Linguistic justice is about institutions distributing material and symbolic resources fairly when they are faced with linguistic diversity. However, no theory of linguistic justice has developed a systematic and comprehensive account of the moral dilemmas that take place in interpersonal linguistic relationships, in particular the power dynamics leading to (linguistic) domination. The aim of this article is to start building a general theory of linguistic domination, one that offers new conceptual tools for both empirical and normative analyses of linguistically (...) diverse societies. Using the republican tradition of thought, I argue that there is linguistic domination whenever someone is subject to the uncontrolled capacity for interference over their linguistic uses, ideology and acquisition by another agent. This article tests under what conditions this phenomenon takes place and the parties involved in it (both in terms of individuals and political institutions). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that many scholars involved in the contemporary free will debates have underappreciated the philosophical appeal of agent causation because the resources of contemporary emergentism have not been adequately introduced into the discussion. Whereas I agree that agent causation’s main problem has to do with its intelligibility, particularly with respect to the issue of how substances can be causally relevant, I argue that the notion of substance causation can be clearly articulated from an emergentist (...) framework. According to my proposal, a free agent is _a causally powerful substance that emerges in an anomic way from her constitutive mental events_, downwardly constraining, selecting and, in this way, having control on them. As we shall see, this particular concept of agent causation not only makes sense of the deep insight behind agent libertarianism, but it also provides us with the resources to solve some of the main objections that have been raised against it. It is true that here I cannot develop a complete defense of the evidential credentials of emergentism. Still, even if the considerations that follow do not serve to convince detractors of agent causal libertarian accounts of free will, they do suggest that libertarian agent causation is more promising than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

I present here a case against the evidentialist approach that claims that in so far as our interests are epistemic what should guide our belief formation and revision is always a strict adherence to the available evidence. I go on to make the stronger claim that some beliefs based on admittedly “insufficient” evidence may exhibit epistemic virtue. I propose that we consider a form of courage to be an intellectual or epistemic virtue. It is through this notion of courage that (...) we can see a weakness in the evidentialist position. Adopting a doxastically courageous approach allows us to acknowledge the role that evidence has in epistemic justification and its connection with promoting epistemic value, but it avoids the narrowness of an evidentialist position. The epistemically courageous agent is not one who disregards the evidence entirely, but she also realizes that taking risks will not necessarily keep her from her epistemic goals. Believing something in the face of insufficient evidence is not always an epistemic vice to be avoided, and the agent that recognizes this is better off for it. (shrink)

This thesis develops a theory about the structure of modal judgment and knowledge. Arguing in favour of pluralism about the source of modal knowledge, it focuses on the questions of the varieties of modal judgment and their relations, the function of modal judgment and the scope of modal knowledge. It offers a hypothesis about the development of the framework of modal knowledge, grounding it on the capacity to evaluate temporal judgments, from which the capacity to evaluate alternatives comes from, and (...) it suggests that the most basic framework of modal judgments consists in that of agentive modality, and in particular, about what one can do, and how. Then, it is argued that the rest of the framework of modal judgment can be developed on this basis, although this imposes certain restrictions about the scope of modal knowledge. Additionally, the thesis provides analyses of various agentive modal notions, such as imaginability, what is a way to do something, and discusses how to understand counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. (shrink)

