The Reading Augustine series presents short, engaging books offering personal readings of St. Augustine of Hippo's contributions to western philosophical, literary, and religious life. This two-volume work provides a new understanding of Western subjectivity as theorized in the Augustinian Rule. A theopolitical synthesis of Antiquity, the Rule is a humble, yet extremely influential example of subjectivity production. In these volumes, Jodra argues that the Classical and Late-Ancient communitarian practices along the Mediterranean provide historical proof of a worldview in which the (...) self and the other are not disjunctive components, but mutually inclusive forces. The Augustinian Rule is a culmination of this process and also the beginning of something new: The paradigm of the monastic self as protagonist of the new, medieval worldview. Three main theoretical challenges leading to, and present in the Rule are tackled: What are the sources of our modern understanding of subjectivity? Can Ancient sources provide an alternative genealogy that resists the individualistic turn of Modernity? And can the commons be saved without suppressing individuality? Jodra seeks to prove that the synthesis-which is also an appropriation-of Greek and Judaic sources carried out by the first Christians allowed for two contrasting models of subjectivity, the self-less and the other-less, to 'take turns' to dominate our understanding of human nature. The Greek world provided the political dimension and the Jewish world established the key theological principles of a Mediterranean synthesis which took place in Rome. Coherently and progressively, Jodra emphasizes the theopolitical nature of our worldview even today, and claim that the subject of the primitive Church is its most visible incarnation. These volumes therefore restore the unity of the Hellenistic and Judaic world as found by the first Christians, proving that the self and the other are two essential pieces in the construction of our world. (shrink)

This essay aims to broaden the understanding of the nature of the physician–patient relationship. To do so, the concept of medical philia that Pedro Laín Entralgo proposes is analysed and is considered taking into consideration the relational trait of the human being and the structure of human action as a story of the permanent tension that exists between freedom and truth, where the ontological foundation of the hermeneutic of the "Gift" and the analogy of “Love” as the central dynamic (...) of this action, helps explain the nature of the doctor-patient relationship as a "friendship relationship". This understanding offers a perspective differing from just the utilitarian considerations of current "patient-centred" approaches and proposed the redirection of the teaching of medicine to more humanistic approaches. The dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship proposed here in its most genuine essence is effectively expressed in physician concrete attitudes that the patient usually captures and relates as the “the doctor’s way of being”. Goya's painting, Self-portrait with Dr Arrieta (1820), can be taken as an outstanding artistic representation of this expanded dimension of the medical act, capturing the “medical friendship” in action. (shrink)

RESUMEN Un atento repaso por la concepción de la violencia chulhaniana en el contexto de las formas tradicionales que han estudiado este fenómeno social permite exponer con mayor detalle y claridad esta propuesta en cuanto a la relación con el otro se refiere. Cuando lo sucedido durante el colonialismo que azotó al mundo en el transcurso de los siglos XVIII y XIX se asumía como las más peligrosas acciones cometidas en procura de la supresión de las características propias de cada (...) uno, en la medida en que los fenómenos de invasión suprimían materialmente la diferencia que poblaba el mundo, apareció la violencia de la positividad como la disposición sistémica que parte de la libertad y el consentimiento individual para, tácitamente, eliminar cualquier tipo de sentido de otredad presente en su constitución. ABSTRACT A careful review of the conception of Chulhanian violence in the context of the traditional forms that have studied this social phenomenon makes it possible to explain in greater detail and clarity this proposal as to the relationship with the other refers. When what happened during colonialism that hit the world during the 18th and 19th centuries was assumed to be the most dangerous actions committed in seeking the suppression of each other's own characteristics to the extent that invasion phenomena materially suppressed the difference that populated the world, the violence of positivity appeared as the systemic disposition that begins with freedom and individual consent to, tacitly, to eliminate any kind of sense of otherness present in its constitution. (shrink)

