Chelicerates (scorpions, horseshoe crabs, spiders, mites and ticks) are the second largest group of arthropods and are of immense importance for fundamental and applied science. They occupy a basal phylogenetic position within the phylum Arthropoda, and are of crucial significance for understanding the evolution of various arthropod lineages. Chelicerates are vectors of human diseases, such as ticks, and major agricultural pests, such as spider mites, thus this group is also of importance for both medicine and agriculture. The developmental genetics of (...) chelicerates is poorly understood and a challenge for the future progress for many aspects of chelicerate biology is the development of a model organism for this group. Toward this end, we are developing a chelicerate genetic model: the two‐spotted spider mite Tetranychus urticae. T. urticae has the smallest genome of any arthropod determined so far (75 Mbp, 60% of the size of the Drosophila genome), undergoes rapid development and is easy to maintain in the laboratory. These features make T. urticae a promising reference organism for the economically important, poorly studied and species‐rich chelicerate lineage. BioEssays 29:489–496, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

We consider${\cal S}$, the class of finite semilattices;${\cal T}$, the class of finite treeable semilattices; and${{\cal T}_m}$, the subclass of${\cal T}$which contains trees with branching bounded bym. We prove that${\cal E}{\cal S}$, the class of finite lattices with linear extensions, is a Ramsey class. We calculate Ramsey degrees for structures in${\cal S}$,${\cal T}$, and${{\cal T}_m}$. In addition to this we give a topological interpretation of our results and we apply our result to canonization of linear orderings on finite semilattices. In (...) particular, we give an example of a Fraïssé class${\cal K}$which is not a Hrushovski class, and for which the automorphism group of the Fraïssé limit of${\cal K}$is not extremely amenable but is uniquely ergodic. (shrink)

Plava predavanja -- Plavo i Ultravioletno -- Slovo o Nostalgiji.

The second Yearbook of the Central East European Forum of Young Legal, Political and Social Theorists aims at reassessing some major legacies of jurisprudence and political philosophy, thereby celebrating one hundred years from the publication of the first important theoretical account of Hans Kelsen - Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre; the fifty-years anniversary of one of the most important contemporary books in legal theory - Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law; as well as the forty-years heritage of the most influential 20th century (...) account of justice - John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. On this occasion fourteen scholars from Eastern and Central Europe gave their accounts and interpretations of jurisprudential and political philosophical problems that persist or emerge anew in contemporary debates. (shrink)

In modern academic article repositories, we find many papers on what Heidegger thought, but few papers that attempt to decipher how Heidegger thought. This article purports to show one aspect of the “how?” question of Heidegger’s thought. In the works of interpreters, historians of philosophy and thinkers, the prevailing view is that the question of being is the central question of the “what?” of Heidegger’s thought. Since the question of “how?” is more original than the question of “what?”, and since (...) the history of thought indicates that the content of thought is always thought according to a given system of thought, this paper aims to prove the hypothesis of a more original, primal, present, and continuous phenomenon than the question of being in Heidegger’s work; a phenomenon on which the question of battle itself is based. We can call this phenomenon “the dialectic of confrontations”. The task is to prove that the answer to the question “How?” is given by Heidegger’s thought in the dialectic of confrontation, by which the “shepherd of being” becomes the “shepherd of confrontations”. (shrink)

In a departure from the mainstream methodology of a positivist-oriented jurisprudence, Collective Rights provides the first legal-theoretical treatment of this area. It advances a normative-moral standpoint of 'value collectivism' which goes against the traditional political philosophy of liberalism and the dominant ideas of liberal multiculturalism. Moreover, it places a theoretical account of collective rights within the larger debate between proponents of different rights theories. By exploring why 'collective rights' should be differentiated from similar legal concepts, the relationship between collective and (...) individual rights and why groups should be recognised as the third distinctive type of right-holders, it presents the topic as connected to the larger philosophical debate about international law of human rights, most notably to the problem of universality of rights. (shrink)

