How do we build up our institutional reality? What do we need in order to construct such things as universities, law firms, banks, retail stores, factories, leg.

Amie L. Thomasson, the Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College, has gained international recognition as a leading figure within various areas of philosophy. She has recently been celebrated as one of the most influential living philosophers for her significant contributions to metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, and aesthetics. By engaging critically with her approach to metaphysics, modality, conceptual analysis, and the methodological issues concerning ontological questions about ordinary objects, social entities, and fictional characters, as well as (...) including a chapter from Thomasson herself where she makes explicit the internal connections which run through her body of work, this volume delivers the first thorough discussion of Thomasson’s philosophy. (shrink)

Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

Modern zoos strive to educate visitors about zoo animals and their wild counterparts’ conservation needs while fostering appreciation for wildlife in general. This research review examines how zoos influence those who visit them. Much of the research to-date examines zoo visitors’ behaviors and perceptions in relation to specific exhibits, animals and/or programs. In general, visitors have more positive perceptions and behaviors about zoos, their animals and conservation initiatives the more they interact with animals, naturalistic exhibits, and zoo programming/staff. Furthermore, zoo (...) visitors are receptive to conservation messaging and initiatives at zoos, and are more likely to participate in on-site conservation opportunities as opposed to after their visits. The research also suggests that repeat visitors are even more inclined to seek out conservation efforts compared to those visiting zoos for the first time. While current research suggests that repeat-visitors are more likely to engage in conservation efforts, little is known about causal factors related to such findings, and almost no research exists to-date comparing the conservation efforts of visitors vs. non-visitors. This latter comparison will likely play a greater role in future zoo visitor research, since it poses one of the most important metrics for evaluating the specific effects visiting a zoo can have on people engaging in conservation efforts in general. (shrink)

Contra recent, inflationary views, the paper submits a deflationary approach to legal ontology. It argues, in particular, that to answer ontological questions about legal entities, we only need conceptual analysis and empirical investigation. In developing this proposal, it follows Amie Thomasson’s ‘easy ontology’ and her strategy for answering whether ordinary objects exist. The purpose of this is to advance a theory that, on the one hand, does not fall prey to sceptical views about legal reality (viz., that ontological truths about (...) legal entities are established by metaphysical principles); and, on the other, is compatible with common-sense jurisprudence (viz., that there in fact exist legal entities, and they all have important practical implications). While this methodology is common to legal philosophers interested in elucidating the ‘artifactual nature’ of law, the paper departs from their projects by taking a step forward in connecting this deflationary approach to legal ontology with an expressivist account of legal discourse, thus providing enough resources to satisfy the general ambition of jurisprudence, viz., to establish the conditions for the analysis of legal reality and its normative character. (shrink)

Although there is already an important discussion regarding social ontology (a first-order investigation about social entities, e.g., social objects, social events, social relations, and social categories), not much attention has been paid to social meta-ontology (a second-order inquiry concerning what it means and how to answer whether there are any such entities). With the intention to contribute towards bringing the latter into the philosophical spotlight, I submit here a brief survey of the meta-ontological issues about two specific kinds of social (...) entities, viz., social and institutional practices. After elaborating on Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology, I argue that it can be extended to account for the existence of those social entities. (shrink)

Proxy agency is the capacity of individuals and groups to act for other individuals or groups in specific social transactions. For example, a legal team acts as a proxy for a client in a courtroom, or the Prime Minister acts as a proxy for the UK Government when attending international meetings, etc. Although a very common social phenomenon, it has not yet received enough philosophical treatment. Currently, the most developed account of this capacity is Ludwig’s proxy agency in collective action. (...) Yet, his account relies on a deflationary, we-content approach to collective intentionality (á la Bratman). In this chapter, I argue that this approach is far too weak to explain proxy agency in institutional contexts—where the individuals and groups formally authorised to perform rule-guided group activities for the principal hold a strong, non-conditional we-commitment. In order to elucidate this feature, I provide an account of proxy agency based on a more robust, we-mode approach to collective intentionality (á la Tuomela). I suggest with this that, for institutional proxy agency to operate as expected, there must be appropriate conditions of sociality in place—which ultimately coheres with the larger project developed by Tuomela on social ontology. (shrink)