Este artículo trata sobre el filósofo chileno Jenaro Abasolo. Se expone en él, primeramente, la producción literaria de Abasolo y la nula receptividad que su obra tuvo en los círculos intelectuales de su tiempo, aludiendo, a la vez, al concepto central de su filosofía, es decir, la idea de personalidad. Luego, y más extensamente, se presentan las consideraciones de Abasolo respecto de algunas de las problemáticas sociales y económicas discutidas en los inicios de la República, abordando temas como la (...) class='Hi'>moral, la religión, el fin social y la libertad. This artick is a treatise on the Chilean philosopher Jenaro Abasólo. Vrimarilj, it exposes Abasólo, his literary production, and the complete lack of attention that his oeuvre recieved from the intellectual áreles of his period. It alludes, at the same time, to the central concept of his philosophy, Le., the idea of personality. Later and more extensively, it presents Abasolo’s considerations regarding social and economic issues discussed at the beginning of the Republic, addressing topics such as morality, religión, social order and freedom. (shrink)

Este artículo trata sobre el filósofo chileno Jenaro Abasolo. Se expone en él, primeramente, la producción literaria de Abasolo y la nula receptividad que su obra tuvo en los círculos intelectuales de su tiempo, aludiendo, a la vez, al concepto central de su filosofía, es decir, la idea de personalidad. Luego, y más extensamente, se presentan las consideraciones de Abasolo respecto de algunas de las problemáticas sociales y económicas discutidas en los inicios de la República, abordando temas como la (...) class='Hi'>moral, la religión, el fin social y la libertad. This artick is a treatise on the Chilean philosopher Jenaro Abasólo. Vrimarilj, it exposes Abasólo, his literary production, and the complete lack of attention that his oeuvre recieved from the intellectual áreles of his period. It alludes, at the same time, to the central concept of his philosophy, Le., the idea of personality. Later and more extensively, it presents Abasolo’s considerations regarding social and economic issues discussed at the beginning of the Republic, addressing topics such as morality, religión, social order and freedom. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo da cuenta de la forma en que el liberalismo del filósofo chileno Jenaro Abasolo (1833-1884), al conceder un rol activo al Estado en la “habilitación de la masa desheredada”, responde al adjetivo “social”. En Abasolo, el deber de asegurar en lo posible la prosperidad de las personas, se sostiene en el derecho natural y en una teología de la historia pan[en]teísta afín al krausismo. Abasolo piensa que la redención del desheredado en naciones aun juveniles debe apoyarse en (...) una forma de Estado “casi socialista”. Esto implica una acción de centralización y de tutela del pueblo que enfrenta a los autores del artículo a la gran dificultad de determinar cómo el autor chileno realiza la transición de una habilitación consumada a través de un buen grado de despotismo, hacia la libertad. Es decir, resulta controversial establecer la factibilidad de la realización de esta vía cuasi socialista a un liberalismo contrafácticamente orientado por el laissez faire. Abstract This article shows how the liberalism of the Chilean philosopher Jenaro Abasolo (1833-1884), by granting an active role to the State in the “empowerment of the disinherited mass”, responds to the adjective “social”. In Abasolo, the duty to ensure as far as possible the prosperity of the people is based on natural law and on a pan[en]theistic theology of history akin to Krausism. Abasolo thinks that the redemption of the disinherited in even juvenile nations must be supported by an “almost socialist” form of state. This implies an action of centralization and guardianship of the people that confronts the authors of the article with the great difficulty of determining how the Chilean author makes the transition from an empowerment consummated through a good degree of despotism, towards freedom. That is to say, it is controversial to establish the feasibility of the realization of this quasi-socialist path to a liberalism counterfactually oriented by laissez faire. (shrink)

Reflection on free agency has largely been motivated by perceived threats to its very existence, which, in turn, has driven the philosophical conversation to focus on the question of whether we have the freedom required for moral responsibility. The Stoics were early participants in this conversation, but they were also concerned about an ideal of inner moral freedom, a freedom over and above that required for responsibility, and one to which we might aspire over the (...) course of our lives. Though some details of the Stoic ideal would be difficult for many of us to accept, I argue that it merits our attention for the way it focuses on the removal of inner obstacles to virtue, leading to improved moral vision and the willingness to follow that vision. I then show how we can harness resources from contemporary theorizing on responsible agency to capture the structure and scalar nature of such an ideal, thereby helpfully situating ideal moral freedom in relation to the freedom relevant to moral responsibility. I outline three possible contemporary versions of such an ideal, noting how each will be sensitive to related commitments in metaphysics, moral psychology, and normative theory. (shrink)

