This paper considers the trend towards megaregionalism that became prominent in the trade domain in the last years of the Obama administration. While megaregionalism has fallen by the wayside since Trump’s inauguration, the underlying rationale for such treaties will most likely reassert itself rather soon. So there are structural issues that need to be discussed from a standpoint of global justice. In all likelihood, megaregionalism is detrimental to global justice. TTIP in particular, or anything like it, might derail any possibility (...) for a trade organization to aid the pursuit of justice at the global level, and any possibility that trade will be used to that end. From the standpoint of global justice one must hope that megaregionalism does not replace WTO multilateralism. The global-justice framework used here is the grounds-of-justice approach offered in the author’s 2012 On Global Justice. (shrink)

In this paper we will consider the existing notions of bilateralism in the context of proof-theoretic semantics and propose, based on our understanding of bilateralism, an extension to logical multilateralism. This approach differs from what has been proposed under this name before in that we do not consider multiple speech acts as the core of such a theory but rather multiple consequence relations. We will argue that for this aim the most beneficial proof-theoretical realization is to use sequent calculi (...) with multiple sequent arrows satisfying some specific conditions, which we will lay out in this paper. We will unfold our ideas with the help of a case study in logical tetralateralism and present an extension of Almukdad and Nelson’s propositional constructive four-valued logic by unary operations of meaningfulness and nonsensicality. We will argue that in sequent calculi with multiple sequent arrows it is possible to maintain certain features that are desirable if we assume an understanding of the meaning of connectives in the spirit of proof-theoretic semantics. The use of multiple sequent arrows will be justified by the presence of congruentiality-breaking unary connectives. (shrink)

This paper makes three related points. First, Japan has played an instrumental role in helping to define the shape and substance of multilateralism in Asia in ways deeper than scholarly literature on Asia's regional architecture has allowed. A key driving force behind Japan's contributions is the perceived utility of multilateralism in facilitating Japan's engagement of and/or balancing against China. Second, Japan has been able to achieve this because of the United States' support for Asian multilateralism and Japanese (...) security interests. In the immediate post-Cold War period, Japan facilitated US participation in regional arrangements such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. But Japanese ambivalence over its dependence on the United States was also apparent in Tokyo's attempts to exclude Washington from the newly formed East Asia Summit in late 2005, despite Japan's felt need to balance China. Japan's reliance on quiet diplomacy and an implicit regional leadership has equally been instrumental to its achievements in regional integration. Third, in the light of Japan's longstanding aim to become a normal military power and adopt a more assertive policy toward China, Japan‒US security ties are likely to deepen with negative consequences for Asian multilateralism. However, if its ties with China and South Korea worsen over their islands disputes in the East China Sea, Japan risks undermining its relations with the United States. How Japan balances its normalization with a continued engagement with multilateralism could be key to a stable and secure Asia. (shrink)

This article challenges the orthodox view of international law, according to which states have no legal duty to cooperate. It argues for this legal duty in the context of COVID-19, based on the ethical principles of solidarity, stewardship, and subsidiarity. More specifically, the article argues that states have a legal duty to cooperate during a pandemic (as solidarity requires); and while this duty entails an extraterritorial responsibility to care for and assist other nations (as stewardship requires), the legal duty to (...) cooperate still allows states to attend first to the basic needs of those under their own jurisdiction—namely, fellow nationals and residents (as subsidiarity requires). The article provides a definition and philosophical justifications for this legal duty that are lacking in the literature by examining its application to a current COVID-19 controversy: namely, states’ responsibility to assist other countries in greater need by, inter alia, exporting at a discount or donating scarce COVID-19 treatments (including vaccines). In providing a principled tripartite account of pandemic governance, this conceptual and normative article offers a new lens for debating the potential international treaty for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response that has now been drafted and is under negotiation at the World Health Assembly, by responding to the recent backlash against multilateralism by substantiating global co-responsibilities in times of pandemics and beyond. (shrink)

The paper introduces the formula structure of poly-sequents, allowing the expression of poly-positions: positions with any number of stances, of which bilateralism and trilateralism are special cases. The paper also puts forward the view that s-coherence of such poly-positions can be defined inferentially, without appealing to their validity under interpretations of the object language.

