This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This study of "problems of the soul in the neoaristotelian and neoplatonic tradition" is exceedingly well documented and for the most part minutely argued. An historical examination of doctrines leading to, derived from, and similar to Plotinus' theory of nous eventuates in a "typology of solutions" or ideal types to which the various doctrines approximate. The final chapter traces nous to "collective consciousness, double consciousness, and metaconsciousness in Kant and some post-kantians," who are represented by Windelband, Husserl and Simmel. The (...) footnotes and critical bibliography are extremely valuable.--C. D. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Forms not only as objects of contemplation but as patterns of conduct. Presumably the "physicist " is not interested, as physicist, in completing the dialectical journey. So from a moral point of view he rests in opinion, even though his thought may be conversant with Forms. Gully does not like the idea that the philosopher has a privileged method; Plato "gives no proper reason why (...) one particular method or account is privileged" (p. 146).Methods of "collection and division," as developments within the dialectical method, are discussed in the later dialogues, but they never take us to the end of the dialectical journey. Perhaps we should say that the modesty of Socrates in Books VI and VII of the Republic is prophetic. If one is looking for a completed theory of knowledge, one does not find it. Gulley is in agreement with this point, but he feels that if one wants to look for the area in which Plato could have settled on an adequate theory one will find it in the relationship of pure to applied mathematics. He says that Plato develops in his latest thought "a metaphysical theory restricted to the explanation of mathematical knowledge which provides a more satisfactory explanation of the distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge than does the theory of Forms" (p. 187). Yet with a suggestion of surprise he concludes, on Aristotle's testimony, that Plato 2id not "abandon the more general explanation.., which the theory of Forms provided." I 1o not think Gulley wishes to suggest that Plato should have seen the light as Gulley sees it, ~or Gulley conveys the impression of having confronted a puzzling fact. Some readers may be reassured in their efforts to lop off Level IV and commit it to the flames, but the author has presented his case with impartiality. ROBERT REIN'L Arizona State University Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic Tradition. By Philip Merlan. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 154.) Innerhalb der Metaphysik liilit sich ein Kreis yon zentralen Fragen abgrenzen und durch den Titel "Noetik" bezeichnen. Wie ist der Mensch zur Erfassung des Seins oder des Absoluten (oder wie sonst der Gegenstand der Metaphysik bezeiehnet werden mag) ausgeriistet? Wie verhiilt sich dies ausgezeichaete VermSgen, mages po~ oder poS~,ro~7~K&oder intellectus oder Vernunft hei[3en, einmal zu seinem Gegenstand, sodann zu den tibrigen VermSgen der menschlichen Seele? Und sehliel]lieh: welehe Bedeutung hat die Be~tigung dieses VermSgens ffir die menschliche Praxis? Nach der Gliederung der Philosophie, wie sie im nach-kantischen Zeitalter iiblich geworden ist, liil~t sich dieser Fragezusammenhang schwer lokalisieren. In die moderne Topologie gepresst, erscheint er als eine Verquickung yon erkenntnistheoretischer, ontologischer, psychologischer und religiiiser Problematik. Aber durehgehend ist der "noetische Bezug", will sagen die Ausriehtung auf die yon den Griechen als ~o~ (inteIlectus, Geist, Vernunft ) bezeichnete Kraft. Der Zugang zu der Fragestellung ergibt sich yon Plato her. Die Seele "bei sich selbst," abr,} ~aO' a~r~, d.i. in AblSsung vom Leib und der dutch ihn vermittelten Sinneswahrnehmung, schaut das An-sich-seiende, die eI~, und diese "reine" Erkenntnis wird verstanden als Wiedererinnerung yon vorgeburtlieh Erschautem. Schon bei der Geburt des Menschen findet sich also die Seele im Besitz yon ihr selbst nicht zug~nglichen Erkenntnissen. Bei Aristoteles lebt dieser platonische Gedanke in verwandelter Gestalt fort. Das VermSgen unmittelbarer, nieht-sinnlicher Erkenntnis, der vo~, verhiilt sich nach De anima III zu den,,,m~a (intelligibilia) wie die bei sich seiende Seele zu den "Ideen". Dies Erkennen aber unterscheidet sich nach Aristoteles yon aller diskursiven Erkenntnis dadurch, daft der Intellekt die Intigibilia ist, und dieses Eins-werden, modern gesprochen die Aufhebung der Subjekt-ObjektRelation, gibt der Kennzeichnung des Intellekts als "sch6pferisch" (~o~K6~, intellectus agens) ihren Sinn. Aueh darin folgt Aristoteles seinem Lehrer Plato, daI3 er den Gedanken des "Vorbesitzes ", will sagen der Unentstandenheit der intellektualen Erkenntnis beibehiilt. Aber er gibt ibm eine neue Wendung dadurch, daft er die Ananmesis ersetzt durch den Begriff des ~o~ als einer yon keiner Potentialit~it behafteten reinen, immer und yon je t~itigen b~p.ycta, eines "von aul3en" (~bpad~) in den Mensehen eingeftihrten gSttlichen Prinzips. BOOK REVIEWS 117... (shrink)

