This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy.Many chapters articulate new, detailed methods of doing history of philosophy. These present conflicting visions of the history of philosophy as an autonomous sub-discipline of professional philosophy. Several other chapters offer new approaches to integrating history into one's philosophy by re-telling the history of recent philosophy. A number of (...) chapters explore the relationship between history of philosophy and history of science.Among the topics discussed and debated in the volume are: the status of the principle of charity; the nature of reading texts; the role of historiography within the history of philosophy; the nature of establishing proper context. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss how Leibniz’s first correspondence with Malebranche from early 1676 can shed new light on the notorious “all-things-are-one”-passage found in the Quod ens perfectissimum sit possibile from late 1676—a passage that has been taken as an expression of monism or Spinozism in the young Leibniz. The correspondence with Malebranche provides a deeper understanding of Leibniz’s use of the notions of “real distinction” and “separability” in the ATOP. This forms the background for a discussion of Leibniz’s commitment (...) to the monist position expounded in the ATOP. Thus, on the basis of a close analysis of Leibniz’s use of these key terms in the Malebranche correspondence, I provide two possible, and contrary, interpretations of the ATOP, namely, a “non-commitment account” and a “commitment account.” Finally, I explain why I consider the commitment account to be the more compelling of the two. (shrink)

The historiography of philosophy is a hot topic these days. One need only peruse the 2013 Philosophy and Its History, edited by Mogens Lærke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser, or this journal’s debate between Daniel Garber and Michael Della Rocca, to see that methodological issues in the history of philosophy are the subject of substantive contemporary discussion. In the volume under review, Lærke defends an approach to the historiography of philosophy that is fundamentally inseparable from the history (...) of philosophy itself: historical perspectivism.Lærke’s volume is a fait preuve for historical perspectivism, four case studies that demonstrate its benefits: methodological exactness, sensitivity.. (shrink)

when reading spinoza’s Ethics,1 one comes upon a particularly disconcerting passage in Part Three. In an explication of two definitions of ‘favor’ (favor) and ‘indignation’ (indignatio), Spinoza writes,I know that in their common usage these words mean something else. But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose meaning is not entirely opposed to the meaning with which I wish to use them. One warning of (...) this should suffice.2The passage cannot but give rise to some bewilderment. First, if Spinoza’s use of words is not “entirely opposed” to the (common) meaning of those words, one wonders to what degree his use of words is in fact .. (shrink)

this paper offers a critical discussion of Martial Gueroult's philosophical conception of the history of philosophy as a discipline. Gueroult was among the most influential French historians of philosophy in the twentieth century and the author of a long list of monographs on a host of modern philosophers. Gueroult's first book, on Maimon, was published in 1929, quickly followed in 1930 by a monograph on Fichte. In the English-speaking world, he is probably best known for his two-volume Descartes selon l'ordre (...) des raisons and the volumes on parts I and II of Spinoza's... (shrink)

The introduction explain the need for how an international, inclusive discussion about the range of different methodological approaches from different traditions of philosophy can be read alongside each other and be seen in sometimes very critical conversation with each other. In addition, the introduction identifies four broad themes in the volume: the largest group of chapters advocate methods that promote history of philosophy as an unapologetic, autonomous enterprise with its own criteria within philosophy. Second, three chapters can be seen as (...) historicizing the history of philosophy from within. Third, four chapters argue for history of philosophy as a means toward making contributions to contemporary philosophy. Finally, two chapters explore the relationship between the history of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)

