In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Mogens Lærke. Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xviii + 387. Hardback, $115.00. -/- Spinoza's political philosophy, always a subject of attention in Francophone scholarship, has been coming into sharper focus for Anglophone readers in recent years as well. Mogens Lærke—well known for his essays on metaphysics and cognition in Spinoza, for his invaluable book Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza (Paris: (...) Honoré Champion, 2008), and for bridging French and English scholarly communities—has now written a richly contextual treatment of Spinoza's conception of the freedom of philosophizing (libertas philosophandi). His book presents a thoroughly mid- to late seventeenth-century Dutch Spinoza. The expression libertas philosophandi appears in the full title of Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise (1670, hereafter TTP). Lærke argues that libertas philosophandi is the key to understanding "Spinoza's attempt to theorize a new republican public sphere" (5). As defined by Spinoza, "the freedom of philosophizing is not for Spinoza an individual right but a collective natural authority constitutive of a particular kind of public sphere" (5)—namely, one constituted by such recognizably republican notions as equality, integrity, virtue, and honor. It depends on citizens "having taken possession of their own free judgment and on their capability and willingness to engage with each other without prejudice and deceit" (234). Far from being "granted," libertas philosophandi is "achieved through civic education and mutual advising in the public sphere" (235). Rather than a formal permission or abstract right, libertas philosophandi is a socially mediated expression of power (or what the Ethics calls conatus, striving and expression): it emerges and is maintained through cultivation, regulation, and identification, and is communal—that is, political. Put another way, libertas philosophandi is a collective form of freedom enacted as a noncoercive exchange of views among equals who agree to search for truth and pursue well-being together. As distinct from the rational and intellectual freedom examined in the Ethics, libertas philosophandi reflects everyone's natural (and so inevitable) power of self-expression and does not depend on rational attainment. The task of politics is inducing as many people as possible to express themselves constructively. Thus, politics depends on motivating people to act as if they were rational. In practice, this means that citizens must commit themselves to friendly mutual advice and teaching rather than to coercive measures, to deliberative structures rather than to secrecy and partiality, and to acceptance of a unified sovereign, whatever the exact form of the government may be. Following the indications of TTP 5 and TTP 16-17, Lærke shows that this commitment can come about either imaginatively [End Page 523] or rationally. For those who do not or cannot—or cannot consistently—comprehend the usefulness of a well-constructed imperium, imaginative myths, such as the revelation at Mount Sinai or the social contract itself, are required. For those for whom the founding myths and codes, such as the principles of universal religion, prove insufficiently binding, state force intervenes. With characteristic erudition, Lærke situates Spinoza in the political, religious, sociocultural, and economic currents of mid- to late seventeenth-century Amsterdam. This contextualization leads to new ways of understanding Spinoza's place in the history of toleration and democratic thought. Lærke pairs this historical-philosophical sleuthing with close attention to Spinoza's exact language and argumentative structure. Most provocatively, Lærke insists on the fundamental continuity of Spinoza's political philosophy against influential readings that suppose a late-life change of heart. Chapters 2–5 explore the meaning of libertas philosophandi. Chapter 2, "Circles and Spheres of Free Philosophizing," retraces the history of the notion; chapter 3, "Philosophizing," presents philosophizing as a broad argumentative style encompassing reasoning from experience and practical or historical reasoning as well as more technical modes of inference and argument. What Spinoza calls the "natural light" and characterizes as "sound reason" is thus common to all, not restricted to intellectuals. Chapter 4, "The Apostolic Styles," studies Spinoza's analysis of the teaching methods exhibited in the Greek Scriptures. Chapter 5, "Authority," draws this part of the book to a... (shrink)

The historiography of philosophy is a hot topic these days. One need only peruse the 2013 Philosophy and Its History, edited by Mogens Lærke, Justin E. H. Smith, and Eric Schliesser, or this journal’s debate between Daniel Garber and Michael Della Rocca, to see that methodological issues in the history of philosophy are the subject of substantive contemporary discussion. In the volume under review, Lærke defends an approach to the historiography of philosophy that is fundamentally inseparable from the history (...) of philosophy itself: historical perspectivism.Lærke’s volume is a fait preuve for historical perspectivism, four case studies that demonstrate its benefits: methodological exactness, sensitivity.. (shrink)

This study considers freedom of speech and the rules of engagement in the public sphere; good government, civic responsibility, and public education; and the foundations of religion and society, as seen through the eyes of seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher, Spinoza.