This article boards some of the central aspects of the philosophy proposed by Philip Mainländer. The intent is centered on glimpsing the implications that arise from the explored author’s thoughts, primarily in regards to the attitude that is derived from the contemplation of human extermination as a consequent solu­tion to the suicide and death of God. The intention of man in the world from said perspective is analyzed and links are offered to authors who have adopted for themselves the scabrous (...) and complex paths of committed Nihilism. The text ends with a series of human redemption alternatives through a philosophy about death and not as a function of death itself. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to legal ontology, Kenneth Ehrenberg identifies a puzzle concerning _the basic validity rule_ of legal systems: If formal institutions require a codified foundational constitutive rule, then legal systems cannot be formal institutions, since their foundational constitutive rule is necessarily an uncodified basic validity rule. To solve this puzzle, Ehrenberg suggests taking this rule as ‘a foundational and self-identifying institutional fact’. Here, I challenge his solution and the very existence of this puzzle. By arguing, contra Ehrenberg, that (...) the basic validity rule is not the foundational constitutive rule of a legal system, but only the foundational constitutive rule of legal validity; that its codification in fact contributes towards the institutionalisation of a legal system; and that the true foundational constitutive rule of a legal system is the formal group structure of the higher-constitutional organisations, I submit an alternative account of the institutional nature of legal systems. (shrink)

Following Tuomela, I argue that institutions consist in institutional activities conducive to the realisation (or “satisfaction”) of institutional activity types. Since this realisation is carried out by institutional groups, our having an answer to 'what are institutional groups?' is a necessary step towards a better understanding of what institutions are and how we create them. In this chapter, I offer an answer to this question.

RESUMEN El presente artículo pretende ofrecer un breve recorrido por algunos aspectos del pensamiento filosófico y teológico de Abraham Heschel, un rabino polaco del siglo XX, conocido por ser asesor y maestro espiritual de Luther King. El texto inicia presentando algunos aspectos biográficos y contextuales de la vida de Heschel. Luego de ello se aluden las pautas centrales de su crítica a la religión, resaltando la intención auténtica de la misma y mostrando los peligros de separarla de la razón. Se (...) denuncia la simulación de Dios en las religiones y el daño social que estas ocasionan cuando no favorecen la autocrítica y eluden su colaboración en el desarrollo social. ABSTRACT This article aims to provide a brief summary of some aspects of the philosophical and theological thought of Abraham Heschel, a Polish rabbi of the 20th century, known for being an advisor and spiritual teacher to Luther King. The text begins with some biographical and contextual aspects of Heschel's life. After that, the central guidelines of Heschel's critique of religion are alluded to, highlighting the authentic intention of religion and showing the dangers of separating it from reason. The simulation of God in religions and the social damage that these cause when they do not favor self-criticism and avoid their collaboration in social development are denounced. (shrink)

El judaísmo posee diversos matices culturales, con características implícitas de la vivencia religiosa según la perspectiva filosófica de Abraham Heschel. Se repasan aspectos biográficos y contextuales de Heschel, a la vez que alude a la importancia que tienen el conocimiento, el compromiso y la celebración en la cosmovisión judía. Se vincula el misticismo con algunas actitudes concretas de la observancia judía, tales como la disposición al estudio, el seguimiento de la Torá y la piedad, y se señala la asociación entre (...) el compromiso espiritual del judaísmo y su concepción de entrecruce de lo infinito y lo finito. (shrink)

The reader will find a proposal of philosophical comprehension of nothingness. The intent of this article is to express in nineteen concrete categories that which can be understood by nothingness in the realm of metaphysics. Among other things: that nothingness is, that there is no manner of directly knowing it, that it contains the world without a will, that it is neither deity nor creator, at the same time that it is un-created, incontingent, atimely, absolute, generator of uncertainty, conditioning, and (...) pre-existing to everything that is; in that sense, nothingness implies movement, is enabling, and is associated to chaos and the cosmos. (shrink)

