How should I live? How can I be happy? What is happiness, really? These are perennial questions, which in recent times have become the subject of diverse kinds of academic research. Ancient philosophers placed happiness at the centre of their thought, and we can trace the topic through nearly a millennium. While the centrality of the notion of happiness in ancient ethics is well known, this book is unique in that it focuses directly on this notion, as it appears in (...) the ancient texts. Fourteen papers by an international team of scholars map the various approaches and conceptions found from the Presocratics through Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic philosophy, to the Neoplatonists and Augustine in late antiquity. They address questions raised by ancient thinkers that are still of deep concern today. (shrink)

The study of the ancient commentators has developed considerably over the past few decades, fueled by recent translations of their often daunting writings. This book offers the only concise, accessible general introduction currently available to the writings of the late ancient commentators on Aristotle and, to a lesser extent, Plato. Miira Tuominen provides a historical overview followed by a series of thematic chapters on epistemology, science and logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, and ethics. In particular, she focuses on the writings of (...) Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Porphyry, Proclus, Philoponus, and Simplicius. Until recently, the late ancient commentators have been understood mainly as sources of information concerning the masters upon whose works they comment. This book offers new insights into their way of doing philosophy in their own right. (shrink)

According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, our potential intellect is a purely receptive capacity. Alexander also claims that, in order for us to actualise our intellectual potentiality, the intellect needs to abstract what is intelligible from enmattered perceptible objects. Now a problem emerges: How is it possible for a purely receptive capacity to perform such an abstraction? It will be argued that even though Alexander's reaction to this question causes some tension in his theory, the philosophical motivation for it is a (...) sound one. Rather than a calculation of actualities and potentialities, the doctrine of receptivity is supposed to explain how human beings come to grasp universal aspects of reality in an accurate manner. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for a new analysis of Porphyry’s argument for justice in On abstinence. I aim to show that (i) in addition to being an inner order of soul, justice is attributed to external actions and (ii) justice of actions consists in refraining from harming harmless living creatures, including animals and plants. The relevant harm, I argue, consists in taking the lives of living creatures and taking products from them by force or without care. I contend that (...) Porphyry extends moral concern for others to all living creatures, but not merely on the basis of animal suffering. Finally, I argue that that the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence does not support the subordination of moral concern for animals and plants to higher virtues of purity and theory. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the views of happiness (eudaimonia) from the perspective of soul in ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools. I consider the specific way in which most schools connect happiness to soul: either as Aristotle, identifying happiness with the human good he defines it as soul’s activity in accordance with virtue or as the soul’s virtuous state as the Stoics. The Stoics famously consider a virtuous state of one’s soul to be sufficient for happiness, and it has been argued (...) that Plato and Socrates subscribed to the claim earlier. Aristotle by contrast holds that having virtue is necessary although not sufficient. Virtue of soul is still necessary for happiness for the late ancient Platonist Plotinus but in Plotinus happiness belongs to the intellect not to the soul, since the soul is capable of evil as well. A happy life belongs to the intellect intrinsically and inevitably and we live happily to the extent to which we can live a life of intellect. All of the schools considered in this chapter also hold that becoming morally or ethically good is either a necessary condition for happiness as in Plotinus, or that ethically good action constitutes happiness as in the case of Aristotle. (shrink)

New Perspectives on Aristotelianism and Its Critics traces Aristotelian influences in modern and pre-modern discourses on knowledge, rights, and the good life. The contributions offer new insights on contemporary discussions on life in its cognitive, political, and ethical dimensions.

In this contribution, we argue that a philosophical clarification of the discussion of adult cognitive development in psychology is needed in order to get a clearer view of what is at stake in this debated phenomenon. On the one hand, we contend that rather than epistemological relativism, mature adult cognition should be described in terms of integration. Integration means understanding that people have different views with each other and from us, but we still need to respect them as people and (...) take their emotions into account. This does not mean simple acceptance of their views as true, as the descriptions of epistemological relativism would suggest. On the other hand, we argue that rather than calling for many-valued logic as some Piagetian views maintain, an adult way of thinking recognises that many conflicts are not logically exhaustive, i.e., that there are more than two solutions to a problem at hand. This often means confusion between two kinds of opposition: contrary and contradictory. While the latter is logically exhaustive in two-valued logic (e.g., good and not-good), the former is not (e.g., good and bad). Our suggestion is that youthful absolutist cognition tends to see conflicts in terms of contrary opposites and assuming them to be logically exhaustive (there is no other solution). A mature adult way of thinking, by contrast, sees that such dichotomies are not logically exhaustive and even in situations in which we have not been able to figure out the solution, it is still possible to find it. Finally, we explore the possibility of articulating an adult way of thinking which recognises that one’s own conceptions might not be insufficient or incorrect by a historical comparison to Ancient Skepticism. (shrink)

From the first century BCE onwards, philosophers started to write commentaries on those Aristotle’s treatises that were meant for the internal use of his school. Plato’s works had been commented on already earlier, the first reported commentary originates in the 300s BCE. Commentaries are treatises that follow an object text in a more or less linear fashion. The format was not unknown before the first century BCE but new in extensive philosophical use. This review essay focuses on authors who commented (...) on Aristotle’s works. The commentaries emerged when Platonists and Aristotelians observed the need to teach the philosophy of these ancient masters to their students and to systematise their philosophy to respond to rival schools. In the late ancient schools, Plato and Aristotle were considered great thinkers, whose views needed to be studied carefully when considering any matter at hand. Many also argued that, despite the initial appearance to the contrary, there is no deep disagreement between Plato and Aristotle but, rather, a division of labour; Aristotle is dominant in natural philosophy and Plato in theology. However, this harmony thesis was not universally accepted. Despite their respect for Plato and Aristotle, the commentators were not mere followers of these authors. They developed, criticised and transformed the doctrines in significant ways, not only by suggesting different answers to the same questions but also by transforming the questions themselves. (shrink)