Teaching mathematics and improving mathematics competence are pending subjects within our educational system. The PEIM (Programa Evolutivo Instruccional para Matemáticas), a constructivist intervention program for the improvement of mathematical performance, affects the different agents involved in math learning, guaranteeing a significant improvement in students’ performance. The program is based on the following pillars: (a) students become the main agents of their learning by constructing their own knowledge; (b) the teacher must be the guide to facilitate and guarantee such a construction (...) by being a great connoisseur of the fundamental aspects of the development of the child’s mathematical thinking; (c) the mathematical contents must be sequenced in terms of the complexity and significance for the student as well as contextualized at all times; and (d) the classroom must have a constructivist climate highlighting cooperative work among students. The implementation of PEIM along with the empirical evaluation conducted in several centers in Madrid and Zaragoza (Spain) confirm how students improve their mathematical competence. Both first- and second-grade students in elementary education were far more effective in solving problems, highlighting the use of more advanced strategies in their resolution and a lower incidence of conceptual errors. Moreover, it was possible to verify how the students proving greater difficulty, experienced an evolution in learning similarly to those who did not present it. The program provides customized education to allow the teacher to know at all times how he should be more influential on the students’ learning through mathematical profiles. Both teaching practice and teachers were observed, being that of the experimental group more prone to analyzing processes and allowing the construction of knowledge by students, due to their psycho-developmental training. As a result, we found several improvements through the implementation of the program that may serve, for upcoming years, as a basis for the necessary changes in the teaching of mathematics. (shrink)

In this paper, I give an overview of different models of understanding attribution and advance a contextualist account of understanding attribution. Whereas other contextualist accounts make the degree in which the epistemic states of the relevant agents satisfy certain invariant conditions context-sensitive, the proposed account makes the conditions themselves context-sensitive.

Providing meaningful and actionable explanations for end-users is a situated problem requiring the intersection of multiple disciplines to address social, operational, and technical challenges. However, the explainable artificial intelligence community has not commonly adopted or created tangible design tools that allow interdisciplinary work to develop reliable AI-powered solutions. This paper proposes a formative architecture that defines the explanation space from a user-inspired perspective. The architecture comprises five intertwined components to outline explanation requirements for a task: (1) the end-users’ mental models, (...) (2) the end-users’ cognitive process, (3) the user interface, (4) the Human-Explainer Agent, and (5) the agent process. We first define each component of the architecture. Then, we present the Abstracted Explanation Space, a modeling tool that aggregates the architecture’s components to support designers in systematically aligning explanations with end-users’ work practices, needs, and goals. It guides the specifications of what needs to be explained (content: end-users’ mental model), why this explanation is necessary (context: end-users’ cognitive process), to delimit how to explain it (format: Human-Explainer Agent and user interface), and when the explanations should be given. We then exemplify the tool’s use in an ongoing case study in the aircraft maintenance domain. Finally, we discuss possible contributions of the tool, known limitations or areas for improvement, and future work to be done. (shrink)

The evaluation of study habits as determinant factors in academic performance is a concern for educational agents because they determine the academic opportunities of students. However, a problem encountered is the accessibility of valid and reliable instruments to evaluate study habits from the students' point of view. In this sense, this paper analyzes the internal structure, reliability, and rating of the study habits perception questionnaire. The results and the practical contribution to the educational community in guiding intervention to improve students' (...) academic opportunities are discussed. (shrink)

For an artificial agent to be morally praiseworthy, its rules for behaviour and the mechanisms for supplying those rules must not be supplied entirely by external humans. Such systems are a substantial departure from current technologies and theory, and are a low prospect. With foreseeable technologies, an artificial agent will carry zero responsibility for its behavior and humans will retain full responsibility.

