Results for 'Molinism'

243 found
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  1.  29
    I. Applications of Molinism.Tilting At Molinism - 2011 - In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
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  2.  20
    John Martin Fischer.I. Freddoso’S. Molinism - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--18.
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  3.  11
    Eat It Too'.How Molinists Can Have Their Cake - 2011 - In Christian Kanzian, Winfried Löffler & Josef Quitterer (eds.), The Ways Things Are: Studies in Ontology. Ontos. pp. 221.
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  4. Molinism: Explaining our Freedom Away.Nevin Climenhaga & Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):459-485.
    Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully (...)
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  5. Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.
    Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by (...)
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  6.  82
    Molinism: The Contemporary Debate.Ken Perszyk (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Molinism promises the strongest account of God's providence consistent with our freedom. But is it a coherent view, and does it provide a satisfying account of divine providence? The essays in this volume examine the status, defensibility, and application of this recently revived doctrine, and anticipate the future direction of the debate.
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  7. On Molinism and Manipulation: Does Molinism answer the problems about Providence, Foreknowledge and Free Will?R. I. Anderson - unknown
    Molinism attempts to resolve the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human libertarian freedom by the inclusion of the divine will into the solution. Moreover, middle knowledge is providentially useful under the Molinist model because of the way God uses it. This speaks of an integral link between the divine will and intellect that works in such a way as to provide a foreknowledge solution and, allegedly, the best view of providence. Nevertheless, there have been several anti-Molinist arguments by analogy (...)
     
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  8. Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?Justin Mooney - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-148.
    John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.
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  9.  16
    Molinism and the Person-Will Paradigm.Randall K. Johnson - 2020 - Philosophia Christi 22 (2):289-306.
    The traditional Molinist scheme implies that God is one center of consciousness, knowledge, and will. The person-will paradigm, however, claims there are three centers of consciousness, knowledge, and will in the Godhead. I argue that the Molinist ought to reject the person-will paradigm, and thus reject both monothelitism and social trinitarianism. I begin by presenting standard accounts of Molinism, monothelitism, and social trinitarianism. Then I consider three approaches to reconciling Molinism and the person-will paradigm. I show that each (...)
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  10. If Molinism is true, what can you do?Andrew Law - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 95 (3):307-322.
    Suppose Molinism is true and God placed Adam in the garden because God knew Adam would freely eat of the fruit. Suppose further that, had it not been true that Adam would freely eat of the fruit, were he placed in the garden, God would have placed someone else there instead. When Adam freely eats of the fruit, is he free to do otherwise? This paper argues that there is a strong case for both a positive and a negative (...)
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  11.  30
    Molinist Gunslingers Redux: A Friendly Response to Greg Welty.Kenneth D. Keathley - 2018 - Perichoresis 16 (2):31-44.
    Philosopher Greg Welty contributed a chapter entitled ‘Molinist Gunslingers: God and the Authorship of Sin’, to a book devoted to answering the charge that Calvinism makes God the author of sin. Welty argues that Molinism has the same problems as Calvinism concerning God’s relationship to sin, regardless of what view of human freedom Molinism may affirm. The Molinist believes that God generally uses his knowledge of the possible choices of libertarianly free creatures in order to accomplish his will. (...)
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  12.  80
    Mere Molinism: A Defense of Two Essential Pillars.Jacobus Erasmus & Tim Stratton - 2018 - Perichoresis 16 (2):17-29.
    Molinism is founded on two ‘pillars’, namely, the view that human beings possess libertarian free will and the view that God has middle knowledge. Both these pillars stand in contrast to naturalistic determinism and divine determinism. In this article, however, the authors offer philosophical and theological grounds in favor of libertarian free will and middle knowledge.
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  13.  67
    Modest Molinism.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 8 (2).
