It is commonly claimed that when X coerces Y into consenting to Z φ-ing, Y’s consent is invalid, and Z is only permitted to φ if this reduces harm or increases optionality for Y. This article demonstrates that Y’s consent in such cases is valid if Y is choosing between options that include all those Z has a duty to offer Y and no autonomy-reducing options Z has a duty to not offer Y. When these conditions are met, Z acts (...) permissibly in φ-ing even if φ-ing does not reduce harm for Y or increase Y’s optionality. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees at risk in their home countries. If this is true, perhaps states have a right to deport refugees once their lives are no longer at risk in their home countries. I raise three types of arguments against this claim, and in support of refugees’ right to remain. Citizenship-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to obtain citizenship, and with citizenship comes the right to (...) remain. Plans-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to plan their lives, and they will struggle to plan without the right to remain. Reciprocity-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to reciprocal relationships with citizens, far easier if they know they can remain. I reject the first two arguments, and defend the third. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees at risk in their home countries. If this is true, perhaps states have a right to deport refugees once their lives are no longer at risk in their home countries. I raise three types of arguments against this claim, and in support of refugees’ right to remain. Citizenship-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to obtain citizenship, and with citizenship comes the right to (...) remain. Plans-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to plan their lives, and they will struggle to plan without the right to remain. Reciprocity-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to reciprocal relationships with citizens, far easier if they know they can remain. I reject the first two arguments, and defend the third. (shrink)

There are more refugees than many states have a duty to accept. As a result, many states are permitted to accept only some refugees and not others. This raises the question of how states should select these refugees. I defend the claim that states should resettle the worst‐off refugees, and maximize the number of refugees gaining a sufficiently decent life. When resettling the worst off conflicts with maximising the number gaining a sufficiently decent life, states should select refugees to maximise (...) aggregate benefits, with benefits holding greater weight the further refugees are from a sufficiency threshold. The only exception to this rule is when it entails wrongful discrimination, in which case states should only follow this rule if victims of discrimination benefit and consent to its implementation. (shrink)

States are increasingly paying other states to host refugees. For example, in 2010 the EU paid Libya € 50 million to continue hosting the refugees within its borders, and five years later Australia offered Cambodia $31.16 million to accept asylum seekers living in Naru. These exchanges, which I call ‘refugees markets,’ have faced criticism by philosophers. Some philosophers claim the markets fail to ensure true protection, and are demeaning, expressing just how much refugees are unwanted. In response, some have defended (...) refugee markets, claiming they can ensure refugees have protection and are not demeaned. I argue that many markets do demean refugees, and therefore have moral costs, but can still be all-things-considered preferable to alternative schemes if they protect refugees more than these alternative schemes. (shrink)

In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it (...) is not clear if they are impermissible, given the benefits for the recipients. I argue that payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: The payments demean or harm other members of society, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to consent to the payments. (shrink)

Literature on the ethics of researching refugees, both as participants and partners, presents strong arguments for why anonymity is the safer option in the event of questionable consent. However, blanket anonymity, without asking refugee interviewees if they wish to be anonymous, may cause more harm than good in certain contexts. One such context which this article will explore is the context of Israel, where a working Refugee Status Determination (RSD) system has yet to be established. This case study highlights that, (...) even in extreme circumstances where identity exposure can create risks, there may be a case for allowing identity exposure and perhaps an obligation on the part of the researcher to publish a name if this is the strong wish of the interviewee. This article builds on literature addressing confidentiality of identities (Duvell et al., 2010; Giordano et al., 2007; Kelly, 2009; Lahman et al., 2011; Lee, 1993; Mackenzie et al., 2007; Pittaway et al., 2010) and literature addressing informed consent (Hugman et al., 2011; Mackenzie et al., 2007; Pittaway et al., 2010; Zion et al., 2010). Primary sources demonstrating the use of waiving anonymity were collected between 2007 and 2012. Data were collected from refugee and activist civil society publications, television and newspaper media reports, participatory observation in the Israeli Knesset, and in-depth interviews with refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan, Sudan, DR Congo, Liberia and Eritrea living in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Eilat. (shrink)

Sometimes the majority of individuals accepting a service regret their decision, and we can predict that future recipients will feel similarly. For example, a hospital might learn that the majority of patients regret accepting a given medical intervention, and a UN agency might learn that most refugees it has helped repatriate regret returning home. I argue that agents providing services that lead to likely regret have one pro tanto reason to discontinue their services, and this reason is weighty if the (...) service is epistemically transformative. (shrink)