Resumen El principal objetivo de este escrito reside en mostrar algunos de los elementos esenciales del proyecto eckhartiano que están fusionados con una mística nihilista que observa en la nada una manifestación de la deidad, es decir, una Nadeidad. De hecho, en este artículo se introduce el término referido, comprendiéndolo como una propuesta sobre las maneras de concebir a lo sagrado a partir de la contemplación de la Nada. La atención se centra en algunos sermones elaborados por Eckhart, en dos (...) de sus tratados y en la Bula con la que fueron prohibidos sus escritos.The main objective of this piece resides in demonstrating some of the essential elements of the Eckhartian Project that are fused to a nihilistic mysticism that observes a manifestation of the deity in nothingness; this is to say, a Nothingeity. In fact, said term is introduced in this article, understanding it as a proposal about the manners in which to conceive that which is sacred, based on the contemplation of Nothingness. The attention is centered on some of the sermons elaborated by Eckhart, on two of his treaties and on the Bull, with which his writing was prohibited. (shrink)

The reader will find a proposal of anthropological conception derived from philosophically assuming nothingness. The intention of this article is to express nineteen concrete consequences derived from being a committed nihilist in the contemporary world. Among other things, the anthropological conception proposed along these lines is congruent with the fact that man is because of his own nothingness and can only believe that he knows, that he is hurled into the world, that his will is imaginary, and that he is (...) un-created, finite, contingent, timely, and light, without certainties and without sense. The article likewise explains the human need of creating gods and what man lives after knowing himself to be mobile in a world that is inserted simultaneously into chaos and the cosmos. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This article addresses some of the central aspects of the philosophy proposed by Philip Mainländer. The intention is focused on glimpsing the implications of this author’s thinking, mainly with regard to the attitude derived from the contemplation of the extermination of the human as a consequent solution to the suicide and death of God. The intention of man in the world is analyzed from this perspective and links are offered with authors who have welcomed the rugged and complex paths of (...) compromised nihilism. The text ends with a series of alternatives for the redemption of the human through a philosophy about death and not as a function of death itself. (shrink)

El artículo plantea distintas concepciones que algunas tradiciones filosóficas y religiosas, tanto de Oriente como de Occidente, han mantenido en torno a lo que es el espíritu y la manera de concebirlo. Se analiza la noción de Alianza entre Dios y el hombre y la personalización del espíritu que deriva de ello en el judaísmo; además, se exponen los argumentos que confrontan tal posición y se debate en torno al finalismo espiritual, aludiendo tanto a Spinoza como a Nagarjuna. Con todo (...) ello, se observará que la filosofía, ya sea como herramienta o modo de vida, constituye un antecedente necesario para considerar la metafilosofía, la cual se alude en la tercera parte del texto. (shrink)

Cuauhtémoc HERNÁNDEZ MARTÍNEZ Editorial Universidad de Guanajuato, 2019, 213 pp. Guanajuato, ISBN : 978-607-441-688-6 ISBN : 978-607-441-689-3.

Firms operating in developing economies are increasingly expected to implement CSR practices aligned with recognized global standards. Drawing on extensive field study data in four Latin American countries, we contribute to business ethics scholarship by making visible and explaining firm shortcomings across social, environmental, and governance goals and activities of CSR. Building on and extending sensemaking literature, we find that leaders and managers responsible for their firms’ CSR activities make sense of and justify CSR shortcomings. We specify that justification based (...) on individual, organizational/industry, and macro-environmental influences serves as a mechanism that decouples firms’ actual CSR practices from recognized CSR standards. Further, we propose that detachment, involving disconnection from the local operating environment, underlies the CSR shortcomings of firms. We develop a theoretical multi-level model that specifies justification as a mechanism and detachment as an underlying driver of CSR shortcomings. (shrink)