The aim of this paper is to offer an analysis of the notion of artificial moral agent (AMA) and of its impact on human beings’ self-understanding as moral agents. Firstly, I introduce the topic by presenting what I call the Continuity Approach. Its main claim holds that AMAs and human moral agents exhibit no significant qualitative difference and, therefore, should be considered homogeneous entities. Secondly, I focus on the consequences this approach leads to. In order to (...) do this I take into consideration the work of Bostrom and Dietrich, who have radically assumed this viewpoint and thoroughly explored its implications. Thirdly, I present an alternative approach to AMAs—the Discontinuity Approach—which underscores an essential difference between human moral agents and AMAs by tackling the matter from another angle. In this section I concentrate on the work of Johnson and Bryson and I highlight the link between their claims and Heidegger’s and Jonas’s sug-gestions concerning the relationship between human beings and technological products. In conclusion I argue that, although the Continuity Approach turns out to be a necessary postulate to the machine ethics project, the Discontinuity Approach highlights a relevant distinction between AMAs and human moral agents. On this account, the Discontinuity Approach generates a clearer understanding of what AMAs are, of how we should face the moral issues they pose, and, finally, of the difference that separates machine ethics from moral philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I provide an exposition and critique of Johnson and Noorman’s (2014) three conceptualizations of the agential roles artificial systems can play. I argue that two of these conceptions are unproblematic: that of causally efficacious agency and “acting for” or surrogate agency. Their third conception, that of “autonomous agency,” however, is one I have reservations about. The authors point out that there are two ways in which the term “autonomy” can be used: there is, firstly, the engineering sense (...) of the term, which simply refers to the ability of some system to act independently of substantive human control. Secondly, there is the moral sense of the term, which has traditionally grounded many notions of human mor-al responsibility. I argue that the continued usage of “autonomy” in discussions of artificial agency complicates matters unnecessarily. This occurs in two ways: firstly, the condition of autonomy, even in its engineering sense, fails to accurately describe the way “autonomous” systems are developed in practice. Secondly, the continued usage of autonomy in the moral sense introduces unnecessary meta-physical baggage form the free will debate into discussions about moral agency. In order to understand the debate surrounding autonomy, we would therefore first need to settle many seemingly intractable metaphysical questions regarding the existence of free will in human beings. (shrink)

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to proliferate into every area of modern life, there is no doubt that society has to think deeply about the potential impact, whether negative or positive, that it will have. Whilst scholars recognise that AI can usher in a new era of personal, social and economic prosperity, they also warn of the potential for it to be misused towards the detriment of society. Deliberate strategies are therefore required to ensure that AI can be safely integrated (...) into society in a manner that would maximise the good for as many people as possible, whilst minimising the bad. One of the most urgent societal expectations of artificial agents is the need for them to behave in a manner that is morally relevant, i.e. to become artificial moral agents (AMAs). In this article, I will argue that exemplarism, an ethical theory based on virtue ethics, can be employed in the building of computationally rational AMAs with weak machine ethics. I further argue that three features of exemplarism, namely grounding in moral exemplars, meeting community expectations and practical simplicity, are crucial to its uniqueness and suitability for application in building AMAs that fit the ethos of AI4SG. (shrink)

Must good deeds be rewarded and wrongdoers punished? Would God be unjust if He failed to punish and reward? And what is it about good or evil actions and moral identity that might generate such necessities? These were some of the vital religious and philosophical questions that eighth- and ninth-century Mu'tazilite theologians and their sophisticated successors attempted to answer, giving rise to a distinctive ethical position and one of the most prominent and controversial intellectual trends in medieval Islam. The (...) Mu'tazilites developed a view of ethics whose distinguishing features were its austere moral objectivism and the crucial role it assigned to reason in the knowledge of moral truths. Central to this ethical vision was the notion of moral desert, and of the good and evil consequences--reward or punishment--deserved through a person's acts. Moral Agents and Their Deserts is the first book-length study of this central theme in Mu'tazilite ethics, and an attempt to grapple with the philosophical questions it raises. At the same time, it is a bid to question the ways in which modern readers, coming to medieval Islamic thought with a philosophical interest, seek to read and converse with Mu'tazilite theology. Moral Agents and Their Deserts tracks the challenges and rewards involved in the pursuit of the right conversation at the seams between modern and medieval concerns. (shrink)

I Want to examine how far the question ‘What is it for a man to act morally?’ can be answered in terms of the sociological concept of a role. Is, for example, acting as a moral agent consistent with acting in the capacity of one's role, or even identical with it if being a moral agent is acting a role? In the first part of my paper I shall examine some of the relations between morality and (...) roles, especially from the point of view of that freedom which is always regarded as a necessary condition of a man's being a moral agent. In the second part I shall examine the concept of a role itself, not from the point of view of sociology to which it notionally belongs, but from the point of view of the philosophy of mind; this is the point of connection between my own theme and the general theme of this series of lectures. The role concept will thus be a bridging concept between ethics and the philosphy of mind. Finally I shall bring to bear on the idea of the moral agent any insights that may be yielded by the psychology of role-acting. (shrink)