Cet article explore la conception spinozienne du rapport entre substance et mode en analysant les notions de cause de soi, de cause immanente et de puissance. Nous soutenons que la théorie spinozienne de la causalité constitue une tentative pour développer une ontologie relationnelle de la puissance dans laquelle toute dénomination intrinsèque est fondée sur une dénomination extrinsèque. Par opposition à une interprétation courante selon laquelle la substance de Spinoza est une sorte de grande monade dans laquelle toutes choses inhèrent comme (...) les prédicats inhèrent à un sujet logique, nous maintenons que l’ontologie de l’immanence opère une extériorisation radicale de l’être : pour un mode fini, « exister » est s’extérioriser en tant que cause, c’est-à-dire agir. La substance, en revanche, n’est rien que la causalité en tant que telle, ou une forme absolue de l’extériorité. Par conséquent, quand Spinoza maintient que toutes choses sont « en Dieu » , la préposition in ne signifie pas s’intérioriser « dans un sujet » , mais plutôt s’extérioriser « dans l’action » .In this paper, I explore Spinoza’s conception of the relation between substance and mode through an analysis of the notions of self-causation, immanent causation and power. I argue that Spinoza’s theory of causality constitutes an attempt to develop a relational ontology of power where all intrinsic denominations are grounded in extrinsic ones. In opposition to a current reading according to which Spinoza’s substance is similar to a huge monad in which things inhere in the same way as predicates inhere in a logical subject, I argue that the ontology of immanence implies a radical exteriorization of being : for a finite mode, « to be » is to exteriorize itself as a cause, i.e. to act. As for substance, it is nothing but causality or action as such, an absolute form of exteriority. Hence, when Spinoza maintains that all things are « in God » , the preposition does not signify the interiorization « in a subject » , but rather an exteriorization « in action ». (shrink)

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 570-573, May 2011.

This volume includes fifteen chapters, case studies and broader reflections, on the notion of ‘radical enlightenment,’ separated into three main sections entitled, respectively, “The Big Picture,” “Origins and Fate of the Radical Enlightenment, ca. 1660–1720,” and “The Radical Enlightenment in Europe and the New World after ca. 1720.” It is presented as “the first stand-alone collection of studies in English on the Radical Enlightenment.” It is worth mentioning, however, that two very similar volumes already exist in French and German. Like (...) its French and German... (shrink)

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

(2013). Spinoza and the Cosmological Argument According to Letter 12. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 57-77. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.696052.

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

The article reconstructs a brief controversy between H. More, G. W. Leibniz and J. G. Wachter about the Kabbalah, or what they called ‘the philosophy of the Hebrews’. I study in particular the status of the proposition ‘nothing comes out of nothing’ in their exchanges - a proposition they all agreed was a fundamental kabbalist axiom while having differing views as to the prospects of reconciling that position with Christianity. I show how Wachter’s curious Kabbalistico-Spinozism provided the stage for an (...) indirect philosophical encounter between Leibniz and More that highlights not only their respective positions on the Kabbalah, but also suggests some important philosophical agreement between them regarding divine transcendence and the nature of creation. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reading of Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the mind in light of his theory of essence and existence. Opposing in particular recent Platonist readings of this theory, rejecting the dichotomy between formal essence and actual essence, upon which they mostly rely, I argue that Spinoza’s conception of the eternity of the mind must be grasped in terms of different aspects of one and the same existence. I moreover suggest that, for Spinoza, the mind (...) was both sempiternal and eternal, without, however, those two aspects of the mind’s existence being identical. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Leibniz's interpretation of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. In particular, I consider whether Leibniz's position on this point was developed partly in reference to Spinoza's position. First, I analyze Leibniz's annotations from 1676 on Spinoza's Letter 12. The traditional cosmological argument, as found in Avicenna and Saint Thomas for example, relies on the Aristotelian assumption that an actual infinite is impossible and on the idea that there can be no effect without a (...) cause. From these premises, the argument concludes that God must be the uncaused first cause of all things. In Letter 12, Spinoza follows Chasdai Crescas and rejects this proof. Instead, he develops a variant of the cosmological argument which depicts God as the self-caused ground of all causes or things. In his annotations, Leibniz agrees with Spinoza about the inadequacy of the traditional argument, but remains ambiguous as to Spinoza's conception of God as a self-caused being. Next, I turn to Leibniz's comments from 1678 on Spinoza's Ethics. Here, Leibniz develops an original interpretation of the cosmological argument based entirely on the consideration of conceptual relations. Leibniz's argument depicts God as an uncaused being conceived through itself which is the condition of conceivability of all things. I argue that Leibniz developed this argument in deliberate opposition to Spinoza's conception of God as the self-caused ground of all causes or things. (shrink)

