Climate justice activists envision a “postcarbon” future that not only transforms energy infrastructures but also redresses the fossil fuel economy’s long-standing racial inequalities. Yet this anti-racist rebranding of the “zero emissions” telos does not tend to the racial grief that’s foundational to white supremacy. Accordingly, I ask: can we address racial oppression through a “just transition” to a “postcarbon” moment? In response, I connect today’s postcarbon imaginary with yesterday’s postcolonial imaginary. Drawing from research on US-based climate activism, I explore how (...) the utopic rhetoric of a “just transition” is instantiated in practice. I argue that the racialized absences constitutive of what scholars call “postcolonial amnesia” are operative in the anti-racist move to a postcarbon moment. This postcarbon imaginary formulates the vulnerability of people of color to biophysical disasters as the raison d’être for infrastructural transformation. This, I argue, has the effect of overlooking the ways in which racial grief inheres in such vulnerability and the capacity of energy infrastructures to uphold racist hierarchies. I situate this “postcarbon amnesia” in Anne Cheng’s framework for differentiating “grief” from “grievance,” calling for renewable energy transitions that move away from enumerative grievances and toward a sobering recognition of racial grief. (shrink)

RésuméMoore attribuah l'idéalisme de Berkeley à sa négligence de la distinction entre l'acte d'appréhension et son objet. Bien que Berkeley ait justement tracé cette distinction dans le premier Dialogue, et l'ait rejetée, peu s'en sont aperçu, et ceux qui l'ont remarqué lui reprochent habituellement de confondre l'acte d'appréhension avec une action. La thèse ici développée est que Berkeley n'est pas coupable de cette confusion et qu'il rejette la distinction, en fait, pour de bonnes raisons à caractére empiriste, qui ont à (...) voir avec ce que l'on tient pour son argument principal. (shrink)

Probably the most celebrated controversy in all of the history of science was that between Newton and Leibniz over the invention of the calculus. The argument ranged far beyond a mere priority dispute and took on the character of a war between two different philosophies of nature. Newton was the first to devise the methods of the calculus, but Leibniz (who independently discovered virtually identical methods) was the first to publish, in 1684. Mutual toleration passed into suspicion and, at last, (...) denunciation of each by the other as a fraud and a plagiarist. The affair became a scandal, as British mathematicians asserted Newton's claims before the public while their Continental colleagues hotly defended Leibniz's priority. Professor Hall analyzes the situation out of which the dispute arose, the circumstances that caused it to become embittered, the dispositions of the chief actors, and the shifts in their opinions of each other. (shrink)

