We consider measurements, described by a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM), whose outcome probabilities determine an arbitrary pure state of a D-dimensional quantum system. We call such a measurement a pure-state informationally complete (PS I-complete) POVM. We show that a measurement with 2D−1 outcomes cannot be PS I-complete, and then we construct a POVM with 2D outcomes that suffices, thus showing that a minimal PS I-complete POVM has 2D outcomes. We also consider PS I-complete POVMs that have only rank-one POVM elements (...) and construct an example with 3D−2 outcomes, which is a generalization of the tetrahedral measurement for a qubit. The question of the minimal number of elements in a rank-one PS I-complete POVM is left open. (shrink)

The technique of minimizing information (infomin) has been commonly employed as a general method for both choosing and updating a subjective probability function. We argue that, in a wide class of cases, the use of infomin methods fails to cohere with our standard conception of rational degrees of belief. We introduce the notion of a deceptive updating method and argue that non-deceptiveness is a necessary condition for rational coherence. Infomin has been criticized on the grounds that there are no (...) higher order probabilities that ‘support’ it, but the appeal to higher order probabilities is a substantial assumption that some might reject. Our elementary arguments from deceptiveness do not rely on this assumption. While deceptiveness implies lack of higher order support, the converse does not, in general, hold, which indicates that deceptiveness is a more objectionable property. We offer a new proof of the claim that infomin updating of any strictly-positive prior with respect to conditional-probability constraints is deceptive. In the case of expected-value constraints, infomin updating of the uniform prior is deceptive for some random variables but not for others. We establish both a necessary condition and a sufficient condition (which extends the scope of the phenomenon beyond cases previously considered) for deceptiveness in this setting. Along the way, we clarify the relation which obtains between the strong notion of higher order support, in which the higher order probability is defined over the full space of first order probabilities, and the apparently weaker notion, in which it is defined over some smaller parameter space. We show that under certain natural assumptions, the two are equivalent. Finally, we offer an interpretation of Jaynes, according to which his own appeal to infomin methods avoids the incoherencies discussed in this paper. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information-theoretic analysis reveals how task-relevant information flows through the system to (...) be combined into a categorization decision. Dynamical analysis reveals the key geometrical and temporal interrelationships underlying the categorization decision. Finally, we propose a framework for directly relating these two different styles of explanation and discuss the possible implications of our analysis for some of the ongoing debates in cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper proposes a minimal logic of fine-grained information dynamics via belief bases. The framework is shown to be able to accommodate explicit belief, implicit belief, awareness of and awareness that, where awareness of agents is not treated as a tacit premise. A sound and complete axiomatization of static logic is established, upon which a series of dynamic operations are defined. It is argued that these dynamics adapt different scenarios. Our logic is minimal because to each agent (...) we only attach two databases, from which a variety of epistemic attitudes are generated. (shrink)

A behavioral drive directed solely at minimizing prediction error would cause an agent to seek out states of unchanging, and thus easily predictable, sensory inputs (such as a dark room). The default to an evolutionarily encoded prior to avoid such untenable behaviors is unsatisfying. We suggest an alternate information theoretic interpretation to address this dilemma.

This article presents a meta-analysis of the impact of minimal exposure to affective stimuli on the emergence of enduring conscious affective feelings. Theories often assume that such affective feelings are linked to automatic appraisals of events (i.e. in the absence of an evaluative processing goal). However, few studies have tested this hypothesis. Moreover, they have provided divergent results. We propose a meta-analysis of these studies to get a clearer picture on this issue. The meta-analysis includes 22 studies (37 effect (...) sizes; combined N = 2159) in which participants were repeatedly exposed to affective stimuli in the absence of an evaluative processing goal before their mood was measured. In this analysis, we focused on the type of stimulus presentation (i.e. visible vs. masked) as well as on the type of stimulus (i.e. faces, pictures, words). The results indicate that the effect of a stimulus is moderated by the visibility of the stimuli. Repeated exposure to visible stimuli leads to congruency effects (i.e. positive stimuli lead to positive feelings), whereas exposure to masked stimuli leads to contrast effects (i.e. positive stimuli lead to negative feelings). Moreover, these effects seem to be restricted to some types of stimuli, with no detectable effects of emotional faces. (shrink)

Informal construction -- Formal construction -- Limiting results.