I Want to examine how far the question ‘What is it for a man to act morally?’ can be answered in terms of the sociological concept of a role. Is, for example, acting as a moral agent consistent with acting in the capacity of one's role, or even identical with it if being a moral agent is acting a role? In the first part of my paper I shall examine some of the relations between morality and (...) roles, especially from the point of view of that freedom which is always regarded as a necessary condition of a man's being a moral agent. In the second part I shall examine the concept of a role itself, not from the point of view of sociology to which it notionally belongs, but from the point of view of the philosophy of mind; this is the point of connection between my own theme and the general theme of this series of lectures. The role concept will thus be a bridging concept between ethics and the philosphy of mind. Finally I shall bring to bear on the idea of the moral agent any insights that may be yielded by the psychology of role-acting. (shrink)

Given that artificial moral agents—such as autonomous vehicles, lethal autonomous weapons, and automated financial trading systems—are now part of the socio-ethical equation, we should morally evaluate their behavior. How should artificial moral agents make decisions? Is one moral theory better suited than others for machine ethics? After briefly overviewing the dominant ethical approaches for building morality into machines, this paper discusses a recent proposal, put forward by Don Howard and Ioan Muntean (2016, 2017), for an artificial (...) class='Hi'>moral agent based on virtue theory. While the virtuous artificial moral agent has various strengths, this paper argues that a rule-based utilitarian approach (in contrast to a strict act-utilitarian approach) is superior because it can capture the most important features of the virtue-theoretic approach while realizing additional significant benefits. Specifically, a 2-level utilitarian artificial moral agent incorporating both established moral rules and a utility calculator is especially well-suited for machine ethics. (shrink)

이 논문은 인공지능이 도덕적 행위자로서 간주될 수 있는지의 문제와 관련된 쟁점을 ‘쉬운 문제’와 ‘어려운 문제’로 나누어 접근하고 그 해결책을 모색한다. 이 두 문제의 성격을 분명히 드러내기 위해 자율주행차의 사례를 분석한다. 그리고 ‘쉬운 문제’의 해결에는 기존 윤리적 개념의 확장이 중요하다는 점을 법인 개념의 탄생 과정과 변화 과정을 통해 설명한다. 또한 ‘어려운 문제’의 해결은 결국 ‘쉬운 문제’의 해결이 축적되는 과정에서 구성적으로 얻어질 것이라고 주장한다. 마지막으로 이 두 문제 해결과정이 서로 본질적으로 연결되어 있기에 논문이 제시하는 방식의 해결이 불가능하다는 반론을 소개하고, 이 반론이 해결책을 (...) 찾는 과정을 구성적, 사회적 과정으로 보지 않고 순간적, 원리적 과정으로 보기 때문이라고 답변한다. (shrink)

Floridi and Sanders, seminal work, “On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as “artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also (...) argue that adopting certain levels of abstraction out of context can be dangerous when the level of abstraction obscures the humans who constitute computer systems. We arrive at this critique of Floridi and Sanders by examining the debate over the moral status of computer systems using the notion of interpretive flexibility. We frame the debate as a struggle over the meaning and significance of computer systems that behave independently, and not as a debate about the ‘true’ status of autonomous systems. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that while levels of abstraction are useful for particular purposes, when it comes to agency and responsibility, computer systems should be conceptualized and identified in ways that keep them tethered to the humans who create and deploy them. (shrink)

This paper investigates qualitatively the significance of different dimensions of ethical organisation culture for the exercise of middle managers’ moral agency in ethical problems. The research draws on the social cognitive theory of morality and on the corporate ethical virtues model. This study broadens understanding of the factors which enable or constrain managers’ potential for moral agency in organisations, and shows that an insufficient ethical organisational culture may contribute to indifference towards ethical issues, the experiencing of moral (...) conflicts, lack of self-efficacy and morally disengaged reasoning. In contrast, a healthy ethical culture can contribute to motivation to tackle ethical problems, an increased capacity for self-regulation and ultimately ethical behaviour. (shrink)

