The widespread assessment of the early period of Semyon L. Frank’s work as being influenced by German Neo-Kantianism is in need of a critical scrutiny. There are several reasons why the Russian philosopher’s interest in Neo-Kantianism merits a closer look. First, two systemic theories belonging to different trends exerted a decisive influence on Russian philosophy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: German Neo-Kantianism and Vladimir Solovyov’s school of all-unity. Second, Frank himself and the German Neo-Kantians considered Nicholas (...) of Cusa to be one of their forerunners and pointed out the importance of his mathematical ideas for their mathematical studies. Thirdly and lastly, Frank paid particular attention, especially in his formative period as a philosopher, to the leading trend in the early twentieth century, namely German Neo-Kantianism, which led some students of his work to believe that German Neo-Kantianism played the decisive role in Frank’s abandonment of Marxism in favour of religious ontology. Frank’s fundamental disagreement with German Neo-Kantianism was expressed in his work The Object of Knowledge in which he criticised the Neo-Kantian concepts of number and time. Although Frank rightly points out the one-sidedness of the Neo-Kantian definition of number, most notably in the works of the Marburg philosopher Paul Natorp, on the whole his criticism of the Neo-Kantian concept of number and time as being different from his own is not entirely convincing. In my opinion, Frank’s attempt to explain the abstract concept of number through a still more abstract concept of all-unity was not crowned with success because he ignored the experience of Christian theology and the Trinity dogma as well as the profound thoughts of the Rev. Pavel Florensky on this topic. (shrink)

This report of the roundtable that took place on 25 November 2021 at The Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia attempts to explain the obvious growth of interest in Neo-Kantian philosophy in general and the philosophy of the head of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, in particular. In their contributions, the participants in the discussion demonstrated that the current interest in Neo-Kantianism does not solely or even largely have to do with the history of philosophy but rather with the (...) relevance of many of the ideas of Marburg Neo-Kantianism for the modern theory of cognition, the philosophy of culture, ethics and the philosophy of religion. The course of the discussion highlighted the relevance of Cohen’s theory of cognition based on logic and rationality. The main outcome of the discussion was the conviction that the potential of many of Cohen’s ideas has yet to be fully tapped and there are grounds for considering them to be heralds of a new philosophy which, in many of its features, is only maturing. (shrink)

The article brings to light the idea that Russian Neo-Kantians were among the first in the history of European philosophy to recognize the significance and originality of Hermann Cohen’s philosophical system. In particular, they identified two related points that revealed the ingenuity of the great Marburg thinker: the creation of a new philosophical system and the synthesis of Kant and Hegel within that system. The article also discusses the particular focus on the part of Russian philosophers at the turn of (...) the twentieth century on Cohen’s ethical theories. It is argued that the full value of the German-Jewish thinker’s work for Russian philosophy is only starting to be appreciated, and that the work of Russian Neo-Kantians will be a great help in this endeavor. (shrink)

The article attempts to raise a question and give an answer to it regarding the evaluation of the philosophical creativity of Hermann Cohen, the German-Jewish thinker of the late XIX - early XX century. Moreover, following the philosophical style of Cohen himself, the question posed and discussed in the article is not idle, but it contains a hypothesis that forms our answer in a certain way. It is important to identify the difficulties and intellectual determinants that prevent the formation of (...) a clear and unambiguous answer. At the same time these difficulties contain an initiating moment for opening a philosophical debate. The historical and philosophical reasons that make the very beginning of the discussion of the question more complex, are considered. The article, of course, cannot claim to be an exhaustive answer on such a fundamental topic, which is contained in the designated question. But the article itself, and the articles following it in the section devoted to the work of Herman Cohen, may be indicate that the time for this discussion has come. (shrink)

The Russian poet and anthroposophist Andrei Belyi has four poems from 1918 with the same title, Anthroposophy [Antroposofiia]. These are love poems and anthroposophy is represented in them as a living spiritual being of female gender. The principal attribute of this being is a "clear gaze," "flashing eyes," which regard the poet from the precincts of light, of blueness, from waves of aromas and musical harmonies. These verses are clearly oriented to the poem "Three Encounters" [Tri vstrechi] by Vladimir (...) Solov'ev, the theme of which is the thrice-repeated vision of what Solov'ev recognized as the Sophia of the ancient Gnostics and of Jakob Böhme. How are we to understand Belyi's enigmatic poetic intent? How does anthroposophy—a "science of the spirit," an occult system created by Rudolf Steiner—become in Belyi's imagination now a "sister," now a beloved—"tender, gentle, and kind"—linked to the poet by a mysterious and fateful meeting in eternity? Most importantly, what does this anthropomorphism of anthroposophy mean? The suggestion that these verses may have had real prototypes poems does not eliminate the question. But the question is resolved if we turn to a very well-known and in certain respects key lecture by Steiner entitled "The Essence of Anthroposophy," which he gave in Berlin in February 1913, and which Andrei Belyi attended. This lecture not only provides the key to those of Belyi's poems of interest to us here; it also brings us directly to the theme of our present study, inasmuch as its content creates a bridge between Russian religious culture of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, developing under the aegis of Sophia, and the latest German gnosis. It is therefore worth dwelling on it especially. (shrink)