Both older persons and those who havedisabilities can encounter discrimination whenthey seek medical care. Just as ageism andstereotypes about older persons mayinappropriately limit medical care for theelderly, limits may be placed on medical carefor those who are disabled simply because ofthe presence of a disability. At the sametime death is the natural end of the lifespanfor all individuals and there are situationswhen aggressive medical care is not indicated. It is not right to always insist on ``doingeverything'' for a person even (...) if that personmay be at risk otherwise for discrimination. Using the example of the elderly, this paperexamines the risks of discrimination and thedangers of overtreatment in caring for olderpersons and suggests parallels in theappropriate care of those who havedisabilities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.2 (2002) 225-237 [Access article in PDF] Did Bayle Read Saint-Evremond? Thomas M. Lennon Of course Bayle read Saint-Evremond—he quotes him. Moreover, he published one of Saint-Evremond's texts. But there is reading, and then there is reading. There is selective, inattentive perusal of excerpts or even secondary sources, with no attempt to penetrate beyond a superficial understanding; and then there is comprehensive, (...) close scrutiny of the best primary sources, with sensitivity to nuance, and attention to context. In short, there is a difference between skimming and studying. Did Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) skim or study the work of Saint-Evremond (ca.1614-1703)?This article argues that Bayle's first-hand knowledge of Saint-Evremond's work was superficial and dependent on a secondary source that gives that work a less than obvious, and hitherto unappreciated meaning for Bayle. This shift matters because it bears on the question of the status of Bayle's religious faith. With her classic Pierre Bayle (1963-64), Elizabeth Labrousse set aside the traditional view of Bayle as a religious skeptic whose professions of faith cannot be taken at face value. Such had been the view held by many in Bayle's own time, most notably by Pierre Jurieu, and near-universally from the Enlightenment into the twentieth century. Very recently, in a work that is no less impressive than hers on this and other topics in Bayle, Gianluca Mori has defended the traditional view, basing a part of his argument on Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond. 1 Thus the question above. Moreover, the matter of Bayle's religious belief is not a merely biographical one. First, there is the fact of his [End Page 225] influence, especially given his huge readership, although Bayle's influence may well be other than anything he intended. Secondly, in any case, the interpretation of Bayle's work as a whole depends on it, for virtually everything he wrote besides the Dictionnaire has a religious dimension.To appreciate the importance of the question, something must first be said about Charles de Marguetel de St. Denis, sieur de Saint-Evremond. He was known in his time, and still is, as a libertine. It is difficult, however, to define libertinage beyond a combination of hedonistic mores and dubious religious beliefs—Epicureanism in some loose and popular sense. 2 What is more important, in any case, is how Bayle might have thought the term applied to Saint-Evremond; and here it is clear that outright atheism may have been at issue. Bayle reports that it was publicly known that Saint-Evremond "ended his long life, just as he had lived it, en esprit fort." He seems certainly to have died without benefit of religion. When asked on his deathbed whether he wished to be reconciled, says Bayle, he answered yes, "with all my heart. I would like to be reconciled with my appetite. For my stomach is no longer functioning in its usual way." Bayle was often at pains to insist upon the ultimate inaccessibility of others' real beliefs (and of the inappropriateness of attempting to reach them). In this case, however, he was prepared to hold up Saint-Evremond as a counter-example to the widely-held belief that there were no speculative atheists, i.e., people who would sincerely deny the existence of God, but only practical atheists, i.e., people who live as if they did not believe in the existence of God, but who, try as they may, are at least occasionally aware of it. 3This view of Saint-Evremond is important because, when accused of irreligion himself, Bayle cited the libertine's work as indicative of his own beliefs. To understand how Bayle came to be accused, and the significance of this response to it, some of the historical background is first necessary. Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique sold better than any text in the eighteenth century, philosophical or otherwise; and it was a best-seller right from the publication of its first edition, in... (shrink)

This article examines why U.S. healthcare professionals became involved in “enhanced interrogation,” or torture, during the War on Terror. A number of factors are identified including a desire on the part of these professionals to defend their country and fellow citizens from future attack; having their activities approved and authorized by legitimate command structures; financial incentives; and wanting to prevent serious harm from occurring to prisoners/detainees. The factors outlined here suggest that psychosocial factors can influence health professionals’ ethical decision-making.