    Molinism, which says that God has middle knowledge, offers one of the most impressive and popular ways of combining libertarian creaturely freedom with full providential control by God. The aim of this paper is to explain, motivate, and defend a heretofore overlooked version of Molinism that I call ‘Modest Molinism’. In Section 1, I explain Modest Molinism and make an initial case for it. Then, in Sections 2 and 3, I defend Modest Molinism against Dean (...)
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  14.  94
    Still Another Anti-Molinist Argument.Daniel Rubio - 2024 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 8 (2).
    Molinists offer a tempting bargain: accept divine middle knowledge, and reap solutions to a number of philosophical/theological problems. The prime benefit we are meant to reap from middle knowledge is a solution to the problem of freedom and providence. I argue that they cannot deliver. Even if we make metaphysical and semantic assumptions that have generally been considered friendly to Molinism, Molinism is in danger of undermining divine providence altogether. This “collapse" persists despite fairly uncontroversial assumptions, and plagues (...)
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  15. Quantum Molinism.Thomas Harvey, Frederick Kroon, Karl Svozil & Cristian Calude - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (3):167-194.
    In this paper we consider the possibility of a Quantum Molinism : such a view applies an analogue of the Molinistic account of free will‘s compatibility with God’s foreknowledge to God’s knowledge of (supposedly) indeterministic events at a quantum level. W e ask how (and why) a providential God could care for and know about a world with this kind of indeterminacy. We consider various formulations of such a Quantum Molinism, and after rejecting a number of options arrive (...)
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  16.  42
    Monergistic Molinism.Kirk R. MacGregor - 2018 - Perichoresis 16 (2):77-92.
    Several philosophers and theologians have attempted to formulate monergistic, soft libertarian accounts of salvation. These accounts hold that the sinner has the ability to either resist or to do nothing at all with God’s universally given saving grace, in which latter case God will save her. However, I wonder with Cyr and Flummer whether these accounts go far enough because the nonresistant sinner voluntarily remains quiescent and is therefore arguably praiseworthy. I aim to remedy this alleged weakness by formulating a (...)
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  17.  75
    The Concord of Molinism with Modal Voluntarism.D. Vander Laan - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):259-270.
    According to Brian Leftow's modal voluntarism, some necessary truths about created beings depend on the divine will. One might expect this view to be in tension with Molinism, according to which some contingent truths about creatures' free actions are independent of the divine will. It is argued that modal voluntarism is consistent with a lightly modified Molinism.
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  18. Molinism and the thin red line.Greg Restall - unknown
    Molinism is an attempt to do equal justice to divine foreknowledge and human freedom. For Molinists, human freedom fits in this universe for the future is open or unsettled. However, God’s middle knowledge — God’s contingent knowledge of what agents would freely do in this or that circumstance — underwrites God’s omniscience in the midst of this openness. In this paper I rehearse Nuel Belnap and Mitchell Green’s argument in “Indeterminism and the Thin Red Line ” against the reality (...)
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  19.  83
    Molinism's kryptonite: Counterfactuals and circumstantial luck.Andre Leo Rusavuk - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to Molinism, logically prior to his creative decree, God knows via middle knowledge the truth value of the counterfactuals or conditionals of creaturely freedom (CFs) and thus what any possible person would do in any given circumstance. Critics of Molinism have pointed out that the Molinist God gets lucky that the CFs allow him to actualize either a world of his liking or even a good-enough world at all. In this paper, I advance and strengthen the popular (...)
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  20.  21
    Molinist Thomist Calvinism: A Synthesis.Sean Luke - 2024 - Heythrop Journal 65 (1):3-18.
    In recent years, attempts to reconcile God's exhaustive providential control over the future and human freedom frequently appeal to Molinism. Through the theory of Middle Knowledge, it is claimed, God can exercise meticulous providence over free creatures while preserving the libertarian agency of those creatures. Historically, both Thomist and Reformed theologians have critiqued the theory of Middle Knowledge for effectively eliminating God's aseity, making God's knowledge in some sense dependent on some non-God reality. In this paper, I aim to (...)
