This paper presents results from a modified dictator experiment aimed at distinguishing and quantifying intrinsic motivations for giving. We employ an experimental design with three treatments that vary the recipient and amount passed. We find giving to the experimenter not to be significantly different from giving to a charity, when the amount the subject donates crowds out the amount donated by the experimenter such that the charity always receives a fixed amount. This result suggests that the latter treatment, first used (...) by Crumpler and Grossman :1011–1021, 2008), does not provide a clean test of warm glow motivation. We then propose a new method of detecting warm glow motivation based on the idea that in a random-lottery incentive scheme, such as the one we employ, warm glow accumulates and this may lead to satiation, whereas purely altruistic motivation does not. We also provide bounds on the magnitudes of warm glow and pure altruism as motives that drive giving in our experiment. (shrink)

The rapid dynamics of COVID-19 calls for quick and effective tracking of virus transmission chains and early detection of outbreaks, especially in the “phase 2” of the pandemic, when lockdown and other restriction measures are progressively withdrawn, in order to avoid or minimize contagion resurgence. For this purpose, contact-tracing apps are being proposed for large scale adoption by many countries. A centralized approach, where data sensed by the app are all sent to a nation-wide server, raises concerns about citizens’ privacy (...) and needlessly strong digital surveillance, thus alerting us to the need to minimize personal data collection and avoiding location tracking. We advocate the conceptual advantage of a decentralized approach, where both contact and location data are collected exclusively in individual citizens’ “personal data stores”, to be shared separately and selectively, voluntarily, only when the citizen has tested positive for COVID-19, and with a privacy preserving level of granularity. This approach better protects the personal sphere of citizens and affords multiple benefits: it allows for detailed information gathering for infected people in a privacy-preserving fashion; and, in turn this enables both contact tracing, and, the early detection of outbreak hotspots on more finely-granulated geographic scale. The decentralized approach is also scalable to large populations, in that only the data of positive patients need be handled at a central level. Our recommendation is two-fold. First to extend existing decentralized architectures with a light touch, in order to manage the collection of location data locally on the device, and allow the user to share spatio-temporal aggregates—if and when they want and for specific aims—with health authorities, for instance. Second, we favour a longer-term pursuit of realizing a Personal Data Store vision, giving users the opportunity to contribute to collective good in the measure they want, enhancing self-awareness, and cultivating collective efforts for rebuilding society. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility that, at least, some metaphysical debates are ‘metalinguistic negotiations’. I will take the dispute between the dominant approaches of realism and the anti-realism ones about the ontological status of scientific models as a case-study. I will argue that such a debate may be better understood as a disagreement, at bottom normatively, motivated, insofar as a normative and non-factual question may be involved in it: how the relevant piece of language ought (...) to be used. Even though I will generally assess the prospects for a broadly deflationist approach, I shall outline a sense in which the dispute can be recast as ‘minimally substantive’. (shrink)

Por meio dos fragmentos de narrativas da trajetória da musicista e ativista Kathleen Hanna, pioneira do movimento Riot Grrrl, remontamos, a partir do documentário The Punk Singer, a terceira onda do movimento feminista, evidenciando a interseccionalidade e protagonismo juvenil. Através de fanzines, arte, colagens, letras de música, performances e formação de bandas a partir de uma filosofia punk do it yourself (DIY), salientamos a ampla contribuição de Hanna para o feminismo contemporâneo ao desafiar um cenário opressor dentro do movimento punk, (...) estimulando o surgimento de outras iniciativas feministas, rebeldes e riot grrrls. Sua prática e performance artística são abordadas pelo viés das culturas DIY e remix, potencializando partilhas do sensível e politicidades no engajamento de subjetividades que superam a contenção dos imaginários vigentes.Palavras-chave: Feminismo. Riot Grrrl. Kathleen Hanna. Cultura remix. Imaginário político. AbstractThrough fragments of narratives gathered from the documentary The Punk Singer, based on the life and career of musician and activist Kathleen Hanna, pioneer of the Riot Grrrl movement, we refer to the third wave of the feminist movement, by demonstrating the dimensions of intersectionality and youth protagonism within her work. Ranging from fanzines, art, collages and lyric-making to performance and music groups based on a punk "do it yourself" (DIY) philosophy, we highlight Hanna's broad contribution to contemporary feminism by challenging an oppressive scenario within the punk movement, and by stimulating the emergence of other feminist, rebel and riot grrrls initiatives. Her artistic practice and performance are analyzed through the bias of DIY and remix cultures, thus potentializing distributions of the sensible and politicities in the engagement of subjectivities that surpass the containment of current imaginaries.Keywords: Feminism. Riot Grrrl. Kathleen Hanna. Remix culture. Political imaginary. (shrink)