One of the most important tasks in each philosophical tradition is to determine the methodological foundations and the target reason for research practice. Russian Russian neo-Kantianism raises several fundamental questions, including the criteria for distinguishing individual systems and the possibility of their integral reconstruction, the identification of the independence of Russian philosophers in overcoming the key contradictions of transcendental idealism, as well as discussions regarding the contribution of Russian neo-Kantians to the history of the development of Russian and European philosophy. (...) No less significant is the problem of uniting Russian neo-Kantianism in the context of the general tradition of neo-Kantianism in its development to the latest trends. The prospect of turning to the heritage of Russian philosophers is largely determined by the design of post-Kantianism and post-Neo-Kantianism. In the works of A.I. Vvedensky, and then B.A. Focht, V.E. Seseman, S.L. Rubinstein, and many others, the transition from German classical idealism in the prism of the specifics of Russian philosophy to the formation of a new understanding of transcendental philosophy and its tasks was marked. In many ways, the proposed solutions were distinguished by originality and obvious independence, but at the same time they were implicitly within the boundaries of the tradition of German neo-Kantian philosophy set by I. Kant. Comparing the latest prospects for the development of neo-Kantian methodology, it can be assumed, not without reason, that Russian neo-Kantianism has largely anticipated the latest trends. Russian neo-Kantians need to reveal the unity of the entire tradition for an objective assessment and subsequent actualization of the heritage of the Russian Neo-Kantians, accompanying this process with a historical and philosophical reconstruction of individual systems of philosophy, but also identifying those perspectives for philosophy that were designated by Russian thinkers. Russian neo-Kantians' problem field of self-determination within the framework of the history of Russian and European philosophy is proposed in the content of the article. Special attention is focused on the unity of methodological tasks and the target reason for the research practices of thinkers who at different stages of their development contributed to the formation of the phenomenon of Russian neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Although the concept of “pure knowledge” is one of the most interesting and singular concepts in the philosophical work of Vasily Seseman, it can only be presented after a comprehensive analysis of the philosopher’s numerous works devoted to ontological, epistemological and logical problems. Seseman believes that the main philosophical trends at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology, could not present this concept, although they did try. According to the philosopher, the main reason for the inability (...) of neo-Kantianism, intuitionism and phenomenology to start talking about pure knowledge is their inability to assert the essential difference between objective and non-objective knowledge. Sesemann pays special attention when substantiating his concept of “pure knowledge” to the difference between his approach and that of the founder of modern phenomenology. The philosopher points out that even Husserl, who concentrated attention on the specifics of inner experience, puts this specific, in the end, in dependence on the process of cognition and reflection, completely ignoring its ontological foundations. While pure knowledge, according to Seseman, is neither non-objective, nor objective knowledge, nor non-objective, nor objective being, it, in fact, is non-knowledge and non-being. It is precisely this understanding by the philosopher of this phenomenon that allows him to characterize pure knowledge as premiseless and limitless and, in general, as free from any ontological or epistemological determinations. However, on the other hand, Sesemann insists that the phenomenon of pure knowledge has the meaning of not just a regulatory idea, an infinitely distant ideal, but also a real constitutive meaning, as a principle that reveals and determines the human striving for knowledge as an interconnected and necessary process that ascends from the onto-gnoseological stage of non-objective knowledge to the epistemological, and then the logical stage of objective knowledge. (shrink)

This article discusses the connection between the ideas of Fyodor M. Dostoevsky and Vladimir S. Solovyov on the need for cultural and moral transformation of those who would claim to participate in...