In this paper an analysis of Hobbes' argument in favor of the Leviathan is combined with a reassessment in a new security environment. The analysis shows that Hobbes' premises are complex and lead to conclusions that differ from the realist as well as from the world-state position, both attributed to Hobbesian logic in IR theory. A strict application of the Hobbesian argument in today's security context leads to a rationale of multilateral institution-building among states. In the first part of the (...) paper the internationalist analogy in the concept of war of all against all is uncovered and analyzed in relation to the security dilemma, domestic analogy, and methodological individualism. The second part reassesses the Hobbesian security rationale in a security environment which is assumed to be shaped by transnational terrorism and nuclear WMD. (shrink)

Since the middle of the twentieth century, the governance of the global system has been organized around the United States and the advanced industrial democracies. In the shadow of the Cold War, these countries established a wide array of global and regional institutions to manage economic, political, and security relations. The Bretton Woods institutions, GATT, the United Nations, and various functional institutions provided the bulwark for an open and managed postwar world economy and global order. An American-led alliance system provided (...) a structure for regional security in Europe and East Asia. When the Cold War ended, these far-flung institutions were extended into a more fully global multilateral system of governance. The United States dominated the global order. But, more so than did leading states in previous eras, it established its dominance through institutions. It was an American-led liberal hegemonic order. (shrink)

The indisputable success of the European integration project also prompted other regions of the world to follow suit. On the other side of coin, these regional blocs cultivated free trade within but remained protectionist vis-àvis the outside, thereby impeding the progress of the multilateral trade system. But also the soaring number of WTO member states accompanied by their incompatible interests, its ambitious agenda spanning over 20 diverse issues and, in particular, the single undertaking approach emerged as the Doha’s Round “stumbling (...) blocks”. The utter dismay over the Doha’s Round deadlock has provoked countries to opt for alternative for a outside the WTO in their endeavor to expedite far-reaching trade liberalization. Besides the vast economic growth in Asia and the rise of international production networks, this urge for deeper integration represents one of the central root causes for the most recent wave of PTAs which has been gathering force over the course of the 21st century and increasingly puts the WTO’s raison d’être under critical scrutiny. (shrink)

Contemporary debates over the appropriate balance of unilateralism and multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy reflect disagreements not simply about the practical effectiveness of these alternative options but also about their legitimacy. Advocates of multilateral and unilateral action alike tend to bundle prudential calculations with normative claims, making assessments about costs and benefits difficult to disentangle from ethical arguments about fairness, justice, morality and obligation. Greater clarity may be possible by classifying U.S. foreign policy into six analytical categories, based on (...) whether the aims pursued are nationalist, internationalist, or cosmopolitan and the strategies adopted to realize them are unilateral or multilateral. Each set of aims has different ethical justifications that generate and help to explain divergent attitudes and judgments about the role of multilateral cooperation in U.S. foreign policy. The article sheds new light on alleged U.S. unilateralism, showing that the U.S. decision to go it alone–or to act with others–can be motivated by the desire to advance the narrow interests of the United States, to advance the interests of all states, or to advance the interests of humanity at large. The article suggests that purely nationalist policies, whether pursued through unilateral or multilateral means, will become increasingly untenable and illegitimate as world politics becomes institutionalized and as humanity becomes integrated, albeit slowly, into a single cosmopolitan community. (shrink)