Resenha do livro de Ceticismo e Naturalismo: algumas variedades, de P. F. Strawson. Traduçáo de Jaimir Conte. Sáo Leopoldo: Editora Unisinos, 2008, 114 páginas.

Obviously, science matters to philosophy. But is philosophy also constrained by science? Naturalism is roughly the view that answers positively. However, even among proponents of naturalism, how science constrains philosophy has always been (and still is) a subject of debate. There are two basic dimensions in which the debate takes place, which give rise to two different kinds of naturalism: ontological and methodological. The former concerns what there is, while the latter deals with the methods whereby we acquire knowledge and (...) beliefs. Ontological Naturalism is loosely the view that all of what there is belongs to the natural world, where the natural world is the world described by the natural sciences. By maintaining, in turn, that the ultimate structure of the world is what the natural sciences say it to be, it is to some extent close to Physicalism, according to which what most fundamentally exist are the entities and properties posited by basic physics. On the other hand, methodological naturalism is often thought of as making an epistemological claim akin to scientism—the claim that the best (perhaps the unique) approach to acquiring knowledge is that of natural sciences. Accordingly, it holds that the very same methods used to arrive at scientific theories are the only legitimate ones to be employed by philosophy.Each of these horns of naturalism implies important consequences for our understanding of the relationship between science and many areas of philosophy, including metaphysics. From the methodological point of view, naturalism might be said to entail the denial that our conception of reality needs to include whatever is exclusively accessible to metaphysical theorizing (or to “first philosophy”), understood as a distinct mode of inquiry that lacks ties to the results and practices of the sciences. Indeed, methodological naturalism is usually assumed to reject the project of a priori theorizing, and it is perhaps hard to see how the traditional metaphysics, as well as current analytical metaphysics, might be in the business of developing and assessing synthetic theories of the world supported by a posteriori evidence. From the ontological point of view, naturalism sees science as already giving us a full account of everything, including our place within that picture. Despite this, the debate around the nature of metaphysics remains very much alive (and complex), spreading its influence all across philosophy and our view of the world. The upshot is that much of metaphysical work is nowadays motivated by the naturalist desire to accommodate what the natural sciences have taught us about the world. This special issue stems exactly from the ongoing debate between naturalist and non-naturalist metaphysicians and aims to assess the prospects of naturalized projects in metaphysics and their relationships to traditional metaphysics.Are science and metaphysics separable enterprises? Should allowable metaphysical theories be constrained by and continuous with natural sciences? Does successful scientific research presuppose metaphysics? These are some of the questions addressed in the contributions comprising this special issue. In response, most of them undertake theoretical commitments of a general naturalist stamp, others challenge their philosophical cogency, while still others discuss and contrast the various versions of naturalism that are currently at the center of many metaphysical debates—which often involve some mixture of the two above-mentioned ones, in different proportions. As a result, this special issue hopes to represent the state of the art drawn from different perspectives, helping somehow to clarify extent and ongoing work in metaphysics with respect to the challenges posed by naturalist thinking and eventually to pave the way for future developments and discussions.The issue opens with Don Ross's paper “A flexible, sloppy blob? Ontology, AI, and the role of metaphysics.” In it, Ross defends a naturalized metaphysics that, in contrast with traditional metaphysical projects, is driven directly by fundamental physics. Therefore, since fundamental physics is taken to be the authoritative source of knowledge on the general structure of the universe, metaphysics should neither be separated from nor transcend it. In particular, he rejects more recent works on building metaphysical foundations for applied ontology—e.g., metaphysics for the foundations of AI—as somehow apt to vindicate the value of analytic metaphysics for the edifice of human knowledge. At the same time, however, he points out how his naturalist (methodological) naturalist approach neither incorporates nor implies a physicalistic reduction.Ferdinando Ceravolo and Steven French, in their contribution “What is a Naturalized Principle of Composition?” also support the project of a methodologically naturalized metaphysics. They focus on Van Inwagen's General Composition Question (GCQ). Specifically, they address the issue concerning whether GCQ could be underpinned by principles that are found to be naturalistically acceptable—that is, constrained and informed by advanced physical knowledge. Arguing positively, they outline two candidates for naturalistically accredited principles of composition and explore the various costs of choosing between