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  21. Molinism and Theological Compatibilism.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92.
    In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical Molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since (...)
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  22. Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense.Michael Bergmann - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):462-478.
    Harry Frankfurt's well-known counterexample to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) has recently come under attack by those who argue that the success of that sort of counterexample depends on the falsity of incompatibilism. In response, I argue that, given one controversial assumption, there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP that don't take the falsity of incompatibilism for granted. The controversial assumption is the Molinist one that something like middle knowledge is possible. I then show how the falsity of PAP causes (...)
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  23.  50
    Molinism, Question-Begging, and Foreknowledge of Indeterminates.John D. Laing - 2018 - Perichoresis 16 (2):55-75.
    John Martin Fischer’s charge that Molinism does not offer a unique answer to the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human freedom can be seen as a criticism of middle knowledge for begging the question of FF -compatibilism. In this paper, I seek to answer this criticism in two ways. First, I demonstrate that most of the chief arguments against middle knowledge are guilty of begging the question of FF-incompatibilism and conclude that the simple charge of begging the question cannot (...)
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  24. Optimistic Molinism.Andre Leo Rusavuk - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):371-387.
    Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, (...)
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  25.  22
    Molinism, Meticulous Providence, and Luck.Steven B. Cowan - 2009 - Philosophia Christi 11 (1):156-169.
    Molinism entails that God cannot actualize just any possible world because God has no control over what counterfactuals of freedom (CFs) are true. This fact confronts the Molinist with a dilemma. If God has a plan for the course of history logically antecedent to his cognizance of the true CFs, then God would have been implausibly lucky if any actualizable world corresponded to his plan. If, on the other hand, God did not have a plan for the course of (...)
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  26.  48
    A Molinist Response to Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument.Timothy A. Stratton & Jacobus Erasmus - 2023 - Perichoresis 21 (1):39-51.
    John Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness is evidence against God’s existence. More precisely, according to Schellenberg’s well-known Hiddenness Argument, God’s existence entails that there would never be any nonresistant non-believers; however, there are some non-resistant non-believers; therefore, God does not exist. In this paper, we offer a Molinist response or solution to the Hiddenness Argument. First, we briefly explain Molinism, we then describe Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument, and, finally, we argue that Molinism undercuts the view that God would necessarily (...)
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  27.  81
    Molinism, Open Theism, and Soteriological Luck.Mark B. Anderson - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (3):371-381.
    It is sometimes claimed by open theists that, on Molinism, God controls who is saved and who is damned and that, as a consequence, God's judgement of us is unjust. While this charge is usually lumped under the problem of evil, it could easily be classified under the problem of soteriological luck. I argue that the open theist is impugned by this latter problem. I then show that the Molinist has a solution to both problems and consider objections to (...)
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  28. Molinism, Creature-types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication.Daniel Murphy - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):65-86.
    Granting that there could be true subjunctive conditionals of libertarian freedom (SCLs), I argue (roughly) that there could be such conditionals only in connection with individual "possible creatures" (in contrast to types). This implies that Molinism depends on the view that, prior to creation, God grasps possible creatures in their individuality. In making my case, I explore the notions of counterfactual implication (that relationship between antecedent and consequent of an SCL which consists in its truth) and counterfactual relevance (that (...)
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  29.  58
    Some Puzzles about Molinist Conditionals.Robert C. Koons - 2022 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 70 (1):137-154.
    William Hasker has been one of the most trenchant and insightful critics of the revival of Molinism. He has focused on the “freedom problem”, a set of challenges designed to show that Molinism does not secure a place for genuinely free human action. These challenges focus on a key element in the Molinist story: the counterfactual conditionals of creaturely freedom. According to Molinism, these conditionals have contingent truth-values that are knowable to God prior to His decision of (...)