Moral Freedom reconciles three apparently inconsistent truisms about morality: first, moral rules are society's rules; second, morality is a matter of individual choice: and third, some things are wrong regardless of what any society or individual has to say. In developing a moral theory that accommodates all three truisms, Jeffrey Olen offers a view of morality that allows individuals a generous degree of moral freedom.The author explores various answers to the question, "Does anybody or (...) anything have any moral authority over how I live my life?" His answer is "No." In a lively, conversational style, Olen leads the reader through the arguments, examples, and exceptions that contribute to this conclusion. Along the way, he contends that what most philosophers call the moral point of view, but what he refers to as the impersonal moral point of view, is but one of two moral points of view. The other is the personal moral point of view, which Olen defends against the allegedly overriding demands of impersonal morality.Moral Freedom considers the work of philosophers as diverse as Kant, Nietzsche, Kurt Baier, Bernard Williams, and Daniel Dennett. Admitting that this is a personal discussion of the nature of morality, Olen claims the "freedom" to engage these intellectual issues in a personal style to illustrate the personal moral point of view that he champions. Author note: Jeffrey Olen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point. (shrink)

Kant’s central notion of a “causality of freedom” seems inconsistent with his theoretical analysis of causation. Because of its detachment from any reference to time, it is also seriously in tension with ordinary moral ideals of individuality, efficacy, responsiveness, and personal growth in the exercise of freedom. I suggest a way of conceiving moral freedom that avoids the absurdity of practical timelessness while preserving the main strengths of Kant’s theories of theoretical and practical meaning, including (...) his refusal to specify the content of human fulfillment. Much as Kant’s ideal of the highest good combines the supreme good of moral virtue with its necessarily desired complement of worthy happiness, a Kantian ideal of the fullest freedom can combine the transcendental freedom of the moral disposition with individual exercises of freedom in the dramatic interaction of actual moral community. (shrink)

The Finalistic Difficulty in Freedom and Its Solution -- Chapter XVIII: Solution of the Ought-Antinomy -- The Inner Conflict in Free Will as the Moral Will -- Solution of the Conflict. Exposure of Equivocations -- The Conflict of the Two Factors in Moral Freedom -- The Complementary Relation behind the Apparent Conflict -- The Recurrence of "Negative Freedom" in the Ought-Antinomy -- The Scope of " Negative" Freedom and its True Relation to " Positive" (...) Freedom -- Reciprocal Conditionality of Positive and Negative Freedom with Regard to Values -- Two-sided Freedom in the Self-Determination of the Person -- Chapter XIX: Problems Still Unsolved -- The Difficulty Concerning Individuality in Moral Freedom -- The Positive Relation between Universal and Individual Autonomy -- The Question as to the Nature of the Individual Determinant -- Personal Teleology as a Determinational Mode of Positive Freedom -- The Ontological Difficulty in Personal Freedom -- The Categorial Structure of the Complex Conditioning-Relationship -- Moral and Categorial Freedom -- The Limit to the Problem -- Section VI: Appendix to the Doctrine of Freedom -- Chapter XX: Apparent and Real Defects of the Theory -- Chapter XXI: Ethical and Religious Freedom -- Index. (shrink)

In this module lesson on Patañjali ’s Yoga Sūtra (I am relying upon my translation, listed in the bibliography: Patañjali 2008), I shall explore Yoga’s critical response to Western moral theory. Yoga was not part of the Western tradition and the author or authors of the Yoga Sūtra were not responding to Western moralists Nevertheless, what Patañjali, the legendary author of the Yoga Sūtra, has to say about moral standing and reason serves as a response to standard accounts (...) on those topics, and in turn, it provides grounds for a response to Western moralists. Yoga is contrasted with the ethics of Plato, Kant, Spinoza and Schopenhauer. (shrink)

A common objection to moral enhancement is that it would undermine our moral freedom and that this is a bad thing because moral freedom is a great good. Michael Hauskeller has defended this view on a couple of occasions using an arresting thought experiment called the 'Little Alex' problem. In this paper, I reconstruct the argument Hauskeller derives from this thought experiment and subject it to critical scrutiny. I claim that the argument ultimately fails because (...) (a) it assumes that moral freedom is an intrinsic good when, in fact, it is more likely to be an axiological catalyst; and (b) there are reasons to think that moral enhancement does not undermine moral freedom. (shrink)

