A central task in contemporary political philosophy is to identify principles governing political life where citizens disagree deeply on important questions of value and, more generally, about the proper ends of life. The distinctively liberal response to this challenge insists that the state should as far as possible avoid relying on such contested issues in its basic structure and deliberations. David McCabe critically surveys influential defenses of the liberal solution and advocates modus vivendi liberalism as an alternative defense (...) of the liberal state. Acknowledging that the modus vivendi approach does not provide the deep moral consensus that many liberals demand, he defends the liberal state as an acceptable compromise among citizens who will continue to see it as less than ideal. His book will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy and political theory. (shrink)

This essay examines the promise of the notion of modus vivendi for realist political theory. I interpret recent theories of modus vivendi as affirming the priority of peace over justice, and explore several ways of making sense of this idea. I proceed to identify two key problems for modus vivendi theory, so conceived. Normatively speaking, it remains unclear how this approach can sustain a realist critique of Rawlsian theorizing about justice while avoiding a Hobbesian (...) endorsement of absolutism. And conceptually, the theory remains wedded to a key feature of social contract theory: political order is conceived as based on agreement. This construes the horizontal tensions among individual or group agents in society as prior to the vertical, authoritative relations between authorities and their subjects. Political authority thereby appears from the start as a solution to societal conflict, rather than a problem in itself. I argue that this way of framing the issue abstracts from political experience. Instead I attempt to rethink the notion of modus vivendi from within the lived experience of political conflict, as oriented not primarily toward peace, but political survival. With this shift of perspective, the idea of modus vivendi shows us, pace Bernard Williams, that the “first political question” is not how to achieve order and stability, but rather: what can I live with? (shrink)

This article deals with modus vivendi, toleration and power. On the face of it toleration and modus vivendi are in tension with each other, because of the power condition on toleration: that an agent is tolerant only if they have the power to engage in an alternative, non- or intolerant form of behaviour, and this seems to be absent in modus vivendi. The article argues that the scope of the power condition is unclear, but (...) might be thought much more extensive than usually supposed. This becomes clear when the agent’s thoughts are subjected to a counterfactual test, concerning what would occur in their ideal world. However it is in the nature of ideals that they cannot usually be subject to a counterfactual variation here, since they determine the ideal world’s content. The article concludes that only a commitment to the other party’s freedom for its own sake proves robust in the face of counterfactual idealisation, but that it is questionable whether the dispositions that characterise toleration should be subject to so demanding a test. (shrink)

A polity is grounded in a modus vivendi (MV) when its main features can be presented as the outcome of a virtually unrestricted bargaining process. Is MV compatible with the consensus-based account of liberal legitimacy, i.e. the view that political authority is well grounded only if the citizenry have in some sense freely consented to its exercise? I show that the attraction of MV for consensus theorists lies mainly in the thought that a MV can be presented as (...) legitimated through a realist account of public justification. Yet I argue that, because of persistent ethical diversity, that realism problematically conflicts with the liberal commitments that underpin the very ideas of consensus and public justification. Thus, despite the interest it has recently attracted from critics of political liberalism and deliberative democracy, MV is not an option for those wishing to ground liberal political authority in some form of consensus. So if realist and agonistic critiques are on target, then the fact that modus vivendi is not an option casts some serious doubt on the viability of the consensus view of liberal legitimacy. (shrink)

In this chapter, I address the two closely related notions of modus vivendi and toleration. Drawing from conceptual clarifications and a distinction between different conceptions of toleration, I argue that an analogous discussion can be provided for the concept of modus vivendi and for a distinction between different conceptions of it. The resulting conceptions of modus vivendi, and especially a distinct ethical conception, allow for a more precise and more promising line of argument when (...) it comes to using the notion of modus vivendi in current debates in political philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter assesses John Gray’s modus vivendi-based justification for liberalism. I argue that his approach is preferable to the more orthodox deontological or teleological justificatory strategies, at least because of the way it can deal with the problem of diversity. But then I show how that is not good news for liberalism, for grounding liberal political authority in a modus vivendi undermines liberalism’s aspiration to occupy a privileged normative position vis-à-vis other kinds of regimes. So (...) class='Hi'>modus vivendi can save liberalism from moralism, but at cost many liberals will not be prepared to pay. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the requirement that all parties subject to a modus vivendi accept it, the philosophical basis of the all-subjected principle has been largely neglected in the realist literature on modus vivendi arrangements as responses to disagreements on issues of common concern. In this article, I argue that the inclusion of all-subjected parties should be understood as instrumental to justifying the presupposition that enough parties will have the motivation to comply with an arrangement that (...) they grudgingly accept as a modus vivendi. I also argue that without accepting the democratic commitments implicit in the acceptance of the standard reading of the all-subjected principle, realist modus vivendi theorists should demonstrate that all those parties who are subjected to a modus vivendi arrangement have the capacity to voice their objection and to be heard for such a claim. (shrink)

