The paper first defines palliative treatment and distinguishes it from symptomatic treatment. Then, the palliative situation is delineated as inseparably linked to the finitude of human life. Given the objectives of palliative treatment — responding to symptoms, damage to the patients' self-image, and the proximity of death — a subjective concept of disease is described, that is regarded as the focus of palliative treatment. The essence of the concept of disease is analysed as the patient's experience with a tendency of (...) reduction of her or his vitality. Palliative medicine is shown not to be symptom-oriented, but disease — directed as other domains of medicine. Implications and practical consequences, especially the status of objective findings, of this concept are discussed and therapeutic opportunities in the palliative situation reconsidered. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we (...) better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship. On the other hand, it is precisely... (shrink)

The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...) account given by de Vignemont and Jacob—is compatible with the direct-perception view. My argument has two parts: My first step is to show that the conflict between these accounts is not—as it seems at first glance—a disagreement on the mechanism by which empathy comes about. Rather, it is due to the fact that their proponents attribute two very different roles to empathy in understanding others. My second step is to introduce Stein’s account of empathy. By not restricting empathy to either one of these two roles, her process model of empathy helps to see how the divergent intuitions that have been brought forward in the current debate could be integrated. (shrink)

On the issue of abortion, Ireland and Poland have been among the most conservative countries in Europe. Their legal and cultural approaches to this issue have been deeply influenced by the institution of the Catholic Church and its purported role as a defender of an authentic national identity. However, their political climates for abortion reform are increasingly divergent: Ireland has liberalised its abortion law substantially since 2018, while Poland is moving towards further criminalisation with the repeated introduction of restrictive laws (...) in parliament. Both have seen active pro-choice movements who mobilise for reform and widespread non-compliance with their restrictive abortion laws, but the policy impact of these trends varies significantly. What accounts for this difference? This article draws on comparative analysis of Ireland and Poland to assess their divergent trajectories on abortion reform, arguing that the most significant driver of change between the two is the disparity in influence of the Catholic Church on politics and policymaking. (shrink)

Vocal fry is a phonation, or voicing, in which an individual drops their voice below its natural register and consequently emits a low, growly, creaky tone of voice. Media outlets have widely acknowledged it as a generational vocal style characteristic of millennial women. Critics of vocal fry often claim that it is an exclusively female vocal pattern, and some say that the voicing is so distracting that they cannot understand what is being said under the phonation. Claiming that a phonation (...) is so distracting as to prevent uptake of the semantic content of an utterance associated with it is an extreme reaction, especially when accompanied by demands for women to change their phonation. We argue that this reaction limits women's communicative autonomy. We analyze the extreme reaction to female vocal fry, which we characterize as a non-content-based response, from the perspectives of philosophy of language, feminist epistemology, and linguistics. We argue that when fry is heard as annoying and distracting, it is because the hearer interprets the speaker as echoing an utterance from a position of authority to which she is not entitled. We show that this reaction encodes conscious or unconscious sexist attitudes toward women's voices. (shrink)

Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant (...) capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera. (shrink)

What’s the basis for considering an egg donor a genetic parent but not a mitochondrial donor? I will argue that a closer look at the biological facts will not give us an answer to this question because the process by which one becomes a genetic parent, i.e., the process of reproduction, is not a concept that can be settled by looking. It is, rather, a concept in need of philosophical attention. The details of my argument will rest on recent developments (...) in biological technology, but the persuasiveness of my argument will turn on the history of another biological concept, death. Given some important similarities between the two concepts, the way in which ‘death’ evolved in the recent past can provide guidance on how we should think about ‘reproduction.’. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common to talk about the second person in the theory of mind debate. While theory theory and simulation theory are described as third person and first person accounts respectively, a second person account suggests itself as a viable, though wrongfully neglected third option. In this paper I argue that this way of framing the debate is misleading. Although defenders of second person accounts make use of the vocabulary of the theory of mind debate, they understand some (...) of the core expressions in a different way. I will illustrate this claim by focusing on Reddy’s and Gallagher’s accounts and argue that these authors use the notions of knowing and of understanding other minds differently than traditionally assumed. As a consequence, second person accounts thus conceived do not directly address the questions that gave rise to the theory of mind debate. They invite us, however, to critically reflect upon the way the debate has been set up. (shrink)