When the conquerors arrived in the Valley of Mexico, they were amazed at the creations of the culture inherited from the Toltec tradition. With the prurpose of acknowledging this culture, this paper points out that words such as truth, thinking, and doubt have a very different connotation in modern European philosophy, to the Anahuac culture, which flourished in the Valley of Mexico between the 9th and 16th centuries. This writing presents a comparison of the process to obtain true knowledge according (...) to the rationality of the Nahua world of the 16th century and three authors of European modernity: Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Modernity is found to present a dominant and egocentric subject with self-referential thinking. In the Nahua culture the ideal is the man with a "heart of stone" and a "wise face" who seeks what is true, what has roots, and expresses it through poetry, “the flower and the song”. (shrink)

El artículo contiene un conjunto de reflexiones en torno al cambio que corresponde al hombre cuando es capaz de reconocerse ante el abismo de la nada. Obviamente, este encuentro con la nada genera angustia, la cual puede ser un obstáculo para la liberación. De tal modo, la intención de este texto es presentar a la angustia como una consecuencia de la incertidumbre, la cual es propiciada por la necesidad humana de tener todo bajo control; en ese sentido, superar la angustia (...) ante la nada permitirá que el hombre la reconozca como una pauta y posibilidad de liberarse de las estructuras que asfixian y condicionan al individuo. Bajo esa óptica, el artículo termina refiriendo el carácter ineludible del cambio y la importancia de reconocer, como seres humanos del mundo contemporáneo, la nada implícita en el ser. (shrink)

La vuelta de los comunes ha sido la respuesta contrahegemónica más clara del siglo pasado frente al modelo neoliberal de cercamiento y extracción en los sures geográficos y políticos del mundo, específicamente en América Latina. Esto ha probado que los comunes no son solo un hecho existente en la realidad social rural y urbana, sino que, pueden ser vistos desde la óptica institucional y, sobre todo, como un proceso cultural cuyo alcance transformador viene a dar un nuevo valor a estructuras (...) jurídicas y políticas. En el contexto de la pandemia, los comunes han demostrado ser necesarios para responder a las crisis colectivas que afrontamos. Son una resistencia fundamental que busca comunizar los derechos a través de la reapropiación de los espacios que permiten la reproducción de la vida. (shrink)

El asombro ante lo sublime no siempre produce una reacción teísta; de hecho, el reconocimiento de lo absoluto puede conducir a la desacreditación de las representaciones sobre la divinidad e, incluso, a la suspensión del juicio en torno a su existencia. Cuando absoluto no se asocia con algún tipo de personificación, produce incertidumbre. Si nuestros conocimientos están construidos a partir de elaboraciones ficticias, lo único que resta es reconocer la ignorancia. Aceptarlo así no conduce a la negación de los saberes, (...) sino a mostrar escepticismo ante lo sabido. En otras palabras: no saber implica mantener la incertidumbre. Contamos con saberes que delimitan nuestro posicionamiento ante lo que creemos que es real, pero no somos poseedores, en el punto de vista del escéptico, de ningún saber que se sustente en una verdad de la que no se pueda dudar. Visto así, el escéptico muestra respeto a lo absoluto al desistir de afirmar cualquier cosa sobre tal. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se pretende clarificar el significado del pathos de lo divino como atributo de la emocionalidad en Dios. Son señalados algunos aspectos esenciales de la tradición judía, refiriendo los vínculos y controversias temáticas entre Heschel, Maimónides y Spinoza en torno a los atributos de Dios y su relación con los hombres. También se alude la crítica que Spinoza dirigió a la tradición judía y las consecuencias de esa actitud para el pensador holandés, incluyendo el rechazo de otros (...) eruditos del judaísmo. Por último, se explican algunas de las confrontaciones recientes hacia la concepción antropomórfica de lo divino y las implicaciones de asumir que Dios tiene emociones. (shrink)