Many developing and transitional countries have grown faster than advanced countries in the past decade, resulting in a shift in the distribution of world income in their favor. China is now the second largest economy in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Japan. As the relative economic weight of China and several others has come to match or exceed that of the middle-ranking G7 economies, the world economy has shifted from “unipolar” toward “multipolar,” less dominated by the (...) G7. How is this change being translated into changes in authority and influence within multilateral organizations like the G20, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund? Alarm bells are ringing in G7 capitals about G7 loss of influence. According to a WikiLeaks cable from the senior U.S. official for the G20 process, from January 2010, “It is remarkable how closely coordinated the BASIC group of countries [Brazil, South Africa, India, China] have become in international fora, taking turns to impede US/eu initiatives and playing the US and EU off against each other.” This essay suggests that the shift in power is much smaller than the headlines or private alarm bells suggest. The United States remains the dominant state, and the G7 states together continue to exercise primacy, but now more fearfully and defensively. China is split between asserting itself as “the wave of the future” and defending itself as too poor to take on global responsibilities. The combination of G7 defensiveness and emerging states’ jealous guarding of sovereignty produces a spirit of Westphalian assertion in international fora, or “every state for itself.” On the assumption that the world economy is in a transitional period, the article suggests reforms in the G20 and the World Bank that would boost their role and legitimacy as multilateral organizations in a more multipolar world. (shrink)

The development of multilateral diplomacy over the past decades, its importance that the process of multilateral diplomacy withholds in solving crises and global governance, this paper will try to evaluate the current trend of processes and critically evaluate is there hope and realistic expectation that multilateral diplomacy will become a basis for global governance in the future. There are many definitions given to the multilateralism, having in account that multilateralism within the global governance is becoming increasingly complex in (...) its form and expressions. In doing the analysis on how much there is scope of multilateral diplomacy as basis for global governance, an overview on historical facts, international organizations and elements contributing to the global governance achievement will be touched upon. Impact and historical aspects of international organisations such as United Nations, European Union and World Trade organisations in setting the first pillars of global governance will be also elaborated, with an emphasis on impact and potential that these institutions have in global governance evolution. (shrink)

In bilateral systems for classical logic, assertion and denial occur as primitive signs on formulas. Such systems lend themselves to an inferentialist story about how truth-conditional content of connectives can be determined by inference rules. In particular, for classical logic there is a bilateral proof system which has a property that Carnap in 1943 called categoricity. We show that categorical systems can be given for any finite many-valued logic using $n$-sided sequent calculus. These systems are understood as a further development (...) of bilateralism—call it multilateralism. The overarching idea is that multilateral proof systems can incorporate the logic of a variety of denial speech acts. So against Frege we say that denial is not the negation of assertion and, with Mark Twain, that denial is more than a river in Egypt. (shrink)

As the world becomes hotter and natural disasters increase, the challenge for survival will become greater. We need to become increasingly resilient. This has implications for how we see ourselves, others and the environment. What is consciousness? If it is more than the firing of an assemblage of neurons in our brain , how does it relate to mindfulness? What is the link between mindfulness, wellbeing and the global commons? Where do we -- indeed should we -- draw the lines (...) of inclusion and exclusion when we consider needs and responsibilities for sustainable futures? Do we have a choice between isolation in zero sum competitive nation states or finding ways to achieve multilateralism? Can mindfulness be enhanced through participation? How could intersubjectivity and expanding our relationships across self-other and the environment change our attitude towards representation, accountability and sustainable futures? The paper reflects on the extent to which participation is an end in itself, in other words that participation enables people to have a greater understanding of one another and a better match of services to needs. It addresses past research aimed at enhancing public policy conducted over the past twenty years and draws on current research into ways to enhance communication and mindfulness to promote wellbeing and resilience. This is addressed through combining cycles of open and structured dialogue guided by e- democracy and e-governance software to inform decision making by both users and providers. It creates updated data which are used only as a guide to inform decisions and as an aid to address complex problems. New approaches to social policy and governance challenges will need to be timely, inclusive and responsive to global citizens. (shrink)

Approaching the concept of multilateral democracy -- The transnational dimension of liberal democracy -- Multilateral democracy from a republican point of view -- The conception of the people in multilateral democracy -- The rational case for multilateralism -- Multilateral democracy: the original position -- Principles of multilateral democracy -- Final remarks.

