For a subset A of a Polish group G, we study the (almost) packing index pack( A) (respectively, Pack( A)) of A, equal to the supremum of cardinalities |S| of subsets $S\subset G$ such that the family of shifts $\{xA\}_{x\in S}$ is (almost) disjoint (in the sense that $|xA\cap yA|<|G|$ for any distinct points $x,y\in S$). Subsets $A\subset G$ with small (almost) packing index are large in a geometric sense. We show that $\pack}(A)\in\mathbb{N}\cup\{\aleph_0,\mathfrak{c}\}$ for any σ-compact subset A of a (...) Polish group. In each nondiscrete Polish Abelian group G we construct two closed subsets $A,B\subset G$ with $\mathrm{pack}(A)=\mathrm{pack}(B)=\mathfrak{c}$ and \mathrm{Pack}(A\cup B)=1 and then apply this result to show that G contains a nowhere dense Haar null subset $C\subset G$ with pack(C)=Pack(C)=κ for any given cardinal number $\kappa\in[4,\mathfrak{c}]$. (shrink)

Many theories of kind representation suggest that people posit internal, essence-like factors that underlie kind membership and explain properties of category members. Across three studies (N = 281), we document the characteristics of an alternative form of construal according to which the properties of social kinds are seen as products of structural factors: stable, external constraints that obtain due to the kind’s social position. Internalist and structural construals are similar in that both support formal explanations (i.e., “category member has property (...) P due to category membership C”), generic claims (“Cs have P”), and the generalization of category properties to individual category members when kind membership and social position are confounded. Our findings thus challenge these phenomena as signatures of internalist thinking. However, once category membership and structural position are unconfounded, different patterns of generalization emerge across internalist and structural construals, as do different judgments concerning category definitions and the dispensability of properties for category membership. We discuss the broader implications of these findings for accounts of formal explanation, generic language, and kind representation. (shrink)

We report three experiments investigating whether people’s judgments about causal relationships are sensitive to the robustness or stability of such relationships across a range of background circumstances. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people are more willing to endorse causal and explanatory claims based on stable (as opposed to unstable) relationships, even when the overall causal strength of the relationship is held constant. In Experiment 2, we show that this effect is not driven by a causal generalization’s actual scope of (...) application. In Experiment 3, we offer evidence that stable causal relationships may be seen as better guides to action. Collectively, these experiments document a previously underappreciated factor that shapes people’s causal reasoning: the stability of the causal relationship. (shrink)

Today, early in the twenty-first century, all that is changed. Individuals may strive for stability, societies may create the illusion of permanence, the quest for certainty may continue unabated, yet the fact remains that society is an ever-changing phenomenon, growing, decaying, renewing and accommodating itself to changing conditions and suffering vast modifications in the course of time. Our understanding of it will not be complete unless we take into consideration this changeable nature of society, study how differences emerge and discover (...) the direction of change. Social theory has at least become a deliberated object of contempt in academic quarters, while standing as an icon for a host of seriously interesting intellectual labours by the younger citizens of those quarters. The business of social theory might, therefore, be said to be thinking ideas about social things that have not previously been thought. Social theory, thereby, would be the work of thinking the Unthinkable. Gone are the days when the theoretical underpinnings of sociological research could be neatly confined to the conceptual terrain of, say, structural-functionalism, symbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology. Today, theoretical innovation in sociology results from a cross-referencing of disciplinary perspectives, a cross-referencing that scoops up and reconfigures many of the new social theories-poststructuralism, postmodernism, post-feminism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and deconstruction. To advocates of the interdisciplinary turn in sociology, these new social theories are primarily valuable because they disrupt traditional disciplinary boundaries. The new theories, it is said, inflame a novel arrangement with current social processes and promote an intellectual process of expansion and transformation. When social theorists today reflect on the changing relations between the individual and society, they generally do so in ways that are intensely shaped by methodological concerns that underscore actor and/or system-based models of analysis. New Directions in Social Theory: Race, Gender and the Canon sociological concerns, from the investigation of power and status processes, to social movements and revolutions, to organisational and institutional structures, to world system analysis. It outlines current developments in thinking in the field of Social Impact Assessment (SIA). This book will be an invaluable introduction for graduate students, academics, consultants and practitioners concerned with social studies. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate the relationships between perceived maternal and paternal acceptance–rejection in childhood on the one hand, and rejection sensitivity in adulthood on the other hand. The sample consisted of 300 adults: 59 males and 241 females aged 18–49. The means used for collecting the data included a Parental Acceptance- Rejection Questionnaire/Control, Adult, Mother and Father Version, and the Interpersonal Rejection Sensitivity Scale. The results showed that adults’ remembrance regarding perceived maternal and paternal acceptance-rejection during (...) childhood had a significant correlation with their current level of rejection sensitivity. We examined two age groups, and there were significant age differences. The relationship between perceived parental rejection and rejection sensitivity was stronger in younger participants than in older ones. These results were interpreted within the framework of IPARTheory. (shrink)