One of the objectives in the field of artificial intelligence for some decades has been the development of artificial agents capable of coexisting in harmony with people and other systems. The computing research community has made efforts to design artificial agents capable of doing tasks the way people do, tasks requiring cognitive mechanisms such as planning, decision-making, and learning. The application domains of such software agents are evident nowadays. Humans are experiencing the inclusion of artificial agents in their environment as (...) unmanned vehicles, intelligent houses, and humanoid robots capable of caring for people. In this context, research in the field of machine ethics has become more than a hot topic. Machine ethics focuses on developing ethical mechanisms for artificial agents to be capable of engaging in moral behavior. However, there are still crucial challenges in the development of truly Artificial Moral Agents. This paper aims to show the current status of Artificial Moral Agents by analyzing models proposed over the past two decades. As a result of this review, a taxonomy to classify Artificial Moral Agents according to the strategies and criteria used to deal with ethical problems is proposed. The presented review aims to illustrate (1) the complexity of designing and developing ethical mechanisms for this type of agent, and (2) that there is a long way to go (from a technological perspective) before this type of artificial agent can replace human judgment in difficult, surprising or ambiguous moral situations. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that artificial moral agents are a fitting subject of intercultural information ethics because of the impact they may have on the relationship between information rich and information poor countries. I will give a limiting definition of AMAs first, and discuss two different types of AMAs with different implications from an intercultural perspective. While AMAs following preset rules might raise con-cerns about digital imperialism, AMAs being able to adjust to their user‘s behavior will lead (...) us to the question what makes an AMA ―moral‖? I will argue that this question does present a good starting point for an inter-cultural dialogue which might be helpful to overcome the notion of Africa as a mere victim. (shrink)

Climate Change and the Moral Agent examines the moral foundations of climate change and makes a case for collective action on climate change by appealing to moralized collective self-interest, collective ability to aid, and an expanded understanding of collective responsibility for harm.

This article examines if bottom-up artificial moral agents are capable of making genuine moral judgements, specifically in light of David Hume’s is-ought problem. The latter underscores the notion that evaluative assertions could never be derived from purely factual propositions. Bottom-up technologies, on the other hand, are those designed via evolutionary, developmental, or learning techniques. In this paper, the nature of these systems is looked into with the aim of preliminarily assessing if there are good reasons to suspect that, (...) on the foundational level, their moral reasoning capabilities are prone to the no-ought-from-is thesis. The main hypothesis of the present work is that, by conceptually analysing the notion of bottom-up artificial moral agents, it would be revealed that their seeming moral judgements do not have proper philosophical basis. For one, the said kinds of artifacts arrive at the understanding of ethically-relevant ideas by means of culling data or facts from the environment. Thus, in relation to the is-ought problem, it may be argued that, even if bottom-up systems seem prima facie capable of generating apparent moral judgments, such are actually absent of good moral grounding, if not empty of any ethical value. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at (...) most bearers of instrumental value. (shrink)

Teaching morally and teaching morality are understood as mutually dependent processes necessary for providing moral education, or the communication of messages and lessons on what is right, good and virtuous in a student's character. This comprehensive and contextualized volume offers anecdotes and experiences on how an elementary schoolteacher envisions, enacts, and reflects on the ethical teaching and learning of her students. By employing a personally developed form of moral education that is not defined by any particular philosophical or (...) theoretical orientation, this volume relates that classroom-based moral education can, therefore, be conceived of and promoted as moral agency. Accentuated by the teacher's voice to offer the experience of being in the classroom, this volume enables others to transfer relevant practices to their own teaching contexts. (shrink)