It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is similarly wrong, many argue, to force migrants back to countries with life-threatening conditions. I argue that it is additionally wrong to help such refugees and migrants voluntarily return whilst failing to inform them of the risks. Drawing on existing data, and original data from East Africa, I describe distinct types of cases where such a wrong arises. In ‘Misinformation Cases’ officials tell refugees that it (...) is safe to return, when it is not, and refugees return who would have otherwise stayed. In ‘Omission Cases’ officials do not provide any information on countries of origin, and this omission causes refugees to repatriate. In ‘Relevancy Cases’ refugees are misinformed or uninformed, but would have returned even if better informed. In all of these cases, at least some state officials are blameworthy for their failure to inform refugees, and are engaging in a form of wrongful immigration control. (shrink)

There are instances where the provider of an intervention, such as surgery, has failed to obtain necessary informed consent from the recipient of the intervention. Perhaps the surgeon has failed to warn the patient that she may go into a coma, or even be killed, from the surgery. Sometimes, as a result of this intervention, the recipient cannot give informed consent to researchers for the release of their personal data precisely because of the intervention. If they are in a coma, (...) they cannot be reached. Sometimes, this personal data itself can prove that the provider of the intervention failed to obtain informed consent for the intervention. For example, a personal file may include a consent form that does not include warnings about the risk of falling into a coma from the surgery. Paradoxically, those who cannot give informed consent for the disclosure of their personal data on an intervention may have been especially ill-informed about the repercussions of the intervention. In such instances, should researchers ever use the data and disclose the data in their research? In an attempt to demonstrate when this dilemma may be relevant, and how it may be solved, I will present a real-world case of this dilemma in my own empirical research on refugees who agreed to repatriate to their countries of origin from Israel. I will consider what theories on consent, if any, can help us resolve this dilemma. (shrink)

Since 2015 millions of migrants have paid smugglers to take them across borders. In response, states have increasingly arrested smugglers, hoping to morally condemn smuggling, and to decrease the rate of inward migration. This article argues that, even if a state is justified in morally condemning smuggling, and justified in decreasing inward migration, arresting smugglers is a disproportionate response for reaching these ends.

Some policies are not politically feasible. In the context of refugees, many claim it is not politically feasible to start admitting significantly more refugees into wealthy countries. In particular, it is not feasible for advocates of refugees to successfully persuade policymakers to adopt such a policy. A recent book by Alexander Betts argues that advocates should instead focus on developing the economies of lower-income countries where most refugees reside. This review essay argues that current data does not yet establish whether (...) Betts's approach is more feasible than increasing refugee admissions to wealthy states. There are good reasons to suppose increasing refugees’ admissions to wealthy states is politically feasible, if we account for the ways citizens in wealthy states are harmed when refugees are not admitted, and for the ways citizens are harmed when immigration enforcement prevents refugees from arriving. Drawing on recent books on immigration, this essay demonstrates that enforcement against refugees constrains citizens’ freedom, well-being, and ability to hold their government to account. Further research can establish if citizens’ interest in reducing enforcement can be translated into policy changes that significantly increase the number of refugees admitted. Such research is necessary before concluding that only helping refugees in lower-income countries is feasible. (shrink)

Some claim that consent requires common knowledge. For a doctor to obtain consent, a doctor must know that her patient has given her permission to perform surgery, and her patient must know the doctor knows that he has given this permission. Some claim that such common knowledge requires communication, and so consent requires communication: the patient must tell the doctor he consents for both to know consent took place, and for both to know the other knows consent took place. I (...) first defend the claim that consent requires common knowledge, responding to recent objections. I then argue that, though consent requires common knowledge, it does not always require communication. It does not require communication when the agent obtaining consent can infer common knowledge based on non-behavioral facts about the world. (shrink)

Moving is hard. Moving to a new neighbourhood, city or country is difficult without money to buy a bus ticket, money to pay for a visa, or even a passport from a rich country: a citizen in Afghanistan, with a GDP-per-capita of roughly $500 a year, has a close to 0% chance of obtaining any visa to any wealthy country. Wealthy countries fear that those trying to enter from poor countries will try to stay, particularly if fleeing persecution. As a (...) result, wealthy states ensure that those most eager to escape their homes are least able to do so. (shrink)