Volume 28, Issue 3, May 2020, Page 431-441.

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but (...) mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

The introduction explain the need for how an international, inclusive discussion about the range of different methodological approaches from different traditions of philosophy can be read alongside each other and be seen in sometimes very critical conversation with each other. In addition, the introduction identifies four broad themes in the volume: the largest group of chapters advocate methods that promote history of philosophy as an unapologetic, autonomous enterprise with its own criteria within philosophy. Second, three chapters can be seen as (...) historicizing the history of philosophy from within. Third, four chapters argue for history of philosophy as a means toward making contributions to contemporary philosophy. Finally, two chapters explore the relationship between the history of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling (KV) in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but (...) mainly through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)

This paper explores a methodological lineage among French Spinoza scholars which can be traced back to texts written by Victor Delbos (1862–1916), which later branched out into two diametrically opposed orientations in the work by Martial Gueroult (1891–1976) and Paul Vernière (1916–1997), only to be reunited reflexively in the more recent work by Pierre-François Moreau (1948-). The aim is mostly to offer an original reconstruction of the way in which Delbos’ historical programme was inherited by subsequent Spinoza scholars. While retracing (...) this lineage, my focus will be on a specific historiographical principle first formulated by Delbos. In the conclusion, however, I briefly turn to Spinoza himself, arguing how this reconstituted family of twentieth century French historians of philosophy can be characterized as a form of ‘Historiographical Spinozism’. (shrink)

when reading spinoza’s Ethics,1 one comes upon a particularly disconcerting passage in Part Three. In an explication of two definitions of ‘favor’ (favor) and ‘indignation’ (indignatio), Spinoza writes,I know that in their common usage these words mean something else. But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose meaning is not entirely opposed to the meaning with which I wish to use them. One warning of (...) this should suffice.2The passage cannot but give rise to some bewilderment. First, if Spinoza’s use of words is not “entirely opposed” to the (common) meaning of those words, one wonders to what degree his use of words is in fact .. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a reading of Spinoza’s theory of the eternity of the mind in light of his theory of essence and existence. Opposing in particular recent Platonist readings of this theory, rejecting the dichotomy between formal essence and actual essence, upon which they mostly rely, I argue that Spinoza’s conception of the eternity of the mind must be grasped in terms of different aspects of one and the same existence. I moreover suggest that, for Spinoza, the mind (...) was both sempiternal and eternal, without, however, those two aspects of the mind’s existence being identical. (shrink)

This article is about Gilles Deleuze's book Le Pli. Leibniz et le Baroque from 1988. It shows how Deleuze's notion of folding captures some basic intuitions in Leibniz and how they relate to each other. To this purpose, I propose five figures, all referring to the same basic fold, all illustrating how the consideration of such figures allows developing central elements of Leibniz's monadology. These figures can help, I hope, alleviate some of the fundamental difficulties in understanding Deleuze's approach to (...) the Monadology from the non-Deleuzian perspective of contemporary Leibniz scholarship and give a sense of the synthetic, explanatory force that Deleuze's notion of folding has in relation to Leibniz's monadological metaphysics. (shrink)