My thesis examines Aquinas's philosophical psychology in the context of his controversy with Siger of Brabant. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with the central thesis of Aquinas's argument against the Averroist doctrine of the intellect, which he often expresses by the claim, intellectus est forma corporis. This claim is fundamental to Aquinas's philosophical psychology insofar as it relates not only to his solution to the tension between the Aristotelian definition of the soul as the form of the body and (...) the intellect's immateriality, but also to his alternative to the Averroist interpretation that the intellect cannot be the form of the body. I argue that this claim cannot be an adequate alternative to the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle since it is not compatible with Aquinas's insistence that the intellect cannot use any bodily organ, nor exist in any part of the body. Furthermore, the thesis of organlessness commits Aquinas to an intellect-body dualism since he postulates the existence of the intellect independently of the body in the human being. ;Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the question of whether Aquinas has an adequate alternative to Siger's critique that the intellect cannot be a power of the human soul which is the substantial form of the body. Some contemporary Thomists have argued that Aquinas's position is not vulnerable to the Sigerian critique at all by appealing to his claim that the human soul is a subsistent form. However, I maintain that the human soul's subsistence cannot be upheld insofar as Aquinas insists that the human soul is essentially the form of the body, and its nature is incomplete without the body. For nothing in the nature of the human soul as the form of the body provides a ground for showing that it can perform its proper operation without the body and thus can be subsistent. Consequently, Aquinas does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the possibility that the human soul can possess the intellect as its power. This leads us to conclude that the difficulties raised by Siger cannot be resolved by Aquinas's position. (shrink)

Merotheism is the view that God is a proper part of nature. Monopsychism is the view that there is exactly one mind or subject of consciousness. This chapter explores the idea of combining these two views. I call the resulting position "panpsychotheism" (all-minds-[are]-God-ism). The goal of this chapter is not the unrealistic one of showing that this position is true. I do, however, hope to show that panpsychotheism is not obviously false, and that it has some important advantages over (...) other versions of theism. While this chapter is included in the section of the book on alternative concepts of God, it also has interesting implications for the future of religion, life after death, and the problem of evil. These implications can be summed up as follows: even if the future of religion is naturalistic, it is still reasonable to hope that there is a God who, by making a significant form of life after death possible, saves us from death without being blameworthy for our needing to be saved. (shrink)

Taking as an assumption the existence of an informatics revolution nowadays and that the examination of studies and debates related to it may allow the identification of questions of a philosophical nature, the present study aims to identify and formulate some of these questions, as well as to investigate whether the historical controversy about monopsychism, which occurred at the University of Paris in 1270, can be considered a theoretical framework capable of providing contributions to these philosophical questions. The answer (...) to this research problem may be positive, insofar as the aforementioned theoretical framework allows to identify contributions to the solution of the above mentioned questions. Or negative, otherwise. Or even in terms, to the extent that such subsidies only partially meet their objectives or raise, in turn, new questions. (shrink)

The Averroistic Monopsychism could not be incorporated to the Christian thought to darken the idea of the immortality of the personal soul. Albert the Great, tries to make a synthesis of the Arab doctrines and the Doctrine of Divine Illumination. The conclusion is a proposal -not systematize- but where it is possible to found the distinction at personal level between intellect agent and possible intellect, in analogous way to the distinction essence/act of being.