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  30.  27
    Molinism’s Freedom Problem: A Reply to Cunningham.William Hasker - 2017 - Faith and Philosophy 34 (1):93-106.
    Arthur Cunningham has asserted that my argument targeting the “freedom problem” for Molinism is unsuccessful. I show that while he has correctly identified two minor (and correctible) problems with the argument, Cunningham’s main criticisms are ineffective. This is mainly because he has failed to appreciate the complex dialectical situation created by the use of a reductio ad absurdum argument. The result is to underscore the difficulty for Molinism of the freedom problem.
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  31.  45
    Molinism and theodicy.Kenneth J. Perszyk - 1998 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (3):163-184.
  32.  19
    Molinism, Freedom, and Luck.Daniel Breyer - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (2):415-432.
    This article argues that Molinism faces an intractable objection. This is the Luck Argument, which begins with a dilemma: either counterfactuals of freedom have truth-makers or they do not. Molinism faces insurmountable problems no matter which horn of the dilemma it accepts. As a result, Molinism cannot account both for divine foreknowledge and for human freedom. If it accounts for one, it sacrifices the other.
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  33. Molinism.Alfred Freddoso - manuscript
    Molinism, named after Luis de Molina, is a theological system for reconciling human freedom with God's grace and providence. Presupposing a strongly libertarian account of freedom, Molinists assert against their rivals that the grace whereby God cooperates with supernaturally salvific acts is not intrinsically efficacious. To preserve divine providence and foreknowledge, they then posit "middle knowledge", through which God knows, prior to his own free decrees, how any possible rational agent would freely act in any possible situation. Beyond this, (...)
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  34. Molinism and divine prophecy of free actions.Graham Oppy & Mark Saward - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):1-10.
    Among challenges to Molinism, the challenge posed by divine prophecy of human free action has received insufficient attention. We argue that this challenge is a significant addition to the array of challenges that confront Molinism.
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  35.  56
    Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!William Hasker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):126-131.
    William Craig has recently objected to my defense of Robert Adams’ anti-Molinist argument. I argue that all of Craig’s objections fail, and anti-Molinism stands undefeated.
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  36. How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):68-90.
    The problem of moral luck is that a general fact about luck and an intuitive moral principle jointly imply the following skeptical conclusion: human beings are morally responsible for at most a tiny fraction of each action. This skeptical conclusion threatens to undermine the claim that human beings deserve their respective eternal reward and punishment. But even if this restriction on moral responsibility is compatible with the doctrine of the final judgment, the quality of one’s afterlife within heaven or hell (...)
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  37.  99
    A Molinist-Style Response to Schellenberg.Michael Thune - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):33-41.
  38. Yet another anti-molinist argument.Dean Zimmerman - 2009 - In Samuel Newlands & Larry M. Jorgensen (eds.), Metaphysics and the good: themes from the philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Molinism’, in contemporary usage, is the name for a theory about the workings of divine providence. Its defenders include some of the most prominent contemporary Protestant and Catholic philosophical theologians.¹ Molinism is often said to be the only way to steer a middle..
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  39.  51
    The Thin Red Line, Molinism, and the Flow of Time.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (3):307-329.
    In addressing the problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter problems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models of temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have proved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure of the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the Thin Red Line ) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are true or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between (...) and \ models, Restall Molinism: the contemporary debate, pp 227–239, 2011) has advanced some criticisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against \ models. In particular, Restall believes that the implication \ is not true in \ models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication is not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall’s criticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in many open future models ) the implication \ is invalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication, some modifications are required in respect of the branching time semantics. In proposing one such modification, we show that this new semantics can be adopted by advocates of the \ and, as a consequence, by Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated by Restall is either a problem for many open future models or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a problem for Molinists either. (shrink)
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  40.  37
    Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, edited by Ken Perszyk.Robert Koons - 2013 - Faith and Philosophy 30 (3):345-353.