Cet article explore la conception spinozienne du rapport entre substance et mode en analysant les notions de cause de soi, de cause immanente et de puissance. Nous soutenons que la théorie spinozienne de la causalité constitue une tentative pour développer une ontologie relationnelle de la puissance dans laquelle toute dénomination intrinsèque est fondée sur une dénomination extrinsèque. Par opposition à une interprétation courante selon laquelle la substance de Spinoza est une sorte de grande monade dans laquelle toutes choses inhèrent comme (...) les prédicats inhèrent à un sujet logique, nous maintenons que l’ontologie de l’immanence opère une extériorisation radicale de l’être : pour un mode fini, « exister » est s’extérioriser en tant que cause, c’est-à-dire agir. La substance, en revanche, n’est rien que la causalité en tant que telle, ou une forme absolue de l’extériorité. Par conséquent, quand Spinoza maintient que toutes choses sont « en Dieu » , la préposition in ne signifie pas s’intérioriser « dans un sujet » , mais plutôt s’extérioriser « dans l’action » .In this paper, I explore Spinoza’s conception of the relation between substance and mode through an analysis of the notions of self-causation, immanent causation and power. I argue that Spinoza’s theory of causality constitutes an attempt to develop a relational ontology of power where all intrinsic denominations are grounded in extrinsic ones. In opposition to a current reading according to which Spinoza’s substance is similar to a huge monad in which things inhere in the same way as predicates inhere in a logical subject, I argue that the ontology of immanence implies a radical exteriorization of being : for a finite mode, « to be » is to exteriorize itself as a cause, i.e. to act. As for substance, it is nothing but causality or action as such, an absolute form of exteriority. Hence, when Spinoza maintains that all things are « in God » , the preposition does not signify the interiorization « in a subject » , but rather an exteriorization « in action ». (shrink)

Ce beau volume rassemble vingt-trois contributions à un colloque international sur le thème des « Lumières radicales », tenu à l’École normale supérieure Lettres et sciences humaines à Lyon en février 2004. L’objectif du colloque était de s’interroger sur le sens et la pertinence de cette catégorie historiographique qui s’est imposée dans l’histoire intellectuelle du xviie et du xviiie siècle depuis quelques décennies déjà, mais avec une force considérable depuis une dizaine d’années. Le volu..

The article reconstructs a brief controversy between H. More, G. W. Leibniz and J. G. Wachter about the Kabbalah, or what they called ‘the philosophy of the Hebrews’. I study in particular the status of the proposition ‘nothing comes out of nothing’ in their exchanges - a proposition they all agreed was a fundamental kabbalist axiom while having differing views as to the prospects of reconciling that position with Christianity. I show how Wachter’s curious Kabbalistico-Spinozism provided the stage for an (...) indirect philosophical encounter between Leibniz and More that highlights not only their respective positions on the Kabbalah, but also suggests some important philosophical agreement between them regarding divine transcendence and the nature of creation. (shrink)

this paper offers a critical discussion of Martial Gueroult's philosophical conception of the history of philosophy as a discipline. Gueroult was among the most influential French historians of philosophy in the twentieth century and the author of a long list of monographs on a host of modern philosophers. Gueroult's first book, on Maimon, was published in 1929, quickly followed in 1930 by a monograph on Fichte. In the English-speaking world, he is probably best known for his two-volume Descartes selon l'ordre (...) des raisons and the volumes on parts I and II of Spinoza's... (shrink)

(2013). Spinoza and the Cosmological Argument According to Letter 12. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 57-77. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.696052.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 570-573, May 2011.

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy.Many chapters articulate new, detailed methods of doing history of philosophy. These present conflicting visions of the history of philosophy as an autonomous sub-discipline of professional philosophy. Several other chapters offer new approaches to integrating history into one's philosophy by re-telling the history of recent philosophy. A number of (...) chapters explore the relationship between history of philosophy and history of science.Among the topics discussed and debated in the volume are: the status of the principle of charity; the nature of reading texts; the role of historiography within the history of philosophy; the nature of establishing proper context. (shrink)

