In the following article, we propose to show that following the general verificationist epistemic programme (its demand that the truth of our judgments be verifiable), the analysis of measurement on the one hand, and the classical positivist analysis of common-sense observation on the other, do not lead to same conclusions. This is especially important, because the differences in conclusions concern the positivist theory/observation distinction. In particular, the analysis of measurement does not fully support this distinction. This fact might have important (...) consequences for the problem of scientific realism and related ontological and epistemological problems in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Theoreticity is closely connected in the (mainstream) philosophy of science to the idea of non-observability. A closer analysis of measurement, however, may give us a deeper perspective into this connection. This was done by Kyburg in his Theory and Measurement, where he argued that theory is much more pervasive then usually thought of -- even the simplest forms of measurement essentially invoke non-observables. In my article I advance Kyburg’s ideas and try to show that theoreticity implicitly invoked by Kyburg’s pervasive (...) theory may be cast in terms of what I call “non-vagueness principle”. Further, I argue that this principle can provide for a natural demarcation between mature science and other more rudimentary forms of science. (shrink)