In this essay the question whether or not African philosophy exists is considered through an examination of the meaning of doubt. In St. Augustine and Descartes the basic presupposition with regard to doubt is the indubitable certainty that the doubting subject must exist before there can be any doubt at all. By parity of reasoning, African philosophy must first exist before it can doubt its own existence or be doubted by another. The origin and meaning of the term “Africa” is (...) then examined. This culminates in the thesis that, once the indigenous conquered peoples of the continent choose to retain the term “Africa”, then they are entitled to give content and meaning to it. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(2) 2003: 113–127. (shrink)

Modu wa taba Legae ke karolo ye botlhokwa ya setshaba. Tabakgolo mo taodishong ye ke go araba potjisho ye: na ke tshwanelo gore bana ba ishe batswadi ba bona kgole kua madulong a batsofe? Re araba potjisho ye ka go ganetja bana ba ba phedilego gabotse basa babjwe go isha batswadi mafelong a botsofe. Re tloga re bontsha le gore kgale-kgale gona mafatsheng a Bodikela gobe go na le motlhalefi bare ke Cicero. Le yena o kwana le kganetjo ye moka (...) le moreti mogolo John Milton. Botee magareng ga bao ba phelago, badimo le bao ba sa tlo belegwa bo a senyega ge bana ba isha batswadi madulong a batsofe. Abstract Taking the African conception of community as our point of departure, we argue that the advancing age of parents is no justification for their children to transfer the responsibility of caring for their parents to others, such as to nursing homes. Usefulness is not the defining feature of the worth of an elderly human being, especially a parent. We will show by appeal to Cicero that this understanding was alive in Western antiquity and was upheld in the modern period by, for example, John Milton the poet. To send one’s parents to a nursing home when one is in good health is to destroy and kill the triangular relationship between parents and children. (shrink)

This article distinguishes between pan-Africanism and pan-Africanness. It argues that the history of pan-Africanism is replete with achievements but that the achievements could have been more and radical if the movement had from its inception adopted pan-Africanness, manifesting itself as ubuntu, as its point of departure. It focuses on epistemic and material injustice and suggests that there cannot be social justice without epistemic justice. The pursuit of the latter ought to lead to giving up one’s life if necessary, for the (...) sake of giving life to others. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Morafe ke bongwe bjo bosa kgaoganego eupja setlwaedi se laetja kgaogano go ya ka merafe Dinyakishisho di supa gore magareng ga batho, morafe ke yo tee fela; ke morafe wa batho. Ya go bitjwa DNA ka Sekgowa e laetja go sena pelaelo gore batho kamoka ke bana ba legoro le lelapa le tee. Ka bjalo, morafe wa batho ga o a tshwanela go kgaolwa dikgaokgao. Bophelong bja ka metlha re bona gore ba gona bao ba gananago le taba ye. (...) Ba ema ka la gore go nale merafe ye mentshi. Go ya ka bona, merafe ye e a fapafapana ebile tlhago e laetja gore go nale merafe ya kua godimo le ya kua fase. Go nale merafe yewe e tlhabologilego le ye esa tlhabologang. Kgopolo ye e tloga ele ditjie badimo. Ke yona e tlholago dintwa. E ganana le phedisano yeo e ithekgilego godimo ga toka le khutjo magareng ga batho. Ka fao taodiso ye e shireletja maemo a gore go nale morafe yo tee fela; morafe yo ebego lelapa le tee fela la batho kamoka. [Race is an indivisible singular but practice insists it is a frangible plural Biological anthropology suggests that there is only one human race. Studies of the DNA have confirmed that there is only one human family marked by a variety of differences such as the type of hair, the color of eyes and skin. Instead of accepting the scientific finding that the human race is one, humanity is involved in an absurd but deadly race to prove that there are many races arising from a preestablished ontological hierarchy. According to this imaginary hierarchy, races are graded on a scale of “superiority” and “inferiority,” “civilization” and “barbarism.” The thesis defended in this article is that the prevailing practice of fragmenting the human race into multiple bits and pieces is against the pursuit of justice and peace in human relations. The human race is an indivisible singular and not a frangible plural.]. (shrink)

This article discusses critically the problems and significance of the concepts of reincarnation and the resurrection. It focuses on the contemporary debate on this topic between Robert Almeder and Stephen Hales. The Akan understanding of these concepts is invoked showing the contrast and,even comparison between the African and the Western understanding of the concepts. It is suggested in this article that the arguments for these concepts could still be ameliorated. This point is taken up by Ramose’s focus on the issues (...) that arise from the critical discussion. Ramose points out that the concept of immortality requires a special place in the discussion since it is the axis around which both reincarnation and resurrection revolve. He complements the discussion accordingly. He further argues that the topic is as relevant today as it was since the dawn of humankind. Any attempt to exclude or discard the topic from philosophy is both questionable and an arbitrary limitation of the scope and meaning of philosophy.2 Keywords: ‘God’, ‘the soul’, immortality, reincarnation, resurrection, the body. (shrink)

This is a reply to Cees Maris. He wrote two articles in Dutch purporting to be a dialogue with Mogobe Ramose. The two articles have subsequently been compressed into one and published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Mogobe’s reply is directed at all three articles, meaning the two published in Dutch together with the one published in English. The core of the argument is the meaning of ubu-ntu against ubuntu. The former is a philosophical concept and the latter (...) is the everyday language usage presupposing but not explicitly manifesting awareness of its reliance upon ubu-ntu. In elaborating upon his criticism of some of the writings of Mogobe on “ubuntu”, Maris appeals to other writers to support his position. Mogobe dismisses all this on the ground that neither Maris nor his supporters actually address and challenge the philosophical exposition of ubu-ntu in the various writings of Mogobe. Maris and his supporters have at best looked at Ramose but have not seen him. The result is that there never was “a dialogue” with Ramose, except the imaginary one by Maris. (shrink)

The sheer variety of socio-political events and technological advancements which affect modern society, and the speed and intensity at which these events occur around the world, delivers change known as epistemic and social transformation. Within this context, the question of justice for all is a poignant one. It is a cognitive revolution challenging humankind to consider whether or not the already contested meaning of philosophy can remain unchanged. The contributions to _Contrasts and contests about philosophy_ address this challenge from a (...) variety of different, and even contending, perspectives. This book was originally published as a special issue of the _South African Journal of Philosophy. _. (shrink)

Professor Heinz Kimmerle encountered African philosophy at a time when his specialisation in the philosophy of Hegel had attained world recognition. For Hegel, African philosophy did not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa, exactly the area in which Kimmerle made his first contact with African philosophy. Hegel¿s philosophy was not a stranger to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was because the Western educational paradigm was imposed upon the conquered, colonized peoples during the period of colonisation. Unlike Hegel, Kimmerle took African philosophy seriously and engaged, (...) initially, in dialogues with African philosophy. Out of the unfolding dialogues grew intercultural philosophy spearheaded by Kimmerle¿s penetrating, insightful and incisive critique of some of the fundamental presuppositions of Hegel¿s philosophy. The essays contained in this book focus on the evolution of Kimmerle¿s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. Underlying this are recognition and respect for other modes of doing philosophy as manifestations of intercultural philosophy. To deny dialogues, if you prefer, polylogue among world philosophies, is to reject the very basis of philosophy. Thus a crucial dimension of philosophy would be precluded, which can be found in this book, namely, the critical evaluation of Kimmerle¿s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. (shrink)