According to the Rationality Constraint, our concept of belief imposes limits on how much irrationality is compatible with having beliefs at all. We argue that empirical evidence of human irrationality from the psychology of reasoning and the psychopathology of delusion undermines only the most demanding versions of the Rationality Constraint, which require perfect rationality as a condition for having beliefs. The empirical evidence poses no threat to more relaxed versions of the Rationality Constraint, which only require only minimal rationality. Nevertheless, (...) we raise problems for all versions of the Rationality Constraint by appealing to more extreme forms of irrationality that are continuous with actual cases of human irrationality. In particular, we argue that there are conceivable cases of “mad belief” in which populations of Lewisian madmen have beliefs that are not even minimally rational. This undermines Lewis’s claim that our ordinary concept of belief is a theoretical concept that is implicitly defined by its role in folk psychology. We argue that introspection gives us a phenomenal concept of belief that cannot be analyzed by applying Lewis’s semantics for theoretical terms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Rejoinder to MoriThomas M. LennonGianluca Mori and I are broadly in agreement about everything in my paper except the answer to its main question, viz., how Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond is to be understood in the third Eclaircissement. Mori thinks that Bayle's use of Saint Evremond was one of his "provocations aimed at orthodox readers." It is an instance of his thesis that "Bayle's professions of Christian faith, (...) though frequent, are generally far from being above suspicion: indeed almost every one of them raises questions about their actual significance."1 On my view, one line of argument for not taking Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond "at face value in his profession of religious faith... is highly questionable."2 That is, as far as his use of Saint-Evremond is concerned, Bayle should be taken as the fideist that he, here and in many other places, in effect claimed to be.We are in agreement about the nature of the key text itself that Bayle cites from the Conversation. It is a "ridiculous" text, dripping with sarcasm, an ironic parody of the very views that Bayle claims to believe. Moreover, Bayle himself is in agreement with this view of the text, and expresses it in so many words. The knot of our disagreement consists in how Bayle could have used such a text to express fideist views. Mori thinks that the very use of the text itself is sufficient to call those views into doubt. "Bayle was fully aware that the text he presented as a 'clarification' of his fideism had very little right to be considered as Christian orthodoxy,... In a word, Bayle knew full well that his fideism would be regarded as insincere and destructive of faith."3The basis for my view begins with what Bayle says about this text in a statement that Mori has so far not acknowledged either in his book or in his reply to me. Says Bayle after citing Saint-Evremond, "Give this thought a more serious and proper tone and it will become reasonable." It is here that Bayle [End Page 335] acknowledges the inappropriateness of Saint-Evremond's text, but he does so to reject it as it stands. Bayle did not, as Mori claims, present the text "as a clarification of his fideism." Only when the text is given a "more serious and proper tone," that is, when it is stripped of its irony and sarcasm, does it cease to be a parody of his views and become an accurate expression of them. Bayle explicitly dissociates himself from the unamended text, introducing it with the comment that "this thought has been given a ridiculous sense, in the hands of a master."4 But Mori takes this text as it stands to convey Bayle's message, as if Bayle had not commented on it at all. It is as if, to repeat the text at the end of my paper, the Bible were to be cited as stating the claim that there is no God. It does so, of course, but only preceded by the disclaimer that only "the fool hath said in his heart there is no God" (Psalm 14: 1).According to Mori, Bayle's use of Saint-Evremond was provocative. Bayle's text is not provocative, however. Had he intended it to be, he would have directly cited Saint-Evremond, without comment. Instead, he is perfectly clear about whom he is quoting and how that source should be understood. To be sure, such a citation is dramatic, and no doubt designed for effect, but the effect is to show how unexceptional Bayle took his conception of the faith-reason relation to be. Bayle in the Eclaircissement is not trying to convert anyone but to explain his position in a way that makes it acceptable to the Consistory of the Walloon Church. To be sure, it is an irony that Saint-Evremond's text, slightly but importantly corrected, expresses Bayle's view, but it is not an irony in the sense of winking sarcasm.Mori insists that, as a matter of historical fact, Bayle's text was found to be provocative... (shrink)

Searching for an explanation to human superiority, Friedman and Lackey offer their General Theory of Purposeful Behavior: People seek control as an end in itself--the ability to make accurate predictions is the means to that end. This tight knit theory defines the dynamic relationship between and among predictive processes responsible for human control and success. A distinctly different view of intelligence, this volume includes discussions on "Human Motivation", "Gaining Control", "Maximizing Control", and "Impediments to Control". Important implications of the theory (...) include "Achieving Success", "Working Effectively", "Educating For Control", and "The Pursuit of Happiness". (shrink)

Millum and Bromwich’s excellent article provides both conceptual and practical rationale for reexamining the fundamentals of the informed consent process for research and clinical interventi...