Contemporary political theory is characterised by a realistic critique of liberalism. Realist theorising is seen as avoiding foundational disagreements about justice mutating into second-order disputes concerning the justifiability of legitimate political institutions. In this sense, the realist critique challenges a key aspect of Rawls’ liberal project – that is, its justificatory constituency. McCabe’s Modus Vivendi Liberalism presents an interesting case of such a critique. Given the condition of deep pluralism that characterizes contemporary democracies, the liberal Justificatory Requirement (JR) (...) should be recast so to include those, illiberal or sceptical, who are excluded by Rawls’ justificatory constituency. This paper confronts McCabe’s modus vivendi justificatory project with Rawls view. It suggests that both views seem to endorse a practice-dependent account of political justice in which “politics is prior to morality”; yet the ways in which reasons are endorsed to justify the shared conception of political authority are significantly different in these two schemes. The paper shows that the most problematic aspect of McCabe contingent model is that it disconnects the idea of legitimacy from a conception of liberal political morality. On this account, political legitimacy that reflects the uncoercive character of extant institutions seems to be sufficient to meet the MVL JR. Yet, from a normative point of view, this might be not enough to ensure morally acceptable outcomes. In conclusion, the paper considers McCabe’s model as a version of ‘practice-independent’ moral theorizing committed to a transcendent view of ‘threshold morality’. This move, however, comes at the cost of sacrificing the theory’s premises of anti-perfectionism and realism. (shrink)

In this paper I seek to explore how the idea of modus vivendi might help us to understand political legitimacy. A suitable conception of modus vivendi, I suggest, can represent a way of underpinning a viable and attractive account of political legitimacy. On my account a modus vivendi is basically a set of arrangements that are accepted as basis for conducting affairs by those who are party to them. Political legitimacy, I argue, is ultimately (...) rooted in the judgements of those subject to it, but is mediated through a language in which claims to it are argued and assessed. The thought is that the web of operative beliefs and values in any given society, which constitute the grounds of judgements about political legitimacy, are what sustains a modus vivendi around the basic political institutions and practices. On this view, legitimate political institutions and practices incline towards a modus vivendi in that they are the outcome of an historical and ongoing conglomeration of settlements reflecting shifting and conflicting values and interests, as well relative balances of power, both currently and in the past. The marriage of modus vivendi and political legitimacy, therefore, seeks to reflect the contingent and ‘negotiated’ character of basic political institutions and practices and an understanding of political legitimacy that sees it as mediated through an ongoing and emergent discourse of argument and judgement, which remains nonetheless always vulnerable to challenge and change. (shrink)

In recent years a number of political theorists, dissatisfied with what they see as a dominant but wrongheaded approach to political philosophy exemplified in what they call “liberal moralism,” have endorsed a modus vivendi approach as a framework for evaluating political institutions around the globe. In this paper I discuss this approach in the face of a serious challenge that can be raised against it. The challenge is to show that as an approach to global political morality (...) class='Hi'>modus vivendi is both essentially different from the liberal moralism it rejects and normatively and conceptually compelling as a way of answering fundamental questions of political morality. To satisfy the first, global modus vivendi must avoid appealing to the parochial notions of universal norms, human nature, and human interests that are often said to mar liberal moralism. To satisfy the second, it must posit some universal moral standards of minimally decent treatment. In this chapter I pursue these challenges to determine whether modus vivendi is best seen as a genuine alternative to liberal moralism or instead simply as a more chastened and sensible version of that approach. (shrink)

When we enquire into political legitimacy, we are, broadly speaking, exploring the question of whether a particular ruler or regime rules rightfully. We are interested in whether the rule is characterised by right or is merely a form of rule via coercion, a distinction that is usually put in terms of de jure and de facto order. While this question is basic to political experience, there nevertheless might be different ways in which it can be formulated which in turn will (...) influence what is going to count as an adequate answer. In this chapter I want to express some concerns as to the way in which much contemporary modus vivendi theories have either raised the question of political legitimacy or the sort of answer that it takes to be sufficient. That is to say, it has either tended to get the question wrong or the answer, or both. In the end, I want to suggest that modus vivendi can only represent a coherent and distinct political theory if it takes its Hobbesian heritage seriously and accept that the provision of order is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of legitimacy. Whether that is an attractive way of thinking about politics is a different question. (shrink)