Machine ethics is the field that strives to develop ‘artificial moral agents’ (AMAs), artificial systems that can autonomously make moral decisions. Some authors have questioned the feasibility of machine ethics, by questioning whether artificial systems can possess moral competence, or the capacity to reach morally right decisions in various situations. This paper explores this question by drawing on the work of several moral philosophers (McDowell, Wiggins, Hampshire, and Nussbaum) who have characterised moral competence in a (...) manner inspired by Aristotle. Although disparate in many ways, these philosophers all emphasise what may be called ‘moral sensitivity’ as a precondition for moral competence. Moral sensitivity is the uncodified, practical skill to recognise, in a range of situations, which features of the situations are morally relevant, and how they are relevant. This paper argues that the main types of AMAs currently proposed are incapable of full moral sensitivity. First, top-down AMAs that proceed from fixed rule-sets are too rigid to respond appropriately to the wide range of qualitatively unique factors that moral sensitivity gives access to. Second, bottom-up AMAs that learn moral behaviour from examples are at risk of generalising from these examples in undesirable ways, as they lack embedding in what Wittgenstein calls a ‘form of life’, which allows humans to appropriately learn from moral examples. The paper concludes that AMAs are unlikely to possess full moral competence, but closes by suggesting that they may still be feasible in restricted domains of public morality, where moral sensitivity plays a smaller role. (shrink)

The study ascertained (1) whether an observer's scope of justice with reference to either the moral agent or the target person of a moral act, would affect his/her judgements of the ethicality of the act, and (2) whether observer judgements of ethicality parallel the moral agent's decision processes in systematically evaluating the intensity of the moral issue. A scenario approach was used. Results affirmed both research questions. Discussions covered the implications of the findings for (...) the underlying cognitive processes of moral judgements, for the link between judgements of fairness and ethicality, as well as for the debate of ethical absolutism versus relativism. (shrink)

본 논문은 비록 시험적 단계에 불과하지만, 마음에 대한 성리학적 개념들을 형식적으로 기술하여 컴퓨터에서 다룰 수 있는 형태로 구성할 수 있을 것인가를 검토하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 필자는 도덕적 마음의 작용에 관해 논의한 내용을 바탕으로 성리학적 도덕행위자구현을 위한 시뮬레이션이 가능한가를 논의해 보았다.BR 성리학에서 마음의 개념을 설명할 때, 본체인 선천적 도덕 능력에 주목하는가 아니면 현실적으로 작용한 마음의 도덕성 여부에 주목하는가에 따라 개념화의 방식이 달라질 수 있다. 필자는 후자에 가까운 율곡의 관점이 상대적으로 경험주의적이라고 보고, 마음을 실물처럼, 몸처럼 명백하게 설명하려고 했다는 점이 인공적 도덕행위자(AMA, Artificial (...) Moral Agent) 토론에 참여하는 데 용이하지 않을까 하여 예시로 삼아 보았다.BR 율곡은 마음의 작용을 기(氣)의 ‘자동적 패턴[機自爾]’으로 설명하면서, 그 패턴이 도덕적 원리로 작동되도록 하는 수양방법을 제시했다. 그래서 필자는 우선 ‘자동적 패턴[機自爾]’이라 했던 기(氣)의 작용이 마음에서 어떻게 전개되는가를 분석하고, 그 다음에 마음의 도덕적 작용, 즉 도덕원리의 우선적 발현을 정형화할 수 있는가를 검토해보았다.BR 나아가, 검토의 과정에서 인공적 도덕행위자 논쟁의 쟁점 중 하나인 무의식적 도덕성이 수기(修己)의 차원에서는 용납될 수 없지만, 치인(治人)의 차원에서는 가능하다는 판단 하에, 필자는 비인격적 모델인 치인(治人) 시스템에 관한 논의를 위해 율곡의 정치개혁론을 검토해보았다. 이러한 시론으로 성리학적 인공적 도덕행위자 구현 가능성에 대한 본격적인 토론이 촉발될 수 있기를 기대한다. (shrink)