Decisions in democracy are binding not in virtue of being true or good, but on account of being an outcome of the majority voting procedure. For some, this is a proof of an intricate connection between democracy and moral relativism. The ‘militant democracy’ model, on the other hand, is premised on the idea that certain political actors and choices have to be banned for being fatally bad for democracy. This gives rise to the claim that protected democratic fundamental values of (...) freedom and equality enjoy the status of absolute moral standards. This article dismisses the intuition that justification of ‘militant democracy’ depends on unpacking the relation between democracy and meta-ethics. Instead, following Bernard Suits’ analytical exposition of the important features of games, it demonstrates, first, how democracy is like a game and, then, it argues that a plausible justification of ‘militant democracy’ stems from its game-like character. (shrink)

The first part of the paper focuses on the current debate over the universality of human rights. After conceptually distinguishing between different types of universality, it employs Sen’s definition that the claim of a universal value is the one that people anywhere may have reason to see as valuable. When applied to human rights, this standard implies “thin” (relative, contingent) universality, which might be operationally worked-out as in Donnelly’s three-tiered scheme of concepts–conceptions–implementations. The second part is devoted to collective rights, (...) which have recently become a new topic of the human rights debate. This part provides the basis of political–philosophical justification and legal–theoretical conceptualization of collective rights, as rights directly vested in collective entities. The third part dwells on the problem of universality of collective rights. It differentiates between the three main collective entities in international law—peoples, minorities, and indigenous peoples—and investigates whether certain rights vested in these collectives might, according to Sen’s standard, acquire the status of the universal ones. After determining that some rights are, in principle, plausible candidates for such a status in international law, this paper concludes by taking notice of a number of the open issues that still need to be settled, primarily by the cooperative endeavor of international legal scholars and legal theorists. (shrink)

Ovaj rad se bavi metodološkim aspektima obnovljenih pravno-filozofskih nastojanja da se preispita pojam međunarodnog prava. Posle kratkog osvrta na istoriju pravne filozofije i ključne tačke Hartovog i Kelzenovog pozitivističkog stanovišta, u radu se dalje ispituje na koji način se savremene pravne teorije, kako u pozitivističkoj, tako i u ne-pozitivističkoj tradiciji, bave međunarodnim pravom. Poslednji deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se skiciraju određene smernice za novi početak u filozofskoj obradi međunarodnog prava. Prvo, istorija rasprava u ovoj oblasti svedoči o tome da (...) su metodološki pravni teoretičari u pravu kada tvrde da nam utvrđivanje odgovarajućeg metoda pomaže u odgovoru na pitanje šta je pravo. Drugo, imajući na umu stalno promenjivu prirodu međunarodnog prava, odgovarajući metodološki pristup zahteva „evolucionarnu epistemologiju“ (D’Amato), koja teško da se može nazvati obeležjem analitičke jurisprudencije. Najzad, takva epistemologija je na kompleksan način povezana sa našim istraživanjem šta međunarodna pravda ili, bar, šta međunarodna „unutrašnja moralnost“ zahteva. (shrink)

A propositional logic is defined which in addition to propositional language contains a list of probabilistic operators of the form P ≥s (with the intended meaning ‘‘the probability is at least s’’). The axioms and rules syntactically determine that ranges of probabilities in the corresponding models are always finite. The completeness theorem is proved. It is shown that completeness cannot be generalized to arbitrary theories.

If one were to publish a book some hundred years ago, with the central claim that there was a necessary connection between law and coercion, one would have largely pushed on an open door. And to sa...

Jurisprudence has up until recently largely neglected international law as a subject of philosophizing. The Nature of International Law tries to offset against this deficiency by providing a comprehensive explanatory account of international law. It does so within an analytical tradition, albeit within the one which departs from the nowadays dominant method of the metaphysically-driven conceptual analysis. Instead, it adopts the prototype theory of concepts, which is directed towards determining typical features constitutive of the nature of international law. The book's (...) central finding is that those features are: normativity, institutionalization, coercive guaranteeing, and justice-aptness. Since typical features are context sensitive, their specificities at the international level are further elucidated. The book, finally, challenges the often raised claim that fragmentation is international law's unique feature by demonstrating that international institutional actors, particularly adjudicative ones, largely perceive themselves as officials of a unified legal order. (shrink)