The foundations of almost all Islamic sciences were laid in the first and second centuries of hijra. With the expansion of the Islamic world since the first century of hijra, the existence of a collective effort to transfer oral information into writing is notable. With the invitation of the prophet Muḥammad to Islam, an unprecedented increase in the culture of writing has been observed. Since the emergence of Islam, the world history scene has witnessed feverish writing activity. Especially in the (...) 2th/8th century, when the transition from oral culture to written culture accelerated, the founding texts of the science of language and religion, which were the carriers of these sciences related to aqāid-kalām, fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh, tasawwuf, tafsir, and hadith, were compiled. Thanks to the founding texts containing the basic principles, the sciences have had the opportunity to develop by deepening. In this study, the contribution of Fiqh al-akbar, the founding text of the science of creed, to the science of kalam, which has made significant progress, will be discussed. In order for a text to be considered a founding and root, there must be a system that it establishes as the fruit of the tree. In this sense, Fiqh al-akbar established a moderate and defensible belief system. There is an organic link between the most concise faith texts and the most voluminous kalām books. While the creed texts, which consist of writing the goals at the end of the road, are the counting of the principles of faith, the texts of the kalām represent the walking of the road that leads to the goal of faith. Fiqh al-akbar, which marks the end of the road by finishing the roads to be walked, is the first and most important of the milestones of Islamic thought. In this study, the contribution of Fiqh al-akbar, the founding text of the science of aqāid, to the science of kalām will be discussed in the context of its belonging to its author. This text gave direction to Ahl al-Sunna theology, which would be written in the later stages of Islamic thought. In this study, the internal and external contexts of the founding text mentioned will be confirmed in terms of its relative acumen to Abū Ḥanīfa. In addition, the reason for the increase in the commentaries (Sharḥ) of Fiqh al-akbar during the Ottoman period will be shown. As a matter of fact, each annotation strengthens that it belongs to the author. In the annotations, there is no sentence stating that the text does not belong to Abū Ḥanīfa, on the contrary, the authenticity of the belonging is emphasized. Of course, not all the annotations of the relevant text will be included here, but mostly printed works will be emphasized. Theology, prophecy and the hereafter are discussed in Fiqh al-akbar. Here, how theological debates and problems related to the history of theological concepts are handled in the commentaries will be shown. In this article, within the framework of the method discussed as an example, a preparation will be made for further studies to evaluate the topics and concepts of prophecy and the hereafter in the context of commentaries. The point that should be emphasized here is that none of the scholars who commented on the text pointed out that the subject or concept was not discussed in the period of Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, from the early period until as late as the 7th/13th century, both theology and bibliography books did not have any doubts about the belonging of Fiqh al-akbar to Abū Ḥanīfa. Moreover, since the early period, both theological and bibliographical works did not have any doubts about Fiqh al-akbar’s belonging to Abū Ḥanīfa. (shrink)

The text of “The Four Premises” (Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a), which began with Sadr al-Sharī‘ah (d. 747/1346), centralizes on the actions of human beings by connecting it with the problem of good and evil in the field of kalām, Islamic philosophy and logic, and fıqh. It was also commented in with incisive and critical footness by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1390). In Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a, al-Kastalī (d. 901/1496) discusses the two main issues. One of them is good/husn-evil/qubh, the other is human (...) actions. Good-evil dichotomy here is axiological, whereas the human actions are examined within an ontological structure. The quest for the origin of moral values is a husn-qubh debate. Identifying the hierarchy of human actions in ontology is another problem. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the theological discussions in the Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a which were written following the order of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror/Fatih. This text addresses the origin of moral judgment and the question of freedom and destiny in human actions linked to the problem of good and evil. Discussing these two fundamental issues, has made it necessary to thoroughly investigate perhaps all the subheadings which concern the entire paradigm that falls under the framework of understanding the God, nature, and humanity. By looking at the treatise, the main sources of the issues being discussed are mostly generated from an Islamic jurisprudence works, entitled Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ. It can easily be discerned that the direct quotations that were made or taken indirectly were from these two sources. References to other sources were quite seldom. However, the excerpts that were taken from primary sources were interpreted and expounded by the author and amended anew. In this article al-Kastalī’s comments will be analyzed. He’s work Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be analyzed in depth and will be published for the first time with a critical edition. Text of Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a product of a culture of criticism and critical thinking has two foundations: Disproval and verification. Critical thinking is then bidirectional. It is wrong to carry out the criticism activity in only one direction. It is insufficient to simply refute the opposing idea. It is not enough to show the wrong. The so-called right idea also needs to be justified. In the Tawdīh, Sadr al-Sharī‘ah criticizes al-Ashʿarī in the issues of husn-qubh and human actions. According to this criticism, good and evil should be based on the reason. On the other hand, human is free in his actions. As it is known, goodness and badness was based on religion according to al-Ashʿarī. Acquisition (kasb) given to man was unclear. It is al-Taftāzānī who wrote an annotation on Tawḍīḥ with the name of Talwīḥ. He’s comments are successful in terms of theology. However, these interpretations do not mean that he accepted the Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a. In terms of al-Taftāzānī, proofs of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah is weak. The theological disputes in Tawḍīḥ and Talwīḥ have reached the level of tension in the following works. The origins of the divergence are based on the differentiation between the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. In fact, these schools are not different from each other in terms of the method they use. Although the roads walked were the same, the results achieved were different. The main reason for this is that the issue is ambiguous and the problem of good and evil is multidimensional. It is directly related to God and human. It is also connected with ontology and epistemology together. The position on the husn-qubh issue is also decisive for other theological problems. The root of the evil problem or theodicy is mostly based on this problem in Islamic thought. The actions of God and human are questioned here. The value judgments that actions will take are examined. Which action is more moral and better? Another major problem discussed in this article is human actions. It is a matter of freedom of human volition. The volition of man before the absolute God is a problem. Because God has absolute power, will and knowledge. On the other hand, God imposes responsibility on man. But what are the limits of this responsibility? Al-Kastalī discusses all these problems in the context of Sadr al-Sharī‘ah and al-Taftāzānī. In the big picture there are representatives of the schools of al-Māturīdi and al-Ashʿarī. Al-Kastalī doesn’t paint a new picture, rather makes the lines in the picture clear. In this article, the texts will be analyzed mutually. The content and uses of the concepts will be given importance. Ideas will be discussed from their main sources and the roots and different reach of the issues will be touched. The interactions of different schools of thought will also be included. (shrink)

This study discusses the treatise of Jalāl al-Dīn Davvānī (d. 908/1502) named Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm. This treatise criticizes a definition of knowledge adopted by some theologians in the late period (mutaʾakhkhirīn). The definition of knowledge at issue consists of three components: Attribution, discernment, no possibility of contradiction. Knowledge is an attribute as a category and with this attribution, a discernment is obtained. As a result of this process knowledge is acquired and there should be no possibility of this knowledge (...) to be inconsistent. Davvānī examines eight possibilities of the definition on knowledge. In each of these eight possibilities a different problems arises. According to Davvānī, the definition mentioned is problematic in all probability. Nonetheless, Davvānī does not propose another definition of knowledge that can replace the definition of knowledge that he criticizes. This article represents the process of reaching the definition of knowledge stated in the history of theological thought. The definitions on knowledge made from the first period (al-mutaqaddimīn) are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of these definitions are explained. There are two main approaches regarding the nature of knowledge in Islamic thought: According to the first approach pioneered by Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī (d. 606/1202), absolute knowledge is a priory (badīhī) and undefinable. According to the second one, the nature of absolute knowledge is a posteriori (naẓarī) and definable. The first part of this article includes the definitions and criticisms of knowledge in Islamic thought. The second part discusses the claim of originality. In the second part, Davvānī’s treatise will be evaluated for the first time. According to the conclusion of the treatise, the definition made to find the essence