In "The Law of Peoples", John Rawls proposes a set of principles for international relations, his "Law of Peoples." He calls this Law a "realistic utopia," and invites consideration of this Law from the perspectives of non-Western cultures. This paper considers Rawls's Law from the perspective of Engaged Buddhism, the contemporary form of socially and politically activist Buddhism. We find that Engaged Buddhists would be largely in sympathy with Rawls's proposals. There are differences, however: Rawls builds his view from the (...) idea of independent nation--states, while the Buddhists see the world more in terms of a single humankind, the members being highly interdependent with one another, and also with the physical world. The Buddhists would also push harder than Rawls for global structures building multilateralism, restrict more severely justifications for war and behavior in war, stress economic justice more heavily, and insist on all the human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (shrink)

This book provides a critique of current international law-making and draws on a set of principles from Persian philosophers to present an alternative to influence the development of international law-making procedure. The work conceptualizes a substantive notion of democracy in order to regulate international law-making mechanisms under a set of principles developed between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries in Persia. What the author here names 'democratic egalitarian multilateralism' is founded on: the idea of 'egalitarian law' by Suhrawardi, the account (...) of 'substantial motion' by Mulla Sadra, and the ideal of 'intercultural dialectical democracy' developed by Rūmī. Following a discussion of the conceptual flaws of the chartered and customary sources of international law, it is argued that 'democratic egalitarian multilateralism' could be a source for a set of principles to regulate the procedures through which international treaties are made as well as a criterion for customary international law-ascertainment. (shrink)

With the ratification of Multilateral Environmental Agreements the countries of the international community or of intentional communities—be they political, economic, financial, securitarian or strategic—endow these instruments of international cooperation with significant autonomy. From the 3550 dates of ratification of these MEAs recorded from 1979 to mid-September 2014, we produce a graph whose vertices are the 48 MEAs and whose links are induced by the succession of ratifications in time. On this basis we propose a diagnosis on the international acceptance of (...) this type of legal instruments and their vulnerability in a global context that builds on the change in the balance of powers as a result of globalization, the break of the bipolar and then unipolar system, and the rise of new powers. Thus, it appears that a global environmental order has been promoted and implemented with some success in the 90s mainly by liberal Western countries who were then able to lead other countries less likely to bind to the fulfillment of environmental obligations. However, the expansion of this global environmental order now seems frozen, due to the current crisis of multilateralism. The rise of many countries, particularly in the South, whose environmental, political and economic weight grew, confronted with the “stable community” formed in the past 35 years suggests that there is a real power shift in the international arena and consequently, multilateralism needs to reflect this new reality. In other terms, the global environmental order is being slowly reformed. As a consequence, the treaties formed clusters in the past but they did not follow the same pattern since the twenty-first century began. (shrink)

Two recent books consider the future of trade governance.Consent and Tradeproposes reforms to trade agreements so that states can consent more freely to their terms.On Trade Justicedefends reforms to the World Trade Organization, arguing that multilateralism is the foundation for a “new global deal” on trade. Each book describes trade's distinctive features and proposes a principle to regulate both trade and trade governance.Consent and Tradedefends a principle of respect for state consent in trade agreements.On Trade Justiceoffers a theory of (...) trade justice that requires nonexploitation. Consent and nonexploitation are important principles for economic exchanges. However, trade governance and trade itself are different forms of cooperation, with different agents and different interests at stake. Consent and nonexploitation are less compelling as principles for trade governance than for trade itself. Both books understate the conflict between their principles for trade governance and liberal justice. (shrink)

