Pragmatism emphasizes practical consequences and empirical explanations rather than introspective contemplations. However, the arguments of pragmatists are not uniform, as shown by the four prominent pragmatists presented in this article. The major difference between them is that Peirce and Haack acknowledge an objective truth, whereas James and Rorty do not. Thus, for a fuller understanding of the pragmatist view of our knowledge, both camps must be consulted. In the nursing field, pragmatism is occasionally referred to as a guiding philosophy. However, (...) the influence of James and Rorty has been greater than that of Peirce and Haack on pragmatists, which may risk leading to a skewed understanding of pragmatism by nursing scholars. Still, the four pragmatists share naturalism, which rejects a metaphysics that defines the nature of knowledge before our enquiry and emphasizes experience and practice. Pragmatic naturalism can help ensure that nursing theory does not deviate from clinical practice. This article also explores the broad adaptability of the ideas of all four pragmatists to philosophical issues in nursing, such as mixed‐methods research, epistemic relativism and realism. By showing that pragmatism can be relevant and stimulating to each of these topics, the article demonstrates that the different approaches to pragmatism can provide more inspiration for nurses and nursing researchers in the future. (shrink)

Even though Richard Routley is known as a proponent of so-callednuclear Meinongianism (in his terminology, noneism), the details of hisview in Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980) have not attractedmuch attention. In this paper, I critically examine two notablebut less known features of Meinongianism in Routley (1980) which particularlyconcern a core claim of nuclear Meinongianism that so-calledCharacterization Principle (CP) is applicable to nuclear properties(in his terminology, characterizing properties) but not to extranuclearproperties (in his terminology, noncharacterizing properties): The firstone is his (...) ‘double determination’ argument for restricting the class ofproperties to which CP is applicable; and the second is his expansionof the class of nuclear properties in terms of the supposition operator s.Firstly, I will show that the double determination argument fails, since,for some extranuclear properties, the argument fails to justify that CPis not applicable to them, and, moreover, the argument unintendedlyshows that CP is not applicable to some nuclear properties. Secondly,based on the idea that the supposition operator, combined with anyproperty f, forms the intensional property of being assumed to havef, I will give a formal treatment of the supposition operator withinthe framework of world semantics. We will see that this interpretationgoes beyond Routley’s original nuclear Meinongianism and assimilateshis view with modal Meinongianism proposed by Priest (2005, 2016). (shrink)

隠す心理をテーマに,社会・発達・認知・生理・動物心理学の領野から12の話題を厳選。心を科学的に探究する面白さへと誘う書。.

The atomic structure of a ‡ = 3, [110]/{112} grain boundary in a yttria-stabilized cubic zirconia bicrystal has been investigated by high-resolution transmission electron microscopy . It was found that the grain boundary migrated to form periodic facets, although the bicrystal was initially joined so as to have the symmetric boundary plane of {112}. The faceted boundary planes were indexed as {111}/{115}. The structure of the {111}/{115} grain boundary was composed of an alternate array of two types of structure unit: (...) {112}- and {111}-type structure units. HRTEM observations combined with lattice statics calculations verified that both crystals were relatively shifted by [110] along the rotation axis to form a stable grain-boundary structure. A weak-beam dark-field image revealed that there was a periodic array of dislocations along the grain boundary. The grain-boundary dislocations were considered to be introduced by the slight misorientation from the perfect ‡ = 3 orientation. The fact that the periodicity of the facets corresponded to that of the grain-boundary dislocations must indicate that the introduction of the grain-boundary dislocations is closely related to the periodicity of the facets. An atomic flipping model has been proposed for the facet growth from the initial ‡ = 3, {112} grain boundary. (shrink)

This paper examines Aristotle's discussion of the priority of actuality to potentiality in geometry at Metaphysics Θ9, 1051a21–33. Many scholars have assumed what I call the "geometrical construction" interpretation, according to which his point here concerns the relation between an inquirer's thinking and a geometrical figure. In contrast, I defend what I call the "geometrical analysis" interpretation, according to which it concerns the asymmetrical relation between geometrical propositions in which one is proved by means of the other. His argument as (...) so construed is ultimately based on the asymmetrical relation between the corresponding geometrical facts. Then I explore this ontological priority in geometry by drawing attention to a parallel passage, Posterior Analytics II.11, 94a24–35, where Aristotle explains the relation between the same geometrical propositions in connection to material causation. (shrink)

