There is a tendency to use data from neuroscience, cognitive science and experimental psychology to rail against philosophical ethics. Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that deontological judgments tend to be supported by emotional responses to irrelevant features, whereas consequentialist judgments are more reliable because they tend to be supported by cognitive processes. In this article, I will analyse the evidence used by Greene to suggest a different kind of argument against deontology, which I will call the argument from self-defeating beliefs. (...) The charge of this type of argument amounts to exposing a psychological nature of deontological judgements that is supposedly rejected by deontologists. I will argue that the alleged evidence is poorly understood, mixed and indeterminate, failing to endorse general conclusions about the psychological processes underlying deontological judgements. (shrink)

Despite the promise to boost human potential and wellbeing, enhancement drugs face recurring ethical scrutiny. The present studies examined attitudes toward cognitive enhancement in order to learn more about these ethical concerns, who has them, and the circumstances in which they arise. Fairness-based concerns underlay opposition to competitive use—even though enhancement drugs were described as legal, accessible and affordable. Moral values also influenced how subsequent rewards were causally explained: Opposition to competitive use reduced the causal contribution of the enhanced winner’s (...) skill, particularly among fairness-minded individuals. In a follow-up study, we asked: Would the normalization of enhancement practices alleviate concerns about their unfairness? Indeed, proliferation of competitive cognitive enhancement eradicated fairness-based concerns, and boosted the perceived causal role of the winner’s skill. In contrast, purity-based concerns emerged in both recreational and competitive contexts, and were not assuaged by normalization. (shrink)

Should the development of pharmacological cognitive enhancers raise worries about doping in cognitively demanding activities? In this paper, we argue against using current evidence relating to enhancement to justify a ban on cognitive enhancers using the example of chess. It is a mistake to assume that enhanced cognitive functioning on psychometric testing is transferable to chess performance because cognitive expertise is highly complex and in large part not merely a function of the sum specific sub-processes. A deeper reason to doubt (...) that pharmacological cognitive enhancers would be as significant in mind sports is the misleading parallel with physical enhancement. We will make the case that cognitive performance is less mechanical in nature than physical performance. We draw lessons from this case example of chess for the regulation of cognitive enhancement more generally in education and the professions. Premature regulation runs the risk of creating a detrimental culture of suspicion that ascribes unwarranted blame. (shrink)

Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from "true" moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not (...) illustrate the relevant model of deontological confabulation. In fact, I will make the case that deontology is unlikely to be a confabulation because alarm-like emotions, which allegedly drive deontological theorizing, are resistant to be subject to confabulation. I will end by clarifying what kind of claims can the confabulation data support. The upshot of the final section is that confabulation data cannot be used to undermine deontological theory in itself, and ironically, if one commits to the claim that a deontological justification is a confabulation in a particular case, then the data suggests that in general deontology has a prima facie validity. (shrink)

To capture genuine utilitarian tendencies, developed the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale based on two subscales, which measure the commitment to impartial beneficence and the willingness to cause harm for the greater good. In this article, I argue that the impartial beneficence subscale, which breaks ground with previous research on utilitarian moral psychology, does not distinctively measure utilitarian moral judgment. I argue that Kantian ethics captures the all-encompassing impartial concern for the well-being of all human beings. The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale draws, in (...) fact, a point of division that places Kantian and utilitarian theories on the same track. I suggest that the impartial beneficence subscale needs to be significantly revised in order to capture distinctively utilitarian judgments. Additionally, I propose that psychological research should focus on exploring multiple sources of the phenomenon of impartial beneficence without categorizing it as exclusively utilitarian. (shrink)

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference (...) in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons. (shrink)

