Results for 'Mood'

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Bibliography: Moods in Philosophy of Mind
  1.  77
    Mood and Wellbeing.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The two main subjectivist accounts of wellbeing, hedonism and desire-satisfactionism, focus on pleasure and desire (respectively) as the subjective states relevant to evaluating the goodness of a life. In this paper, I argue that another type of subjective state, mood, is much more central to wellbeing. After a general characterization of some central features of mood (§1), I argue that the folk concept of happiness construes it in terms of preponderance of good mood (§2). I then leverage (...)
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  2.  67
    Mood and the Analysis of Non-Declarative Sentences.Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber - 1988 - In J. Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik & C. C. W. Taylor (eds.), Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value. Stanford University Press. pp. 77--101.
    How are non-declarative sentences understood? How do they differ semantically from their declarative counterparts? Answers to these questions once made direct appeal to the notion of illocutionary force. When they proved unsatisfactory, the fault was diagnosed as a failure to distinguish properly between mood and force. For some years now, efforts have been under way to develop a satisfactory account of the semantics of mood. In this paper, we consider the current achievements and future prospects of the (...)-based semantic programme. (shrink)
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  3. Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
    Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being (...)
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  4. The Intentional Structure of Moods.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-19.
    Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but (...)
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  5. Mood and Gradability: An Investigation of the Subjunctive Mood in Spanish.Elisabeth Villalta - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4):467-522.
    In Spanish (and other Romance languages) certain predicates select the subjunctive mood in the embedded clause, while others select the indicative mood. In this paper, I present a new analysis for the predicates that select the subjunctive mood in Spanish that is based on a semantics of comparison. The main generalization proposed here is the following: in Spanish, a predicate selects the subjunctive mood in its embedded proposition if the proposition is compared to its contextual alternatives (...)
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  6. Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.
    Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...)
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  7.  29
    Collective Moods. A Contribution to the Phenomenology and Interpersonality of Shared Affectivity.Nina Trcka - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1647-1662.
    Collective moods are ubiquitous in social life. People may experience the sharing of a mood at a large sporting event, a concert or a religious ceremony, but also at a small family celebration or as part of a tour group. However, in philosophical discussions, collective moods are often framed as experiences of ecstasy, intoxication or even disinhibition at mass events without examining other aspects. Yet we practice and cultivate the sharing of moods in quite varied forms. In this paper (...)
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  8. Mood and Modality.F. R. Palmer - 1988 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 50 (4):728-729.
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  9.  88
    The Mood-Emotion Loop.Muk Wong - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3061-3080.
    This paper aims to clarify and reformulate the conceptual relationship between emotions and moods in light of recent researches in philosophy and cognitive psychology. I argue that the mechanism of mood may produces cognitive biases that affect the appraisals involved in emotions, whereas the mechanism of emotion may produce physiological and behavioral responses that affect the energy level being monitored by mood. These two distinct mechanisms can affect each other repeatedly and continuously, which form the mood-emotion loop. (...)
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  10. Moods and Appraisals: How the Phenomenology and Science of Emotions Can Come Together.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Human Studies (4):1-27.
    In this paper, I articulate Heidegger’s notion of Befindlichkeit and show that his phenomenological account of affective existence can be understood in terms of contemporary work on emotions. By examining Heidegger’s account alongside contemporary accounts of emotions, I not only demonstrate the ways in which key aspects of the former are present in the latter; I also explicate in detail the ways in which our understanding of Befindlichkeit and its relationship to moods and emotions can benefit from an empirically-informed study (...)
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  11. Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality.William Fish - 2005 - In Intentionality: Past and Future (Value Inquiry Book Series, Volume 173). Rodopi NY.
    Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...)
     
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  12. Content, Mood, and Force.Francois Recanati - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):622-632.
    In this survey paper, I start from two classical theses of speech act theory: that speech act content is uniformly propositional and that sentence mood encodes illocutionary force. These theses have been questioned in recent work, both in philosophy and linguistics. The force/content distinction itself – a cornerstone of 20‐century philosophy of language – has come to be rejected by some theorists, unmoved by the famous ‘Frege–Geach’ argument. The paper reviews some of these debates.