This paper examines the second geometrical problem in the Meno. Its purpose is to explore the implication of Cook Wilson’s interpretation, which has been most widely accepted by scholars, in relation to the nature of hypothesis. I argue that (a) the geometrical hypothesis in question is a tentative answer to a more basic problem, which could not be solved by available methods at that time, and that (b) despite the temporary nature of a hypothesis, there is a rational process for (...) formulating it. The paper also contains discussion of the method of analysis, problem reduction and a diorism, which have often been ambiguously explained in relation to the geometrical problem in question. (shrink)

This paper argues that the hypothesis proposed in the Meno is the proposition ‘virtue is good’ alone, and that its epistemic nature is essentially insecure. It has been an object of huge scholarly debate which other hypothesis Socrates posited with regard to the relationship between virtue and knowledge. This debate is, however, misleading in the sense of making us believe that the hypothesis that virtue is good is regarded as a truism in the light of the process of positing a (...) higher hypothesis described in the Phaedo and the Republic. I argue that the hypothesis in question is presented as a result of the earlier discussion of Meno's third definition of virtue, which implies the consequence that morally correct actions are beneficial whether or not accompanied by conventional goods such as wealth and honour. The underlying role of presenting it as a hypothesis is therefore to postpone demonstrating the truth of a controversial thesis which needs a substantial justification. In conclusion, I s... (shrink)

Many scholars have denied that Plato’s argument about desire at Philebus 34c10–35d7 is related to his recollection arguments in the Meno and Phaedo, because it is concerned only with postnatal experiences of pleasure. This paper argues against their denial by showing that the desire argument in question is intended to prove the soul’s possession of innate memory of pleasure. This innateness interpretation will be supported by a close analysis of the Timaeus, where Plato suggests that our inborn desires for food (...) and drink derive from the primitive experiences of pleasure that have naturally been incorporated into the appetitive part of the soul. (shrink)

Existence Since Thales fell into the well while gazing at the stars, philosophers have invested considerable effort in trying to understand what, how and why things exist. Even though much ink has been spilled about those questions, this article focuses on the following three questions: What is the nature of existence? Are there … Continue reading Existence →.

At Phaedo 86b7–c2 Simmias puts forward the theory that the soul is the attunement of bodily elements. Many scholars have claimed that this theory originates in the Pythagoreans, especially Philolaus. The claim is largely based on their reading of the Phaedo, since we have scarce doxographical evidence. In this paper I show that the dialogue in question does not constitute any evidence for the Pythagorean origin of Simmias’ attunement theory, and that it rather represents the theory as stemming from a (...) materialistic world view that had become widespread among people at that time. I also pursue the question how and why, then, the attunement theory was able to attract many people, by examining its relation to Socrates’ affinity argument. (shrink)

Even though metaphysical dependence has been a subject of a lively debate in contemporary metaphysics, it is rare in such a debate to seriously consider the possibility that the metaphysical dependence relations among the things in the reality is inconsistent. This paper focuses on two philosophers of the Kyoto School, Kitaro Nishida and Keiji Nishitani, who challenge the common supposition that the structure of reality is consistent. In this paper, we show that Nishida’s logic of place is a version of (...) inconsistent foundationalism, according to which absolute nothingness as a foundational element does not depend on anything but depends on itself, and that Nishtani’s theory of the field of emptiness is a version of inconsistent coherentism, according to which emptiness does not depend on anything but depends on everything else (and possibly on itself). (shrink)