Extrapolation from a well-understood base population to a less-understood target population can fail if the base and target populations are not sufficiently similar. Differences between laboratory mice and humans, for example, can hinder extrapolation in medical research. Mice that carry a partial or complete human physiological system, known as humanized mice, are supposed to make extrapolation more reliable by simulating a variety of human diseases. But what justifies our belief that these mice are similar enough to their human counterparts to (...) simulate human disease? I argue that, unless three requirements are met in the process of humanizing mice, very little does. My requirements are not meant to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee a particular outcome. Instead, they serve as a heuristic for guiding scientific judgments involving extrapolation. In developing each requirement, I engage with philosophical issues concerning the nature of model-based science and the mechanistic approach (and its limits) to making generalizations in the life sciences. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed commentary on the classic monograph by Alfred Tarski, and offers a reinterpretation and retranslation of the work using the original Polish text and the English and German translations. In the original work, Tarski presents a method for constructing definitions of truth for classical, quantificational formal languages. Furthermore, using the defined notion of truth, he demonstrates that it is possible to provide intuitively adequate definitions of the semantic notions of definability and denotation and that the notion (...) in a structure can be defined in a way that is analogous to that used to define truth. Tarski’s piece is considered to be one of the major contributions to logic, semantics, and epistemology in the 20th century. However, the author points out that some mistakes were introduced into the text when it was translated into German in 1935. As the 1956 English version of the work was translated from the German text, those discrepancies were carried over in addition to new mistakes. The author has painstakingly compared the three texts, sentence-by-sentence, highlighting the inaccurate translations, offering explanations as to how they came about, and commenting on how they have influenced the content and suggesting a correct interpretation of certain passages. Furthermore, the author thoroughly examines Tarski’s article, offering interpretations and comments on the work. (shrink)

The concept of the dialogical soul proposed by Joseph Ratzinger is a contemporary attempt to describe the anthropology of humanity in terms of basic, fundamental theological concepts. Epistemological approach of the dialogic soul is not about the division, but co-existence in the concept of humanity significantly different anthropological concepts. Modern neuroscience, although following completely different paths of knowing is currently concerning an important issue "of the embodied mind". Such a holistic effort to discover the truth about the man, though carried (...) out on completely different epistemological platforms, however, have some points in common. The difficulty in finding a common language for the dialogue in this field can be overcome and lead to dialogue, which is extremely difficult but doable. We must, however, at the beginning formulate certain fundamental axioms that define class concepts used in different areas of scientific activity. The concept of dialogical soul of Ratzinger’s now exceeds the barrier of scientific paradigms axioms. It does not stop on the vision of human oneself, but recognition of one in the area of relationships and makes room for a substantial dialogue with the world of modern science. (shrink)

Media reporters often announce that we are on the verge of bringing back the woolly mammoth, even while there is growing consensus among scientists that resurrecting the mammoth is unlikely. In fact, current “de-extinction” efforts are not designed to bring back a mammoth, but rather adaptations of the mammoth using close relatives. For example, Harvard scientists are working on creating an Asian elephant with the thick coat of a mammoth by merging mammoth and elephant DNA. But how should such creatures (...) be classified? Are they elephants, mammoths, or both? Answering these questions requires getting clear about the concept of reproduction. What I hope to show is that with an appropriate notion of reproduction—one for which I will argue—resurrecting a member of Mammuthus primigenius is a genuine possibility. (shrink)

With an increasing number of ways to ‘assist’ reproduction, some bioethicists have started to wonder what it takes to become a genetic parent. It is widely agreed that sharing genes is not enough to substantiate the parent–offspring relation, but what is? Without a better understanding of the concept of reproduction, our thinking about parent–offspring relations and the ethical issues surrounding them risk being unprincipled. Here, I address that problem by offering a principled account of reproduction—the Overlap, Development and Persistence account—which (...) I believe best captures the meaning of ‘genetic parenthood’. (shrink)