Put together to honour one of the most influential philosophers in recent times, Mrinal Miri, this book brings together articles on philosophy, politics, literature and society, and updates the status of enquiry in each of these fields. In his philosophical writings, Miri has broken the stranglehold that early training has on academics and written on a range of themes and areas, including analytical philosophy, political philosophy, tribal identity, ethics and, more recently, an abiding engagement with the ideas of Gandhi. The (...) articles in this volume mirror some of Miri’s concerns and philosophical interests, but go beyond the format of a festschrift, as they seek to enhance and restate themes in moral philosophy, ethics, questions of identity, Gandhi’s philosophy, and offer a fresh perspective on themes such as secularism, religion and politics. (shrink)

Put together to honour one of the most influential philosophers in recent times, Mrinal Miri, this book brings together articles on philosophy, politics, literature and society, and updates the status of enquiry in each of these fields. In his philosophical writings, Miri has broken the stranglehold that early training has on academics and written on a range of themes and areas, including analytical philosophy, political philosophy, tribal identity, ethics and, more recently, an abiding engagement with the ideas of Gandhi. The (...) articles in this volume mirror some of Miri’s concerns and philosophical interests, but go beyond the format of a festschrift, as they seek to enhance and restate themes in moral philosophy, ethics, questions of identity, Gandhi’s philosophy, and offer a fresh perspective on themes such as secularism, religion and politics. (shrink)

In "Existential Humanism and Moral Freedom in Simone de Beauvoir's Ethics" Tove Pettersen elucidates the close connection between Beauvoir’s ethics and humanism, and argues that her humanism is an existential humanism. Beauvoir’s concept of freedom is inspected, followed by a discussion of her reasons for making moral freedom the leading normative value, and her claim that we must act for humanity. In Beauvoir’s ethics, freedom is not reserved for the elite, but understood as everyone (...) being “able to surpass the given toward an open future.” By addressing the continuing friction between individual freedom and public interests, Beauvoir’s normative thinking remains highly relevant today. It also exemplifies the enduring importance of humanistic reflections and demonstrates how, through critical and creative thinking, the humanities can contribute to a free, well-functioning democratic society. (shrink)

In line with the tradition running from Ancients through Christian thought, Kant affirms the idea of moral freedom: that true freedom consists in moral self-determination. The idea of moral freedom raises the problem of moral freedom: if freedom is moral self-determination, it seems that the wicked are not free and therefore not responsible for their wrongdoings. In this essay I discuss Kant's solution to this problem. I argue that Kant distinguishes (...) between four modalities of freedom as moral self-determination and that the problem of moral freedom disappears when these distinctions are brought to light. (shrink)

Kant’s account of the freedom gained through virtue builds on the Socratic tradition. On the Socratic view, when morality is our end, nothing can hinder us from attaining satisfaction: we are self-sufficient and free since moral goodness is (as Kant says) “created by us, hence is in our power.” But when our end is the fulfillment of sensible desires, our satisfaction requires luck as well as the cooperation of others. For Kant, this means that happiness requires that we (...) get other people to work for our ends; and this requires, in turn, that we gain control over the things other people value so as to have influence over them. If this plan for happiness is not subordinated to morality, then what is most valuable to us will be precisely what others value. This is the root of the “passions” that make us evil and make us slaves whose satisfaction depends on others. But, significantly, this dependence is a moral slavery and hence does not signal a loss, or even diminishment of the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility. (shrink)

This article introduces English translations of Tanabe’s two essays entitled “Moral Freedom” and “On Moral Freedom Revisited.” In these essays, Tanabe tries to understand the unity of the contradictory division between freedom and necessity, while remaining truthful to the moral experience. Freedom is ultimately characterized as ideality that we ought to realize in reality, while the stage of religion constitutes the ultimate end of such moral struggles. Tanabe does not clearly work out (...) how the continuity of the freedom-necessity discontinuity is possible in these essays. Nevertheless, we can gain insight into the early stages of Tanabe’s practical metaphysics that culminate in his mature works on the philosophy of religion. The translators’ introduction will highlight these points and also provide a brief description of the historical background in which the publication of these texts took place in 1917. (shrink)

