. Finally, I use this account of historical facts to respond to a classic criticism of pragmatism: the charge that pragmatism is _narcissistic_. I argue that pragmatism is narcissistic in only the minimal sense that it cannot countenance theory-neutral givens. But pragmatists can happily grant that there is more to truth than consensus, and that our claims are answerable to facts that everyone can get wrong. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 21 This essay asks whether a pragmatist philosophy of history can make sense of the notion of historical facts. It is tempting to think it cannot, since pragmatists insist, as James puts it, that the trail of the human serpent is over everything. Facts, by contrast, are typically thought of as something untouched by the human serpent, something impervious to what we think and do. I argue, however, that there is a way of understanding facts that (...) is perfectly at home in pragmatist philosophy of history. Drawing on work by Robert Brandom, I propose that facts be interpreted inferentially. On this view, to call something a fact, or to say that the facts make my beliefs true, is simply a shorthand way of saying that a particular sort of relationship exists among certain sentences. I further show that this inferential understanding of facts is fully compatible with the distinctive features of historical inquiry. In particular, it is compatible with history’s irreducibly narrative character, and with the way different narratives can reveal radically different facts. Finally, I use this account of historical facts to respond to a classic criticism of pragmatism: the charge that pragmatism is _narcissistic_. I argue that pragmatism is narcissistic in only the minimal sense that it cannot countenance theory-neutral givens. But pragmatists can happily grant that there is more to truth than consensus, and that our claims are answerable to facts that everyone can get wrong. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Narcissists Are Morally ResponsibleAleksandar Fatic, PhDIn his insightful commentary of ‘Narcissism as a moral incompetence,’ Professor Pies proposes several principal objections to my line of argument. First, Pies mentions that I embrace a Platonic essentialism and a ‘binary’ view of narcissism, whilst in fact narcissistic traits present themselves in degrees, within a continuum of pathology.Let us clarify the meaning of essentialism. When applied to the phenomenology (...) of narcissism, Platonic essentialism would imply that there is an idea, or ideal, of ‘pure’ narcissism, which governs our cognition of narcissistic phenomenology. Without an ‘essentialist’ understanding of what narcissism as a more or less pure phenomenon would look like, it would make no semantic or logical sense to speak of various ‘types’ or ‘degrees’ of narcissism. In the 1940s, in The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle offered the now infamous logical analysis of ‘false’ and ‘true coins’: if there were not true coins of which we had some idea, it would be logically impossible to speak of counterfeit coins (McDermid, 2004; Ryle, 1949, pp. 94–99). There are shoddily produced coins that bear only a vague resemblance to the original idea or mint of the real coin, however, for each we would ultimately have to decide whether the resemblance is sufficient for it to be considered a real coin. Shoddily produced coins represent various ‘degrees’ of resemblance of the idea, or form, of a coin, but to call them coins, and to decide whether they are true coins or not, it is a logical presupposition that we must first have an ‘idea’ of what an ‘ideal’ real coin is like. This, at its core, is essentialism.There is no escape from this type of essentialism in any rigorous argument, because Platonic essentialism is the foundation of the very meanings of the concepts we use. Plato’s ideas are paradigms, where the particular instantiations of their qualities are called ‘phenomena’ (Sedley, 2016; Taylor, 2016). Thus, the nuanced expression of ideas or forms in their various phenomena is the very substance of the essentialist theory of ideas. It appears that Professor Pies is also a Platonic essentialist, as am I.So why is it often impossible in clinical practice to ascribe necessary and sufficient conditions to narcissism? Well, let us remember Rosenhan’s experiments (1973). Rosenhan illustrates how the same individuals were diagnosed with very different disorders by different clinicians at roughly the same time, and how healthy individuals, once they had been instructed to ‘fake’ psychotic symptoms, remained under the same or more serious [End Page 177] diagnoses even when they stopped pretending and behaved completely normally. The reason for the arbitrariness of psych-diagnoses is the insufficiency of the psych-diagnostic language, including the actual diagnostic criteria, a kind of Lacanian ‘lack’ that is built into the very structure of psychodiagnostics (Ruti, 2008), and not a metaphysics behind such use of diagnostic language, whether it is essentialist or non-essentialist. Whether a particular patient actually has NPD or not in practice comes down to a consensual judgement—one that has been notoriously lacking in the history of psychiatry (Verhaeghe, 2008, pp. 71–125).Second, Pies suggests that empathy is ‘a complex, multidimensional construct comprising cognitive and affective components.’ I do not think this is a correct understanding of empathy. In fact, it is a conceptual revision of the original concept of empathy, which is one of a moral emotion (Kauppinen, 2014). What Pies calls ‘cognitive empathy,’ namely the ability to recognize and influence the emotions of others is an entirely different quality capacity that has recently been called ‘emotional intelligence’ (e.g., Conte, 2005). Many Cluster B personality disorders are characterized by an exceptionally high emotional intelligence and an almost complete lack of empathy, which allows them to use their emotional intelligence to manipulate and mistreat others. Surely such emotionally intelligent, but highly malignant strategies would not be considered ‘empathy.”Relatedly, Pies objects to Slote’s alleged view that only actions arising from factual empathy are morally justifiable. This is a ‘naturalist fallacy’ in reading Slote. The natural fallacy is a confusion between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought.’ Slote actually argues that only actions that are consistent with... (shrink)

Using Kohut's seminal paper "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism" as a springboard, Frank Lachmann updates Kohut's proposals for contemporary clinicians. _Transforming Narcissism: Reflections on Empathy, Humor, and Expectations _draws on a wide range of contributions from empirical infant research, psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic practice, social psychology, and autobiographies of creative artists to expand and modify Kohut's proposition that archaic narcissism is transformed in the course of development or through treatment into empathy, humor, creativity, an acceptance of transience and (...) wisdom. He asserts that empathy, humor, and creativity are not the goals or end products of transformations, but are an intrinsic part of the ongoing therapist-patient dialogue throughout treatment. The transformative process is bidirectional, impacting both patient and therapist, and their affect undergoes transformation - for example from detached to intimate - and narcissism or self-states are transformed secondarily as a consequence of the affective interactions. Meeting or violating expectations of emotional responsivity provides a major pathway for transformation of affect. For beginning therapists, _Transforming Narcissism_ presents an engaging approach to treatment that incorporates the therapeutic action of these transformations, but also leaves room for therapists to develop styles of their own. For more experienced therapists, it fills a conceptual and clinical gap, provides a scaffold for crucial aspects of treatment that are often unacknowledged, or are dismissed and pejoratively labeled "countertransference." Most importantly, Lachmann offers a balance between therapeutic spontaneity and professional constraint. Focused and engaging, _Transforming Narcissism_ provides a bridge from self psychology to a rainbow of relational approaches that beginning and seasoned therapists can profitably traverse in either direction. Dr. Lachmann contributed to an article on empathy in the April, 2008 issue of _O_ magazine, pp. 230. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, organizations need to effectively manage changes, and employees need to proactively adapt to these changes. The present research investigated when and how individual employees’ narcissism was related to their change-oriented organizational citizenship behavior. Specifically, based on a trait activation perspective, this research proposed the hypotheses that individual employees’ narcissism and environmental uncertainty would interactively influence employees’ change-oriented organizational citizenship behavior via felt responsibility for constructive change; furthermore, the effect of narcissism on change-oriented organizational (...) citizenship behavior via felt responsibility for constructive change would be stronger when the environmental uncertainty prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic was high rather than low. Two studies were conducted to test these hypotheses: an online survey of 180 employees in mainland China and a field study of 167 leader–follower dyads at two Chinese companies. The current research reveals a bright side of narcissism, which has typically been recognized as a dark personality trait, and enriches the understanding of the antecedents of change-oriented organizational citizenship behavior. This research can also guide organizations that wish to stimulate employee proactivity. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to investigate the association between grandiose narcissism and the feeling of distress. We referred to the narcissistic admiration and rivalry model. We hypothesized that people with high narcissistic admiration would experience less distress and fear and that intellectual self-confidence would account for this relationship. We examined two dimensions of grandiose narcissism using Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire, self-assessed intelligence, and various aspects of distress in two studies. In Study 1, we assessed (...) distress, related to performance in an intelligence test, and in Study 2 we measured fear related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In both studies, narcissistic admiration was inversely related to distress/fear, and this relationship was fully mediated by self-assessed intelligence. Narcissistic rivalry was unrelated to both distress and self-assessed intelligence. These findings emphasize the importance of self-views related to intelligence for those with high narcissistic admiration. In particular, intellectual self- confidence plays an important role in reducing distress among narcissists. (shrink)

