First-2d ed. published under title: Manual de introduccion a la ciencia del derecho.

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with (...) others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience. (shrink)

This second edition has been revised to provide additional coherence to the themes examined and introduces sections on topical issues, for example the chapter on Utilitarianism now includes a discussion on law and economics.

Background : researchers and sponsors increasingly confront the issue of whether participants in a clinical trial should have post-trial access (PTA) to the trial drug. Legislation and guidelines are inconsistent, ambiguous or silent about many aspects of PTA. Recent research highlights the potential importance of systematic reviews (SRs) of reason-based literatures in informing decision-making in medicine, medical research and health policy. Purpose: to systematically review reasons why drug trial participants should, or need not be ensured PTA to the trial drug (...) and the uses of such reasons. Data sources: databases in science/medicine, law and ethics, thesis databases, bibliographies, research ethics books and included publications’ notes/bibliographies. Publication selection: a publication was included if it included a reason as above. See article for detailed inclusion conditions. Data extraction and analysis: two reviewers extracted and analyzed data on publications and reasons. Results: of 2060 publications identified, 75 were included. These mentioned reasons based on morality, legality, interests/incentives, or practicality, comprising 36 broad (235 narrow) types of reason. None of the included publications, which included informal reviews and reports by official bodies, mentioned more than 22 broad (59 narrow) types. For many reasons, publications differed about the reason’s interpretation, implications and/or persuasiveness. Publications differed also regarding costs, feasibility and legality of PTA. Limitations: reason types could be applied differently. The quality of reasons was not measured. Conclusion: this review captured a greater variety of reasons and of their uses than any included publication. Decisions based on informal reviews or sub-sets of literature are likely to be biased. Research is needed on PTA ethics, costs, feasibility and legality and on assessing the quality of reason-based literature. (shrink)

The essays collected in this special issue explore what legitimacy means for actors and institutions that do not function like traditional states but nevertheless wield significant power in the global realm. They are connected by the idea that the specific purposes of non-state actors and the contexts in which they operate shape what it means for them to be legitimate and so shape the standards of justification that they have to meet. In this introduction, we develop this guiding methodology further (...) and show how the special issue’s individual contributions apply it to their cases. In the first section, we provide a sketch of our purpose-dependent theory of legitimacy beyond the state. We then highlight two features of the institutional context beyond the state that set it apart from the domestic case: problems of feasibility and the structure of international law. (shrink)

Debate over the nature of science has recently moved from the halls of academia into the public sphere, where it has taken shape as the "science wars." At issue is the question of whether scientific knowledge is objective and universal or socially mediated, whether scientific truths are independent of human values and beliefs. Ronald Giere is a philosopher of science who has been at the forefront of this debate from its inception, and Science without Laws offers a much-needed mediating (...) perspective on an increasingly volatile line of inquiry. Giere does not question the major findings of modern science: for example, that the universe is expanding or that inheritance is carried by DNA molecules with a double helical structure. But like many critics of modern science, he rejects the widespread notion of science--deriving ultimately from the Enlightenment--as a uniquely rational activity leading to the discovery of universal truths underlying all natural phenomena. In these highly readable essays, Giere argues that it is better to understand scientists as merely constructing more or less abstract models of limited aspects of the world. Such an understanding makes possible a resolution of the issues at stake in the science wars. The critics of science are seen to be correct in rejecting the Enlightenment idea of science, and its defenders are seen to be correct in insisting that science does produce genuine knowledge of the natural world. Giere is utterly persuasive in arguing that to criticize the Enlightenment ideal is not to criticize science itself, and that to defend science one need not defend the Enlightenment ideal. Science without Laws thus stakes out a middle ground in these debates by showing us how science can be better conceived in other ways. (shrink)

This paper examines the shareholder primacy norm as a widely acknowledged impediment to corporate social responsibility and explores the role of business schools in promoting the SPN but also potentially as an avenue for change by addressing misconceptions about shareholder primacy and the purpose of business. We start by explaining the SPN and then review its status under US and UK laws and show that it is not a likely legal requirement, at least under the guise of shareholder value (...) maximization. This is in contrast to the common assertion that managers are legally constrained from addressing CSR issues if doing so is inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders. Nonetheless, while the SPN might be muted as a legal norm, we show that it is certainly evident as a social norm among managers and in business schools—reflective, in part, of the sole voting rights of shareholders on corporate boards and of the dominance of shareholder theory—and justifiably so in the view of many managers and business academics. We argue that this view is misguided, not least when associated with claims of a purported legally enforceable requirement to maximize shareholder value. We propose two ways by which the influence of the SPN among managers might be attenuated: extending fiduciary duties of executives to non-shareholder stakeholders and changes in business school teaching such that it covers a plurality of conceptions of the purpose of the corporation. (shrink)

1. Che 1-chang. Saengmyŏng, saengmyŏng kwahak, saengmyŏng yulli -- Che 2-chang. Saengmyŏng yulli ŭi wŏlli wa kyuje -- Che 3-chang. Yŏnmyŏng ŭiryo kyŏlchŏng kwa allaksa.

I argue for a new conception of practical authority based on an analysis of the relationship between authority and subject. Commands entail a demand for practical deference, which establishes a relationship of hierarchy and vulnerability that involves a variety of signals and commitments. In order for these signals and commitments to be justified, the subject must be under a preexisting duty, the authority’s commands must take precedence over the subject’s judgment regarding fulfillment of that duty, the authority must accept the (...) position and responsibilities of command, and the authority must be sufficiently trustworthy relative to how vulnerable the subject makes herself by deferring. This results in an instrumentalist conception of practical authority that can be favorably compared to Joseph Raz’s famous service conception. The relational conception’s main advantage is that it focuses on the authority as much as the subject, requiring that the authority accept responsibility for the relationship and be sufficiently trustworthy. (shrink)

The essay replies to comments by Finnis, Gardner and Endicott, on my book, Law as a Moral Idea. It is questioned whether Finnis is right to suggest that governance by law is a requirement of justice. It is suggested that Hart's positivism may have rested upon an unduly private conception of morality. Gardner's suggestion that Law as a Moral Idea falsely manufactures disagreement with Hart is rejected, principally by pointing out that Gardner focuses upon only one issue, where the book (...) already acknowledges that Hart might conceivably agree, and ignores other issues where the disagreement with Hart seems indisputable. In response to Endicott, it is acknowledged that 'politics' could be understood as a moral idea comparable to the idea of 'law', but denied that this robs either thesis of interest. The nature of doctrinal reasoning and law's justificatory force is then discussed. (shrink)

The question that probably emerges when the title of this work is read is if it is possible to establish any relation between philosophy and a scientific discipline such as molecular biology. The common opinion, shared even by many renowned biologists and philosophers, is that each of these disciplines has got its own without taking into account the results of the other. However, the relation between science and philosophy is nowadays one of the most challenging topics, where philosophers and biologists (...) meet and each other to better understand what life is and how it works. Philosophical concepts such as information, causality, semiotics and function can be seen as instruments for a philosophical approach to biological topics. The aim of this work is to see if, studying a biological example in depth, there are elements that fit with the informational paradigm that is proposed as a philosophical framework. Biology has been considered as a discipline in which objects can be reduced to the laws of physics and chemistry. A different approach can be seen in this work. The philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce can help us to see biological systems as informational systems, where molecules are more than their chemical structure, indeed, the cell can deal with them from a semiotic point of view; that is, treating them as signs that stand for other molecules or processes, allowing the system to canalize all this information to its own benefit. (shrink)