Much recent work on explanation in the interventionist tradition emphasizes the explanatory value of stable causal generalizations—i.e., causal generalizations that remain true in a wide range of background circumstances. We argue that two separate explanatory virtues are lumped together under the heading of `stability’. We call these two virtues breadth and guidance respectively. In our view, these two virtues are importantly distinct, but this fact is neglected or at least under-appreciated in the literature on stability. We argue that an adequate (...) theory of explanatory goodness should recognize breadth and guidance as distinct virtues, as breadth and guidance track different ideals of explanation, satisfy different cognitive and pragmatic ends, and play different theoretical roles in helping us understand the explanatory value of mechanisms. Thus keeping track of the distinction between these two forms of stability yields a more accurate and perspicuous picture of the role that stability considerations play in explanation. (shrink)

This paper builds upon Mary Kate McGowan’s analysis of the mechanisms of harm in conversations (McGowan 2004; 2009). McGowan describes how a speaker’s intervention might constitute harm by enacting what is permissible to do in the conversation thereafter. We expand McGowan’s analysis in two ways: first, we use her account to argue for the potential of interlocutor’s silence, not only speaker’s intervention, to enact harm; second, we introduce a new party into the picture: observers of the conversation. We propose that (...) not only interlocutors who contribute to harm through action, but also those who do so by omission are morally responsible for that harm. We focus on one aspect of conversations: introduction of presuppositions. We argue that when the presupposition is morally problematic (e.g., sexist, ableist, racist, homo-, trans- or xeno-phobic), interlocutors have a moral responsibility to block it. This responsibility comes in degrees, and, importantly, depends on whether the interlocutor’s speech capacity is diminished by the harmful presupposition (i.e. whether the interlocutor is being silenced). Unlike common approaches to harm in speech, which take the unit of analysis to be the speaker-interlocutor relationship, we take as unit of analysis the relationship between the pair speaker-interlocutor and an observer. Problematic presuppositions introduced in conversations can harm observers overhearing these conversations (as well society as a whole), and prevention of such harm motivates our proposal for attribution of responsibility to interlocutors. We proceed as follows. First we review the dynamics of presupposition introduction. Second, we briefly introduce McGowan’s analysis of conversational pragmatics, subscribing to her account that some conversational moves constitute a special type of harm related to oppression, and outline a taxonomy of the pathways through which harm can be inflicted upon observers and the society as a whole. In the third part we articulate our argument that in the cases of presupposition introduction considered here, interlocutors are not merely allowing harm, but actively doing it, and put forward our proposal for responsibility attribution. Finally, we address potential objections, and situate our proposal within a broader project to fight oppressive speech. (shrink)

We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity-sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent, but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as (...) the moral and political meaning of sex categorization. We propose an externalist account of sex, elaborating on extended and distributed approaches to cognition that capitalize on the natural capacity of organisms to couple with environmental resources. We introduce the notion of extended sex, and argue that properties relevant for sex categorization are neither exclusively internal to the individual skin, nor fixed. Finally, we spell out the potential of extended sex to support an active defense of diversity and an intervention against sex-based discrimination. (shrink)

When Nadya Suleman gave birth to eight babies in January 2009, the story ignited a media frenzy—first because the babies were only the second set of octuplets born in the United States, and later because of the irregularities of their conception by in vitro fertilization and the personal details of their mother's life. Hidden beneath the sensational aspects of the story, though, are a number of fundamental ethical, medical, and legal issues concerning assisted reproductive technologies. Three essays examine these (...) questions. (shrink)

This article proposes to engage Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer in light of Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology and in dialogue with Orthodox theology and the prison letters exchanged by Nadhezhda Tolokonnikova, and Slavoj Zizek. First, there is a discussion of aspects of Althaus-Reid’s theology: caminata, libertinaje, and la vida loca. Second, the Punk Prayer – what I will call an Indecent Prayer – is presented in dialogue with Althaus-Reid’s theology and Orthodox theology. Third, the prison letters between Nadya and Slavoj (...) are discussed in light of Althaus-Reid’s Indecent theology and Nadya Tolokonnikova’s Sly Christianity. (shrink)