A familiar image from the Roman world is a Pompeian portrait of a man and woman sometimes identified as Terentius Neo and his wife. He has a papyrus roll under his chin, while she looks out with a writing tablet in one hand, a stylus held to her lips in the other. The message of the attributes presented would seem to be: ‘ We can and do read and write’. But how should the message be interpreted? To judge from the (...) houses in which this and similar portraits were found, the couple was not of the elite decurion class, but belonged to that difficult to define group of varying social, economic and cultural statuses recently described by Keith Hopkins as ‘sub-elites’. Does the display of book and pen then reflect the social reality of the sub-elite orders of Pompeian society, or is the self-representation rather an expression of social pretension, with the couple attempting to emulate the Roman elite? If the latter is the case, what does the image say about the habits of the Roman ruling class? This question has been raised in relation to the issue of literacy, particularly women's literacy, but the image invites another question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bayle’s Anticipation of PopperThomas M. LennonA comprehensive history of skepticism might someday argue, what now perhaps seems prima facie implausible, that Karl Popper (1902–96) was anticipated by Pierre Bayle (1647–1706). Now, pointing out adumbrations, anticipations, or even outright earlier statements of later philosophical views is by itself of only antiquarian interest. Questions of priority may be of importance in the history of science but not in the history of (...) philosophy, in which the exercise must pay off in a better understanding of the connected authors.For example, in a paper called “Locke’s Anticipation of Kripke,” J. L. Mackie drew attention to passages in Locke where the so-called causal theory of reference recently advanced by Kripke and others is at least adumbrated. 1 The so-called traditional theory of reference has it that denotation is fixed by connotation—in the terminology of Locke, reference to a thing requires the idea of that thing. But Mackie discovered that Locke thought it possible, at least under certain circumstances, to refer to the real essence of gold, for example, even though we have no idea whatsoever of that essence. The causal theory is supposed to overthrow the traditional theory precisely in that it systematically allows such reference in ignorance of essence. Mackie’s discovery is ironic, for Locke is the author most often associated with the traditional theory.Mackie himself did nothing with the Locke-Kripke connection, which he seems to have regarded as a curiosity. In fact the anticipation, if startling, seems rather slight and circumscribed considering that, in the passages cited by Mackie, Locke sees such reference only when an instance of gold is present to be referred to. But there is at least this payoff, that the so-called traditional theory of [End Page 695] reference may not be quite traditional. Moreover, it may be, not just Locke, but the whole skeptical tradition that anticipates Kripke. 2There is a close analogy between the Locke-Kripke connection and a connection that will be drawn here between Bayle and Popper. In both cases the seventeenth-century anticipator specifically sets out but clearly rejects a view that is later central to the twentieth-century anticipated. That Kripke should be anticipated by the very author whose “traditional” view is most often held up as a foil to the causal theory obviously involves a certain irony, but any irony in Popper’s being anticipated by such a figure as Bayle will be dispelled by the more systematic connections between them. 3 Here, at the end, some indication of these systematic connections will be sketched, but the main purpose of this paper is only to provide a program for interpreting Bayle. The payoff of Bayle’s anticipation of Popper, then, is an optic that focuses for us this key figure of the early Enlightenment.Some brief indication of the systematic connections between Bayle and Popper will be useful at the outset, lest the main thrust of the paper be missed. After all, the specific anticipation of Popper by Bayle that is likened to Mackie’s Locke-Kripke connection is, like that connection, something of a curiosity—mildly interesting in its own right but without systematic significance by itself—for in both cases, the views are stated only to be rejected. In the case of Bayle and Popper, however, the negative connection leads one to further reflections that yield positive connections—rather as if Locke should be reread as Kripkean in other respects.This result is more interesting in the case of Bayle for two reasons. First, a rereading based on Popper is going to be far more comprehensive and programmatic than would anything based on Kripke. Second, readers of Bayle, far more than those of Locke, are in need of all the interpretive help they can get. Interpretations of Bayle notoriously vary with respect to every one of his views, and do so more widely than for any other figure in his period. Despite his universally acknowledged importance, 4 the literature has taken to referring to the actual views underlying that importance as “the Bayle enigma.” 5 [End Page 696]Here some of that enigma may be dispelled if... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 128-129 [Access article in PDF] Robert Crocker, editor. Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. xix + 228. Cloth, $77.00. By describing the early modern period as such, we thereby avow a continuity with it that ill squares with the following, insufficiently appreciated fact. The early modern counterparts of the largely atheistic American Philosophical Association, let's (...) say, were to an even greater degree theistic, and, moreover, theism affected their description and explanation of the world in a profound way—certainly more so than it does their few theistic descendents. This is true even of authors, like Hobbes and Spinoza, who might be read as leading to later atheism. The fact of early modern theism and its centrality in early modern philosophy and science are amply demonstrated in one after another of the eleven essays of this book.An emblematic figure is Robert Boyle, who figures as a main player in three of the essays, and is at least mentioned in five of the others. Lotte Mulligan, for example, investigates the role of "right reason" in Boyle's argument that religion is illuminated and made [End Page 128] plausible by metaphorically expressed analogies with natural philosophy, and conversely. The upshot is that only the "Christian Virtuoso," endowed with right reason whereby he is inspired to notice and express these analogies, was in a position to interpret the codes expressed both in the book of revelation and in the book of nature, one being incomplete without the other.Luisa Simonutti treats Boyle's engagement with the theological and scientific work of Spinoza through Spinoza's correspondence with Oldenburg. And G. A. J. Rogers deploys the work of Boyle, as well as of Locke, Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists, against the once-standard view (vide Butterfield) that "a major feature of the seventeenth-century was a secularization of knowledge." (Given just the other papers in this volume, this may seem like shooting fish in a barrel. Even so, perhaps one or two of the shots appear to miss. Newton seems proleptically to answer Hume's skepticism about induction by invoking, not divine simplicity, but an argument to the best explanation.)These papers overlap with two others, forming the core of the book. Sarah Hutton and Robert Crocker take on Cambridge Platonism. The former deals with Ralph Cudworth's rejection of Cartesian voluntarism in favor of an intellectualism of goodness and wisdom that grounds both the providential governance of the world and its intelligibility to human inquiry. The latter deals with Henry More's doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, a prima facie unlikely doctrine, but one that is less problematic, according to More, than the orthodox alternatives (creationism and traducianism).Three other papers fall outside this core, but their topics are no less relevant. Perhaps the most undeniable connection between the natural and the supernatural is to be found in Grotius, here studied by Jacqueline Lagree. Likely the most unexpected player will be the eccentric esprit fort, Cyrano de Bergerac. His work of nearly pure fantasy, in the Rabelaisian tradition, might well have made later, more serious heterodoxies possible. James E. Force provides a nice case study in Newton's reliance on what he took to be providentially guided comets as sources for the replenishment of otherwise declining celestial motion and matter (a line which, ironically, was picked up by Hume as a premise of an argument designed to undo the argument from design). Richard H. Popkin outlines three views of Judaism in the period. There is little connection with nature, but an important one with reason via a problem that exercised Cudworth and Newton: most peoples are polytheistic despite the clear monotheism of revelation. One theory had it that Judaism was the original, pure religion, which degenerated into various forms of paganism. But this degeneracy was soon read by the English deists such that originally there was a natural religion, of which Judaism and all others were a degeneration. Transmitted to the Enlightenment by Spinoza... (shrink)