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  13.  54
    Moods and Performances.Donald Davidson - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 9--20.
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  14.  49
    Moods in Layers.Achim Stephan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1481-1495.
    The goal of this paper is to examine moods, mostly in comparison to emotions. Nearly all of the features that allegedly distinguish moods from emotions are disputed though. In a first section I comment on duration, intentionality, and cause in more detail, and develop intentionality as the most promising distinguishing characteristic. In a second section I will consider the huge variety of moods, ranging from shallow environmentally triggered transient moods to deep existential moods that last much longer. I will explore (...)
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  15. Basic Moods.Craig DeLancey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
    The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by (...)
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  16. Affect Without Object: Moods and Objectless Emotions.Carolyn Price - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):49-68.
    Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not (...)
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  17.  1
    Mood.Paul Portner - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    This book presents the essential background for understanding semantic theories of both verbal mood and sentence mood. Paul Portner evaluates and compares the theories, draws connections between seemingly disparate approaches, and highlights the most significant insights in the literature to provide a clearer understanding of how mood works.
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  18. Delusional Mood and Affection.Jae Ryeong Sul - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (4):467-489.
    Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state, often present in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. Various phenomenological psychopathologists have proposed that delusional mood may not only precede but also contribute to the later formation of schizophrenic delusion. Hence, understanding experiential abnormalities involved with the delusional mood have been considered central for the understanding of schizophrenic delusion. Ranging from traditional and contemporary phenomenological and neurobiological accounts, it has been often mentioned that the peculiar affective saliency of the world (...)
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  19. Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods.Matthias Siemer - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):256-263.
    The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. (...)
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  20. Intentionalism About Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...)
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  21. Mood and Language-Game.Erik Stenius - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):254 - 274.
  22.  85
    A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147.
    The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...)
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  23.  12
    Embodied Mood Regulation: The Impact of Body Posture on Mood Recovery, Negative Thoughts, and Mood-Congruent Recall.Lotte Veenstra, Iris K. Schneider & Sander L. Koole - 2017 - Cognition and Emotion 31 (7):1361-1376.
    ABSTRACTPrevious work has shown that a stooped posture may activate negative mood. Extending this work, the present experiments examine how stooped body posture influences recovery from pre-existing negative mood. In Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to receive either a negative or neutral mood induction, after which participants were instructed to take either a stooped, straight, or control posture while writing down their thoughts. Stooped posture led to less mood recovery in the negative mood condition, (...)
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  24. Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.Alex Madva - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78.
    Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals’ moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals’ partial awareness of their implicit biases makes (...)
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  25.  82
    Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...)
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  26. Tense, Mood, and Centering.Maria Bittner - manuscript
    Natural languages exhibit a great variety of grammatical paradigms. For instance, in English verbs are grammatically marked for tense, whereas in the tenseless Eskimo-Aleut language Kalaallisut they are marked for illocutionary mood. Although time is a universal dimension of the human experience and speaking is part of that experience, some languages encode reference to time without any grammatical tense morphology, or reference to speech acts without any illocutionary mood morphology. Nevertheless, different grammatical systems are semantically parallel in certain (...)
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  27. Affectivity in Heidegger I: Moods and Emotions in Being and Time.Andreas Elpidorou & Lauren Freeman - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):661-671.
    This essay provides an analysis of the role of affectivity in Martin Heidegger's writings from the mid to late 1920s. We begin by situating his account of mood within the context of his project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time. We then discuss the role of Befindlichkeit and Stimmung in his account of human existence, explicate the relationship between the former and the latter, and consider the ways in which the former discloses the world. To give a more (...)
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  28. Force, Mood and Truth.William B. Starr - 2014 - ProtoSociology 31:160-181.
  29.  13
    Mood, Force and Truth. [REVIEW]William B. Starr - 2014 - ProtoSociology 31:160-181.