In this interview Michael Hardt analyses the changes in the balance of Imperial power brought about by the war in Iraq. American unilateralism has led to an untenable military situation; but European multilateralism would only mean a division of the spoils among a few other great powers. The demonstrations of February 15, 2003, whose organizational mode prolongs the cycle of counter-globalization struggles, are more promising for the multitude. The latter, Hardt notes, is « a concept of social singularities that... (...) are able to communicate, collaborate and act in common. » Its development is oriented by the major characteristics of immaterial labor, which exerts its hegemony across the global division of labor. Writing « multitude » without an « s » indicates the « decision-making capacity » required for the multitude to become a social project. One way to conceive this project would be through a science of foreigners, a « becoming foreign in one’s own and every country ». (shrink)

For decades Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany have gone to extraordinary lengths to cultivate as low a profile as possible on defense and national security policy matters. However, since the Gulf War, the Federal Republic has come under growing pressure from its allies to assume a greater international security role. Slowly, reluctantly it has acceded to these demands, albeit at the expense of considerable internal angst and turmoil. At the same time, German decision makers have sought to preserve (...) as much as possible the old approach to security policy. Consequently, the long-standing German norms eschewing the use of military force have been gradually displaced, although not wholly replaced, by norms of multilateralism. Rather than a dramatic break with the past, the Federal Republic's actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan can be seen as the culmination of a series of incremental steps that had begun a decade ago. (shrink)

In "The Law of Peoples", John Rawls proposes a set of principles for international relations, his "Law of Peoples." He calls this Law a "realistic utopia," and invites consideration of this Law from the perspectives of non-Western cultures. This paper considers Rawls's Law from the perspective of Engaged Buddhism, the contemporary form of socially and politically activist Buddhism. We find that Engaged Buddhists would be largely in sympathy with Rawls's proposals. There are differences, however: Rawls builds his view from the (...) idea of independent nation--states, while the Buddhists see the world more in terms of a single humankind, the members being highly interdependent with one another, and also with the physical world. The Buddhists would also push harder than Rawls for global structures building multilateralism, restrict more severely justifications for war and behavior in war, stress economic justice more heavily, and insist on all the human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (shrink)

After World War II, the United States participated in helping to produce an international set of institutions, treaties, and multilateral relationships to cope with political conflict and global problems. Internationalist multilateralism was complicated by the Cold War that split the world into competing camps and blocs. Facing a Soviet nuclear threat and challenges on the military, political and economic front, the US developed multilateral institutions and alliances with European and other allies to provide national security. Doctrines of containment and (...) deterrence combined with a global system of alliances protected the US from military assault and provided outlines of a global system from within which conflicts could be resolved and global problems dealt with. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were brief hopes that a more peaceful and secure world could be produced through strengthened multilateral global alliances and with major countries working together within international law. The first Bush administration and the two Clinton administrations developed globalist and multilateral politics and the 1990s exhibited remarkable economic prosperity, at least for those in the overdeveloped countries, and, with some marked failures, began to deal with human rights and violations of international law collectively and multilaterally within a global framework. The second Bush administration renounced internationalist and multilateralist policies and alliances. From the beginning, they rejected international accords such as the Kyoto Treaty on the environment and a series of arms limitations treaties ranging from attempts to cutback on nuclear weapon to controlling the small arms trade. After the September 11 terror attacks on the US, the Bush administration responded with unilateralist militarism, developed new doctrines of preemptive strikes, and waged violent but unresolved wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.. (shrink)

The normative theory of multilateral democratic integration starts within the context of liberal peoples engaged in the common realization of rights, freedoms, and life chances for their citizens while seeking to preserve self-government and popular sovereignty. The point argued in the paper is that the fair terms of multilateral democratic integration must be determined by an integrated original position of citizen and people representatives choosing basic principles of liberal multilateralism. The proposal to merge the two Rawlsian original positions offers (...) a political solution to the contrast between rival conceptions of grand universalism and national particularism. After a general discussion of the wider problematic and the original position, I explain the concept and the reality of multilateral democratic integration. In part three, I justify why citizen and people representatives ought to be seen as participants of the original position of multilateral democratic integration. I then assess the rational motives of both types of representatives and determine the veil of ignorance of the integrated original position. In section, the original position is applied to the test of several normative hypotheses prima facie considered as candidates for basic principles of multilateral democratic integration. These principles are not necessarily new, but they are principles which presumably apply to multilateral democratic integration as a specific political order and system of cooperation. (shrink)