This article examines Bourdieu’s adoption of Husserl’s concept of ‘doxa’ and argues that Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl overpolarizes doxa and reflexivity. The article argues that there is a need for Bourdieusian sociology to adopt a more complex interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology in order to understand the potential range of states of consciousness between doxa and reflexivity. In contrast to Bourdieu’s reading of Husserl, this article argues that the philosophical underlabouring for an adequate understanding of doxa is now available within recent (...) Husserlian studies which marks a radical development from earlier readings in the ‘sociology of consciousness’. (shrink)

Feminist scholars advocate the adoption of distinctive values in research. While this constitutes a coherent alternative to the more frequently cited cognitive or scientific values, they cannot be taken to supplant those more orthodox values. Instead, each set might better be understood as a local epistemology guiding research answerable to different cognitive goals. Feminist scholars advocate the adoption of distinctive values in research. While this constitutes a coherent alternative to the more frequently cited cognitive or scientific values, they cannot be (...) taken to supplant those more orthodox values. Instead, each set might better be understood as a local epistemology guiding research answerable to different cognitive goals. (shrink)

ArgumentDuring the early nineteenth century, the German Association of Investigators of Nature and Physicians drew upon the cultural resource of choral-society songs as a way to promote male camaraderie and intellectual collaboration. Investigators of nature and physicians wished to forge a unified, scientific identity in the absence of a national one, and music played a critical role in its establishment. During the 1820s and 30s, Liedertafel and folk songs formed a crucial component of their annual meetings. The lyrics of these (...) tunes, whose melodies were famous folk songs, were rewritten to reflect the lives of investigators of nature and physicians. Indeed, the singing of these Liedertafel songs played an important part in the cultivation of the Naturforschers’ persona well into the twentieth century. (shrink)