U vremenu novog definisanja srpskog nacionalnog identiteta od odlucujuceg je znacaja uspostavljanje kopce izmedju kriticki vrednovane tradicije s jedne i zahteva vremena globalizacije, s druge strane. Produktivnu vezu izmedju starog i novog mogu ce je ostvariti ukoliko Srbija izgradi demokratske i nekompromitovane i nekorumpirane drzavne institucije preko kojih bi se obrazovala racionalna svest o vlastitoj posebnosti, kao i vrednostima spoljnog sveta. Glavna odgovornost u tom osetljivom procesu samo definisanja je na politickim elitama i ideoloskim projektima koje oni otvoreno ili prikriveno (...) proteziraju, a koji se na najprozirniji nacin ogledaju u medijima (javnom mnjenju) i institucijama obrazovanja. (shrink)

The article analyzes the creativity of one of the most famous Russian neokantians Boris V. Yakovenko. Despite the fact that the work of Yakovenko becomes the subject of analysis of an increasing number of researchers both in Russia and abroad, it has not yet taken place in a systematic analysis. The article attempts to consider the philosophical creativity of the Russian philosopher systematically, revealing both the main directions of European thought that had the greatest influence on the position of Yakovenko (...) and the main areas of philosophy to which the efforts of the national thinker were directed. These, according to the author, include the history of philosophy and the system of so-called transcendental pluralism. It is pointed out that the history of philosophy for Yakovenko is a single holistic process and therefore is the history of the development of philosophical ideas, and not the history of life and work of individual philosophers. According to Yakovenko, the general philosophical scheme of historical development looks like this: from Greek cosmism to German epistemology and the beginning ontological turn in modern philosophy. There is also the belief of B.V. Yakovenko that there is no national philosophy. In his opinion, philosophy, as well as science in General, can only be international. His second main thesis concerning the development of philosophy is that philosophy should be independent from other branches of human knowledge and knowledge. She must not be a servant of theology or science. The article also presents various stages of the Russian philosopher's development of his version of the concept of pluralistic philosophy. According to Yakovenko, only pluralistic philosophy is able to know the essence as the main object of philosophy. (shrink)

The philosophy of religion as presented by Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, the founders and main representatives of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, is an important and at the same time controversial part of their philosophical systems. The discussion around the problems of religion began within the Marburg School and still continues among those who study that School. The reason for this is that “fitting” philosophical thinking about the phenomenon of religion into the classical triad of any system of philosophy, (...) i. e. effectively formulating that phenomenon in logical concepts, ethical postulates and aesthetic principles touched the very foundations of that system. Drawing mainly on the rough notes and correspondence of Cohen and Natorp I argue that, in spite of internal and quite important differences over the problems of religion and its place in philosophical constructions, Cohen and Natorp, first, retained their commitment to critical idealism and remained loyal to their philosophical school to the end and, second, followed the principle of mutual respect, preserving their professional and human sympathy for each other. Besides, I substantiate my assertion that Marburg Neo-Kantians had different concepts of the special place of religion in the system of philosophy. The specific nature of this difference warrants the discussion not only of the boundary of reason and rationality but adds new dimensions to that boundary, filling it with content and thus broadening the very sphere of critical idealism. In the course of the discussion of the problems of religion, Paul Natorp and Hermann Cohen stake a claim to projects for the serious transformation of philosophy which they tried to implement in their later works. (shrink)

The notion of conditional entropy is extended to noncomposite systems. The \-deformed entropic inequalities, which usually are associated with correlations of the subsystem degrees of freedom in bipartite systems, are found for the noncomposite systems. New entropic inequalities for quantum tomograms of qudit states including the single qudit states are obtained. The Araki–Lieb inequality is found for systems without subsystems.

Interdisciplinary studies of science form a “living” organism, in which every part performs its function and is connected with other parts. Philosophy of science plays a role of the “think-tank” of that organism. It is a generator of the sense that connects the functions of its separate parts into a systematic unity. It can be called the consciousness of science. Metaphilosophy of science is related to philosophy of science in the same way as philosophy of science itself is related to (...) science. Within metaphilosophy of science the propensity of philosophy of science to self-reflection is implemented. Metaphilosophy of science makes relevant the issues that relate to the philosophical significance of the processes taking place in the so-called “trading zone” (in the sense of P. Galison). These trading zone is a place where scientists, science-of-science theorists and philosophers exchange their ideas. The interaction between philosophy and metaphilosophy of science takes place in the course of a competition among various philosophical interpretations of the results received within the studies of these “trading” processes. Institutional, methodological, historical and culturological studies get a philosophical interpretation and become the source of metaphilosophical ideas. Metaphorically, one may say, that metaphilosophy of science is the self-consciousness of philosophy of science. The very idea that metaphilosophy of science is a participant of the process occurring in the “trading zone” puts an end to a meaningless pile of “metalevels” that very often characterize philosophical discussions of science. (shrink)