As part of the roundtable “International Institutions and Peaceful Change,” this essay focuses on the “Kindleberger trap,” a term coined by Joseph Nye Jr. referring to the situation in which no country takes the lead to maintain international institutions in the international system. President Trump's destructive policies toward many international institutions seem to push the current international order to the brink of the Kindleberger trap. Ironically, China has pledged, at least rhetorically, to support and even save these existing international institutions. (...) Based on an institutional-balancing perspective, we suggest that the worry about the Kindleberger trap is unwarranted because the international institutional order will not easily collapse after the decline of U.S. hegemony. Institutional competition among great powers and institutional changes within the institutional order have become two remedies to maintain international institutions and to avoid the Kindleberger trap during the international order transition. What states, including the United States and China, should do is to reembrace and reinvigorate the role of multilateralism in world politics so that the dynamics of institutional balancing and consequential institutional changes in the context of U.S.-China competition do not deprive international society of the public goods and normative values of international institutions. The future international order should not be led by a single country, but by dynamic and balanced international institutions. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 3, Page 421-440, Fall 2022.

Many classically valid meta-inferences fail in a standard supervaluationist framework. This allegedly prevents supervaluationism from offering an account of good deductive reasoning. We provide a proof system for supervaluationist logic which includes supervaluationistically acceptable versions of the classical meta-inferences. The proof system emerges naturally by thinking of truth as licensing assertion, falsity as licensing negative assertion and lack of truth-value as licensing rejection and weak assertion. Moreover, the proof system respects well-known criteria for the admissibility of inference rules. Thus, supervaluationists (...) can provide an account of good deductive reasoning. Our proof system moreover brings to light how one can revise the standard supervaluationist framework to make room for higher-order vagueness. We prove that the resulting logic is sound and complete with respect to the consequence relation that preserves truth in a model of the non-normal modal logic _NT_. Finally, we extend our approach to a first-order setting and show that supervaluationism can treat vagueness in the same way at every order. The failure of conditional proof and other meta-inferences is a crucial ingredient in this treatment and hence should be embraced, not lamented. (shrink)

European states, including Belgium, have looked at the construction of Europe through an economie and a political prism. Both dimensions have evolved following parallel paths. In Belgium a large consensus has always existed concerning the economie dimension of the European construction. In this respect Belgiums post-1945 European policies area direct continuation of the interwar efforts to build a West-European economic area, based on a free trade philosophy and a rejection of economic nationalism which always handicapped small trading states such as (...) Belgium. Even before the second world war the Belgian elite thus accepted the principles of economic multilateralism.In the political dimension however a consensus on a federal Europe only emerged at the end of the seventies. Till then, important parts of the Belgian political elite remained sceptical and even hostile to the construction of a supranational Europe, based on a traditional view on political autonomy and independence. The reasons why Belgian views on the political dimension of Europe slowly shifted to a federal objective were partly domestic and partly the result of the growing awareness that a small countries' political interests in the world can be best pursued through supranationality. (shrink)

An armed humanitarian intervention must have a reasonable prospect of success to be justified. It must also be a proportional last resort. These are necessary conditions for legitimate AHI. It has been suggested that, in addition to these necessary conditions, there are also ideal conditions of AHI, namely disinterest and multilateralism. These conditions are said to enhance the moral credentials of an armed intervention without being strictly required. The paper concerns itself with the relationship between these two ideals and (...) the requirement of a reasonable prospect of success. Specifically, I explore the suggestion that the former are in some way instrumental to the latter. On this view, we should aspire towards disinterest and multilateralism because these things contribute to a positive humanitarian outcome. If this is correct then the ideal conditions can be partly grounded in, or justified in reference to, the prospect of success principle. (shrink)