The standard interpretion of Hume's philosophy presents him both as a radical skeptic regarding rational claims about the adequate foundation of our belief system and as a naturalist who maintained that our beliefs (though rationally ungrounded) cannot be given up in ordinary life, due to natural drives and sentiments. This paper purports to show that Hume's naturalism can and should be interpreted as a method for addessing philosophical concepts (ideas and beliefs,to use Hume's jargon) that incorporates unreflected elements ofordinary life (...) (such as natural sentiments and drives) and assigns to them the same theoretical status that abstract processes such as reasons and arguments have. A philosophy that warrants unreflected mechanisms in the treatment of philosophical problems is what Hume calls a "true philosophy". Such philosophy is compatible with the more radical forms of skepticism, because the unreflected mechanisms that bring about ideas are imune to doubt. To ilustrate the theses put forth here and so as to render my characterization of naturalism more persuasive, I describe briefly and in broad terms at the end of the paper Hume's view of moral agency. (shrink)

‘도덕 행위자(moral agent)’의 개념은 전통적으로 자신의 행동에 대해 책임을 질 수 있는 자유의지를 가진 인격적 존재에 한정되어 적용되었다. 그런데 도덕적 함축을 갖는 다양한 행동을 수행할 수 있는 자율적 AI의 등장은 이러한 행위자 개념의 수정을 요구하는 것처럼 보인다. 필자는 이 논문에서 일정한 요건을 만족시키는 AI에 대해서 인격성을 전제하지 않는 기능적인 의미의 도덕 행위자 자격이 부여될 수 있다고 주장한다. 그리고 그런 한에 있어서, AI에게도 그 행위자성에 걸맞은 책임 혹은 책무성의 귀속이 가능해진다. 이러한 주장을 뒷받침하기 위하여, 본 논문은 예상되는 여러 가능한 (...) 반론들을 살펴보고 거기에 응답함으로써, AI를 자율적 행위자로 여길 수 있는 여러 근거들을 제시하는 동시에, AI에게 귀속 가능한 책임 혹은 책무성의 개념을 발전시키고자 시도한다. (shrink)

This article focuses on a particular issue under machine ethics—that is, the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. Machine ethics is a branch of artificial intelligence that looks into the moral status of artificial agents. Artificial moral agents, on the other hand, are artificial autonomous agents that possess moral value, as well as certain rights and responsibilities. This paper demonstrates that attempts to fully develop a theory that could possibly account for the nature of Artificial Moral (...) Agents may consider certain philosophical ideas, like the standard characterizations of agency, rational agency, moral agency, and artificial agency. At the very least, the said philosophical concepts may be treated as signposts for further research on how to truly account for the nature of Artificial Moral Agents. (shrink)

Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents. Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners (...) than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further. (shrink)

As robots and Artificial Intelligences become more enmeshed in rich social contexts, it seems inevitable that we will have to make them into moral machines equipped with moral skills. Apart from the technical difficulties of how we could achieve this goal, we can also ask the ethical question of whether we should seek to create such Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs). Recently, several papers have argued that we have strong reasons not to develop AMAs. In response, we develop (...) a comprehensive analysis of the relevant arguments for and against creating AMAs, and we argue that all things considered we have strong reasons to continue to responsibly develop AMAs. The key contributions of this paper are threefold. First, to provide the first comprehensive response to the important arguments made against AMAs by Wynsberghe and Robbins (in “Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents”, Science and Engineering Ethics 25, 2019) and to introduce several novel lines of argument in the process. Second, to collate and thematise for the first time the key arguments for and against AMAs in a single paper. Third, to recast the debate away from blanket arguments for or against AMAs in general, to a more nuanced discussion about the use of what sort of AMAs, in what sort of contexts, and for what sort of purposes is morally appropriate. (shrink)