The secure release of identity attributes is a key enabler for electronic business interactions. Users should have the maximum control possible over the release of their identity attributes and should state under which conditions these attributes can be disclosed. Moreover, users should disclose only the identity attributes that are actually required for the transactions at hand. In this paper we present an approach for the controlled release of identity attributes that addresses such requirements. The approach is based on the integration (...) of trust negotiation and minimal credential disclosure techniques. Trust negotiation supports selective and incremental disclosure of identity attributes, while minimal credential disclosure guarantees that only the attributes necessary to complete the on-line interactions are disclosed. (shrink)

Classifying research proposals by risk of harm is fundamental to the approval process and the most pivotal risk category in most regulations is that of “minimal risk.” If studies have no more than a minimal risk, for example, a nearly worldwide consensus exists that review boards may sometimes: (1) expedite review, (2) waive or modify some or all elements of informed consent, or (3) enroll vulnerable subjects including healthy children, incapacitated persons and prisoners even if studies do not (...) hold out direct benefits to them. The moral and social purposes behind this threshold are discussed along with relevant views from the National Commission, NBAC, NHRPAC, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, The Nuremberg Code, and The WMA's Declaration of Helsinki. Representative policies from Australia, Canada, South Africa, the U.S., and CIOMS are reviewed revealing different understandings of this sorting threshold. Six of nine frequently cited interpretations of “minimal risk” are untenable. The “absolute” interpretation of the “routine examination” standard is defended as best. (shrink)

The emergence of signaling systems has been observed in numerous experimental and real-world contexts, but there is no consensus on which shared mechanisms underlie such phenomena. A number of explanatory mechanisms have been proposed within several disciplines, all of which have been instantiated as credible working models. However, they are usually framed as being mutually incompatible. Using an exemplar-based framework, we replicate these models in a minimal configuration which allows us to directly compare them. This reveals that the development (...) of optimal signaling is driven by similar mechanisms in each model, which leads us to propose three requirements for the emergence of conventional signaling. These are the creation and transmission of referential information, a systemic bias against ambiguity, and finally some form of information loss. Considering this, we then discuss some implications for theoretical and experimental approaches to the emergence of learned communication. (shrink)

Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivistif it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into (...) extant versions of the file-picture of reference. In this paper, I argue that the rejection of minimal descriptivism only follows from the rejection of satisfactionalism given certain implausible assumptions about the nature of competence with a proper name. I do this by showing that considerations internal to the file-picture - in particular the idea that competence with a proper name constitutes an ‘epistemically rewarding’ relation to its bearer - motivate an acceptance of minimal descriptivism. (shrink)

Plant predictive processing suggests that plants anticipatorily perceive their environment. This hypothesis runs up against a challenge which takes the form of two constraints on per- ception advanced by Tyler Burge: the veridicality constraint and the constancy constraint. This paper argues that the veridicality constraint can be satisfied by assuming a general account of predictive processing. To show how the constancy constraint may be fulfilled, an ecologically informed account of invariant pick-up is developed and given a place within plant predictive (...) processing. It is concluded that, against our anthro- pocentric folk-psychological notions of perception, there is reason to believe that plants engage in minimal perception. (shrink)

As interest in comparative effectiveness research grows, questions have emerged regarding whether it is ever acceptable to alter informed consent requirements for research when patients are randomly assigned to widely-used therapies. This paper reports on interviews with Institutional Review Board members and researchers and on focus groups with patients from Geisinger and Johns Hopkins health systems. The objective was to elicit participants' views of the acceptability of four different disclosure and authorization models for low-risk pragmatic comparative effectiveness trials of widely-used (...) therapies. Results suggest that although participants valued autonomous choice, many also believed that it was acceptable to streamline information disclosure and to use an opt-out process for eligible individuals who would prefer not to participate. This provides some preliminary evidence that relevant stakeholders find alternatives to traditional informed consent acceptable for low-risk pragmatic comparative effectiveness trials of widely-used therapies as long as a sufficient amount of choice is preserved. (shrink)

