Preston and Hofelich (2012) suggested that researchers disagree on the role of self–other overlap in empathy due to a failure to differentiate among neural overlap, subjective resonance, and personal distress; they also developed a framework for tying neural and subjective overlap to various aspects of functioning they include in the construct of empathy. Although we found their discussion of different processes that have been labeled empathy interesting and helpful, we found their discussion of self–other overlap to be somewhat less useful (...) for conceptualizing differences among empathy-related processes. In addition, we provide an alternative perspective to their reasoning regarding the role of experience and neural overlap in an aspect of empathy-related responding (e.g., concern or compassion). (shrink)

Preston & de Waal minimized differences among constructs such as empathy, sympathy, and personal distress. However, such distinctions have been shown to relate differently to altruistic behavior. Moreover, although the authors discussed the role of regulation in empathy, they did not consider the possibility that sometimes empathy is not well-regulated and likely leads to personal distress rather than sympathy.

Emotion is critical in Mealey's conceptual arguments. However, several of her assertions about the role of emotion in sociopathy are problematic. Questions are raised regarding the link between lack of anxiety and low levels of secondary emotions such as love and sympathy, the argument that sociopaths are low in anxiety but high in neuroticism, and the designation of anxiety as a secondary emotion.