El artículo inicia con un análisis respecto a la posición de Nishitani en la escuela de Kioto y el peso de la misma en la filosofía occidental. Análogamente, la intención del texto es favorecer la distinción entre los conceptos de nihilidad y vacuidad, ambos presentes en Nishitani, particularmente en su concepción sobre la religión; en tal sentido, se aborda la función de la vivencia de nihilidad y la inapropiada estrategia religiosa de eludir la vivencia de la vacuidad, con lo cual (...) se obstaculiza la experiencia trascendental auténtica. Contrariamente, se propone que cuando la religión es un camino facultativo, orienta a la noción de una nada absoluta o una nada de la Deidad, preámbulo obligado para la comprensión de la filosofía espiritual de Nishitani. (shrink)

En las siguientes páginas el lector encontrará una propuesta de concepción antropológica derivada de asumir filosóficamente a la nada. La intención de este artículo es expresar veinte consecuencias concretas derivadas de ser un nihilista comprometido en el mundo contemporáneo. Entre otras cosas, la concepción antropológica propuesta en estas líneas es congruente con el hecho de que el humano es debido a su propia nada y que sólo puede creer que conoce, que es arrojado al mundo, que su voluntad es imaginaria (...) y que es increado, finito, contingente, temporal, leve, sin certezas y sin sentido; en el artículo se explica, igualmente, la necesidad humana de crear dioses y lo que el hombre vive tras saberse móvil en un mundo que está inserto en el caos y en el cosmos simultáneamente. (shrink)

What grounds the capacity of human agents to engage in individual, temporally extended activity (e.g. a philosopher writing a book), small-scale social interact.

Raimo Tuomela (1940-2020) was a leading figure within social philosophy and a pioneer of contemporary social ontology. His main research and publications helped define the scholarly agenda of a philosophical investigation of social reality. Working first on (social) scientific realism and (social) action theory, he then developed an unprecedented account of collective intentionality—the kind of intentionality that individual agents require in order for them to perform intentional actions together, as a group.

In recent years, some prominent legal philosophers have argued both that law (as a legal system) is a certain kind of abstract artifact and that we can elucidate its nature by elucidating its artifactual properties (e.g., authorship, functionality, etc). In this chapter, I present an objection to their arguments and show that law is not an abstract artifact, but rather a composite, concrete entity. I do so by arguing that law is an institutional practice, the purpose of which is for (...) legal organisations to produce legal artifacts (e.g., laws, legal judgements, international treaties, etc) through the performance of legal activities. Based on this, I next provide an ontological analysis of these artifacts by elaborating on the conditions for their creation and maintenance. By distinguishing law as an institutional practice from legal artifacts as institutional objects created by legal organisations, I intend to advance a more precise ontological account of legal phenomena. (shrink)

Amie L. Thomasson, currently appointed Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College and celebrated as one of the most influential living philosophers, has gained international recognition as a leading figure in metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, and aesthetics. Although her extensive body of work stretches far beyond the topic of this book, it is fair to say that her most notable contributions as well as controversial theses lie in her deflationary approach to ontology, which is why it (...) is the selected theme of this volume. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela, late Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of our time. He published extensively on various topics within social philosophy; particularly, on social action, cooperation, group belief, group responsibility, group reasoning, social practices, and institutions. To celebrate his legacy, this volume engages with and delves deeply into his philosophy of sociality. By gathering original essays from a world-class line-up of social ontologists, (...) social action theorists, and social philosophers, this collection provides the first comprehensive and critical treatment of Tuomela's outstanding contribution to social ontology and collective intentionality. (shrink)

La investigación aborda el dilema que implica la relación entre economía y ética, el cual se deriva de la separación entre filosofía moral y economía positiva. Analizarlo a través de la teoría del bienestar permite acercarse a los preceptos de un cognitivismo ético o de psicología moral, mediante una propuesta distinta de individuo representativo. La finalidad es ofrecer algunos elementos para observar a la economía desde otra perspectiva, al estrechar los lazos teóricos con la ética.

This volume contains the proceedings of the Social Ontology, Normativity, and Philosophy of Law conference, which took place on May 30–31, 2019 at the University of Glasgow. At the invitation of the Social Ontology Research Group, a panel of prominent scholars shed light on a range of key topics within social ontology, normativity, and philosophy of law from an interdisciplinary perspective.