The emergence of signaling systems has been observed in numerous experimental and real‐world contexts, but there is no consensus on which (if any) shared mechanisms underlie such phenomena. A number of explanatory mechanisms have been proposed within several disciplines, all of which have been instantiated as credible working models. However, they are usually framed as being mutually incompatible. Using an exemplar‐based framework, we replicate these models in a minimal configuration which allows us to directly compare them. This reveals that (...) the development of optimal signaling is driven by similar mechanisms in each model, which leads us to propose three requirements for the emergence of conventional signaling. These are the creation and transmission of referential information, a systemic bias against ambiguity, and finally some form of information loss. Considering this, we then discuss some implications for theoretical and experimental approaches to the emergence of learned communication. (shrink)

We propose a method of learning indicative conditional information. An agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven, 239–263 2012)’s benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for the Judy Benjamin Problem.

Emotion expressions convey valuable information about others’ internal states and likely behaviours. Accurately identifying expressions is critical for social interactions, but so is perceiver confidence when decoding expressions. Even if a perceiver correctly labels an expression, uncertainty may impair appropriate behavioural responses and create uncomfortable interactions. Past research has found that perceivers report greater confidence when identifying emotions displayed by cultural ingroup members, an effect attributed to greater perceptual skill and familiarity with own-culture than other-culture faces. However, the current (...) research presents novel evidence for an ingroup advantage in emotion decoding confidence across arbitrary group boundaries that hold culture constant. In two experiments using different stimulus sets participants not only labeled minimal ingroup expressions more accurately, but did so with greater confidence. These results offer novel evidence that ingroup advantages in emotion decoding confidence stem partly from social-cognitive processes. (shrink)

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

I propose a minimal account of authorship that specifies the fundamental nature of the author-relation and its minimal domain composition in terms of a three-place causal-intentional relation holding between agents and sort-relative works. I contrast my account with the minimal account tacitly held by most authorship theories, which is a two-place relation holding between agents and works simpliciter. I claim that only my view can ground productive and informative principled distincitons between collective production and collective authorship.

This chapter focuses on what’s novel in the perspective that the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework affords on the cognitive-scientific project of explaining intelligence by appeal to internal representations. It shows how truth-conditional and resemblance-based approaches to representation in generative models may be integrated. The PEM framework in cognitive science is an approach to cognition and perception centered on a simple idea: organisms represent the world by constantly predicting their own internal states. PEM theories often stress the hierarchical structure of (...) the generative models they posit. The novel explanatory power of the PEM account derives largely from the way in which pairs of generative and recognition models interact. “Predictive coding” refers to an encoding strategy in which predicted portions of an input signal are subtracted from the actual signal received, so that only the difference between the two is passed as output to the next stage of information processing. (shrink)

Data-sharing among genomic researchers is promoted for its potential to accelerate our understanding of the molecular basis of cancer. However, with genomic data sharing the risks of re-identifying study participants, revealing personal genomic information and data misuse might increase. This study aims at exploring perceptions of patients and physicians in Oncology regarding their assessment of the informational risks resulting from participating in whole genomic research studies in order to improve the informed consent process. For this purpose, we conducted a (...) qualitative focus group study at the National Center for Tumor Diseases. Patients and oncologists assessed the informational risks either as minimal or as greater than minimal, depending on the context factors of occupational status, age, and patients’ prognosis. Interestingly, even patients who assumed a greater risk did not refrain from participating in genomic research, provided that certain informational and institutional safeguards are implemented. Moreover, they expected comprehensive disclosure of the risks resulting from genomic data sharing. These results suggest comprehensive disclosure of the risks of genomic research to potential study participants in genomic research to facilitate risk assessment and sound decision making, establishing independent governance entities in order to minimize the informational risks of genomic research, and implementing data sharing policies which offer guidance for physicians and researchers involved in genomic research. (shrink)