them.Along the same lines, in his essay “Naturalism and the Question of Ontology,” Javier Cumpa argues for a naturalistic approach in metaontology based on the project of Wilfrid Sellars. He proposes a naturalistic criterion of relational substantivity for ontological questions, which is held to be naturalistic insofar as it relies on the epistemic value and the degree of understanding of the world in line with science that those questions provide us. Cumpa's view is certainly methodologically naturalist, however, although ontologically he does not seem to be committed to metaphysical notions such as ontological categories, he endorses what he calls an “Impure Eliminativism about Categories.”A more straightforward version of eliminativism is advocated by Otávio Bueno in his chapter “Dispensing with Facts, Substances, and Structures.” He contends that, even though ontological categories (i.e., structures, substances, and facts) play a central role in metaphysical theorizing, we do not need to be committed to their existence. Unlike metaphysical realists – who see true thought or assertion as adequately shaped in terms of the correct representation of completely thought and/or language independent bits of reality – he accounts for metaphysical discourse by offering a naturalist account of the linguistic practice that govern it, but without the ontological commitments that realism recommends. Nevertheless, by dropping realism he does not aim to drop metaphysics as an important form of understanding the world. In order to qualify metaphysical judgements as meaningful, he explores and invokes a distinctive deflationary strategy. The result is a view that takes metaphysical discourse literally but without ontologically inflationary maneuvers.The same deflationary strategy is pursued by Anjan Chakravartty in his piece “Last Chance Saloons for Natural Kind Realism.” But rather than on ontological categories in general, he focuses on natural kinds, arguing against realist views that contend for their mind-independent existence. Nevertheless, he shows how a deflationary approach to kinds, while rejecting kind realism, can be integrated with broader realist doctrines such as scientific realism. That is, we need not be committed to either the existence of these posits or with the metaphysically inflationary interpretations that support them in order to invoke these items in scientific theorizing and to vindicate as objective or mind-independent the truth or falsity of scientific as well as everyday claims about natural kinds.In contrast to the previous standpoints, in her article “Metaphysics as Essentially Imaginative and Aiming at Understanding,” Michaela M. McSweeney defends a non-naturalist view of metaphysics. She explores the idea that metaphysics is essentially imaginative and (at least in part) “up to us.” But treating metaphysics as essentially imaginative makes metaphysics methodologically different from scientific inquiry and more akin to art. Nevertheless, she maintains, it can still be deemed epistemologically valuable to the extent that imagination can lead to understanding. On her view, the central goal of the metaphysical project thus turns out to be understanding rather than truth.The closing paper of the issue investigates precisely the relationship between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism. In “Methodological naturalism undercuts ontological naturalism,” Peter Forrest argues that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. According to his view, one way to defend ontological naturalism is to retain a version of nominalism: specifically, what he calls Redundancy Nominalism (a kind of deflationary nominalism). On the other hand, methodological naturalism requires adopting Categorial Realism. This means being a realist about universals in at least a minimal way. As a result, the fundamental description that methodological naturalism requires proves be contrary to ontological naturalism, whose precondition, in turn, is not available to methodological naturalists. This leads him to criticize ontological naturalism as a belief but, at the same time, to vindicate it as a speculation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to better understand what ontologists are doing when they ask questions about the categories of the world. I will take Cumpa’s attempts to find out the fundamental structure of the world as a case-study. In one of his latest paper (Cumpa 2014), he conceives the classical ontological question about the existence of the fundamental categories of the world (what are the fundamental categories of the world?) as a question about the category able to unify (...) the two Sellarsian images of the world: the manifest and scientific images, considered as two different languages. According to him, the only category with such an explanatory power is the category of ‘facts’ (or ‘state of affairs’): the fundamental category of what he calls ‘the metaphysical language.’ I will argue that if Cumpa takes the latter to be a broader language or framework, in Carnap’s terms, common to both the ordinary and the scientific ones, then his proposal turns out to be rather problematic (as they are ultimately ‘incommensurable’). On the other hand, if he understands it as external to both of them, then his solution ends up being meaningless and devoid of any cognitive content, with at best a practical character and/or an expressive function. (shrink)

