Dawwānī, Muḥammad ibn Asʻad, 1426 or 1427-1512 or 1513. Zawrāʼ.

Views exchanged between Narahara Śesharāva Pohanekara, b. 1907, and Vāmana Malhāra Jośī, 1882-1943, Marathi litterateurs, on the latter's article, Jñāna he visha kā amr̥ta? on the philosophical concept of knowledge.

Islamic philosophy ; Philosophical anthropology.

Ibrāhīm Dīnānī, Ghulām Ḥusayn - Interviews ; Islamic philosophy.

Interviews with Ghulām Ḥusayn Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, an Iranian philosophers; views on life and philosophy etc.

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Study of "Kalimāt al-maknūnah" of Muḥammad ibn Murtaḍá Fayḍ al-Kāshī, 1598 or 1599-1680 or 168 discussed Shīʻah studies etc.

Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...) item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response. (shrink)

A new English translation of the founding text of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Buddhism, with the Tibetan version of the text included. The Root Stanzas holds an honored place in all branches of Tibetan Buddhism, as well as in the Buddhist traditions found in China, Japan, and Korea, because of the way it develops the seminal view of emptiness (shunyata), which is crucial to understanding Mahayana Buddhism and central to its practice. It is prized for its pithy and (...) pointed arguments that show that things lack intrinsic being and thus are “empty” (shunya). They abide in the Middle Way, free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. (shrink)

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...) I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

Collection of seminar papers on concept of creation in Hindu philosophy.

Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, Ghulām Ḥusayn, 1934- Quotations, maxims, etc. ; Muslim philosophers- Iran- Quotations, maxims, etc. ; Philosophers- Iran- Quotations, maxims, etc.

Comparative study of philosophy of God in Indic and Western philosophy.

Knowledge, Theory of (Islam) ; Islamic philosophy ; Knowledge, Theory of ; Relativity.

本书包含三编,第1编为用图刻画的各种反基础公理系统(ZFCˉ+AFA(或者SAFA,FAFA以及反基础公理家族AFA~))建立不同的集论模型,从而证明各种反基础公理与ZFCˉ的相对协调性.第2编修正, 完善和丰富了巴威斯(J.Barwise)等人用代数方法——方程组刻画的反基础公理——解引理理论.第3编包括两个附录.附录1给出了结构之间的互摸拟理论.附录2给出了项目研究期间发表的部分论文.

1. Yugyo chŏnt'ong kwa taedong inyŏm -- 2. Yugyo chŏnt'ong, Han'guk minjujuŭi, taedong minjujuŭi -- 3. Taedong minjujuŭi wa pip'an iron ŭi pangbŏp -- 4. Munmyŏng chŏnhwan ŭi sidae wa saengt'ae, taedong minjujuŭi ŭi kanŭngsŏng.

Reflection (Philosophy). ; Reason -- Philosophy.

On ancient system of study Vedic literature and and schools of Indic philosophy.

Analytical study of 'Pramāṇa' in Mīmāṃsā philosophy in the light of Śāstradīpikā by Pārthasārathimiśra, active 11th century.

Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, -1641 -- Criticism and interpretation.

Free will and determinism -- Religious aspects -- Islam ; Islamic philosophy.