Data-sharing among genomic researchers is promoted for its potential to accelerate our understanding of the molecular basis of cancer. However, with genomic data sharing the risks of re-identifying study participants, revealing personal genomic information and data misuse might increase. This study aims at exploring perceptions of patients and physicians in Oncology regarding their assessment of the informational risks resulting from participating in whole genomic research studies in order to improve the informed consent process. For this purpose, we conducted a (...) qualitative focus group study at the National Center for Tumor Diseases (NCT). Patients and oncologists assessed the informational risks either as minimal or as greater than minimal, depending on the context factors of occupational status, age, and patients’ prognosis. Interestingly, even patients who assumed a greater risk did not refrain from participating in genomic research, provided that certain informational and institutional safeguards are implemented. Moreover, they expected comprehensive disclosure of the risks resulting from genomic data sharing. These results suggest (1) comprehensive disclosure of the risks of genomic research to potential study participants in genomic research to facilitate risk assessment and sound decision making, (2) establishing independent governance entities in order to minimize the informational risks of genomic research, and (3) implementing data sharing policies which offer guidance for physicians and researchers involved in genomic research. (shrink)

Minimizers are widely acknowledged cross-linguistically to denote a minimal quantity, extent or degree. With respect to minimizers in Mandarin Chinese, Shyu claims that their so-called negative polarity is purely syntactically determined and is facilitated by the lian…dou EVEN construction. Within the framework of Dynamic Syntax which allows for interaction between syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information, we demonstrate that the total negation is actually derived from the interaction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics, rather than being determined by purely syntactic (...) means. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decision-theoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory – a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions – and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker set (...) of constraints than the standard AGM postulates. The Levi identity characterizes Pareto-minimal revisions of belief bases: a change of belief base is Pareto-minimal if and only if the change satisfies the Levi identity (for “maxichoice” contraction operators). Thus for belief bases, Pareto-minimality imposes constraints that the AGM postulates do not. The Ramsey test is a well-known way of establishing connections between belief revision postulates and axioms for conditionals (“if p, then q”). Pareto-minimal theory change corresponds exactly to three characteristic axioms of counterfactual systems: a theory revision operator that satisfies the Ramsey test validates these axioms if and only if the revision operator is Pareto-minimal. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the notion of a minimal belief change that incorporates new information. I apply the fundamental decisiontheoretic principle of Pareto-optimality to derive a notion of minimal belief change, for two different representations of belief: First, for beliefs represented by a theory –a deductively closed set of sentences or propositions–and second for beliefs represented by an axiomatic base for a theory. Three postulates exactly characterize Pareto-minimal revisions of theories, yielding a weaker set of constraints than (...) the standard AGM postulates. The Levi identity characterizes Pareto-minimal revisions of belief bases: a change of belief base is Pareto-minimal if and only if the change satisfies the Levi identity (for “maxichoice” contraction operators). Thus for belief bases, Pareto-minimality imposes constraints that the AGM postulates do not. Keywords: belief revision, decision theory.. (shrink)

The paper develops an account of minimal traces devoid of representational content and exploits an analogy to a predictive processing framework of perception. As perception can be regarded as a prediction of the present on the basis of sparse sensory inputs without any representational content, episodic memory can be conceived of as a “prediction of the past” on the basis of a minimal trace, i.e., an informationally sparse, merely causal link to a previous experience. The resulting notion of (...) episodic memory will be validated as a natural kind distinct from imagination. This trace minimalist view contrasts with two theory camps dominating the philosophical debate on memory. On one side, we face versions of the Causal Theory that hold on to the idea that episodic remembering requires a memory trace that causally links the event of remembering to the event of experience and carries over representational content from the content of experience to the content of remembering. The Causal Theory, however, fails to account for the epistemic generativity of episodic memory and is psychologically and information-theoretically implausible. On the other side, a new camp of simulationists is currently forming up. Motivated by empirical and conceptual deficits of the Causal Theory, they reject not only the necessity of preserving representational content, but also the necessity of a causal link between experience and memory. They argue that remembering is nothing but a peculiar form of imagination, peculiar only in that it has been reliably produced and is directed towards an episode of one’s personal past. Albeit sharing their criticism of the Causal Theory and, in particular, rejecting its demand for an intermediary carrier of representational content, the paper argues that a causal connection to experience is still necessary to fulfill even the minimal requirements of past-directedness and reliability. (shrink)

Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory (perhaps only tacitly endorsed) concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options (concerning the nature and extent of innate knowledge) accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of (...) possible nativisms. (shrink)

I argue in favor of the Minimal Approval account, an original account of an agent’s moral responsibility for her actions, understood as the conditions that must be met so that an agent’s actions speak for her such that she can appropriately be blamed on their basis. My account shares a general theoretical orientation with Deep Self views, but diverges in several respects. I argue that Deep Self views tend to seriously over-generate exemptions, such that agents are exempt from responsibility (...) even from ordinary weak-willed actions. Accordingly, much of my focus is on giving a more nuanced, and in certain senses narrower, explanation of genuine exemption cases. While I address the advantages the Minimal Approval account has over competing accounts throughout these chapters, the account also aims to provide an empirically informed response to a certain sort of skeptical worry about how it could be the case that anyone is ever responsible for what they do at all. One commonplace thought is that when agents’ behaviors are due to compulsion their “brains make them do it.” But, in a literal sense, it might seem that our brains make all of us do everything that we do. In this dissertation I head off this worry by directly addressing both what the difference is, and what it should mean for our practices. (shrink)

One of the central problems concerning research with children is the delineation of appropriate levels of risk exposure. In the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, the "minimal risk" concept serves as an anchoring measure for allowable risk. While the regulations sought to promote a balance between scientific advances and the protection of children's vulnerable status, ambiguities in the language of the regulations and the regulatory definition of "minimal risk" have given rise to a great deal of confusion. Research (...) ethics boards and the medical community espouse a multitude of varying opinions regarding the interpretation and application of the federal regulations with more recent research demonstrating an apparent increase in risk without corresponding benefit in pediatric research. Informed by ethical theory, law, and science, this project analyzes the apparent increase in allowable risk, calls for a reassessment of the concept of "minimal risk," and recommends modifications to the federal regulations. (shrink)

Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms.

The essential difficulty about Computer Ethics' (CE) philosophical status is a methodological problem: standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with CE-problems, which appear to strain their conceptual resources, and CE requires a conceptual foundation as an ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE), the philosophical foundational counterpart of CE, can be seen as a particular case of environmental ethics or ethics of the infosphere. What is good for an information entity and the infosphere in general? This is (...) the ethical question asked by IE. The answer is provided by a minimalist theory of deseerts: IE argues that there is something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely being, understood as information, and entropy, and that any information entity is to be recognised as the centre of a minimal moral claim, which deserves recognition and should help to regulate the implementation of any information process involving it. IE can provide a valuable perspective from which to approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not only moral problems in CE, but also the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena that form the ethical discourse. (shrink)