So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of focus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of valueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two (...) aspects of Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between the impairments of valueception and the perception of certain value classes; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and its juxtaposition with the modus vivendi of schizophrenia. According to Cutting, in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia the valueception impairment entails putting vital values in brackets and focusing on personal values, with a process that recalls Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. Regarding the first aspect, I share Cutting’s starting point, but then shift the focus on how important the valueception is for the intersubjective dimension. In particular, I maintain that rather than compromising the perception of vital values, valueception impairments in the modus vivendi of schizophrenia interfere with the intersubjective dimension and are interwoven with a process of disembodiment. My thesis is that the modus vivendi of schizophrenia involves a disturbance of the intersubjective dimension that arises from the level of valueception and that determines the person’s self-referential closure. With regard to the second point, by analyzing Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, I sustain that its main objective is to increase both the interaction with otherness and the openness to the world (Weltoffenheit). As a consequence, the modus vivendi of schizophrenia, in my opinion, is not comparable, as Cutting claims, with Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, but goes in a different direction. (shrink)

Studie se zabývá analýzou politické teorie modu vivendi britského politického filosofa Johna Graye, přičemž za její hlavní cíl lze považovat především určení autorovy ideologické pozice v kontextu liberálního myšlení, jakož i posouzení koherence Grayovy teorie s koncepcí liberalismu strachu. Na základě kritické reflexe převažujícího univerzalistického pojetí liberalismu článek identifikuje a analyzuje stěžejní atributy Grayova specifického uchopení liberální teorie v podobě ideálu modu vivendi, etické teorie hodnotového pluralismu, univerzálního minima a hodnoty tolerance. V návaznosti na tuto identifikaci je následně (...) zkoumán i etický rozměr Grayovy politické teorie, jehož charakteristika umožňuje zhodnotit, do jaké míry lze autorovu teorii interpretovat v kontextu liberálního myšlení. V této souvislosti se studie rovněž snaží ukotvit Grayovu tvorbu v širším rámci alternativních projektů liberální teorie, když usiluje o prokázání principiálních paralel mezi Grayovým politickým modelem a politickým myšlením Bernarda Williamse jakožto stěžejním představitelem tzv. liberalismu strachu. Výzkum těchto paralel pak přispívá především k nastolení otázek souvisejících s možností důsledného odlišování politické a morální teorie a chápání konfliktu jakožto neodmyslitelné součásti politické reality v rámci současného liberalismu. The paper aims to analyse the political theory of modus vivendi by political philosopher John Gray and to determine the ideological standpoints of Gray's theory within the context of liberal thought as well as to assess its coherence with the concept of liberalism of fear. On the basis of a critical reflection of the prevailing universalistic conception of liberalism, the study identifies and analyses essential attributes of Gray's specific but controversial political theory: the ideal of modus vivendi; ethical theory of value pluralism; universal minimum and the value of toleration. Having interpreted all those main parts of the concept, the study is supposed to clarify also the ethical dimension of Gray's theory which makes it possible to decide to what extent the author might be identified as a liberal thinker. In this regard, the study endeavours to embed Gray's thought in a broader framework of alternative projects of liberal theory by demonstrating fundamental parallels between Gray's model and political thought of Bernard Williams as the main theoretician of liberalism of fear. Investigations of those parallels thus contributes towards articulating questions concerning the possibility of consistently distinguishing between the political and the moral theory as well as perception of a conflict as an ineradicable part of political reality in the framework of contemporary liberalism. (shrink)

While John Rawls made the notion of a “modus vivendi” prominent in political philosophy, he treats modus vivendi arrangements rather short and dismissively. On the other hand, some political theorists like John Gray praise modus vivendi as the only available and legitimate goal of politics. In the article I sketch the outlines of a different, more nuanced approach to modus vivendi arrangements. I argue that the moral standing of modus vivendi (...) arrangements varies, and I try to spell out the factors that determine the relative moral standing of modus vivendi arrangements. (shrink)

