Evaluation is, as J. R. Maze has recently suggested, central to the concept of attitude. But it is argued that Maze's noncognitivist analysis of evaluation yields an inadequate account of our ordinary concept of attitude. A criteriological account of evaluation is sketched which allows for an objective dimension to evaluation and hence to attitudes. In the case of attitudes, it is argued that some criteria will be chosen at least in part for their consequences, and hence will not be chosen (...) solely on the basis of interest, preference or affect. (shrink)

Ma and Sun have recently argued that some forms of insider trading are ethically acceptable. We argue that the authors fail to prove three key premises of their argument, which is therefore unsound.

Fully updated and revised, this contemporary classic discusses the powerful moral issues facing corporate America: conflicts of interest, payoffs, trade secrets, insider trading, product safety and product liability, hiring, drug testing, sexual harassment, diversity, reverse discrimination, employee productivity monitoring, Internet/computer privacy, worker safety, whistle-blowing, ethical decision-making, ethical accounting and advertising practices, environmental responsibility, down-sizing, and the conduct of multinational corporations. These are just some of the many topics raised in this versatile text. Enhanced by many new case studies, questions for (...) discussion, and valuable bibliographies, Business Ethics focuses on the issues that will confront decision-makers well into the new century. (shrink)

David Ehrenfeld argues that humanism emphasizes reason at the expense of emotion, and that its narrow focus on the use of reason to serve human interests leads to a dichotomy between man and nature in which ecological factors are subordinated to the satisfaction of human wants. In response, I argue that: (1) humanists stress employment of reflective reason and reason’s interrelations with other aspectsofthe human personality, (2) humanism’s typical commitment to naturalism locates man as part of nature and does not (...) entail an exclusive focus on human interests, and (3) humanism’s commitment to the legitimate sphere of human interests does not entail indifference to nonhuman nature, for a healthy environment is necessary for the long-term satisfaction of human interests. (shrink)

David Ehrenfeld argues that humanism emphasizes reason at the expense of emotion, and that its narrow focus on the use of reason to serve human interests leads to a dichotomy between man and nature in which ecological factors are subordinated to the satisfaction of human wants. In response, I argue that: humanists stress employment of reflective reason and reason’s interrelations with other aspectsofthe human personality, humanism’s typical commitment to naturalism locates man as part of nature and does not entail an (...) exclusive focus on human interests, and humanism’s commitment to the legitimate sphere of human interests does not entail indifference to nonhuman nature, for a healthy environment is necessary for the long-term satisfaction of human interests. (shrink)