: A familiar criticism of bioethics charges it with being more conceptual than practical—having little application to the "real world." In order to answer its critics and keep its feet on the ground, bioethics must utilize the social sciences more effectively. Empirical research can provide the bridge between conceiving a moral vision of a better world, and actually enacting it.

Across the world, an authoritarian and exclusionary form of populism is gaining political traction. Historically, some populist movements have been democratic and based on a sense of inclusive justice and the common good. But the populism on the rise at present speaks and acts otherwise. It is challenging constitutional democracies. The polarization seen in authoritarian populism goes beyond the familiar left-right political spectrum and generates disturbing forms of extremism, including the so-called alternative right in the United States and similar ethnic (...) and nationalistic political movements in other countries. The field of bioethics will be profoundly affected if authoritarian populism displaces constitutional democracy. But the field has a significant contribution to make to rebuilding the communal and civic foundations upon which constitutional democracy rests. (shrink)

“There's glory for you!”“I don't know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you dont—till I tell you. I meant ‘there's a nice knock-down argument.’”“But ‘glory’ doesn't mean a ‘nice knock-down argument,” Alice objected.“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said (...) Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master, that's all.”When applied bioethics confronts the topic of futility, the question of who is to be master turns out to be central. Indeed, much of the literature on futility has focused on exactly this question: who gets to define the terms of the debate? Who gets to decide that treatment is “futile” and therefore allowably withheld or withdrawn? (shrink)

“There's glory for you!”“I don't know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you dont—till I tell you. I meant ‘there's a nice knock-down argument.’”“But ‘glory’ doesn't mean a ‘nice knock-down argument,” Alice objected.“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said (...) Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master, that's all.”When applied bioethics confronts the topic of futility, the question of who is to be master turns out to be central. Indeed, much of the literature on futility has focused on exactly this question: who gets to define the terms of the debate? Who gets to decide that treatment is “futile” and therefore allowably withheld or withdrawn? (shrink)

Two papers in this issue address the limits of surrogates’ authority when making life-and-death decisions for dying family members or friends. Using palliative sedation as an example, Jeffrey Berger offers a conceptual argument for bounding surrogate authority. Since freedom from pain is an essential interest, when imminently dying, cognitively incapacitated patients are in duress and their symptoms are not manageable in any other way, clinicians should be free to offer palliative sedation without surrogate consent, although assent should be sought and (...) every effort made to work with surrogates as harmoniously as possible. Ellen Robinson and her colleagues report on the implementation of a policy at Massachusetts General Hospital that supports do-not-resuscitate orders when cardiopulmonary resuscitation is likely to be ineffective or harmful, even if surrogates disagree. The “Doing No Harm” policy at MGH allows for what MGH calls a “medically indicated DNR” and what in some other places is called “a unilateral DNR”—the writing of an order not to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation, regardless of surrogate disapproval. These kinds of DNR policies have emerged in some hospitals across the country and for much the same reason that Berger provides in his argument regarding palliative sedation. I support the reasoning and the policies in both the Berger and Robinson papers. However, as the authors would most likely agree, the problems they aim to remedy are not simply about the scope of surrogate and professional authority. They are also symptoms of inattention to professional obligations and system failures. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 2, Page inside_front_cover-inside_front_cover, March‐April 2022.

A belief that high school students have the cognitive ability to analyze and assess moral choices and should be encouraged to do so but have rarely been helped to do so was the motivation for developing Exploring Bioethics, a six-module curriculum and teacher guide for grades nine through twelve on ethical issues in the life sciences. A multidisciplinary team of bioethicists, science educators, curriculum designers, scientists, and high school biology teachers worked together on the curriculum under a contract between the (...) National Institutes of Health and Education Development Center, a nonprofit research and development organization with a long history of innovation in science education. At the NIH, the Department of Bioethics within the Clinical Center and the Office of Science Education within the Office of the Director guided the project.Our overarching goal for Exploring Bioethics was to introduce students to bioethics as a field of inquiry and to enable them to develop ethical reasoning skills so they could move beyond “gut reactions” to more nuanced positions. (shrink)

What is bioethics to do when it strives to assess the quality of its research and scholarship and when it needs to justify its work to prospective funders, especially a funder like the National Institutes of Health that privileges empirical discovery? In “A Conceptual Model for the Translation of Bioethics Research and Scholarship,” Debra Mathews and colleagues take an important first step at advancing an answer. The authors describe what they call a translational process, whereby bioethics “outputs” are translated into (...) changes of three types: in thinking, practice, and policy. It goes nearly without saying that bioethics research and scholarship must be held accountable for changes in thinking. What raison d'etre do we have if not to deepen thinking, question assumptions, and encourage ourselves and others to examine hard issues from novel approaches? Assuredly it is hard to assess quality, and even harder to assess specific changes in thinking for which high-quality scholarship may be responsible, but it is a necessary goal and one for which we should strive without reservation. Bioethics should also affect policy and practice. We should document how it does and the extent to which it does as often and as prominently as possible. However, let us be wary of pinning too much on practice and policy changes as the primary way of establishing bioethics’ worth. (shrink)

Together this August, Hastings Center fellows and staff scholars left their respective studies to look up. Over a three-day period, we engaged with one another, renewing ties with beloved old friends and welcoming new ones. We asked what each other was passionate about. We asked how our field could be better. We shared works-in-progress and imagined how we might work together across institutions, across miles to accomplish things we couldn't do alone.