BackgroundNarcissism viewed as a personality process rather than a stable trait explains narcissistic functioning as a tool for maintaining a positive self-view. Studying narcissism therefore needs adequate momentary measures for collecting higher frequency longitudinal data in experience sampling method studies. In this study, a shorter version of the Pathological Narcisissm Inventory is offered to measure vulnerable and grandiose narcissistic states, applicable in momentary assessment.MethodsThe measurement tool was tested in three samples. First, we assessed the factor structure and associations with (...) other contemporary measures of narcissism in a cross-sectional design on one English speaking and one Hungarian sample. Second, we conducted a five-day long experience sampling method study with a total of 15 measurement points.ResultsBased on structural equation modelling and multilevel analyses, the results suggest that the measure has adequate psychometric properties in both the within and between subject levels as well as acceptable convergent and discriminant validity.ConclusionsThe Pathological Narcissism Inventory – State Version can be a useful tool in momentary data collection enabling the examination of personality processes behind narcissistic functioning. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between human and non­human animals in the context of de-extinction projects. Following van Dooren and Rose’s (2015) suggestion that de-extinction projects are reluctant to engage with mourning work, I argue that these scientific endeavours can be understood as inherently melancholic. In reading them as such, I focus on the concepts of identification and ambivalence central to Freud’s theorisation of melancholia, and argue that looking at these key ideas in relation to de-extinction reveals the way that (...) notions of human exceptionalism can be problematized by a psychoanalytic reading of these projects. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between human and non­human animals in the context of de-extinction projects. Following van Dooren and Rose’s (2015) suggestion that de-extinction projects are reluctant to engage with mourning work, I argue that these scientific endeavours can be understood as inherently melancholic. In reading them as such, I focus on the concepts of identification and ambivalence central to Freud’s theorisation of melancholia, and argue that looking at these key ideas in relation to de-extinction reveals the way that (...) notions of human exceptionalism can be problematized by a psychoanalytic reading of these projects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Note From A Narcissist (Amores 1.11) OVID (Translated by Caleb M. X. Dance) Yoohoo! Yes! You! You do her hair. Right? Not like the one who does her legs or nails, right? You know where she goes, right? And you can let her know, like before, to rush those lovely toes— Oh! I mean her hair, to me. Oh, you’ve always been a friend! Right! Take this little note (...) to her tomor— Oh! and hand it to her. Understand? No delay! You’ve got a heart, right? You might be softer than you think and not as “plain Jane” as you think? I think you’ve felt a bit of love, no? You see it in me too, no? So— anyway, if she wants to know what I’m thinking, tell her I can’t wait to hold her close tonight. Right! Enough. My note will say the rest. Oh, it’s late! I’m blabbing. Go! No! Wait! Catch her in a good mood—when she’s free. Oh! but make her read it right away. Watch her eyes! And her face, reading. I mean as she reads. Oh, you learn a lot, even from dumb faces. Don’t be slow! When she’s read it, arion 27.1 spring/summer 2019 make her write right back. Lots. Tell her! It’s the worst when every page is filled with loads of empty space. She should pack them in—lines—so eyes linger on words in the margins. My eyes! No! Wait! Tell her not to tire fingers writing long. Let her only write: “Come!” No delay—I’ll praise these letters right away. I’ll dedicate them to... oh... you know, Lady Love herself, and I’ll note, “To Love: Ovid offers up these loyal saviors— you who just were scraps of paper.” 154 note from a narcissist... (shrink)

The results of the previous research which tried to investigate links between self-esteem and narcissism in search of the source of narcissistic fragility are not consistent. The aim of the study was to contribute to the understanding of this complex relation by assessing relationships between the four facets of grandiose narcissism measured by the NPI and the two kinds of self-esteem i.e. explicit and implicit, and by comparing the results with theoretical models. The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, a (...) more recent measure based on response latency, was used to assess ISE. The analysis confirms the reports on NPI heterogeneity. Different relationships between the particular facets of narcissism and ESE/ise were observed. These differences indicate that composite measures of narcissism and ISE do not reflect the entire complexity of the phenomena. The results provide support for the two theoretical models i.e. the global marker model and the mask model. (shrink)