The logic of single-conclusion proofs () is introduced. It combines the verification property of proofs with the single valuedness of proof predicate and describes the operations on proofs induced by modus ponens rule and proof checking. It is proved that is decidable, sound and complete with respect to arithmetical proof interpretations based on single-valued proof predicates. The application to arithmetical inference rules specification and -admissibility testing is considered. We show that the provability in gives the complete admissibility test for the (...) rules which can be specified by schemes in -language. The test is supplied with the ground proof extraction algorithm which eliminates the admissible rules from a -proof by utilizing the information from the corresponding -proofs. (shrink)

Для Макса Вебера «рациональная бюрократия» есть идеальный тип организации общества. Однако идеальный тип не позволяет заполнить провал между властью и обществом, который называется отчуждением. Это - миф, и когда Макс Вебер говорит о рациональности, то в основе этого лежат не требования научности, но отсылка к некоей культурной аксиологии. Этот миф можно критиковать, анализируя конкретное поведение бюрократов, обычно мало рациональное, но также ставя под вопрос и саму культуру, которая хочет быть или даже претендует быть рационалистической. В России чудовищность бюрократии является следствием (...) кризиса культуры. Pour Max Weber la « bureaucratie rationnelle » est un type idéal d’organisation de la société. Mais ce type idéal ne permet pas de combler le hiatus entre pouvoir et société, lequel s’appelle aliénation. C’est un mythe, et si Max Weber parle de rationalité, ce n’est pas en vertu d’une exigence scientifique mais par référence à une axiologie culturelle. On peut donc le critiquer en analysant le comportement concret des bureaucrates -lequel est souvent fort peu rationnel -mais également en mettant en question une culture qui se veut ou se prétend rationaliste. En Russie, la monstruosité de la bureaucratie est la conséquence d’une crise de la culture. According to Max Weber, “rational bureaucracy” is an ideal-type of social organization. But this ideal-type cannot bridge the gap between power and society, something we could call alienation. It is a myth, and if Max Weber resorts to the concept of rationality, it is not because of any scientific need, but by reference to a cultural axiology. He can therefore be criticized by analyzing the actual behavior of bureaucrats, which often is less than rational, but also by challenging a culture that wants or claims to be rationalistic. In Russia, the monstrosity of bureaucracy is the consequence of a crisis of culture. (shrink)

Since there is a hierarchy in levels of the organization of the world (in, for example, its social, biological, physical and cosmic aspects) there is a plurality of aspects of scientific philosophy, each of which takes its bearings from this or that level of the organization of the world. This means that when speaking about the laws of philosophy, it is necessary to specify which aspect is being spoken about. In the course of my argument my guideline is the highest, (...) or cosmic world, but I shall also use examples from the physical world. The first law of philosophy of the cosmic world is: each being has a single basis. (It realizes this basis of itself, i.e. it is a primary basis). The first law of the philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: all physical being is unique. The second law of philosophy of the cosmic world is: the basis of all being is active to the point of self-excitement. It is manifest and demonstrable of itself, fracturing unity into multiplicity. The second law of the philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: all physical being is active and excitable. The third law of the philosophy of the cosmic world is: the basis of all being excites itself unevenly. The third law of philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: every physical being changes by a conversion leap. These then are the three laws of the philosophy of the cosmic and physical worlds: uniqueness, activity, and leap. I end by showing how laws of cosmic ethics and a cosmic aesthetics follow from the laws of the philosophy of the cosmic world. (shrink)

It is argued that O.E. Stoliarova’s analysis of the STS programs leads her to a conclusion that in them the principle of reflexivity is not carried out though this contradicts the orientation of these programs on a self-reflection of the scientific bases. Hence, a problem arises: whether we will apply the principle of empiricism to justification of metascientific reasonings. This, in turn, leads to a problem of universality of philosophy as a platform for metascientific criticism. The formulation and the solution (...) of such a problem assume the possibility of creation of metaphilosophical systems radicalizing the principle of reflexivity before its application to philosophy. Thereby the philosophy of science appears in the field of immanent paradoxes. An exit from similar paradoxes demands new prospect of philosophical researches. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical anthropology fluctuates between, on the one hand, the positivist rejection of the metaphysically loaded concepts of “essence” and “existence” in their theoretical constru...