In this paper Sullins argues that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is made between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in order to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is achieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of (...) the machine. The second is when one can analyze or explain the robot's behavior only by ascribing to it some predisposition or 'intention' to do good or harm. And finally, robot moral agency requires the robot to behave in a way that shows and understanding of responsibility to some other moral agent. Robots with all of these criteria will have moral rights as well as responsibilities regardless of their status as persons. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of prison inmates' right to privacy from an ethical perspective. I argue that the right to privacy is important because of its connection to moral agency and that the protection of privacy is warranted by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. I discuss the practical implications of this argument by addressing two potential problems. First, how much privacy should be allowed during imprisonment in order to meet the criteria of respecting (...) inmates as moral agents? Second, how should the conflict between privacy and other rights, including the rights of the public and the prison staff, as well as those of the prison inmates, be handled? Consequently, from an ethical perspective, the invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible without compromising other important values and rights to safety and security. In defending this position, I argue that respect for inmates' privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment to better effect in the long run. (shrink)

본 연구는 최근 주목 받고 있는 AI에 적용 가능한 윤리적 접근법이 타당한지를 검토해 보고자 한다. 이러한 검토는 우선 AI가 과연 윤리적일 수 있는가 하는 근본적인 물음에서 부터 어떻게 기술적으로 AMA(인공 도덕행위자)를 구현 가능한가 하는 방법론의 검토를 동시에 요한다. 이는 다시 AMA가 과연 자율적인 개체로서 인식될 수 있는지에 대한 문제 와 지속적으로 논의되고 있는 AMA 관련 윤리적 접근법 또한 포함한다. 필자는 이와 관련 된 여러 논의들을 검토하고 각각의 논의들이 가진 특징 및 한계점을 분석하고자 한다. 이 러한 모든 검토들은 AMA의 근본적인 한계를 (...) 드러내려는 필자의 의도로 수렴된다. 필자는 근본적으로 AI가 자율적인 도덕행위자가 될 수 없고, 바로 이 때문에 어떤 이상적인 AMA 로도 AI가 가져올 수 있는 위험을 막을 수 없다고 주장한다. 필자는 이것이 한나 아렌트가 말한 ‘사유행위’와 같은 선상에서 비판 가능한 문제라고 생각하며 논의를 마무리 짓고자 한다. (shrink)

Animal rights philosophers have traditionally accepted the claim that human beings are unique, but rejected the claim that our uniqueness justifies denying animals moral rights. Humans were thought to be unique specifically because we possess moral agency. In this commentary, I explore the claim that some nonhuman animals are also moral agents, and I take note of its counter-intuitive implications.

As arti® cial intelligence moves ever closer to the goal of producing fully autonomous agents, the question of how to design and implement an arti® cial moral agent (AMA) becomes increasingly pressing. Robots possessing autonomous capacities to do things that are useful to humans will also have the capacity to do things that are harmful to humans and other sentient beings. Theoretical challenges to developing arti® cial moral agents result both from controversies among ethicists about moral (...) theory itself, and from computational limits to the implementation of such theories. In this paper the ethical disputes are surveyed, the possibility of a `moral Turing Test ’ is considered and the computational di culties accompanying the diŒerent types of approach are assessed. Human-like performance, which is prone to include immoral actions, may not be acceptable in machines, but moral perfection may be computationally unattainable. The risks posed by autonomous machines ignorantly or deliberately harming people and other sentient beings are great. The development of machines with enough intelligence to assess the eŒects of their actions on sentient beings and act accordingly may ultimately be the most important task faced by the designers of arti® cially intelligent automata. (shrink)

The latter part of the 20th century is known for a surge in the so-called ‘genitive theologies’. Usually, a genitive theology has an ulterior motive, aiming at the transformation of a society or the promotion of sound politics and economy. In recent years, this trend culminated in public theology. The issue of religion with an ulterior motive was raised by Van de Beek in a seminal article focusing on theology without gaining anything from it as an answer to the surging (...) genitive theologies of the latter part of the 20th century and the public theologies of today. Taking into account Van de Beek’s critique against ‘religion with an ulterior motive’, this article explores the concept of the church as a moral agent in dialogue with Van de Beek. The central theoretical argument of this investigation is that Van de Beek’s ecclesiology is valuable when defining the role of the church as a moral agent. However, the perspective of the Kingdom of God concerning the church can enrich one’s views and can add value to his valid critique on public theology. (shrink)