    There is a big difference between saying Maya is singing, Is Maya singing? and Sing Maya! This paper examines and criticizes two attempts to rigorously explain this difference: Searle’s speech act theory and the truth-conditional reductionism advocated by Davidson and Lewis. On the speech act analysis, each utterance contains a marker which says what kind of speech act the utterance counts as performing. The truth-conditional reductionists try to reanalyze the non-declaratives as complex declarative forms. The former analysis fails to recognize (...)
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  30. Mood Induction Differently Affects Early Neural Correlates of Evaluative Word Processing in L1 and L2.Johanna Kissler & Katarzyna Bromberek-Dyzman - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    We investigate how mood inductions impact the neural processing of emotional adjectives in one’s first language and a formally acquired second language. Twenty-three student participants took part in an EEG experiment with two separate sessions. Happy or sad mood inductions were followed by series of individually presented positive, negative, or neutral adjectives in L1 or L2 and evaluative decisions had to be performed. Visual event-related potentials elicited during word processing were analyzed during N1, Early Posterior Negativities, N400, and (...)
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  31.  6
    Mood and Force in Defeasible Arguments.Ryan Phillip Quandt & John Licato - 2021 - Argument and Computation 12 (3):303-328.
    Argumentation schemes bring artificial intelligence into day to day conversation. Interpreting the force of an utterance, be it an assertion, command, or question, remains a task for achieving this goal. But it is not an easy task. An interpretation of force depends on a speaker’s use of words for a hearer at the moment of utterance. Ascribing force relies on grammatical mood, though not in a straightforward or regular way. We face a dilemma: on one hand, deciding force requires (...)
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  32. Affective Shifts: Mood, Emotion and Well-Being.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-28.
    It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. I argue that we do best to understand important features of (...)
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  33.  4
    Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking.Hagi Kenaan & Ilit Ferber (eds.) - 2011 - Springer.
    Philosophy's Moods is a collection of original essays interrogating the inseparable bond between mood and philosophical thinking. What is the relationship between mood and thinking in philosophy? In what sense are we always already philosophizing from within a mood? What kinds of mood are central for shaping the space of philosophy? What is the philosophical imprint of Aristotle’s wonder, Kant’s melancholy, Kierkegaard’s anxiety or Nietzsche's shamelessness? Philosophy's Moods invites its readers to explore the above questions through (...)
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  34.  41
    Mood as Representation of Momentum.Eran Eldar, Robb B. Rutledge, Raymond J. Dolan & Yael Niv - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):15-24.
  35. Mood and Language-Game.Erik Stenius - 1969 - In J. W. Davis, D. J. Hockney & W. K. Wilson (eds.), Philosophical Logic. Reidel. pp. 251--271.
     
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  36.  36
    A mood for Philosophy.François Laruelle & Anne-Françoise Schmid - 2017 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 19 (2):14-21.
    _A mood for Philosophy_ __ _ _ _In this dialogue with Francois Laruelle Anne-Françoise Schmidt suggests that Laruelle's non-philosophy, which begins with an indecision, could be conceived as something that in the history of painting has been called figura serpentinata, "serpentine line". This line, which produces a kind of music by the use of concepts, is visible according her trough his whole work: from his first book on Ravaisson, _Phenomenon and Difference,_ through to his last one, _The Last Humanity: (...)
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  37.  12
    Mood States and Everyday Creativity: Employing an Experience Sampling Method and a Day Reconstruction Method.Wei Han, Xue Feng, Mi Zhang, Kaiping Peng & Dan Zhang - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
  38.  15
    Moral Moods.C. Jason Throop - 2014 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 42 (1):65-83.
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  39. Horror and Mood.Andrea Sauchelli - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):39-50.
    Horror is a popular genre or style in many different forms of art. In this essay I propose a definition of horror that is meant to capture our intuitions about the extension of this category over a variety of forms of art. In particular, I claim that horror is individuated by a specific atmosphere and mood, rather than by any singular entity in the horror representation.
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  40.  21
    Situating Moods.Dina Mendonça - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1453-1467.
