Beginnings of Marxist historical thinking in Slovakia.

Kvokačka, A. – Migašová, J.: Súradnice estetiky, umenia a kultúry IV: Študovať estetiku: koncepcie, stratégie a súvislosti štúdia estetiky na Slovensku a v zahraničí. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta PU v Prešove 2019. ISBN 978-80-555-2310-1. 198 s.

Kvokačka, A. – Migašová, J.: Súradnice estetiky, umenia a kultúry IV: Študovať estetiku: koncepcie, stratégie a súvislosti štúdia estetiky na Slovensku a v zahraničí. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta PU v Prešove 2019. ISBN 978-80-555-2310-1. 198 s.

Kvokačka, A. – Migašová, J.: Súradnice estetiky, umenia a kultúry IV: Študovať estetiku: koncepcie, stratégie a súvislosti štúdia estetiky na Slovensku a v zahraničí. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta PU v Prešove 2019. ISBN 978-80-555-2310-1. 198 s.

Kvokačka, A. – Migašová, J.: Súradnice estetiky, umenia a kultúry IV: Študovať estetiku: koncepcie, stratégie a súvislosti štúdia estetiky na Slovensku a v zahraničí. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta PU v Prešove 2019. ISBN 978-80-555-2310-1. 198 s.

Kvokačka, A. – Migašová, J.: Súradnice estetiky, umenia a kultúry IV: Študovať estetiku: koncepcie, stratégie a súvislosti štúdia estetiky na Slovensku a v zahraničí. Prešov: Filozofická fakulta PU v Prešove 2019. ISBN 978-80-555-2310-1. 198 s.

Dawwānī, Muḥammad ibn Asʻad, 1426 or 1427-1512 or 1513. Zawrāʼ.

Views exchanged between Narahara Śesharāva Pohanekara, b. 1907, and Vāmana Malhāra Jośī, 1882-1943, Marathi litterateurs, on the latter's article, Jñāna he visha kā amr̥ta? on the philosophical concept of knowledge.

Islamic philosophy ; Philosophical anthropology.

Ibrāhīm Dīnānī, Ghulām Ḥusayn - Interviews ; Islamic philosophy.

Interviews with Ghulām Ḥusayn Ibrāhīmī Dīnānī, an Iranian philosophers; views on life and philosophy etc.

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Study of "Kalimāt al-maknūnah" of Muḥammad ibn Murtaḍá Fayḍ al-Kāshī, 1598 or 1599-1680 or 168 discussed Shīʻah studies etc.

Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...) item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response. (shrink)

A new English translation of the founding text of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school of Buddhism, with the Tibetan version of the text included. The Root Stanzas holds an honored place in all branches of Tibetan Buddhism, as well as in the Buddhist traditions found in China, Japan, and Korea, because of the way it develops the seminal view of emptiness (shunyata), which is crucial to understanding Mahayana Buddhism and central to its practice. It is prized for its pithy and (...) pointed arguments that show that things lack intrinsic being and thus are “empty” (shunya). They abide in the Middle Way, free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation. (shrink)