In the digital age, the use of advanced technology is becoming a new paradigm in police work, criminal justice, and the penal system. Algorithms promise to predict delinquent behaviour, identify potentially dangerous persons, and support crime investigation. Algorithm-based applications are often deployed in this context, laying the groundwork for a ‘smart criminal justice’. In this qualitative study based on 32 interviews with criminal justice and police officials, we explore the reasons why and extent to which such a smart criminal justice (...) system has already been established in Switzerland, and the benefits perceived by users. Drawing upon this research, we address the spread, application, technical background, institutional implementation, and psychological aspects of the use of algorithms in the criminal justice system. We find that the Swiss criminal justice system is already significantly shaped by algorithms, a change motivated by political expectations and demands for efficiency. Until now, algorithms have only been used at a low level of automation and technical complexity and the levels of benefit perceived vary. This study also identifies the need for critical evaluation and research-based optimization of the implementation of advanced technology. Societal implications, as well as the legal foundations of the use of algorithms, are often insufficiently taken into account. By discussing the main challenges to and issues with algorithm use in this field, this work lays the foundation for further research and debate regarding how to guarantee that ‘smart’ criminal justice is actually carried out smartly. (shrink)

Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the (...) implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail: monika[email protected] (shrink)

Research ethics committees must sometimes deliberate about objects that do not fit nicely into any existing category. This is currently the case with the “gastruloid,” which is a self-assembling blob of cells that resembles a human embryo. The resemblance makes it tempting to group it with other members of that kind, and thus to ask whether gastruloids really are embryos. But fitting an ambiguous object into an existing category with well-worn pathways in research ethics, like the embryo, is only a (...) temporary fix. The bigger problem is that we no longer know what an embryo is. We haven’t had a non-absurd definition of ‘embryo’ for several decades and without a well-defined comparison class, asking whether gastruloids belong to the morally relevant class of things we call embryos is to ask a question without an answer. What’s the alternative? A better approach needs to avoid what I’ll refer to as “the potentiality trap” and, instead, rely on the emergence of morally salient facts about gastruloids and other synthetic embryos. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz vertrete ich die These, dass die Betreuungsverbote und einschränkungen für Kleinkinder, die im Zuge der Corona-Pandemie in Deutschland galten und immer noch gelten, in bestimmten Fällen zu signifikanten Verlusten des Wohlergehens von Kleinkindern führen. Dabei beziehe ich mich auf Kleinkinder, die in Strukturen leben, in denen die außerhäusliche Betreuung einen gewichtigen Beitrag zur Kinderbetreuung leistet. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass für diese Kinder der Wegfall der Kinderbetreuung bedeuten kann, dass gewichtige aktuelle immaterielle Wohlergehensinteressen nur noch teilweise oder (...) gar nicht mehr befriedigt werden. Um diese Interessen und das Ausmaß ihrer Nichtbefriedigung zu beschreiben, greife ich auf das Konzept der Kindheitsgüter zurück und werde mich dabei auf drei gewichtige immaterielle Wohlergehensinteressen konzentrieren: das Interesse des Kindes an pädagogisch wertvollen Betreuungsstrukturen, das Bedürfnis des Kindes nach Austausch und Spiel mit Gleichaltrigen und das Interesse des Kindes, frei von Sorgen und Ängsten zu sein. Die anschließende kinderethische Auswertung dreier aktueller Studien zur Situation der Kinder und Familien unter den Bedingungen der Corona-Pandemie zeigt, dass besonders die Umstände während des Lockdowns im Frühjahr 2020, aber auch die fortbestehenden Einschränkungen bei der Kinderbetreuung sowie die veränderte Arbeitssituation der Eltern erheblich dazu beitragen, dass das Wohlergehen von Kleinkindern in dieser Hinsicht beeinträchtigt wird. Am Ende des Aufsatzes werde ich mich der Frage widmen, was bei der Ausgestaltung zukünftiger Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Corona-Pandemie aus kinderethischer Perspektive berücksichtigt werden sollte, um das Wohlergehen der Kleinkinder so gut wie möglich zu schützen. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis study explored whether three-dimensional wisdom and psychosocial growth, defined as increases in psychological well-being, spirituality, and death acceptance, can be learned in university courses. Specifically, the study examined whether courses that tried to engage the whole person rather than only the intellect and/or courses that included a service learning component fostered greater wisdom and psychosocial growth than regular sociology or religion courses. Results of repeated measure MANOVAs showed that, on average, the 165 students who were enrolled in 12 growth (...) classes significantly increased in wisdom, PWB, spirituality, and death acceptance between the beginning and the end of the semester, whereas the 153 students who attended eight control classes significantly decreased in wisdom and did not change significantly in PWB, spirituality, and death acceptance. It appears that it is indeed possible to learn wisdom and psychosocial growth in university courses. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Due to the ongoing advancements in technology, socio-technical collaboration has become increasingly prevalent. This poses challenges in terms of governance and accountability, as well as issues in various other fields. Therefore, it is crucial to familiarize decision-makers and researchers with the core of human–machine collaboration. This study introduces a taxonomy that enables identification of the very nature of human–machine interaction. A literature review has revealed that automation and technical autonomy are main parameters for describing and understanding such interaction. Both aspects (...) must be carefully evaluated, as their increase has potentially far-reaching consequences. Hence, these two concepts comprise the taxonomy’s axes. Five levels of automation and five levels of technical autonomy are introduced below, based on the assumption that both automation and autonomy are gradual. The levels of automation were developed from existing approaches; those of autonomy were carefully derived from a review of the literature. The taxonomy’s use is also explained, as are its limitations and avenues for further research. (shrink)

Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the (...) following three features: the same work content or domain of activity; the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one’s work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them. (shrink)

The article focuses on Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech and its recontextualisation 50 years later in view of the rising anti-immigration sentiment and Brexit campaign. Having discussed the dynamics of the threat construction process and its role in shaping public attitudes to migration and policies related to it across time and space, we proceed to analyse Powell’s speech in terms of lexical, grammatical, and discursive fear-inciting devices and strategies. While doing so we draw on the insights from neuroscientific research (...) on the role of lexis in fear stimulation and functional-cognitive models of grammatical structure. The second part of our analysis is meant to demonstrate how the semiotic potential of cyberspace and social media, along with multimodal integration of various forms, intertextuality, and interdiscursivity they enable, endow fear-inciting discourse with new spatiotemporal and affective qualities. To this end we examine one of the most popular YouTube videos making “Rivers of Blood” speech part of its anti-immigration stance. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary, social scientific analysis of the regulatory discourse on nanotechnology in the three German-speaking countries of Germany, Austria and Switzerland and in the EU between 2000 and 2013 has shown three distinct phases, characterised by shifts in the configuration of actors and in the thematic scope from nanotechnology to nano-materials. Compared to modes of governance based on traditional statutory law, modes of governance based on less binding forms of soft law and self-regulation (like codes of conduct, guidelines and certification (...) systems) and new modes of governance (like assessment studies, risk management frameworks as well as participatory and cooperative forms of communication and negotiation) have gained importance. Despite some similarities, two different cultures in governing nanotechnology can be distinguished: a product-oriented culture in statutory regulations (when speaking about products, the article is also referring to substances) and a risk-based culture in applying soft law based on new modes of governance. In addition, the different regulatory cultures have led to four strategic approaches: modes of governance mainly based on hard law and soft law at the EU level, modes of governance mainly based on cooperative and self-regulatory approaches in Germany, cooperative governance approaches in Austria and modes of governance mainly based on self-regulatory and soft law approaches in Switzerland. (shrink)

Koncepcja autonomii osoby Harry’ego Frankfurta, uznawana obecnie za jedną z ważniejszych teorii autonomii, podkreśla istotną rolę zdolności podmiotu moralnego do świadomej refleksji nad sobą i swoim życiem i ufundowana jest na zdolności podmiotu do formułowania pragnień pierwszego oraz drugiego rzędu. Intrygujące, że już w myśli średniowiecznej daje się zauważyć propozycje, które budują prekursorski wobec współczesnych teorii obraz podmiotu moralnego, odnosząc się do złożonej struktury woli, jak również dwurzędowości jej aktów. W niniejszym artykule śledzę rozwój terminologii oraz argumentacji wykorzystywanej w tych (...) średniowiecznych koncepcjach, które odwołują się do pragnień pierwszego oraz drugiego rzędu oraz rozróżnień między różnymi aktami woli. Skupiam się na koncepcjach powstałych do pierwszej połowy XIII wieku wprowadzających do debaty woluntarystycznej terminologię, niuanse pojęciowe oraz argumentację, która stanie się punktem wyjścia dla późnośredniowiecznych teorii woli. (shrink)