In a widely cited and controversial speech, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the moral character of the boundaries of political sovereignty when he questioned whether respecting national sovereignty everywhere and always precluded the international protection of human rights. He argued that it did not and highlighted the importance of multilateral authorization. In this article, I explore the difference that multilateral authority, as opposed to unilateral national decision, should make in justifying armed intervention. Should the more salient role of the United (...) Nations lead us to a more expansive tolerance of international intervention? And, if multilateralism does make a difference—and many think its impartiality is key—are good intentions enough? Had the international community also discovered how to intervene more effectively, with a better prospect of self-sustaining self-determination, at an acceptable humanitarian cost? I will conclude that multilateralism should widen our acceptance of intervention, even though the intentions at play are not reliably superior to unilateral intentions. (shrink)

In a widely cited and controversial speech, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the moral character of the boundaries of political sovereignty when he questioned whether respecting national sovereignty everywhere and always precluded the international protection of human rights. He argued that it did not and highlighted the importance of multilateral authorization. In this article, I explore the difference that multilateral authority, as opposed to unilateral national decision, should make in justifying armed intervention. Should the more salient role of the United (...) Nations lead us to a more expansive tolerance of international intervention? And, if multilateralism does make a difference—and many think its impartiality is key—are good intentions enough? Had the international community also discovered how to intervene more effectively, with a better prospect of self-sustaining self-determination, at an acceptable humanitarian cost? I will conclude that multilateralism should widen our acceptance of intervention, even though the intentions at play are not reliably superior to unilateral intentions. (shrink)

The current transatlantic debate over multilateralism reveals that the traditional understanding of liberal internationalism is being transcended in favor of “globalism.” The latter is a doctrine that goes well beyond favoring international cooperation among states; in fact, the new globalism is intrinsically hostile to the sovereignty of the nation-state. Thus it runs counter to the basic liberal understanding of the nature of the political order, as reflected in the American Declaration of Independence and, on a more philosophical level, in (...) the political teaching of John Locke. The Declaration and the Lockean teaching proclaim universal principles, but hold that the implementation of these principles should be the business not of some international authority but of democratically elected and accountable national. (shrink)

The world in the global age is characterized by a diversity of cultures, philosophies, religious traditions, and by a political landscape that increasingly features a multiplicity of powers or at least sides. Thus, an increasing amount of voices suggests the inevitability of multiculturalism, “intercultural philosophy,” religious dialogue, and political multilateralism. At the same time, however, the step from the fact of diversity to pluralism, that is the belief that diversity is a value, is frequently questioned. What is missing in (...) this debate on pluralism, however, is a genuine philosophy of diversity, that is, a philosophy that takes into account the fact of diversity without succumbing to either particularism or universalism. This essay will try to examine the metaphysical conditions for diversity in order to suggest a philosophical position that takes seriously the diversity of cultures, traditions, and positions, without denying their individual particularities and idiosyncracies, on the one hand, and yet allows the theorist to envision a philosophy that does justice to the postmodern predicament, on the other. (shrink)

Decision 1/cp.17 limits the choice of legal form of a new climate agreement to three options: a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Climate Convention. This commentary provides seven reasons for the conclusion that a protocol is the only viable legal option to serve the object and purpose of the convention. The reasons include, inter alia, the exclusion of non-binding, soft law under a ‘result based regime’, multilateralism, a 5 year timeline which (...) indicates a ratification process and the agreements purpose of raising the level of ambition. (shrink)