ABSTRACTCarnap famously argued that there are two kinds of questions and claims concerning the existence or reality of entities: internal and external ones. We focus on Carnapian external ontological claims of the form: ‘Xs really exist’, where ‘X’ stands for some traditional metaphysical category, such as ‘substance’, ‘fact’ or ‘structure’. While Carnap considered them as meaningless, we consider them as faultlessly meaningful. However, in line with an expressivist guise, we do not claim that they have the meaning they have in (...) virtue of representing a certain range of entities in the world or describing pieces of reality. Quite the contrary, we maintain that they are meaningful because they perform a function that is fundamentally expressive, that is, a non-descriptive function. In particular, they may imply a distinctive type of metalinguistic expressive function. Moreover, we avoid accuses of mentalism insofar as we explain the meaning of external ontological claims in terms of the practical commitments to the adoption of certain linguistic forms they express, rather than as expressing some kind of mental state. (shrink)

A possible way out to Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief could start from the rejection of the notion of epistemic transparency. Epistemic transparency seems, indeed, irremediably incompatible with an externalist conception of mental content. However, Brandom’s inferentialism could be considered a version of externalism that allows, at least in some cases, to save the principle of transparency. Appealing to a normative account of the content of our beliefs, from the inferentialist’s standpoint, it is possible to state that a content is transparent (...) when name-components of that content are a priori associated with some application conditions and, at the same time, reflection alone provides an a priori access to those application conditions, with no need of any empirical investigation. Nevertheless, such requirements are only met in trivial cases. The aim of this paper is to argue that some application conditions of that sort, albeit trivial, can be ontologically ampliative. As a result, the related contents can be regarded as transparent in a substantial and rich way. (shrink)

Referindo-se ao capítulo 6 da minha Introduction to Logical Theory, o professor Calabria demonstra de modo correto e sistemático que, tal como exposta, a doutrina da pressuposição implica uma concepção da lógica que é substancialmente desviante tanto no que diz respeito à lógica tradicional como à lógica moderna clássica.

Rectification note to “Scientific models and metalinguistic negotiation”, 277-295).

Sumário. Apresentação. PARTE I. 1. O legado filosófico de P. F. Strawson, Itamar Luís Gelain e Jaimir Conte; 2 . Strawson e o caso dos metafísicos descritivos, Itamar Luís Gelain; 3. Metafísica e linguagem comum: sobre uma conturbada herança wittgensteiniana de Strawson, Jônadas Techio; 4. Strawson e Descartes, Albertinho Luiz Gallina; 5. Strawson: sobre Kant e Berkeley, Robert Calabria; 6. O empirismo pós-kantiano de Strawson, Wenceslao J. González; 7. Reabilitando Strawson, Marco Antonio Franciotti; 8. Strawson e o ceticismo (...) em Individuals, Plínio Junqueira Smith; 9. Strawson e a causação visível, João Paulo Monteiro; 10. A verdade dos fatos, Susana Badiola; 11. Estabelecer limites: implicações epistemológicas da lógica, Roberta Corvi; 12. Referência e termos singulares, Carlos E. Caorsi; 13. Strawson: da experiência possível para a ação possível, Márlon Henrique Teixeira; 14. Atitudes reativas e responsabilidade moral, Cristina de Moraes Nunes; 15. Strawson e Hume: uma comparação a propósito de “Moralidade social e ideal individual”, Amán Rosales Rodríguez; PARTE II. 16. Liberdade e ressentimento, P. F. Strawson. Tradução: Jaimir Conte; 17. Moralidade social e ideal individual, P. F. Strawson, Tradução: Jaimir Conte. Seleção bibliográfica. (shrink)