    The paper aims to better identify the relationship between moods and emotions showing their link to the overall environment. Adopting a Situated Approach to Emotions, 209–227, 2012; Stephan Emotion Review, 4, 157–162, 2012; Stephen et al. Philosophical Psychology, 27, 65–81 2014) enables showing that the link to emotions to the environment is best understood using the term situation, while moods’ link to the environment is best captured by the notion of context. Exploring the difference points out that what is selected (...)
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  41. Heidegger, Mood, and the Lived Body: The Ontical and the Ontological.Robert D. Stolorow - 2014 - Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts 13 (2):5-11.
    Summary of claims: (1) One of the most important relationships between the ontical and the ontological in Heidegger’s thought is the central, ontologically revelatory role that he gives to moods. (2) Heidegger uses the word “mood” as a term of art to refer to the whole range of disclosive affectivity. (3) Because of the role that Heidegger grants to mood as a primordial way of disclosing Being-in-the-world, and because it is impossible to think mood without also thinking (...)
     
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  42.  11
    Intentionalism About Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:89-97.
    Moods are sometimes thought to be counter-examples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state’s phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods on which moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties that are not bound to any (...)
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  43. Social Psychology, Mood, and Helping: Mixed Results for Virtue Ethics.Christian Miller - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):145-173.
    I first summarize the central issues in the debate about the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics, and then examine the role that social psychologists claim positive and negative mood have in influencing compassionate helping behavior. I argue that this psychological research is compatible with the claim that many people might instantiate certain character traits after all which allow them to help others in a wide variety of circumstances. Unfortunately for the virtue ethicist, however, it turns out that these helping (...)
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  44.  51
    Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: A Comment on Gallegos.Bartek Chomanski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):625-632.
    In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.
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  45.  9
    Mood Migration: How Enfacing a Smile Makes You Happier.Ke Ma, Roberta Sellaro, Dominique Patrick Lippelt & Bernhard Hommel - 2016 - Cognition 151:52-62.
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  46.  10
    Mood and Ethical Decision Making: Positive Affect and Corporate Philanthropy.Leon Zolotoy, Don O’Sullivan, Myeong-Gu Seo & Madhu Veeraraghavan - 2021 - Journal of Business Ethics 171 (1):189-208.
    This study examines the influence of mood on corporate philanthropic giving. Drawing on group emotions theory and affect-infused decision theory, we advance the argument that firms allocate greater resources to philanthropy when headquarters-based employees are in a more positive affective state. We also describe three boundary conditions in this relationship—executives’ embeddedness in the firm, executives’ latitude to engage in philanthropic giving, and the firm’s track record of corporate social irresponsibility. We test our arguments using a longitudinal dataset of philanthropic (...)
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  47.  33
    Mood Regulation and Memory: Repairing Sad Moods with Happy Memories.Braden R. Josephson - 1996 - Cognition and Emotion 10 (4):437-444.
  48.  3
    Mood Profiling in Singapore: Cross-Cultural Validation and Potential Applications of Mood Profile Clusters.Christie S. Y. Han, Renée L. Parsons-Smith & Peter C. Terry - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  49.  25
    Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.
    There are many more philosophical discussions of emotions than of moods. One key reason for this is that emotions are said to have a robust connection to beliefs while moods are said to lack that connection. I argue that this view, though prevalent, is incorrect. It is motivated by examples that are not representative of how moods typically change. Indeed, once we examine the notion of belief-responsiveness and look at a wider range of examples, we can see that moods are (...)
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  50.  63
    Stimmung: From Mood to Atmosphere.Angelika Krebs - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1419-1436.
    Unlike human beings, landscapes, cities and buildings cannot feel anything in the literal sense. They do not have nervous systems. Nevertheless, we attribute “Stimmungen” such as peacefulness and melancholy to them. On what basis? With what right? And why does it matter anyway? This paper attempts an answer to this bunch of questions. The first section clarifies the concept of “Stimmung,” by distinguishing its three major meanings, namely harmony, mood and atmosphere. Section two discusses various models of how “Stimmung” (...)
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