One of John Horton’s most original and significant contributions to political theory is his development and exploration of the political theory of modus vivendi. I examine what Horton understands a MV to be, what sort of theory he intends the political theory of MV to be, and why he believes a MV to be the best we can reasonably hope for. I consider how far his notion of MV matches the reality of contemporary political systems and whether ‘liberal (...) moralism’ is quite as divorced from reality or as devoid of practical consequence as his political theory of MV would have us believe. (shrink)

Political realism points out that politics is to create and sustain a legitimate order in a context of persistent disagreement, with the possible surge of conflicts, and where political power inevitably uses coercion. Political realists contend that modus vivendi is a contingent political arrangement at the level of the political constitution that allows diverse groups of people to coexist peacefully. Proposals of modus vivendi do not say enough about how to manage disagreements and conflicts. In this (...) paper, I argue that proposals of agonistic democracy supply this lack. I contend that agonistic democracy proposals share the premises of political realism and contribute to the sustainment of a liberal modus vivendi. (shrink)

There have been four main motives to introduce the notion of modus vivendi in the political-philosophical literature. One is to use it as a negative contrast to what one regards as the ideal goal in politics. The second is to use it within a distinctively realist political theory that refrains from advocating utopian ideals. The third is to defend liberal institutions as a modus vivendi. The fourth is to have a concept for the institutional tools for (...) peace. Depending on the motive to introduce the notion of modus vivendi, the notion is conceptualized slightly differently. One aim of the chapter is to provide an overview of the different motives that have led theorists to think about modus vivendi and the different conceptualizations of modus vivendi they have offered. But the chapter also makes a more substantial point: it argues that we should conceptualize the notion of modus vivendi in line with the fourth motive, because this seems the most promising way to get a conception of modus vivendi that is both ‘deeply motivated’ and ‘open’ for all kinds of approaches in political theory. (shrink)

This book focuses on the idea of a modus vivendi as a way of governing political life and addressing problems characterized by pluralism or deep-rooted diversity. The individual essays illustrate both the merits and the limitations of a political theory of modus vivendi; how it might be interpreted and developed; specific challenges entailed by articulating it in a convincing form; what its institutional implications might be; and how it relates to other seminal issues and concepts in (...) political theory; such as legitimacy, toleration, the social contract, etc. The book makes a significant contribution to the discussion on the scope and limits of liberal political theory, and on how to deal politically with deep-rooted diversity. (shrink)

Political theories of modus vivendi start from an assumption of deep and permanent disagreement about conceptions of the good and conceptions of justice. In response to this disagreement, modus vivendi provides an account of legitimacy as a result of a minimally restricted bargaining process. This account of legitimacy faces three major criticisms. Firstly, that the political arrangement will be unstable, secondly that a modus vivendi will institutionalise injustice, and thirdly, that it will institutionalise the (...) status quo. I concede the objection that a modus vivendi is unstable in order to address the more serious objections that it institutionalises injustice or the status quo. Through its acceptance of instability, modus vivendi theory is no more likely than liberal theory to institutionalise injustice. Far from the conservatism it is often associated with, modus vivendi permits radical political doctrines and radical political action in a way that is precluded by mainstream liberal theory. (shrink)

This article sets out some of the key features of a realist critique of liberal moralism, identifying descriptive inadequacy and normative irrelevance as the two fundamental lines of criticism. It then sketches an outline of a political theory of modus vivendi as an alternative, realist approach to political theory. On this account a modus vivendi should be understood as any political settlement that involves the preservation of peace and security and is generally acceptable to those who (...) are party to it. In conclusion, some problems with this conception of modus vivendi and with a realist political theory more generally are discussed. In particular, the question is raised of whether a realist political theory should be understood as an alternative to liberal moralism or only a better way of doing basically the same kind of thing. (shrink)

John Rawls rejected modus vivendi political outcomes as normatively deficient because he believed that the participants are not motivated by moral reasons. Contemporary defenders of modus vivendi reject the importance of distinguishing between moral and nonmoral reasons for constructing terms of peaceful coexistence. Theorists have highlighted peace and security as values that are integral to a modus vivendi. I argue that the idea of mutuality ought to be included in an account of how a (...) modus vivendi emerges between parties who have opposed views about how to decide jointly a matter of common concern.A modus vivendi is a compromise, and the creation of a modus vivendi requires the parties to understand themselves as facing a situation to which they ought to respond together. I argue that mutuality is a value that is presupposed in their effort to create a modus vivendi. How and why parties regard each other as having standing to shape the resolution of a political conflict remains unexplored in the literature on modus vivendi. Although parties to a modus vivendi are unlikely to regard each other as deserving equality of standing, they nevertheless recognize each other in a manner that is morally salient. Mutuality involves viewing people whom one opposes or considers to be a rival as nevertheless having standing to participate in a shared political life.Inquiry into the origin of a shared commitment to mutuality can help scholars understand what conditions facilitate willingness to coexist and to participate in a modus vivendi. (shrink)