of knowledge is unfounded in all respect. It is important to evaluate the treatise as a reflection of anti-essentialism in the history of Islamic thought. Most contemporary studies do not count this treatise among Davvānī’s works. In the biography book al-Aʿlām written by Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī (d. 1976), Risāla fī taʻrīf ʻilm is counted among the works of Davvānī. In the introduction of more than one manuscript, the work is clearly attributed to Davvānī. As a result of the double-sided research, it has been ensured that the work belongs to Davvānī. However, in other two manuscripts containing the same treatise, the work is shown as belonging to an unknown person named Şāirzāda. But there is no information found about this person. This name seems more like a copyist (mustansıh) than an author. Possibly, such a mistake occurred as a result of confusing the two names. Davvānī’s small volume treatise sheds light on the intellectual atmosphere and level of its period. The definition of knowledge mentioned in the classical theology book of ‘Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355) called al-Mawāqif is superior to other definitions of knowledge. Instead of this definition of knowledge, which is presented as perfect, Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) preferred the definition of knowledge attributed to al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) in the Sharḥ al-Mawāqif. This preference has been accepted as an implicit criticism for future generations, including Davvānī. Those who claimed that Jurjānī did not taken a random choice, carried on their criticism by going over the definition. The fine craftsmanship revealed in the treatise reveals that critical thinking is used intensively. The properly understanding of the treatise depends on knowing the science of logic and following it with intense attention. The definition of knowledge is examined from various angles with the help of concepts such as conception, ratification, judgment and contradiction (nakz) of the science of logic. In the science of logic, every layer of knowledge such as certainty, conjecture, imitation, doubt is investigated one by one. In the science of kalām, attention is paid that the ideal level of knowledge is precise. An uncertain knowledge is not considered knowledge according to kalām. Because the main goal of theologians is to build religious beliefs on the obtained certain knowledge. It is not accepted to base knowledge to a probable information on imprecise knowledge. For a knowledge among the knowns to reach the level of certainty, it must be correct and exclude other possibilities. Another condition is required for certainty in the definition of knowledge that Davvānī examines in his treatise is that the opposite is wrong. The fact that a piece of information is considered true depends on the fact that its reverse is false. In this treatise, it is discussed how to look for the contradictions or discrepancy that are wanted to be excluded. Knowledge is inseparable from the human mind, from outside of the world, or from the relationship between the two. (shrink)

There is no common working style followed in the preparation of the editorial critiques of the ĥāshiya. The overwhelming majority of the ĥāshiya works written on at least one text and commentary, were produced in the Ottoman science-culture basin and period. Ĥāshiya style of writing is an area neglected by the academic community until recently. A claimant is obliged to prove his claim by scientific, legal and moral principles. However, studies that prove or at least support the said judgment have (...) not been completed. The final objective decision should be postponed to the research of manuscripts. Otherwise, the judgment will not go beyond the pre-judgment. The article is intended to give momentum to academic studies on the sharḥ-ĥāshiya writing style. Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a is a text in which Ṣadr al-Sharī‛ah [die. 747/1346], considered one of the pioneers of the contractor Māturīdī school, analyzes human verbs. Since its establishment, the Māturīdī school has remained sensitive to human freedom and human-centred moral principles. According to the claim, thanks to the four premises, the ontological status of the will has attained a structure that can exist or disappear in terms of expression. The understanding of free God and free man depends on the acceptance of the will in this structure. Otherwise, man and God will not be considered free. The representative of the Ashʿarī thought system Taftazānī [die. 792/1390], critically commented on the text. According to him, the conclusion of the four premises in terms of Ash‘arī doctrine consists of a door creak and a fly hum. There is also Ḥāccī Hasanzāda’s [die. 911/1505-1506] among the scholars who wrote on the order of Fatih Sultan Meḥmed, who wondered the basis of the thought and scientific tension. His work is a product of ĥāshiya style. The article of Ḥāccī Hasanzāda points out the deficiencies and weaknesses of the premises and discusses the connection of the will with the moral principles within the framework of schools. In this article, Ḥāccī Hasanzāda’s work titled Ĥāshiya ‘alā Muqaddimāt al-Arba‘a will be introduced and its critical edited publication will be presented. (shrink)