În acest studiu, îmi propun să arăt că modelul social intuiţionist al judecăţii morale propus de Haidt este la rândul său prea restrictiv faţă de influenţa raţionării morale, poate tot aşa cum modelul raţionalist subestima influenţa emoţiilor morale. Mai întâi, voi prezenta modelul raţionalist despre natura judecăţii morale şi voi evidenţia rezultatele empirice care au contribuit la erodarea sa. Apoi, voi prezenta şi critica modelul social intuiţionist revigorat de revoluţia „afectivă” din psihologia morală, argumentând că rezultatele din psihologia experimentală, neuroştiinţă (...) şi psihologia evoluţionistă acordă raţionării morale o influenţă cauzală mai mare decât admite Haidt. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that intuitive methods of moral decision making are objective tools on the grounds that they are reasons based. First, I will conduct a preliminary analysis in which I highlight the acceptance of methodological pluralism in the practice of medical ethics. Here, the point is to show the possibility of using intuitive methods given the pluralism framework. Second, I will argue that the best starting point of elaborating such methods is a bottom-up perspective. (...) Third, I will address the worry of subjectivism. Under the influence of certain rationalist positions and recent developments in cognitive science and moral psychology, one might think that intuitive methods of moral decision making are essentially subjective and emotion based. If moral intuitions are the result of emotional reactions and intuitive reasoning is emotionally driven, then there are reasons to believe intuitive methods are subjective and relative to particular psychological constitution. Against this picture, I will argue that intuitive methods of moral decision making are essentially reasons-based. A Wittgensteinian approach will show that intuitive methods of moral decision making are conceptually linked with criteria of morality. (shrink)

The Internet has been identified in human enhancement scholarship as a powerful cognitive enhancement technology. It offers instant access to almost any type of information, along with the ability to share that information with others. The aim of this paper is to critically assess the enhancement potential of the Internet. We argue that unconditional access to information does not lead to cognitive enhancement. The Internet is not a simple, uniform technology, either in its composition, or in its use. We will (...) look into why the Internet as an informational resource currently fails to enhance cognition. We analyze some of the phenomena that emerge from vast, continual fluxes of information–information overload, misinformation and persuasive design—and show how they could negatively impact users’ cognition. Methods for mitigating these negative impacts are then advanced: individual empowerment, better collaborative systems for sorting and categorizing information, and the use of artificial intelligence assistants that could guide users through the informational space of today’s Internet. (shrink)

In acest articol voi intreprinde o analiza conceptuala asupra formei si a continutului codului deontologic al farmacistilor din Romania din perspectiva expertizei etice. Voi atrage atentia asupra necesitatii de a distinge intre obligatii morale si alte tipuri de normativitate. Dupa analiza diferitelor modele de redactare a codurilor de etica, voi evidentia doua exigente metodologice pe care ar trebui să le satisfaca un cod deontologic. In final, voi puncta cateva provocari pentru managementul eticii farmaceutice.

Moral outrage is often characterized as a corrosive emotion, but it can also inspire collective action. In this article we aim to deepen our understanding of the dual nature of online moral outrage which divides people and contributes to inclusivist moral reform. We argue that the specifics of violating different types of moral norms will influence the effects of moral outrage: moral outrage against violating harm-based norms is less antagonistic than moral outrage against violating loyalty and purity/identity norms. We identify (...) which features of social media platforms shape our moral lives. Connectivity, omniculturalism, online exposure, increased group identification and fostering what we call “expressionist experiences”, all change how moral outrage is expressed in the digital realm. Finally, we propose changing the design of social media platforms and raise the issue of moral disillusion when ample moral protest in the online environment does not have the expected effects on the offline world. (shrink)

How do we make good moral decisions? There is a tendency to answer this question by developing methods and procedures of moral decision making. In this paper I will show some limits and pitfalls of this approach. Good moral decisions need to take into account factors which cannot be codified into procedures. I draw attention to how analyzing the type of context is a necessary preamble for a better handling of procedures.

Many natural scientists explain the evolutionary origin of morality by documenting altruistic behaviour in our nearest nonhuman relatives. Christine Korsgaard has criticized such attempts on the premise that they do not put enough effort in explaining the capacity to be motivated by normative thoughts. She speculates that normative motivation may have originated with the internalization of the dominance instincts. In this article I will challenge the dominance hierarchy hypothesis by arguing that a proper investigation into how and when dominance inhibits (...) behaviour does not seem to reveal a minimal normative dimension. (shrink)

Many Kantian scholars have debated what normative guidance the formula of the law of nature provides. There are three ways of understanding the role of FLN in Kant’s ethics. The first line of interpretation claims that FLN and FLU are logically equivalent. The second line claims that there are only subjective differences, meaning that FLN is easier to apply than the abstrct method of FUL. The third line of interpretation claims that there are objective differences between FLN and FUL in (...) the sense that each formula has an irreducible role in Kant’s ethics. In this article I will show that the first and second lines of interpretation cannot fully explain Kant’s account of FLN and I will propose a new interpretation which pertains to the third type. I will explore the schematism model to understand the role of FLN and argue that it is an intermediary principle that fills in a practical gap between the moral law and action. In the end, I will consider a possible objection against this understanding which claims that the schematism model is not applicable to practical judgment since nothing is given in experience. (shrink)