Within the framework of Meinongianism, nothingness turns out to have contradictory features—it seems to be an object and not. In this paper, we explore two different kinds of Meinongian accounts of nothingness. The first one is the consistent account, which rejects the contradiction of nothingness, while the second one is the inconsistent account, which accepts the contradiction of nothingness. First of all, after showing that the consistent account of nothingness defended by Jacquette fails, we express some concerns on the general (...) possibility of consistently characterizing nothingness. Secondly, starting from Priest’s inconsistent characterization of nothingness :146–158, 2014b), we will introduce our own inconsistent account. The key idea of our account is to take nothingness as the complement of the totality. Finally, we will make formal sense of it by constructing an inconsistent mereological system, which is the development of the paraconsistent mereology proposed by Weber and Cotnoir. (shrink)

Scholars have assumed what I call the synthetic interpretation, according to which the aim of Socrates’ first voyage (Phaedo 97b8–99d3) is to determine features of each object in the world by considering what features are good for it. Against this I argue for what I call the analytic interpretation, according to which it is to determine what the good is by considering why each object has its features as it does. I shall then show that my analytic interpretation sheds new (...) light on the objective and method of his second voyage (99d4–100a3). It has been discussed in the literature whether the theory of Forms is intended to explain things teleologically. But I argue that its point is rather for indirectly discovering the teleological cause, which Socrates attempted, but failed, to discover because of his reliance on empirical observation through the senses. (shrink)

According to Meinongianism, some objects do not exist but we can legitimately refer to and quantify over them. Moreover, Meinongianism standardly regards nonexistent objects as contributing to the truth-makers of sentences about nonexistent objects. Recently, Tim Crane has proposed a weak form of Meinongianism, a reductionism, which denies any contribution of nonexistent objects to truth-making. His reductionism claims that, even though we can truly talk about nonexistent objects by using singular terms and quantifiers about them, any truth about nonexistent objects (...) is reducible to some truths about existent objects. In this paper, we critically examine the reductionism casting some doubts on the reducibility of truths of sentences like ‘a winged pig is possible’ or ‘some winged pig does not exist’ into truths about existent objects. We also argue that the truth of such sentences can be explained by adopting a strong form of Meinongianism which admits contribution of nonexistent objects to the truth-making of such sentences. (shrink)

We reply to various arguments by Otavio Bueno and Edward Zalta (‘Object Theory and Modal Meinongianism’) against Modal Meinongianism, including that it presupposes, but cannot maintain, a unique denotation for names of fictional characters, and that it is not generalizable to higher-order objects. We individuate the crucial difference between Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory in the former’s resorting to an apparatus of worlds, possible and impossible, for the representational purposes for which the latter resorts to a distinction between two kinds (...) of predication, exemplification and encoding. We show that encoding has fewer forerunners in the history of philosophy than Bueno and Zalta want, and that there’s a reason why the notion has been found baffling by some. (shrink)

Aphasia is a language disorder that occurs after a stroke and impairs listening, speaking, reading, writing, and calculation skills. Patients with post-stroke aphasia in Japan are increasing due to population aging and the advancement of medical treatment. Opportunities for adequate speech therapy in chronic stroke are limited due to time constraints. Recent studies have reported that intensive speech therapy for a short period of time or continuous speech therapy using high-tech equipment, including speech applications (apps, can improve aphasia even in (...) the chronic stage. However, its underlying mechanism for improving language function and its effect on other cognitive functions remains unclear. In the present study, we investigated whether intensive speech therapy using a newly developed speech support app could improve aphasia and other cognitive functions in patients with chronic stroke. Furthermore, we examined whether it can alter the brain network related to language and other cortical areas. Thus, we conducted a prospective, single-comparison study to examine the effects of a new speech support app on language and cognitive functions and used resting state functional MRI (rs-fMRI) regions of interest (ROI) to ROI analysis to determine changes in the related brain network. Two patients with chronic stroke participated in this study. They used the independent speech therapy system to perform eight sets of 20 randomly presented words/time (taking approximately 20 min), for 8 consecutive weeks. Their language, higher cognitive functions including attention function, and rs-fMRI, were evaluated before and after the rehabilitation intervention using the speech support app. Both patients had improved pronunciation, daily conversational situations, and attention. The rs-fMRI analysis showed increased functional connectivity of brain regions associated with language and attention related areas. Our results show that intensive speech therapy using this speech support app can improve language and attention functions even in the chronic stage of stroke, and may be a useful tool for patients with aphasia. In the future, we will conduct longitudinal studies with larger numbers of patients, which we hope will continue the trends seen in the current study, and provide even stronger evidence for the usefulness of this new speech support app. (shrink)

Graham Priest, One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness, Oxford University Press, 2014, 272 pp., ISBN 9780199688258.