This article takes as its point of departure the idea that the adoption of managerial principles to ensure the quality of DNA evidence is an accident of history which has changed the ways forensic biology is conducted and forensic biologists think. I begin by defining managerialism and tracking its entry into the contentious world of forensic biology, asking how it is that a focus on efficiency and precise process control is affecting these labs. My analysis unfolds in two parts. I (...) first look at the external inspection routines that assure quality in forensic labs and the degree to which these routines represent ‘‘self” rather than ‘‘peer” assessment. I next look at the internal lab quality assurance routines that facilitate managerial control of technical and scientific workers, noting that QA is a trope flexible enough to govern both the numerically auditable and quasirobotic activities of technicians along with the less tangible more consensus-based human interactions of scientists. Illustrating that ‘‘science” is being pushed aside by management imperatives, I examine the consequences of this new emphasis for both the lab workers and the criminal justice system. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christianity, Democracy, and the Shadow of Constantine eds. by George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle PapanikolaouMyles Werntz and Logsdon SeminaryChristianity, Democracy, and the Shadow of Constantine Edited by George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou new york: fordham university press, 2017. 304 pp. $125.00 / $35.00Since the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, one of the new rapprochements that has emerged is between the worlds of Eastern Orthodoxy and that (...) of Protestants and Catholics. In this set of constructive essays, contributors from each of these veins of Christianity explore the relationship between Christianity and democracy from their vantage point. Drawing together political theologians, ethicists, and historical theologians, the volume creates an encounter between "East" and "West" that addresses some critical questions facing the whole of Christianity.The first section of essays details the post-Communist situation for Orthodox churches and how they wrestle with traditions of human rights. These essays set the scene broadly for the second set of essays, which bring together Protestant and Catholic political thought together with their Orthodox counterparts. In this section, essays from Luke Bretherton on consociational democracy, Eric Gregory on Augustine and the Good Samaritan, and Nathaniel Wood on Russian visions of theosis in a liberal world make for compelling and informative contributions. The third section—a historical set of essays—explores the actual influence of Constantine's theopolitical vision in the East and West. Contributions from luminaries such as Timothy D. Barnes and J. Bryan Hehir elucidate some of the effects of a theopolitical synthesis in various historical epochs. Barnes's essay on what did and did not occur in Constantinople is of particular note here. The final section, a single essay by Stanley Hauerwas, "How (Not) to Be a Political Theologian," is a vintage essay reflecting on legacies of "Constantinian" thinking in American Christianity.The most prominent strengths of the volume are twofold. First, it brings into focus one of the critical challenges facing Christianity globally: political representation. Presently, the globe is engulfed in any number of challenges to popular sovereignty, whether conceived of in terms of revolution or tyranny. As such, democracy—while imperfect and theologically problematic in many respects—is the de facto form of governance standing between these extremes. Christian traditions of all persuasions have reasons to be suspicious of even the best of these alternatives, making this set of essays all the more pressing. Second, it contributes in a practical way to the ecumenical labors taking place in synods and councils across the world. While the World Council of Churches has undertaken some of the common moral issues affecting various Protestant [End Page 202] communions, cooperation among Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic communions remains ad hoc. Volumes such as this contribute to the practical work of more highly publicized doctrinal discussions.As with most edited volumes, the vast theme of the book tends to be cumbersome; linking together Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox sources around democracy and liberalism creates a wide-ranging but at times unfocused conversation. The quality of the essays themselves is quite uniformly good—a rarity among edited volumes!—but such a wide range of topics and contributors makes for a set of essays that is more indicative of future discussions than definitive. In short, the volume illuminates and provocatively indicates future directions without being a definitive statement on democracy and Christianity, opening new doors for future work.Myles WerntzHardin-Simmons UniversityLogsdon SeminaryHardin-Simmons UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:In Defence of War by Nigel BiggarMyles WerntzIn Defence of War Nigel Biggar oxford: oxford university press, 2013. 371 pp. $55.00Nigel Biggar’s recent work, In Defence of War, is, from the first page, a provocative work. Theological defense of military intervention has fallen on hard times in recent decades, though historically the tradition of Christian ethics tilts decidedly in this direction. Over seven chapters, Biggar offers not a (...) comprehensive analysis of just war but in many ways a theological apologia and retrieval of some of its more salient aspects. [End Page 202]Biggar opens his book by taking on the most well-known proponents of Christian pacifism (Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, and Richard Hays), finding their collective work wanting on empirical and moral grounds, naming the “Anabaptist distinctive” as “theologically incoherent and morally hypocritical” (60). In the next chapter Biggar begins to unpack his realist account for Christian participation in war, exploring the role of love in combat, arguing that a form of “forgiving retribution” is intrinsic to a Christian account of forgiveness (71). This ethic, central to the moral deliberations of the just war tradition, is a scriptural ethic routinely ignored by pacifists.Throughout the work, Biggar defends against pacifisms of various types, both theological and philosophical. Chapter 5, for example, attends to the philosophical work of David Rodin, a contemporary critic of the just war theory; criticisms against both philosophical and theological pacifism likewise under-gird his chapters on double effect and interventionism. While Biggar gives a good deal of attention to philosophical and political pacifism, his Christian pacifist target seems to be quite narrow. The opening chapter, “Against Christian Pacifism,” focuses on the work of Hauerwas, Hays, and Yoder with the implicit assumption that, having dealt with them, Christian pacifism as such can be shown to be untenable. The reduction of the polyphony of Christian pacifism, however, to this recent Anabaptist-influenced work was not entirely persuasive.Later chapters take up various and often undiscussed aspects of the just war tradition, including the principle of double effect, proportionality, and the relation between the just war tradition and international positive law. In each of these chapters Biggar offers a theological account of war that is rich and multidisciplinary, with analysis that is not strictly analytical but deeply historical. Throughout the book, this reviewer was reminded of Michael Walzer’s classic Just and Unjust Wars, as Biggar peppers his comments with military history and firsthand accounts by soldiers in wars both modern and ancient. As the work unfolds, various case studies such as Kosovo and Iraq ground his discussions, avoiding much of the abstract argumentation that pervades so much literature on war ethics.In the end the virtues of Biggar’s volume lie not with a defeat of pacifism as an alternative approach to Christian ethics but with his careful descriptions and robust assessment of the contours of a Christian realist account of participation in war. Biggar rightly directs us to view just war not as a pragmatic concession but as a complicated facet of the moral life. The chapters on double effect, legal positivism, and especially his defense of the Iraq war as justifiable, are particularly worth the read and should be carefully debated. Biggar has done the discipline a great service by pushing ethicists beyond sloppy tropes and into the deeper waters of careful analysis of what a Christian account of war might look like. [End Page 203]Myles WerntzPalm Beach Atlantic UniversityCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Anyone who has read Plato’s Republic knows it has a lot to say about mathematics. But why? I shall not be satisfied with the answer that the future rulers of the ideal city are to be educated in mathematics, so Plato is bound to give some space to the subject. I want to know why the rulers are to be educated in mathematics. More pointedly, why are they required to study so much mathematics, for so long?