  41.  44
    Molinist Divine Complicity in advance.A. Elisher Robert - forthcoming - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
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  42.  29
    Anti-Molinist Argument'.Dean Zimmerman - 2011 - In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 140.
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  43.  63
    Molinism’s Freedom Problem.William Hasker - 2017 - Faith and Philosophy 34 (1):93-106.
    Arthur Cunningham has asserted that my argument targeting the “freedom problem” for Molinism is unsuccessful. I show that while he has correctly identified two minor (and correctible) problems with the argument, Cunningham’s main criticisms are ineffective. This is mainly because he has failed to appreciate the complex dialectical situation created by the use of a reductio ad absurdum argument. The result is to underscore the difficulty for Molinism of the freedom problem.
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  44.  18
    Molinist Divine Complicity.Robert A. Elisher - 2015 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89:85-95.
    I argue here that God, as Molinism conceives Him, is complicit in moral evil. This is of course a problem because complicity in evil undermines divine perfection. I argue, however, that it is a problem that Open Theism, as a theory of “general” (as opposed to “meticulous”) providence, avoids. This claim opposes that of Neal Judisch, who has recently (2012) argued that theories of general providence (e.g., Open Theism) are in no better position to answer the problem of gratuitous (...)
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  45. Recent Work on Molinism.Ken Perszyk - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.
    Molinism is named after Luis de Molina (1535–1600). Molina and his fellow Jesuits became entangled in a fierce debate over issues involving the doctrine of divine providence, which is a picture of how God runs the world. Molinism reemerged in the 1970s after Alvin Plantinga unwittingly assumed it in his Free Will Defense against the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil. Molinism has been the subject of vigorous debate in analytic philosophy of religion ever since. The main aim of (...)
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  46. The Neo-Molinist Square Stands Firm: A Rejoinder to Kirk MacGregor.Elijah Hess - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (2):391-406.
    In a previous issue of Philosophia Christi, Kirk MacGregor responded to an essay of mine in which I argued for a neo-Molinist account of open theism. The argument demonstrated how, given standard counterfactual semantics, one could derive an “open future square of opposition,” that is, a depiction of the logical relations that hold between future-tense statements from an open theistic standpoint. Conceding the validity of the argument, MacGregor nevertheless sought to deny its soundness by criticizing both its conclusion and the (...)
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  47.  58
    Flint’s ‘Molinism and the Incarnation’ is Still Too Radical — A Rejoinder to Flint.R. T. Mullins - 2017 - Journal of Analytic Theology 5:515-532.
    I greatly appreciate Thomas Flint’s reply to my paper, “Flint’s ‘Molinism and the Incarnation’ is too Radical.” In my original paper I argue that the Christology and eschatology of Flint’s paper “Molinism and the Incarnation” is too radical to be considered orthodox. I consider it an honor that a senior scholar, such as Flint, would concern himself with my work in the first place. In this response to Flint’s reply I will explain why I still find Flint’s Christology (...)
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  48.  13
    The Neo-Molinist Square Collapses.Kirk R. MacGregor - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):195-206.
    Elijah Hess has argued that, given the accuracy of Stalnaker-Lewis semantics, Molinists possess good reason to shift their position to neo-Molinism. Conceding the validity but denying the soundness of this argument, I contend that the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics is multiply flawed, especially in its definitions of □→ and ◇→. Based on corrected definitions of □→ and ◇→ consistent with Molina’s own thought, I show how Hess’s neo-Molinist square of opposition collapses and his neological stages of God’s knowledge are undermined, thereby (...)
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  49.  20
    Anti-Molinist Arguments.William Hasker - 2011 - In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 73.
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  50.  45
    Divine Providence: The Molinist Account.David Basinger - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):274.
    Christian theists have always been concerned with the relationship between God’s providential control and human freedom. Flint’s book is an explication and defense of what he sees as the best way for orthodox Christians to conceive of this relationship: the Molinist account.
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