Some philosophers of science have suggested that contemporary science should be the source of inspiration to the new analytic metaphysics (A. Chakra vartty, C. Callender, S. French, J. Ladyman, T. Maudlin, etc.). This paper explores the prospect of a string metaphysics: a research program in analytic metaphysics based on string theory. Different forms of fundamentalism and pluralism are discussed in this context. The paper focus on string metaphysics with S-dualities (a relation between models of string theory at different coupling regimes) (...) and argues that fundamentality and compositionality have to be reconceptualized. String metaphysics with dualities is better couched in terms of metaphysical pluralism. Grounding, as well as a sketch of a string modality, are briefly discussed. The paper concludes with a suggestion for future work: the metaphysician may find a productive ground for research in discussing other dualities (especially the T-dualities, or the AdS/CFT duality), the emergence of spacetime, the concept of time in string theory, the multiverse etc. (shrink)

Book review: _Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond_, Brigitte Falkenburg and Gregor Schiemann, editors, _European Studies in Philosophy of Science_, Vol. 11, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2019, pp.220.

This paper proposes a model for an artificial autonomous moral agent (AAMA), which is parsimonious in its ontology and minimal in its ethical assumptions. Starting from a set of moral data, this AAMA is able to learn and develop a form of moral competency. It resembles an “optimizing predictive mind,” which uses moral data (describing typical behavior of humans) and a set of dispositional traits to learn how to classify different actions (given a given background knowledge) as morally right, wrong, (...) or neutral. When confronted with a new situation, this AAMA is supposedly able to predict a behavior consistent with the training set. This paper argues that a promising computational tool that fits our model is “neuroevolution,” i.e. evolving artificial neural networks. (shrink)

Trust is defined as a belief of a human H (‘the trustor’) about the ability of an agent A (the ‘trustee’) to perform future action(s). We adopt here dispositionalism and internalism about trust: H trusts A iff A has some internal dispositions as competences. The dispositional competences of A are high-level metacognitive requirements, in the line of a naturalized virtue epistemology. (Sosa, Carter) We advance a Bayesian model of two (i) confidence in the decision and (ii) model uncertainty. To trust (...) A, H demands A to be self-assertive about confidence and able to self-correct its own models. In the Bayesian approach trust can be applied not only to humans, but to artificial agents (e.g. Machine Learning algorithms). We explain the advantage the metacognitive trust when compared to mainstream approaches and how it relates to virtue epistemology. The metacognitive ethics of trust is swiftly discussed. (shrink)

In string theory with S-dualities, there is an object-oriented realism and a structure-oriented realism. This paper discusses the advantages of “string structural realism”, a form of the latter, having a multi-aspected structure with a “model-oriented” pluralistic ontology, and grounded in the relation among fundamental objects of various string models.

In this paper I discuss Tim Maudlin’s attempt to reject the theory of universals based on the interpretation of gauge theories in the fiber bundle framework. The project is novel and assuring, but, I argue, it is vulnerable to several objections stemming from both metaphysics and physics. I complement his project by emphasizing two missing elements: first, a commitment to realism; second, the fundamentality or non-fundamentality of gauge theories.

We argue that the concepts of mechanism and autonomy appear to be antagonistic when autonomy is conflated with agency. Once these concepts are disentangled, it becomes clearer how autonomy emerges from complex forms of control. Subsequently, current biomimetic strategies tend to focus on homeostatic regulatory systems; we propose that research in AI and robotics would do well to incorporate biomimetic strategies that instead invoke models of allostatic mechanisms as a way of understanding how to enhance autonomy in artificial systems.

In this chapter I discuss the attempts by Theodor Kaluza [Kaluza, T., 1921. Zum Unitätproblem der Physik. Sitzungsber. der K. Ak. der Wiss. zu Berlin, 966–972] and by Oskar Klein [Klein, O., 1926a. Quantentheorie und fünfdimensionale Relativitätstheorie. Zeitschrift für Physik 37 (12), 895–906; Klein, O., 1926b. The atomicity of electricity as a quantum theory law. Nature 118, 516], respectively, to unify electromagnetism and general relativity within a five-dimensional Riemannian manifold. I critically compare Kaluza's results to Klein's. Klein's theory possesses more (...) explanatory power and unificatory strength and uses less types of brute facts than Kaluza's. The characteristic feature of Klein's theory is that it relies on an extrinsic element of unification, i.e. the wavefunction behavior, which is not intrinsic to EM or GR. Finally, I compare and discuss Kaluza's and Klein's theories in the context of Tim Maudlin's [Maudlin, T., 1996. On the unification of physics. Journal of Philosophy 93 (3), 129–144] ranking of unification and I clarify in what sense they constitute counterexamples to some of Margaret Morrison's [Morrison, M., 2000. Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical Concepts and Mathematical Structures. Cambridge University Press] assertions about unification. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of the theories of time travel in a perspective close to theories of time. In the last section we discuss the special ontology of the objects that exist on closed timelike curves. We simply assert that CTC need a new ontology and these objects are not simply impossible or unconcevaible.