In Kant’s writings, we can discover four key moments in the realization of moral freedom: i) The original possibility of being free, ii) The act described by Kant as radical evil, iii) The opposite act, that is, an inner conversion to good, and, finally, iv) The long process of the self-development of virtue extending to immortality. There are further issues such as the double concept of moral evil, and practical temporality. Moral freedom is originally located (...) in the individual, her decisions, and the maxims or principles that guide her actions, even though a community provides the scope wherein all this takes place and its socially and historically-situated shapes. This paper tries to systematize these crucial stages of Kant’s moral philosophy with the focus on the concept of virtue. (shrink)

Spinoza and Moral Freedom guides the reader through Spinoza's principal ideas and powerful lines of reasoning, clearing up obscurities along the way, while acknowledging the genuine difficulties and gaps.

Why are moral actions beautiful, when indeed they are? This paper assesses the view, found most notably in Schiller, that moral actions are beautiful just when they present the appearance of freedom by appearing to be the result of internal harmony (the Schillerian Internal Harmony Thesis). I argue that while this thesis can accommodate some of the beauty involved in contrasts of the ‘continent’ and the ‘fully’ virtuous, it cannot account for all of the beauty in such (...) contrasts, and so needs to be weakened considerably (to the Internal Harmony Thesis). To account for the remaining beauty that cannot be fully accommodated even by this revised thesis, as well as the beauty contained in contrasts that involve agents who experience internal conflict as a result of being sensitive to different sources of moral value to an appropriate extent, a number of further theses need to be posited: namely, that the beauty of some moral actions is to be accommodated in terms of internal disharmony (the Internal Disharmony Thesis), and in terms of a felt harmony between the appreciator of the action and the executor of the action (the Affective Harmony Thesis). As such, in contrast to Schiller, I suggest that we need to take a pluralist and context-sensitive approach to accommodating the beauty of moral actions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Like other philosophical traditions, what we call French spiritualism is a complicated constellation of thinkers who developed partially divergent answers to shared themes or concerns. In order to avoid easy generalizations and artificial labels, this article aims to explore the many-voiced character of this tradition by focusing on a debate on the notion of ‘liberté morale’ that took place in 1903 at the Société française de philosophie. Given the number and the calibre of the participants, as well as the (...) centrality of the discussed notion, this episode sets the perfect stage for an in-situ assessment of the inner fault lines underlying any superficial unity in the French spiritualist tradition. (shrink)

In "reason and conduct" henry david aiken maintains that there is an antinomy of moral objectivity and freedom. Freedom requires that we each choose our own moral principles while objectivity requires that there be universally binding principles. He resolves the antinomy by proposing a principle of objectivity consistent with a diversity of moral codes, Thus forsaking universalizability in ethics. However, His notion of freedom is too stringent and his objectivity inadequate in not encompassing universalizability. (...) Still, Aiken's concept of objectivity is important in pointing to the defeasibility of all our moral positions. (staff). (shrink)

自由的核心概念在康德的建構中，除了奠定了道德法則與法權法則的普遍性、必然性與約束性之外，它還有一個軸心的關鍵作用，居間連結道德哲學與法權哲學。自由是實踐哲學的基本概念，藉此設定，康德業已以不言而喻的必 然方式，將法權哲學的法權論，與倫理學的德行論，一併歸編列於道德哲學的大系統之內。這樣一個大系統的建構，反過來使法權哲學的法權論能夠具有道德形上學的向度，從外在的強制法，通過意念的反思建立德行，成為可能 。再透過理性本體之自由理念的溯源，自由基本人權明確顯示的，即是「人作為人」不可冒犯的尊嚴。在康德通過道德法則的理性事實證成自由理念的客觀真實性之後，我們可以合理地倒反過來，從存有的觀點來鳥瞰他的道德哲 學的這整個系統的基本架構，是透過一個核心作用的統籌運用：從作為核心的自由概念出發，一方面「縱向貫徹」，另外一方面「橫向一致」，動態交錯地開展出來。.