Coletânea de textos: 1.Idealismo transcendental, naturalismo e um pouco de história, Adriano Naves de Brito; 2. Ceticismo e a reconstrução de P.F. Strawson da dedução kantiana das categorias, Pedro Stepanenko; 3. Dedução Transcendental e Ceticismo, Marco Antonio Franciotti; 4. Strawson e Kant sobre a dualidade entre intuições e conceitos, Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira; 5. Princípio de significatividade em Kant e Strawson, Cristina de Moraes Nunes; 6. Strawson e Kant sobre a Liberdade, Albertinho Luiz Gallina e Cecília Rearte Terrosa; 7. (...) Argumentos Transcendentais e Metafísica Descritiva em P. F. Strawson, Itamar Luís Gelain; 8. Breve consideração sobre o problema da tese da aprioridade do espaço e do tempo, Juan Adolfo Bonaccini; 9. Os novos fundamentos da metafísica estabelecidos por Kant, Peter F. Strawson, Trad. Jaimir Conte; 10. Imaginação e percepção, Peter F. Strawson, Trad. Ítalo Lins Lemos. (shrink)

Esta coletânea é um tributo a Peter Frederick Strawson pelo centenário de seu nascimento (1919-2019). Diferentemente de outras coletâneas, esta propõe colocar em relevo a interlocução de Strawson com a tradição filosófica. Em outras palavras, por um lado, queremos evidenciar as discussões que Strawson travou com os seus contemporâneos (Austin, Quine, Russell e Wittgenstein), e, por outro, a influência que recebeu e as críticas que dirigiu àqueles que o precederam na história da filosofia (Aristóteles, Descartes, Hume, Kant). Poderíamos ter enriquecido (...) a lista acima com o nome de muitos outros filósofos com os quais Strawson teve contato, mas julgamos que o trabalho ficaria bastante extenso. Por esse motivo, optamos por aqueles nomes mais significativos que figuram na construção da história intelectual de Strawson. O presente volume reúne nove capítulos que levam como título o nome de Strawson e do filósofo com o qual ele dialogou ao longo de suas obras. Essa opção na nomeação dos capítulos por si só já permite colocar em evidência os principais filósofos pelos quais Strawson se interessou e com os quais se confrontou ao longo de seu trabalho filosófico. Com exceção do capítulo sobre Wittgenstein, que é uma versão revisada de um texto publicado anteriormente, todos os outros capítulos são inéditos e foram escritos especialmente para esta coletânea. O volume inclui na abertura a tradução de “Um fragmento de autobiografia intelectual”, de P. F. Strawson. Quando elegemos como título desta obra, Strawson e a tradição filosófica, não estamos insinuando que Strawson é um historiador da filosofia e muito menos que se interesse por historiografia. O título desta obra apenas quer indicar que Strawson, por um lado, transita na história da filosofia com alguma facilidade, além de nutrir um grande apreço por ela e, por outro, que ele discute com os principais nomes da história da filosofia no que concerne aos temas de seu interesse. A sua proposta filosófica é alimentada e irrigada por esse conhecimento, o que lhe dá a possibilidade de assumir na maioria das vezes posições ponderadas e equilibradas acerca de temas complexos por ele tratados. ​ ISBN: 978-85-5696-689-6. Nº de pág.: 244. (shrink)

Previous studies consistently showed age-related differences in temporal judgment and temporal memory. Importantly, emotional valence plays a crucial role in older adults’ information processing. In this study, we examined the effects of emotions at the intersection between time and memory, analysing age-related differences in a temporal source memory task. Twenty-five younger adults (age range 18–35), 25 old adults (age range 65–74), and 25 old–old adults (age range 75–84) saw a series of emotional pictures in three sessions separated by a one-day (...) rest period. In the fourth session, participants were asked to indicate in which session (1, 2, or 3) they saw each picture. Results showed that old–old adults tended to collocate negative pictures distant in time, while positive stimuli were remembered as more recent than real, compared to neutral pictures. To a lower extent, people over 65 showed the same pattern of results. In contrast, emotional valence did not affect younger adults’ temporal positioning of stimuli. Current findings fit well with the Socio-Emotional Selectivity Theory’s assumptions and extended the literature on the positivity effect to temporal source memory. (shrink)