This paper proposes a model of the Artificial Autonomous Moral Agent (AAMA), discusses a standard of moral cognition for AAMA, and compares it with other models of artificial normative agency. It is argued here that artificial morality is possible within the framework of a “moral dispositional functionalism.” This AAMA is able to “read” the behavior of human actors, available as collected data, and to categorize their moral behavior based on moral patterns herein. The present model is based on several analogies (...) among artificial cognition, human cognition, and moral action. It is premised on the idea that moral agents should not be based on rule-following procedures, but on learning patterns from data. This idea is rarely implemented in AAMA models, albeit it has been suggested in the machine ethics literature (W. Wallach, C. Allen, J. Gips and especially M. Guarini). As an agent-based model, this AAMA constitutes an alternative to the mainstream action-centric models proposed by K. Abney, M. Anderson and S. Anderson, R. Arkin, T. Powers, W. Wallach, i.a. Moral learning and moral development of dispositional traits play here the fundamental role in cognition. By using a combination of neural networks and evolutionary computation, called “soft computing” (H. Adeli, N. Siddique, S. Mitra, L. Zadeh), the present model reaches a certain level of autonomy and complexity, which illustrates well “moral particularism” and a form of virtue ethics for machines, grounded in active learning. An example based on the “lifeboat metaphor” (G. Hardin) and the extension of this model to the NEAT architecture (K. Stanley, R. Miikkulainen, i.a.) are briefly assessed. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

The relation between Christianity and nation is a very old but also a permanent theme within the Ecumenical Movement. Our aim is to explain why this relation is so important for us, the Europeans, because Europe is in fact, a continent of nations that have to be known by their traditions and by the reciprocal manifestations which, unfortunately, are sometimes conflicting. This is why it is not very easy to speak or to write about it. From the Orthodox point of (...) view, the ideal of the nation can be completely integrated in the Christian ideal. Such an ideal makes possible the development of a nation’s natural qualities. It does not lead to a uniformity of nations, on the contrary, it leads to their growth within the unity of the Christian faith. (shrink)

In the context of the Union of Greater Romania, a problem specific to the development of the Romanian society and of the re-united national state was the regulation of the status or the varied religious cults. It is well known that under the Older Romanian Kingdom, the Orthodoxy was a state religion. The other cults – Lutheran, Catholic, Mosaic, and Moslem – represented small numbers of believers and had not been regulated under the law; they were tolerated. Following the Union (...) of 1918, the Romanian State came to accommodate not just one, but several denominations. Consequently, it had to clarify its relations with the cults in the Romanian provinces of Bucovina, Basarabia, Banat, and Transylvania. These cults which had not existed in the Older Kingdom functioned according to the legislative systems they had belonged to before 1918. Thus came the necessity of establishing the unitary status for the minority cults, which, given the diversity of their religious doctrines, rituals and interests, posed new problems to be settled for the government policy. This also should be the focus of the debates surrounding the forthcoming law of the cults in Romania. (shrink)

Claudiu Herţeliu, Metode cantitative în studiul fenomenului religios (Quantitative Methods in the Study of Religious Phenomena), (Cluj-Napoca: Ed. Napoca Star, 2009), 227 p.

William D’Alessandro has recently argued that there are no implicit truths in fiction. According to the view defended by D’Alessandro, which he terms explicitism, the only truths in fiction are the ones explicitly expressed therein. In this essay, I argue that explicitism is incorrect on multiple counts. Not only is the argument D’Alessandro gives for it invalid, but explicitism as a theory of truth in fiction fails drastically to account for a number of phenomena that are crucial to our understanding (...) and interpretation of fiction, such as pragmatic implicatures and speech acts occurring in fiction, psychological profiles of fictional characters, and fictional truths determined by literary conventions. (shrink)

It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names . In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity view. I also show that the arguments philosophers usually (...) rely on in order to ban surrogates are not as serious as they have been taken to be. In the first part of the paper, I describe the two conflicting views. In the second part, I discuss several specific arguments in favor of surrogates. In the third part I take up the kind of reasons ordinarily offered against them. (shrink)

This article explores the development of the theme of the Life-giving Spring in Byzantine iconography. The path towards its establishment was initiated at the moment when a representation rule, an original convention was set. Thereafter, because of its diffusion in time and space, the theme became enriched by particular mentalities and sensibilities of the epochs and the communities that adopted it as a form of devotion for the Virgin Theotokos. As a result, the representations we have known so far are (...) extremely varied. CONTRIBUTION: The final purpose of this approach, as well as its contribution, is to highlight the diverse unity of the iconographic tradition and illustrate both the evolution of the theme in the painting of Romanian church artists and its gradual refinement through the incorporation of diverse nuances and new perspectives. (shrink)

According to the social contract theory, in order to achieve justice, people grouped themselves in societies. Historically speaking, judges appeared long before the legislator which means that justice was the first element of the social life. Therefore, it expresses the social ethics of a particular time and requires a minimum of credibility. Excessive pragmatism and utilitarianism have kidnapped more and more of what is humane, superior and sacred in the act of justice, and “secularized” it. As Eliade said in The (...) Sacred and the Profane, the sacred is something which is totally different, a space of radical otherness which overshadows the physical territory. This shading manifests itself through limitation, sequencing, reiteration and keeping what is sacred there, even in a courtroom, through ritualization. (shrink)