The ArgumentThis article explores the relationship between Goethe's administration of the duchy of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach and his investigation of nature. The notion of the budget was crucial to both enterprises. In Goethe's morphological and mining works, nature's budgets were a heuristic tool by which one could elucidate natural processes. Goethe applied his epistemological approach of investigating nature to the realm of social order. Law, order, balance, and budget formed the basis of Goethe's financial reform of the duchy. He tried, unsuccessfully, to (...) construct artificial budgets, which were intended to mirror natural budgets to guide his plans of reform. (shrink)

Much discussion surrounding Christian nonviolence in the late twentieth century has centered around the ecclesiocentric version popularized by Stanley Hauerwas. In this essay, I assess the manner in which virtue is connected to internal church practices for Hauerwas, such that displaying nonviolence external to the church risks losing the formative nature of church life. Using examples from contemporary proponents, I argue that when internal church practices, such as prayer, economic sharing, and interpersonal reconciliation are performed publically, they form their practitioners (...) in the virtues which Hauerwas values, but in a way which transposes nonviolence into a public key. (shrink)

Christian pacifism has often been construed as quietist and unconcerned with public order. By using the trifold categories of ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum used by just war theorists, I offer an account of how Christian pacifists might have a more full and active witness to the peace of Christ in times of conflict without abandoning their core convictions.