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

This volume includes fifteen chapters, case studies and broader reflections, on the notion of ‘radical enlightenment,’ separated into three main sections entitled, respectively, “The Big Picture,” “Origins and Fate of the Radical Enlightenment, ca. 1660–1720,” and “The Radical Enlightenment in Europe and the New World after ca. 1720.” It is presented as “the first stand-alone collection of studies in English on the Radical Enlightenment.” It is worth mentioning, however, that two very similar volumes already exist in French and German. Like (...) its French and German... (shrink)

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Leibniz's interpretation of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. In particular, I consider whether Leibniz's position on this point was developed partly in reference to Spinoza's position. First, I analyze Leibniz's annotations from 1676 on Spinoza's Letter 12. The traditional cosmological argument, as found in Avicenna and Saint Thomas for example, relies on the Aristotelian assumption that an actual infinite is impossible and on the idea that there can be no effect without a (...) cause. From these premises, the argument concludes that God must be the uncaused first cause of all things. In Letter 12, Spinoza follows Chasdai Crescas and rejects this proof. Instead, he develops a variant of the cosmological argument which depicts God as the self-caused ground of all causes or things. In his annotations, Leibniz agrees with Spinoza about the inadequacy of the traditional argument, but remains ambiguous as to Spinoza's conception of God as a self-caused being. Next, I turn to Leibniz's comments from 1678 on Spinoza's Ethics. Here, Leibniz develops an original interpretation of the cosmological argument based entirely on the consideration of conceptual relations. Leibniz's argument depicts God as an uncaused being conceived through itself which is the condition of conceivability of all things. I argue that Leibniz developed this argument in deliberate opposition to Spinoza's conception of God as the self-caused ground of all causes or things. (shrink)

Dans cette contribution, je reviens sur la « liberté de philosopher » que, selon le sous-titre de l’ouvrage, Spinoza se propose de défendre dans son Traité théologico-politique. Je montre notamment qu’il s’agit d’une forme complexe et positive de liberté à ne pas confondre avec la conception de la liberté d’expression et du free speech dont on parle dans le discours politique d’aujourd’hui. Je montre ainsi que la liberté de philosopher n’est pas un droit civil accordé par l’État mais un style (...) ou mode de parler dont l’autorité repose sur un droit naturel inaliénable, inséparable de la nature humaine. (shrink)

This chapter proposes a very condensed overview of some three centuries of Spinoza reception in France, from around 1670 to 1970. Spinoza's presence in the history of French philosophy is pervasive, deep, and varied. The chapter presents some of the most important figures and stages in that inextricable double history of both Spinozism from the viewpoint of French philosophy and French philosophy from the viewpoint of Spinozism. The translation is a testimony to the depth with which the French libertine tradition (...) of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century sometimes appropriated Spinoza's philosophy for its own subversive purposes. One way of coming to grips with Spinoza's biblical scholarship was to drown his argument in a deluge of superior erudition. Spinoza's philosophy, by contrast, was universally condemned as fatalist and pantheist. (shrink)

Les Lumières de Leibniz mettent en oeuvre une méthode inédite en histoire de la philosophie : le perspectivisme historique. En prenant Leibniz pour guide dans la république des lettres, le livre propose une perspective immanente sur quatre controverses philosophiques du XVIIe siècle.

In this article, I propose a conjecture concerning the transmission of Spinoza’s Korte Verhandeling in the 1670s involving Leibniz. On the basis of a report about Spinoza’s philosophy written down by Leibniz after some conversations with Tschirnhaus in early 1676, I suggest that Tschirnhaus may have had in his possession a manuscript copy of KV and that his account of Spinoza’s doctrine to Leibniz was colored by this text. I support the hypothesis partly by means of external evidence, but mainly (...) through a comparative analysis of Leibniz’s report and the doctrine contained in KV, showing that the report in important respects corresponds better to this text than to Ethics. I finally point to the importance that this hypothesis, if true, would have for our knowledge of Tschirnhaus’ role in the first diffusion of Spinoza’s philosophy outside Holland and for our understanding Leibniz’s reception of Spinoza in the mid-1670s. (shrink)