Aquinas criticizes Averroes’ monopsychism for failing to offer a satisfactory explanation for the obvious fact that “this human being thinks.” However, it also poses great challenges to Aquinas himself to show how an individual person as a material compound can be the subject of thinking, which is supposed to be unmixed with the matter. This essay aims to address these challenges by reconstructing three ontological reasons Aquinas could have offered to demonstrate the compatibility of immateriality and individuality of thinking: (...) the conception of individuality in terms of imparticipability, the complicated status of intelligible species, and the ontological priority of the soul to the body. It argues that the intellective soul as the substantial form of human beings is the ultimate principle of thinking, both for its immateriality and for its individuality. (shrink)

Revisions of three lectures given at Catholic University of America in March 1978. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Introduction.--The first lecture, Eternity of the world.--The second lectures, Monopsychism.--The third lecture, Rationalism.

La mia collaborazione con Massimo Campanini si è sviluppata su comuni interessi per i classici del pensiero islamico ma con competenze assai diverse, essendo io più orientato a studiare gli effetti e gli sviluppi che essi produssero sul pensiero occidentale medievale e moderno attraverso una pratica di traduzioni spesso creative per imprecisione – l’inverso dell’operazione che essi stessi avevano fatto rispetto a Platone e Aristotele. Averroè-Ibn Rushd è già un bell’esempio di deformazione del nome, ma proprio la formazione della sua (...) opera e i modi in cui è stata trasmessa al mondo ebraico e cristiano sono singolari testimonianze degli esiti ambigui del processo traduttivo. Cerchiamo infatti di mostrare come la lettura del _De substantia orbis_ abbia stimolato sia nel Medioevo che nel Rinascimento non solo il rifiuto del creazionismo ma anche posizioni panteistiche, mentre la famosa tesi dell’intelletto materiale unico contenuta nel _Commentarium Magnum_ al _De anima_ aristotelico ha stimolato molteplici varianti del monopsichismo, da Spinoza a Marx e alla più recente letteratura post-strutturalista. My collaboration with Massimo Campanini developed around our common interests in the classics of Islamic thought, but with very different approaches, since I am more oriented towards studying the effects and developments they produced on medieval and modern Western thought through a practice of translation that was often creative in terms of inaccuracy – so the opposite of what had been done with respect to Plato and Aristotle. The same Averroes-Ibn Rushd is a fine example of name distortion, and the very formation of his work and the ways in which it was transmitted to the Jewish and Christian world are singular testimonies to the ambiguous outcomes of this translation process. I try to show how the reading of _De substantia orbis_ in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance stimulated not only the rejection of creationism but also pantheistic beliefs, while the famous thesis on the material intellect exposed in the _Commentarium Magnum_ to Aristotle’s _De anima_ stimulated many variants of monopsychism, from Spinoza to Marx and the more recent post-structuralist literature. (shrink)

This paper investigates the degree to which information theory, and the derived uses that make it work as a metaphor of our age, can be helpful in thinking about God’s immanence and transcendance. We ask when it is possible to say that a consciousness has to be behind the information we encounter. If God is to be thought about as a communicator of information, we need to ask whether a communication system has to pre-exist to the divine and impose itself (...) to God. If we want God to be Creator, and not someone who would work like a human being, ‘creating’ will mean sustaining in being as much the channel, the material system, as the message. Is information control? It seems that God’s actions are not going to be informational control of everything. To clarify the issue, we attempt to distinguish two kinds of ‘genialities’ in nature, as a way to evaluate the likelihood of God from nature. We investigate concepts and images of God, in terms of the history of ideas but also in terms of philosophical theology, metaphysics, and religious ontology. (shrink)

From an epistemological point of view, monopsychism implies that the unity or universality of cognition can be secured only through the unity of the subject. Scholastics in the 13–14th centuries who did not accept it for various reasons therefore had to show that the multiplicity of subjects does not impair the unity of cognition. But the attempts to harmonize the unity of cognition with the plurality of subjects were not successful. While some of them only transformed the issue into (...) another with some variations, others accepted monopsychism to some extent. (shrink)