This article is about Gilles Deleuze's book Le Pli. Leibniz et le Baroque from 1988. It shows how Deleuze's notion of folding captures some basic intuitions in Leibniz and how they relate to each other. To this purpose, I propose five figures, all referring to the same basic fold, all illustrating how the consideration of such figures allows developing central elements of Leibniz's monadology. These figures can help, I hope, alleviate some of the fundamental difficulties in understanding Deleuze's approach to (...) the Monadology from the non-Deleuzian perspective of contemporary Leibniz scholarship and give a sense of the synthetic, explanatory force that Deleuze's notion of folding has in relation to Leibniz's monadological metaphysics. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 3, May 2020, Page 431-441.

Ce beau volume rassemble vingt-trois contributions à un colloque international sur le thème des « Lumières radicales », tenu à l’École normale supérieure Lettres et sciences humaines à Lyon en février 2004. L’objectif du colloque était de s’interroger sur le sens et la pertinence de cette catégorie historiographique qui s’est imposée dans l’histoire intellectuelle du xviie et du xviiie siècle depuis quelques décennies déjà, mais avec une force considérable depuis une dizaine d’années. Le volu..

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly (...) through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

The paper studies the historical background for the ‘idealist’ reading of Spinoza usually traced back to British and German Idealism. Here, I follow this history further back than and focus on one earlier idealist reading, indeed perhaps the mother of them all. It can be found in the _Elucidarius cabalisticus, sive reconditae Hebraeorum philosophiae brevis et succincta recensio_ by Johann Georg Wachter, a kabbalist interpretation of Spinoza published in 1706. I am principally interested in the importance that Wachter’s book may (...) have had for German philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century. Focusing on Moses Mendelssohn’s _Philosophische Gespräche_ of 1755, I argue that, via Mendelssohn, the Elucidarius cabalisticus is perhaps the earliest possible source of the idealist reading of Spinoza that dominated the German _Spinozabild_ from throughout the _Pantheismusstreit_ up to the second edition of Herder’s 1800 _Gott: Einige Gespräche_, culminating with Hegel’s ‘acosmist’ reading of Spinoza in the 1825–26 lectures on the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly (...) through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

this paper has a double objective. On the one hand, it aims to examine Leibniz's approach to church-state relations, a central question in early modern political philosophy that has rarely been discussed in the context of the philosopher of Hanover despite the fact that his political texts contain much to be appreciated on the topic. On the other hand, it aims at providing a prominent example of how Leibniz's political philosophy, contrary to what is often held, was not exclusively grounded (...) in the metaphysical principles of 'universal jurisprudence,' that is, the eternal and immutable principles of justice common to God and men. I argue that Leibniz realized that applying those principles in human jurisprudence... (shrink)

In 1697, the publication of a letter from Leibniz to Bourguet in the Journal des Sçavants prompted a vigorous reply from the Cartesien Pierre-Sylvain Regis, leading to a public exchange between the two philosophers. The controversy ended with a contribution by Regis who seemingly got the final word. The exchange mainly focused on Descartes’s Principles of philosophy, III, art. 47, a text where Descartes held that the world would eventually take all the possible forms it is capable of. While Leibniz (...) maintained that this claim had inescapable Spinozistic consequences, Regis defended Descartes against the accusation. Each position relied on its own distinct conception of the world’s infinity. This chapter follows this controversy step by step. I show in particular that Leibniz, although he did not write it, had a forceful reply to Regis’s final published objections ready at hand, based on his rehabilitation of the notion of actual infinity. (shrink)