It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (Sect. 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one’s engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (Sect. 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological (...) devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (Sect. 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, _allusion_, which means that the subject acts _as if_ the virtual experiences are real (Sect. 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind—given the current state of technology—between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science. (shrink)

The search for origins of human linguistic behavior is a consuming project in many fields. Philosophers drawing on studies of animal behavior are working to revise some of the standard cognitive requirements in hopes of linking the origins of human language to non-human animal communication. This work depends on updates to Grice’s theory of communicative intention and Millikan’s teleosemantics. Yet the classic idea of speaker meaning on which these new projects rest presupposes coherent, stable, individual, internal, and prior intention as (...) a cognitive or mental state, which is also the framework presupposed in theory of mind. This framework neglects the co-authored nature of communicative intentions and is thereby at odds with enactivist views of cognition. In this paper we draw on the idea of participatory sense-making alongside research on non-human animal communication to identify _utterances—_co-authored meaningful acts—as the token of communicative activity cross-species. Utterances by our definition are expressive, relational, and work without mindreading. In closing we propose the possibility of dialogical subjectivity, and engage with animal studies to show that some species exhibit its traits. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation is justifiable by suggesting the conditions under which it can be accepted and how it can be related to mental states. We present mental states in terms of private experiences and public events. We argue that a representation is a relation involving three main elements as well as the user of the representation, and defend that the conditions in which we can conceive neural (...) activity as representational are set by the context of observing a correlation between public events and patterns of neural activity. We aim at demonstrating that neural activity can be seen as both representational and non-representational - but rather constitutive - depending upon if we are considering public events under the perspective of the observer, or if we are considering private experiences under the subjective perspective. (shrink)

Esta é uma tradução do texto "What are plants saying about us?" (O que as plantas estão dizendo sobre nós?) publicado originalmente pela Nautilus Science Magazine. O texto explora as complexas capacidades das plantas, usando-as para desafiar visões tradicionais das ciências cognitivas sobre a mente humana. Com base no trabalho de Barret e Calvo, a autora explica que as plantas têm habilidade de responder ao seu entorno com comportamento inteligente, e isso nos permite questionar se neurônios são necessários para haver (...) cognição. Calvo defende que não. No texto, à medida que as capacidades e ações das plantas vão sendo relatadas, questionamos cada vez mais suposições como: a necessidade do cérebro e/ou representações mentais para haver cognição. Assim, a autora apresenta, de forma clara e introdutória, uma crítica ao modo de pensar a cognição a partir da analogia com o funcionamento de máquinas, em favor da compreensão de seres vivos a partir das ideias da cognição corporificada, estendida, integrada e enativa (4E) e da psicologia ecológica. (shrink)

This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist (...) claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology. (shrink)

Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving’s view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker’s distinction of perception and sensation, and his account (...) of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving’s conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory. Keywords: memory, episodic memory, awareness, private experiences. (shrink)

In this review, I briefly explain some of the key concepts of the book in order to offer a panoramic view of the theory of linguistic bodies. Following the book's structure, I first describe the authors’ notion of body, then refer to their notion of dialectics, after that, I expose the steps of the model and, finally, get to their conception of languaging.