The volume aims to capture a European gist of theoretical sensibilities, conceptual resources, and research interests, but not in an adversarial way, as opposed to American bioethics. The volume gathers contributions from European scholars as they collaborate and form a research network, drawing on a diversity of philosophical traditions and local knowledge, with the aim of debating universal bioethical problems. ABSTRACTING & INDEXING Contemporary Debates in Bioethics: European Perspectives is covered by the following services: Baidu Scholar DOAB EBSCO Discovery Service (...) Google Scholar J-Gate Naviga Primo Central ReadCube Semantic Scholar Summon TDOne WorldCat. (shrink)

In this paper we develop test cases to adjudicate between dual-process and the causal mapping explanations of order effects. Using dilemmas with minimized emotional force, we explore new conditions for order effects to occur. Overall, the results support causal model theory. We produced novel evidence that order effects extend not only to cases with low emotional engagement, but also to specialized judgments about whether an action violates a rule. However, when objects are sacrificed instead of persons the order effect either (...) disappears or becomes symmetrical, contrary to previous theorizing that it is an asymmetrical transfer effect. Causal model theory needs to be developed to include interplays between the moral status of sacrificed entities and computational models of causal mapping. Symmetric order effects remain a puzzle, motivating future research. Though we do not know how to explain them yet, we discuss how symmetric order effects can influence policy decision making. (shrink)

„E o plăcere să citeşti o carte filosofică în care este atât de evidentă preocuparea autorului pentru a se face cât mai bine înţeles, iar rezultatele sunt pe măsura acestei preocupări. Sobrietatea scrierii este, în acest caz, expresia unei onestităţi intelectuale lipsite de cusur. Sunt atribute, din păcate mai rar întâlnite, care constituie apanajul acelora care îşi pot permite să renunţe la orice încercări de a-şi impresiona cititorii prin efecte exterioare. şi aceasta deoarece ei pot convinge pe deplin numai şi (...) numai prin substanţa ideilor şi forţa argumentelor.” Mircea Flonta. (shrink)

Parents frequently attempt to shield their children from distressing prognostic information. Pediatric oncology providers sometimes follow parental request for non-disclosure of prognostic information to children, invoking what we call the stability of the family argument. They believe that if they inform the child about terminal prognosis despite parental wishes, cohesion and family structure will be severely hampered. In this paper, we argue against parental request for non-disclosure. Firstly, we present the stability of the family argument in more detail. We, then, (...) set out the (conceptual, legal, systemic) entitativity of the family and the kind of value the stability of the family argument assumes, before we set on to critically evaluate the argument. Our analysis shows that disclosure of prognostic information to children does not necessarily destabilize the family to a greater extent than non-disclosure. In fact, a systemic perspective suggests that mediated disclosure is more likely to result in a (long-term) stability of the family than non-disclosure. It is in the interest of the family to resist the initial aversive reaction to delivering bad news. In the final part, we draw a set of recommendations on how to facilitate decision-making in face of parental request for non-disclosure. (shrink)

BackgroundThis is the first qualitative study to investigate how researchers, who do empirical work in bioethics, relate to objectives of empirical research in bioethics (ERiB). We explore reasons that make some objectives more acceptable, while others are deemed less acceptable.MethodsUsing qualitative exploratory study design, we interviewed bioethics researchers, who were selected to represent different types of scholars working in the field. The interview data of 25 participants were analyzed in this paper using thematic analysis. ResultsFrom the eight objectives presented to (...) the study participants, understanding the context of a bioethical issue and identifying ethical issues in practice received unanimous agreement. Participants also supported other objectives of ERiB but with varying degrees of agreement. The most contested objectives were striving to draw normative recommendations and developing and justifying moral principles. The is-ought gap was not considered an obstacle to ERiB, but rather a warning sign to critically reflect on the normative implications of empirical results.ConclusionsOur results show that the most contested objectives are also the more ambitious ones, whereas the least contested ones focus on producing empirical results. The potential of empirical research to be useful for bioethics was mostly based on the reasoning pattern that empirical data can provide a testing ground for elements of normative theory. Even though empirical research can inform many parts of bioethical inquiry, normative expertise is recommended to guide ERiB. The acceptability of ambitious objectives for ERiB boils down to finding firm ground for the integration of empirical facts in normative inquiry. (shrink)

Historically, empirical research in bioethics has drawn on methods developed within the social sciences, including qualitative interviews, focus groups, ethnographic studies, and opinion surveys, t...