Recently, psychological phenomena have been expanded to new domains, crisscrossing boundaries of organizational levels, with the emergence of areas such as social personality and ecosystem learning. In this contribution, we analyze the ascription of an individual-based concept (personality) to the social level. Although justified boundary crossings can boost new approaches and applications, the indiscriminate misuse of concepts refrains the growth of scientific areas. The concept of social personality is based mainly on the detection of repeated group differences across a population, (...) in a direct transposition of personality concepts from the individual to the social level. We show that this direct transposition is problematic for avowing the nonsensical ascription of personality even to simple electronic devices. To go beyond a metaphoric use of social personality, we apply the organizational approach to a review of social insect communication networks. Our conceptual analysis shows that socially self-organized systems, such as isolated ant trails and bee’s recruitment groups, are too simple to have social personality. The situation is more nuanced when measuring the collective choice between nest sites or foraging patches: some species show positive and negative feedbacks between two or more self-organized social structures so that these co-dependent structures are inter-related by second-order, social information systems, complying with a formal requirement for having social personality: the social closure of constraints. Other requirements include the decoupling between individual and social dynamics, and the self-regulation of collective decision processes. Social personality results to be sometimes a metaphorical transposition of a psychological concept to a social phenomenon. The application of this organizational approach to cases of learning ecosystems, or evolutionary learning, could help to ground theoretically the ascription of psychological properties to levels of analysis beyond the individual, up to meta-populations or ecological communities. (shrink)

From the advent of general purpose, Turing-complete machines, the relation between operators, programmers and users with computers can be observed as interconnected informational organisms (inforgs), henceforth analysed with the method of levels of abstraction (LoAs), risen within the philosophy of information (PI). In this paper, the epistemological levellism proposed by L. Floridi in the PI to deal with LoAs will be formalised in constructive terms using category theory, so that information itself is treated as structure-preserving functions instead of (...) Cartesian products. The milestones in the history of modern computing are then analysed through constructive levellism to show how the growth of system complexity lead to more and more information hiding. (shrink)

Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vaccuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and deliniate a space of options accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of represenational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms.

Cooperation admits of degrees. When factory workers stage a slowdown, they do not cease to cooperate with management in the production of goods altogether, but they are not fully cooperative either. Full cooperation implies that participants in a joint action are committed to rendering appropriate contributions as needed toward their joint end so as to bring it about, consistently with the type of action and the generally agreed upon constraints within which they work, as efficiently as they can, where their (...) contributions are sensitive to information (where available) about how others are contributing in the sense that they adjust as needed their contributions in light of information about how others are contributing to ensure effective pursuit of their joint end, where this includes rendering aid to other participants if needed, insofar as they are able. Full cooperation entails those cooperating are engaged in a joint intentional action. Some prominent studies of joint intentional action focus exclusively on cases of full cooperation (notably that of Michael Bratman (2014)). But not all joint intentional action is fully cooperative. One example is the work slowdown. Another example is provided by competitive games like chess and football, or sports like boxing and wrestling, where participants are clearly not intending to contribute to the pursuit of all of the goals of the others engaged in the activity, even when those goals are internal to the type of activity in question, but instead intend actively to frustrate some of them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of forms of non-cooperative behavior within the context of behavior that is still to some degree cooperative, and I argue that the minimal conditions of joint intentional action define minimal cooperative behavior, that is, that minimally joint intentional action is per se minimally cooperative behavior. I define in precise terms what that comes to, and how it is possible in cases in which it seems that one or more participants are in one or more ways acting so as to frustrate the contributions of other participants to their joint action. (shrink)

Information is a basic structure of the world, while computation is a process of the dynamic change of information. This book provides a cutting-edge view of world's leading authorities in fields where information and computation play a central role. It sketches the contours of the future landscape for the development of our understanding of information and computation, their mutual relationship and the role in cognition, informatics, biology, artificial intelligence, and information technology. -/- This book is (...) an utterly enjoyable and engaging read which gives readers an opportunity to understand and relate phenomena seemingly unrelated in a completely new light — especially the connections between information, computation, cognition and life. -/- Contents: Cybersemiotics and the Question of Knowledge (Søren Brier) Information Dynamics in a Categorical Setting (Mark Burgin) Mathematics as a Biological Process (G J Chaitin) Information, Causation and Computation (John Collier) From Descartes to Turing: The Computational Content of Supervenience (S Barry Cooper) A Dialogue Concerning Two World Systems: Info-Computational vs Mechanistic (Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic & Vincent C Müller) Does Computing Embrace Self-Organization? (Wolfgang Hofkirchner) Analysis of Information and Computation in Physics Explains Cognitive Paradigms: From Full Cognition to Laplace Determinism to Statistical Determinism to Modern Approach (Vladik Kreinovich, Roberto Araiza & Juan Ferret) Bodies — Both Informed and Transformed Embodied Computation and Information Processing (Bruce J MacLennan) Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations: An Evolutionary Approach (Christophe Menant) Interior Grounding, Reflection, and Self-Consciousness (Marvin Minsky) A Molecular Dynamic Network: Minimal Properties and Evolutionary Implications (Walter Riofrio) Super-recursive Features of Evolutionary Processes and the Models for Computational Evolution (Darko Roglic) Towards a Modeling View of Computing (Oron Shagrir) What's Information, for an Organism or Intelligent Machine? How can a Machine or Organism Mean? (Aaron Sloman) Inconsistent Knowledge as a Natural Phenomenon: The Ranking of Reasonable Inferences as a Computational Approach to Naturally Inconsistent (Legal) Theories (Kees (CNJ) de Vey Mestdagh & Jaap Henk (JH) Hoepman) On the Algorithmic Nature of the World (Hector Zenil & Jean-Paul Delahaye) . (shrink)