The novelty of this paper is that modus vivendi of 13-14 year old teenagers is viewed from the perspective of the new generation Z teachers. Teachers, belonging to the same generation as students, participated in the qualitative study and ex-pressed their opinions on the modus vivendi of 13-14 year old teenagers. This age range was selected specifically because it is close to the generational boundary of generation Alpha. Teachers from generation Z were purposefully selected as informants, (...) since the researchers noticed a difference in modus vivendi of generation Z members closer to the generation Alpha and the older ones. The study is based on the methodological attitude of social constructivism. Its essence lies in perceiving that individuals construct their own personal understanding and it is not the mirror of their acquired knowledge. It is constructed on the basis of attitudes, experience, relationships between people, things and events. The aim of the study is to elucidate modus vivendi of teenagers from generation Z, as viewed by the teachers from generation Z. The paper contains the results of the conducted qualitative study and formulated conclusions. (shrink)

Much of the recent work on modus vivendi politics has come from writers who are broadly sympathetic to the realist critique of liberal moralism. They present modus vivendi politics as an alternative to the political moralism that is associated with liberal Anglo-American philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. This chapter argues that the opposition between these two sets of views—liberal moralism and modus vivendi politics—has been misconceived. On the one hand, it argues (...) that liberal moralists have failed both to accurately characterize and to adequately appreciate the importance of modus vivendi arrangements for political order. On the other hand, it argues that realist critics of liberal moralism have generally failed to appreciate the extent to which an adequate defense of a modus vivendi arrangement presupposes commitment to moral principles of the sort defended by liberal moralists. After advancing these two lines of criticism, the chapter takes a more constructive turn and discusses the notion of a moralized modus vivendi, explaining how this notion draws on ideas from both liberal moralism and modus vivendi political theory. The possibility of a moralized modus vivendi, the chapter concludes, illustrates not only the compatibility but also the integration of liberal moralism and modus vivendi politics. (shrink)

Minkoff et al.’s contention that Dobbs threatens pregnant women’s right to refuse medical treatments that would risk the embryo’s life offers a bracing set of challenges to ethicists who affirm the...

(2006). John Gray and the Political Theory of Modus Vivendi. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 9, The Political Theory of John Gray, pp. 155-169.

In this paper we investigate ways to comply with justice in a liberal democracy. In order to do that, we sketch Rawls’s account of moral-consensus stability and discuss the alternative idea of stability reached through a modus vivendi. We defend modus vivendi as a way to achieve stability backed by a variety of reasons and even by ‘non-reasons’. By ‘non-reasons’ we mean alternative sources of motivation for compliance as a precondition of a stable coexistence. We focus (...) on such sources, which differ from reasons and beliefs, that are practices, shared values, and value experiences, in light of both a theoretical-political and a qualitative social-ontological perspective. We argue that individuals who experience the same values become collectives and even stable ones: the sharing of values creates social unity and makes collectives solid and resistant to individualistically centrifugal tendencies. (shrink)

This essay develops a novel account of the distinction between a publicly justified polity and modus vivendi regimes by appealing to the ideal of congruence in public reason liberalism. A fully publicly justified polity is one whose laws are supported by congruent “first-personal” and “second-personal” moral reasons to internalize laws as personally binding on those subject to them. Regimes approach modus vivendi status to the extent that their laws fail to be justified by either type of (...) reason, or where firstpersonal and second-personal reasons fail to justify internalization. (shrink)

The ‘traditional’ conception of toleration, understood as the putting up with beliefs and practices by those who disapprove of them, has come under increasing attack in recent years for being negative, condescending and judgemental. Instead, its critics argue for a more positive, affirmative conception, perhaps best captured by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s idea of ‘toleration as recognition’. In this article, without denying that it is not always the most appropriate form of response to differences, I defend the traditional conception of toleration (...) against its critics. Two principal arguments are advanced in defence of it: the first articulates its role as part of a viable and realistic political theory of modus vivendi, while the second argues that it is only the traditional conception of toleration that makes possible the mutual accommodation of some values that are genuinely antithetical and hostlie to each other. Thus, there remains an important place for the traditional conception of toleration in both political theory and practice. (shrink)