The principle of the responsibility to protect (RtoP) conceives of a broad set of measures that can be employed in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes. Nevertheless, the UN Security Council remains an important part of the implementation architecture, given what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty referred to as its authoritative position in international society as the “linchpin of order and stability.” As part of the roundtable “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years (...) since Its Inception,” this review of the Council's role in fulfilling its responsibility to protect advances two somewhat contrasting arguments about the original ICISS report. First, it suggests that the commissioners may have underestimated the Council's potential contribution, by concentrating on the authorization of coercive means to address crises of human protection. Over the past two decades, the Security Council has not only employed various diplomatic, political, and humanitarian measures to address atrocity crimes but also adjusted the purposes and practices of peace operations to advance protection goals and more subtly shaped discourses and expectations about state responsibilities for protection. However, I also argue that the willingness of the ICISS to identify potential alternatives to the Security Council when its members are paralyzed appears in retrospect to have been both bold and forward looking, in light of the Council's failures to act in a timely and decisive manner to protect amid crises and the contemporary realities of geopolitical rivalry. The article concludes by suggesting that future efforts to protect populations from atrocity crimes should focus not only on the herculean task of trying to change the behavior of P5 members of the Council but also on encouraging a new institutional balance between the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies. (shrink)

El trabajo analiza el tema de los derechos humanos bajo la perspectiva de la política multilateral. En esta línea, se concentra en las innovaciones que ha implicado el establecimiento del Consejo de Derechos Humanos, en lugar de la antigua Comisión de Derechos Humanos. Para tal efecto, se pone un énfasis especial en el estudio de las discusiones políticas que se dieron en el seno de la Comunidad Internacional, durante el proceso de constitución del nuevo Consejo, así como en los nuevos (...) mecanismos de revisión que éste contempla. (shrink)

This article recounts the backlash against the neoliberal constitutionalism that locked in free trade and capital rights through the multilateral treaty organizations of the 1990s. It argues that we can find important forces in the disruption of the status quo among the elite losers of the 1990s settlement. Undercut by competition from China, the US steel industry, in particular, became a vocal opponent of unconditional free trade and a red thread linking all of Trump’s primary advisers on matters of trade. (...) Steel lobbyists themselves helped frame a critique of actually existing neoliberal globalism, which Trump both adopted and acted on as part of his trade war. By searching for the contemporary attack on neoliberal constitutionalism among the disgruntled corporate elite, we find that our current crisis must be framed as a backlash from above as well as one from below. (shrink)

The world has changed in the last few decades. While the enforcement of international issues may once have been undermined by differences in transnational institutions, the onset of globalisation has led to a greater willingness amongst states to cooperate with each other. It is suggested that this could be a positive development for, amongst other things, gradually tackling climate change, global poverty and the greater realisation of human rights. What is needed is a period of reflection of how far we (...) have come and how we can use this to change for the future. (shrink)

Over the past seventy-five years, the UN has evolved significantly, often in response to geopolitical dynamics and new waves of thinking. In some respects, the UN has registered remarkable achievements, stimulating a wide range of multilateral treaties, promoting significant growth of human rights, and at times playing a central role in containing and preventing large-scale armed conflict. As part of the special issue on “The United Nations at Seventy-Five: Looking Back to Look Forward,” this essay argues that the organization has (...) been the most impactful in three areas: producing, shaping, and driving key ideas, particularly on development and rights; generating such effective operational agencies as UNICEF and the World Food Program; and, especially in the immediate post–Cold War period, addressing major conflict risks through the Security Council. Since then, however, the UN has struggled to meet emerging challenges on many fronts and been increasingly hampered by internal ossification and institutional sprawl as well as internecine dysfunction. The twenty-first century has confronted the UN with further challenges relating most notably to climate change; to risks arising from new technologies; and to the increasingly fraught relationships between China, Russia, and the United States. If the past seventy-five years can offer one lesson, it is that new thinking and new ideas will need to drive the organization to evolve still further and faster, or else risk irrelevance. (shrink)