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

Starting from the assumption that everything is measured in this world, the author sets out to ask some questions about the value and the measure of the human soul and postulates that we should distinguish between an earthly measure and a divine measure of the soul. He concludes that the “positive” measure of the soul is acquired according to its redemption and salvation for the eternal life, because a saved soul is worthier than the whole world.

The aim of this article is to sketch the procedural nature of the modus in which Deleuze reads the other philosophers. The hermeneutical problem indicated by the indecision to consider his books on different authors as an authorized interpretation or as fantasist utilization may be scattered if we understand his hermeneutical attempts both as interpretation and construction. In addition, this indecision affects the guild of Deleuzian exegetes in respect to the directory idea which could point out the general strategy of (...) his philosophy. (shrink)

This article pulls together the disjointed complexification of security studies. Such analytical overview suggests that the perspective of “timescapes” allows for exploring the complexity that shapes meanings and practices of security and its governance. In this respect, it is the imperative to change that suggests the significance of complexity thinking to security studies—that is, it is alone in taking the discontinuities of global life seriously. Security, in this regard, is not merely about the clockwork of survival, but is redefined through (...) the cloudlike adaptive contingency of “security as resilience.” In this setting, the security governance of complexity is identified through its dancing to the timescaped rhythms of uncertainty, cognitive challenges, complex risks, and exaptation prompted by the heterogeneity of global life. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the program of Deleuze’s work on Hume’s philosophy. Also, I plan to make clear the operational meaning of Deleuze’s own hallmark regarding his approaches to philosophy. I start to follow Deleuze’s plot by engendering three functions of his interpretation of Hume’s Treatise that will be the area of three thematic chapters. The first tries to sort the polemical function of empiricism that is launched through Deleuze’s Hume; the second attempts to figure the domain of subjectivity (...) as the inventive function of the book; the third searches the creative function by describing the role of the institutional theory. (shrink)

Cette contribution entend rendre compte de l’actualité de la pensée de Michel Foucault à travers une analyse du concept de bio-politique. L’étude vise l’émergence historique et celle discursive de la bio-politique, essayant d’insister sur le rapport étroit entre la mutation à travers laquelle la politique se donne comme objet la vie en tant que telle et l’émergence du capitalisme en tant que paradigme dominant de la modernité. Ce faisant, l’analyse s’inscrit dans un horizon herméneutique plus large des Temps modernes.

The five articles composing the thematic dossier Rhetorics of Justice in Emerging Democracies represent the initial results of the joint Romanian and South African research project – Rhetoric of Justice and Deliberative Perceptions of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Romania and Post-Apartheid South Africa.

We propose hereafter an analysis of the way in which the post-communism has determined the significance of justice and, in doing so, pretended to reorganize the possibility for a legitimate political community. Given that the public perception points out to a gap between the rule of law and justice, one should understand for what reasons. Does the rule of law have the resources for doing justice? Are the legal procedures enough? Or should we take into consideration the possibility that the (...) rule of law is unable to do justice? Subsequently, we identify and discuss three radicalizations: the issue of normativity, the rogue state and the heterogeneity between law and justice. Ultimately, the possibility of justice depends on a different way of thinking democracy. (shrink)

Contemporary critical space theories as well as singular architectural experiments acknowledge a quest for renewing the most significant ways in which space design is conceptually elaborated, factually realised and socially perceived. Searching to seize the possibility and the meaning of a creative intervention in space-related practices, the paper aims at revisiting the manner in which modern times determined the relationship between architectural production and politics. The main reason is that this sequence of the argument allows for a more accurate definition (...) of transformations that build up contemporary experience and especially the ways in which common creative practices totally abandon existential and political concerns. We argue that a specific comprehension of anarchitecture in ontological terms could shed a new light on creative architectural gestures. Anarchitecture, as we understand it, interrupts the logic of manifestos, which distinguishes it from oppositional architecture. In supporting the idea that experienced spaces are more that mere reified presences, involved as they are in shaping and determining meaning, our approach is not prescriptive but, quite on the contrary, attempts to empirically construct minimal orientations for thought and practice. (shrink)