Infant-directed speech, the particular form of spontaneous language observed in interactions between parents and their infants, is a crucial aspect of the mother-infant interaction and an index of the attunement of maternal linguistic input to her infant communicative abilities and needs during dyadic interactions. The present study aimed to explore linguistic and pragmatic features of IDS during mother-infant interactions at 3-month of infant age. The effects of infant, maternal and dyadic factors on IDS were explored. Results evidenced few differences between (...) the groups on IDS linguistic characteristics. Moreover, observing the interaction of birth status and dyadic co-regulation, full-term mothers varied their IDS pragmatic features according to the quality of co-regulation while preterm mothers did not. Parenting stress was associated to specific linguistic IDS features independently from the birth status. Findings are discussed underling implications for the study of preterm dyads interactions and the importance to consider the interplay of several factors in affecting the quality of IDS. (shrink)

Prefácio ao livro Peter F. Strawson: Metafísica e Ceticismo, de Itamar Luís Gelain.

Capítulo de livro publicado em "Uma introdução à filosofia do direito" Itamar Luís Gelain (Org.) .- Ijuí: Ed. Unijuí, 2015. - 368 p. - (Coleção direito, política e cidadania; 37). . ISBN 978-85-419-0 I 75-8.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction Juliette Kennedy and Roman Kossak; 2. Historical remarks on Suslin's problem Akihiro Kanamori; 3. The continuum hypothesis, the generic-multiverse of sets, and the [OMEGA] conjecture W. Hugh Woodin; 4. [omega]-Models of finite set theory Ali Enayat, James H. Schmerl and Albert Visser; 5. Tennenbaum's theorem for models of arithmetic Richard Kaye; 6. Hierarchies of subsystems of weak arithmetic Shahram Mohsenipour; 7. Diophantine correct open induction Sidney Raffer; 8. Tennenbaum's theorem and recursive reducts James H. (...) Schmerl; 9. History of constructivism in the 20th century A. S. Troelstra; 10. A very short history of ultrafinitism Rose M. Cherubin and Mirco A. Mannucci; 11. Sue Toledo's notes of her conversations with Gödel in 1972-1975 Sue Toledo; 12. Stanley Tennenbaum's Socrates Curtis Franks; 13. Tennenbaum's proof of the irrationality of [the square root of] 2́. (shrink)

This paper continues an earlier investigation into the philosophical tradition of Vienna Indeterminism until the formation of the Vienna Circle in 1929. It focuses in particular on how Philipp Frank and Richard von Mises were able to contemplate genuine indeterminism in physics before the advent of quantum mechanics. On this account, all apparently deterministic laws could well be the macroscopic limit of indeterministic basic laws valid for the single mirco-events. Philosophically Vienna Indeterminism was launched by Mach's redefinition of causality (...) in terms of functional dependencies. This severed the rigid bond between causality and empirical realism characteristic of the Kantian conception and made possible to adjust the ontology according to the needs of a single theory. The debates between Max Planck and Franz Serafin Exner teach that the indeterminism issue was also a struggle about Boltzmann's philosophical legacy between Vienna and Berlin. Quite in line with Mach's firm empiricism, Vienna Indeterminists rejected any final decision between determinism and indeterminism on the metaphysical level. Once the frequency interpretation had won favor, the empiricist stance, moreover, permitted them to consider mass phenomena as generic observational facts coordinated to statistical collectives and to treat them on a par with moving point particles. The only condition imposed on this ontology was the uniqueness of this coordination, a condition that could be viewed as a late heir of Mach's principle of unique determination which had complemented his relational ontology. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do ensaio "Freedom and Resentment”, de P. F. Strawson. Publicado originalmente em Proceedings of the British Academy, v. 48, 1960. Republicado em Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Londres: Methuen, 1974. [Routledge, 2008, p. 2-28]. Publicado na coletânea: Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson: com a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual. Organizadores: Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luís Gelain. Editora da UFSC, 2015. ISBN: 9788532807250.

Tradução para o português do ensaio "Social Morality and Individual Ideal”. Publicado originalmente em Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, vol. XXXVI, n. 136, p. 1-17, Jan. 1961. Republicado em: STRAWSON, P. F. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. Londres: Methuen, 1974. [Routledge, 2008, p. 26-44]. ]. Publicado na coletânea: Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Strawson: com a tradução de Liberdade e ressentimento & Moralidade social e ideal individual. Organizadores: Jaimir Conte & Itamar Luís Gelain. Editora (...) da UFSC, 2015. ISBN: 9788532807250. (shrink)