Filozofia grecka, a w szczególności arystotelizm, ze względu na zawartą w niej koncepcję Boga nie podejmowała tematu Bożej wszechwiedzy, która wydawała się sprzeczna z boską doskonałością, a co za tym idzie — również zagadnienie Boskiej wiedzy na temat zła nie było rozważane. W czasach Temistiusza, którego myśli tutaj przedstawiam, pojawiają się jednak nowe możliwości ukazania tego problemu pod wpływem nowej koncepcji Boga w neoplatonizmie i neoplatonizmie chrześcijańskim. Temistiusz, będąc świadom tych nowych zagadnień i włączając je do swoich rozważań, nie zmienił (...) jednak schematu, w jakim powstaje jego stanowisko. Zadał więc pytanie o to, czy Bóg zna zło, ale jego odpowiedź ograniczyła się w zasadzie do powtórzenia nauki Arystotelesa: Bóg poznaje samego siebie, tj. najdoskonalszy przedmiot poznania, a nie poznaje tego, co niedoskonałe, w tym braku, jakim jest zło. (shrink)

Kategoria struktur metodologicznych wprowadzona przez Zygmunta Hajduka jest kategorią nową, nieużywaną dotąd w rozważaniach metodologicznych i niemającą w nich ugruntowanego miejsca. Dlatego można zapytać o funkcję, jaką miałaby ona pełnić w metodologii nauk, oraz ojej przydatność jako ogólnego pojęcia metodologicznego. Zasadnicze pytanie, jakie stawiam to: czy wprowadzony przez Z. Hajduka termin struktury metodologiczne może służyć jako najogólniejsza kategoria wyznaczająca przedmiot badań metodologii nauk? Odpowiadając negatywnie na to pytanie, przedstawiam argumenty, jakie przemawiają przeciwko używaniu pojęcia struktur metodologicznych w ten sposób. Moja (...) argumentacja przebiega w następujący sposób. Przywołując funkcjonujące w metodologii nauk zasadnicze sposoby rozumienia nauki, ujęcie metodologii nauk wyznaczone przez Szkołę lwowsko-warszawską i tradycję metodologiczną KUL, będącą jej kontynuacją, typy metodologii, współczesne anglosaskie ujęcia filozofii nauki oraz rozumienie analizy metodologicznej, próbuję wskazać w miarę całościową mapę kategorii metodologicznych wyznaczających przedmiot badań metodologii nauk. Następnie odnoszę do niej kategorię struktur metodologicznych jako wyznaczającą, moim zdaniem zbyt wąsko, przedmiot badań metodologii nauk i przeprowadzam krytykę pojęcia struktur metodologicznych jako najogólniejszej kategorii wyznaczającej przedmiot badań metodologii nauk. Wskazuję także na niekompletność zaproponowanej przez Z. Hajduka listy struktur metodologicznych, którymi zajmuje się metodologia nauk. (shrink)

New discoveries are improving the odds of human cells surviving in host animals, prompting regulatory and funding agencies to issue calls for additional layers of ethical oversight for certain types of human–animal chimeras. Of interest are research proposals involving chimeric animals with humanized brains. But what is motivating the demand for additional oversight? I locate two, not obviously compatible, motivations, each of which provides the justificatory basis for paying special attention to different sets of human–animal chimeras. Surprisingly, the sets of (...) animals that actually get flagged for special scrutiny by research and funding guidelines do not correlate with either of the sets of animals that arise when we think about what is motivating additional oversight. What this shows is that existing research policies and funding guidelines are disconnected from their motivation: the rationale for flagging certain types of human–animal chimeras as requiring special oversight is ignored in execution. (shrink)