This text is an examination of the democratic public sphere in relation to the presently dominating crisis discourse. More precisely, we endeavor to expose assumptions, aims and consequences entailed by the discourse of crisis, hereafter considered as a rhetorical apparatus asserting that crisis reveals an unambiguous and mandatory nature of things imposing self-evident and thus non deliberative decisions concerning both singular existence and communities. The crisis discourse serves to endorse indisputable certainty and therefore to blur or even suppress indeterminacy. Nevertheless, (...) and it is our guiding allegation formulated mainly in reference to Claude Lefort’s political thought, the possibility of democracy and of its public sphere depends constitutively on a unique indeterminacy. Our analysis proves that restoring certainty cannot but go along with a naturalist fallacy and an abuse of rhetoric power postponing deliberative-shaped democratic practices. This line of reasoning comes to define public sphere as a rhetorical counter-power strategy meant to reassert democratic indeterminacy. (shrink)

We present a comparatively simple way to construct Martin-Löf random and rec-random sets with certain additional properties, which works by diagonalizing against appropriate martingales. Reviewing the result of Gács and Kučera, for any given set X we construct a Martin-Löf random set from which X can be decoded effectively. By a variant of the basic construction we obtain a rec-random set that is weak truth-table autoreducible and we observe that there are Martin-Löf random sets that are computably enumerable self-reducible. The (...) two latter results complement the known facts that no rec-random set is truth-table autoreducible and that no Martin-Löf random set is Turing-autoreducible [8, 24]. (shrink)

This paper explores the phenomenon of revisionism in historiography, while focusing in particular on illegitimate revisionism and negationism. It is indisputably true that historiography must be subject to constant revisions. Like all scientific theories, it needs to be characterized by a sort of?conservative? openness towards new ideas; however, revisions and negations are often put forward without scientific grounding. They reject the well-established historiographical methods, while opening themselves to various kinds of ideologies, biases and manipulations. The paper further offers a synthesized (...) overview of the revisionist practice in dominant parts of the society and historiography in post-communist Serbia. The change in the ideological paradigm that occurred in the 1980s was accompanied by a politically motivated reinterpretation of the past, which primarily focused on World War II in Yugoslavia. In Serbia in the 1990s, Tito?s Partisans were no longer celebrated as national heroes and fighters against fascism; they were replaced by the royalist and nationalist Chetniks led by Draza Mihailovic, whose collaboration with the occupying forces was purposefully glossed over. The nationalist interpretation of history and the new revisionist politics in Serbia were supported by the state and the activities of its three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. In spite of the political changes that took place in Serbia in 2000, the dominant nationalist matrix in historical interpretations and revisionist politics remained unchanged. (shrink)

Philosophical literature in Soviet Russia displays the same arid uniformity as before and is almost entirely confined to the exposition of dialectical materialism. That can be seen from the very titles of the books published within the last year: Dialectical Materialism–the Philosophy of the Proletariat, by V. Pozner; Dialectical Materialism, extracts from Marxist classics, selected by the students of the Institute of Red Professorship; Marxism and Natural Science, a collection of articles; The Problem of Causality in the History of New (...) Philosophy and in Dialectical Materialism, by B. Bogdanov and Mihailov. The latter is a digest of papers read at the seminars on the history of philosophy at the Institute of Red Professorship and does not contain a single original idea or throw any fresh light on what has already been said on the subject by Engels, Lenin, Byhovsky, and others. The very quotations from Engels and Lenin are the same as are generally made in Soviet works on dialectical materialism. Arzhanov's Hegelianism in the Service of German Fascism is a critique of neo-Hegelian theories from the orthodox Marxist point of view. But although Hegel's name is often used merely as a bludgeon against the infidels, the non-Marxists, there is a genuine interest in Hegel's work in U.S.S.R. and a desire to introduce it to the general public. In 1929 the Marx and Engel Institute undertook the publication of a Russian edition of Hegel's works, except his lectures on the “Philosophy of Religion” this year two volumes of Kuno Fisher's History of Modern Philosophy, dealing with Hegel, have been republished. (shrink)