Ortega y Gasset pidió al filósofo la cortesía de la claridad. Las circunstancias del momento presente, en continua transformación, añaden al requerimiento orteguiano otro segundo no menos acuciante: la brevedad. Quien auténticamente sabe algo, acierta a decirlo de forma luminosa y en breve espacio, por ejemplo mil palabras. Y este es el espíritu que anima a Javier Gomá en esta colección de ensayos, o microensayos, que se resume así en su título: Todo a mil. El objetivo es, en un (...) millar de palabras, introducir al lector en la almendra de la reflexión filosófica. Así, por ejemplo, alguno de estos microensayos se arriesgan a definir con precisión cuestiones normalmente difusas como la sabiduría frente a la inteligencia o la dignidad humana; hay unos que abogan por actitudes contracorriente, como los beneficios de estar sentado, el desdén hacia las novedades, las ventajas del chisme o la afirmación gozosa de nuestro tiempo; otros critican ideas recibidas tan asentadas como el prestigio de la transgresión, la noción tradicional de 'vida privada', o la molesta tendencia a la sinceridad excesiva; otros más toman posición respecto a la responsabilidad de la crisis o el significado profundo de la paz social conquistada por el Estado de derecho; mientras otros, en fin, expresan la voz más personal del autor. Con este libro, Javier Gomá da un paso más en su decidida voluntad de hacer una filosofía mundana, abierta a todos, y ofrece así la mejor introducción posible, en mil palabras, a los más serios y perennes problemas filosóficos. (shrink)

Será que uma vida humana, por mais realizada que seja, é destituída de sentido a menos que exista uma vida depois da morte? Ou haverá sentido - o único tipo real e humano de sentido - numa vida dedicada à procura cuidadosa do que tem genuinamente valor? Serão os valores relativos de acordo com as culturas em que estamos inseridos ou conforme as opiniões pessoais? O que queremos compreender em filosofia quando discutimos as relações entre a arte e a moralidade? (...) Estas são algumas das perguntas a que este livro procura responder. O objetivo não é persuadir o leitor, mas antes ajudá-lo a fazer o seu próprio percurso reflexivo para que sejam seus todos os sonhos do mundo. (shrink)

Cogito ergo sum. "Penso, logo existo." Tal proposição resume o espírito de René Descartes (1596-1650), sábio francês cujo Discurso do método inaugurou a filosofia moderna. Em 1637, em uma época em que a força da razão tal qual a conhecemos era muito mais do que incipiente, e em que textos filosóficos eram escritos em latim, voltados apenas para os doutores, Descartes publicou Discurso do método, redigido em língua vulgar, isto é, o francês. Ele defendia o "uso público" da razão e (...) escreveu o ensaio pensando em uma audiência ampla. Queria que a razão – este privilégio único dos seres humanos – fosse exatamente isso, um privilégio de todos homens dotados de senso comum. Trata-se de um manual da razão, um prático "modo de usar". Moderno, Descartes postulava a idéia de que a razão deveria permear todos os domínios da vida humana e que a apreciação racional era parâmetro para todas as coisas, numa atividade libertadora, voltada contra qualquer dogmatismo. Evidentemente, tal premissa revolucionária lhe causaria problemas, sobretudo no âmbito da igreja: em 1663, vários de seus livros foram colocados no Index. Razão alegada: a aplicação de exercícios metafísicos em assuntos religiosos. Discurso do método mostra por que Descartes – para quem "mente", "espírito", "alma" e "razão" significavam a mesma coisa – marcou indelevelmente a história do pensamento. (shrink)