Emma Borg has defined semantic minimalism as the thesis that the literal content of well-formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable, fully determined by their lexico-syntactic features, and recoverable by language users with no need to access non-linguistic information. The task of this article is threefold. First, I shall raise a criticism to Borg’s minimalism based on how speakers disambiguate homonymy. Second, I will explore some ways Borg might respond to my argument and maintain that none of them offers a conclusive (...) reply to my case. Third, I shall suggest that in order for Borg’s minimalism to best accommodate the problem discussed in this paper, it should allow for semantically incomplete content and be converted into a claim about linguistic competence. (shrink)

This article examines the issue of whether consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about real-world targets. Using a widely cited example as a test case, it argues against the increasingly popular view that consideration of minimal models can prompt learning about such targets. The article criticizes influential defenses of this view for failing to explicate by virtue of what properties or features minimal models supposedly prompt learning. It then argues that consideration of minimal models (...) cannot prompt learning about real-world targets unless one supplements these models with additional information or presuppositions concerning such targets. (shrink)

N. Kamide introduced a pair of classical and constructive logics, each with a peculiar type of negation: its double negation behaves as classical and intuitionistic negation, respectively. A consequence of this is that the systems prove contradictions but are non-trivial. The present paper aims at giving insights into this phenomenon by investigating subsystems of Kamide’s logics, with a focus on a system in which the double negation behaves as the negation of minimal logic. We establish the negation inconsistency of (...) the system and embeddability of contradictions from other systems. In addition, we attempt at an informational interpretation of the negation using the dimathematical framework of H. Wansing. (shrink)

The essential difficulty about Computer Ethics’ (CE) philosophical status is a methodological problem: standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with CE-problems, which appear to strain their conceptual resources, and CE requires a conceptual foundation as an ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE), the philosophical foundational counterpart of CE, can be seen as a particular case of ‘environmental’ ethics or ethics of the infosphere. What is good for an information entity and the infosphere in general? This is (...) the ethical question asked by IE. The answer is provided by a minimalist theory of deserts: IE argues that there is something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely being, understood as information, and entropy, and that any information entity is to be recognised as the centre of a minimal moral claim, which deserves recognition and should help to regulate the implementation of any information process involving it. IE can provide a valuable perspective from which to approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not only moral problems in CE, but also the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena that form the ethical discourse. (shrink)

In ‘Forgiveness, an Ordered Pluralism’, Fricker distinguishes two concepts of forgiveness, both of which are deployed in our forgiveness practices: moral justice forgiveness and gifted forgiveness. She then argues that the former is more explanatorily basic than the latter. We think Fricker is right about this. We will argue, however, that contra Fricker, it is a third more minimal concept that is most basic. Like Fricker, we will focus on the function of our practices, but in a way that (...) is informed by research in ethology (research which seeks to explain the function of animal behaviour and determine how these behaviours evolved). (shrink)