Las sociedades más avanzadas de la actualidad se estructuran en torno a tres elementos normativos: el Estado de derecho, la satisfacción de las necesidades humanas básicas y la limitación de las desigualdades. Son elementos profundamente arraigados en la cultura, y se espera que los ciudadanos subordinen sus intereses y valores a un compromiso con el funcionamiento social justo y equitativo. Podría decirse que la supervivencia a largo plazo de la humanidad requiere un logro civilizatorio análogo en el plano global. Allí (...) también, las normas y los acuerdos institucionales justos y equitativos pueden persistir solo si se espera que quienes se encargan de su diseño y funcionamiento sean estrictamente imparciales en la ejecución de sus funciones públicas y, por tanto, ampliamente denunciados por cualquier favoritismo hacia su país de origen. Como un mero reflejo de modus vivendi, el estado actual de las relaciones internacionales implica la expectativa contraria: que los agentes que operan a nivel supranacional actúen para promover los intereses y valores concretos de su Estado de origen. Este nepotismo nacional impide el surgimiento de un orden mundial basado en valores compartidos que la humanidad necesita urgentemente. (shrink)

This book explores the morality of compromising. The author argues that peace and public justification are values that provide moral reasons to make compromises in politics, including compromises that establish unjust laws or institutions. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our moral duties and obligations in making such compromises. The book also contains discussions of the sources of the value of public justification, the relation between peace and justice, (...) the nature of modus vivendi arrangements and the connections between compromise, liberal institutions and legitimacy. In exploring the morality of compromising, the book thus provides some outlines for a map of political morality beyond justice. (shrink)

Recent political theory has seen a wave of interest in the topic of compromise. Its conceptualizations tend to be unstable, however, resulting in varying and shifting appreciations of compromise, not least in debates between political realists and liberal moralists. This article presents a new and integrated theoretical framework of compromise to facilitate theoretical and empirical enquiry. In this framework, every compromise has two underlying dimensions (inter-actor and intra-actor), four necessary and sufficient elements (conflict, consensus, concessions, and consent), and four corresponding (...) conceptual boundaries (stalemate, synthesis, surrender, and shift-of-position). The framework is used to show how compromise can clarify and mitigate the Rawlsian contrast between modus vivendi and overlapping consensus and thus between realism and moralism. Ultimately, the framework not only serves to transcend established distinctions in the theoretical literature, but also to develop counterintuitive hypotheses for empirical research and stimulate the phenomenological enquiry of political compromise making. (shrink)

Our societies are marked not only by disagreements on the good life, but also by disagreements on justice. This motivates philosophers as divergent as John Gray and Chandran Kukathas to focus their normative political theories on peace instead of justice. In this article, I discuss how peace should be conceived if peace is to be a more realistic goal than justice, not presupposing any moral consensus. I distinguish two conceptions of peace to be found in the literature. One, ordinary peace, (...) conceives of peace as non-violent coexistence based on modus vivendi arrangements. Modus vivendi arrangements, in turn, are explained as a special kind of compromise. Ordinary peace does not presuppose any moral consensus and is therefore realistic, but at the same time it is too minimalist and undemanding to be satisfying. The other conception of peace, ambitious peace, can be found in Kukathas’s work. It is a conception of peace ‘beyond compromise’, not minimalist and undemanding, but, I will argue, not realistic because presupposing at least a second-order moral consensus. In the end, I advocate a division of labour between both conceptions of peace under the umbrella of an overarching ideal of peace. (shrink)

I model an attempt by radical parties to topple a modus vivendi between a ruling government and a moderate opposition group. Cooperation between the regime and the moderate opposition is possible if each player prefers mutual cooperation to mutual confrontation. If each player also prefers mutual confrontation to cooperating while the other defects then radical parties have a chance at breaking up this accord. Radical parties can succeed in bringing the government and opposition to mutual confrontation if they (...) can agree on power-sharing arrangements after regime change. This paper also resolves central questions surrounding the trial and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. I use an institutional approach to infer player preferences from historical and biblical sources and then use game theory to model the interactions between participants in these events. In so doing, I clarify aspects of the Gospel narrative that have puzzled readers for the past 2000 years. (shrink)