Niels Bohr and Philosophy of Physics: Twenty-First Century Perspectives examines the work, influences and legacy of the Nobel Prize physicist and philosopher of experiment Niels Bohr. While covering Bohr's groundbreaking contribution to quantum mechanics, this collection reveals the philosophers who influenced his work. Linking him to the pragmatist C.I. Lewis and the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding, it draws strong similarities between Bohr's philosophy and the Kantian way of thinking. Addressing the importance of Bohr's views of classical concepts, it discusses how (...) his interpretation of quantum mechanics now compares with a variety of issues that have arisen only since his lifetime, including decoherence and other non-collapse arguments. Balancing historical themes with contemporary ideas, Niels Bohrs and Philosophy of Physics reveals Bohr's on-going contribution to the philosophy of science and confirms his place in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter examines what role new behaviour-modification policies – commonly known as “nudges” – might play in cultivating virtues. At first sight, they would appear to be ruled out as a candidate means; but, by offering a more nuanced analysis, the chapter argues that some nudges have virtue-cultivating properties. It distinguishes between two kinds of nudges – 'automatic-behavioural' and 'discernment-developing' – and shows that what divides them is the ability of the latter, which the former lacks, to play an ecological-educative (...) role in developing the virtue of practical reason, which is required for the other virtues too. It thus provides an answer to the question of whether virtue-cultivating nudges are possible, while remaining neutral on whether virtue cultivation is, or under what conditions it could be, a legitimate aim of liberal-democratic states. (shrink)

Farmers, especially those within historically underserved populations, utilize networks to access educational training, community support, and market opportunities. Through a case study of the Pennsylvania Women's Agriculture Network's three-year Women's Rural–Urban Network (WRUN) initiative, this research analyzes the process of developing solidarity across geographic and racial lines while building a statewide farmers' network. Applying White's (2018) Collective Agency Community Resilience (CACR) theoretical framework to this initiative offers a way to evaluate how socially marginalized groups in agriculture build farmers’ networks to (...) resist oppression within the white heteropatriarchal agricultural system. This research draws on interviews with 12 steering committee members and three years of participant observation to understand how participants assessed the initiative. Findings suggest that changes to existing programming were influential in creating a place for diverse women farmers and growers to meet, thus contributing to prefigurative politics; however, the inability to form commons as praxis and economic autonomy due to divergent needs, varying roles in the agrifood system, and different levels of engagement with racial justice deterred network-building efforts. This initiative examines food justice theory through praxis. Findings offer insights for predominately white non-profits, research institutions, and activists in future anti-racism and food justice efforts in the agrifood system. (shrink)

I argue for an account of grasping, or understanding that, on which we grasp via a higher-order mental act of Husserlian fulfillment. Fulfillment is the act of matching up the objects of our phenomenally presentational experiences with those of our phenomenally representational thought. Grasping-by-fulfilling is importantly different from standard epistemic aims, in part because it is phenomenal rather than inferential. (I endorse Bourget’s 2017 arguments to that effect.) I show that grasping-by-fulfilling cannot be a species of propositional knowledge or belief, (...) and that it is not essentially connected to justification. I motivate a revisionary epistemology on which achieving propositional knowledge and coming to grasp are dual epistemic aims. My account makes sense of a common occurrence—that we are often unmoved to act on our beliefs until we come to phenomenally experience them in some way. It also explains puzzling features of human inquiry. (shrink)

Better Choices is not just the title of this book. It is also a goal for everyone who invests the time to complete the program. In Better Choices, Dr. Faye Hargrove guides you through the Decision Reframing Process to let go of the stored negative emotions that impact the decisions you make every day.

Traditionally, philosophers have argued that epistemology is a normative discipline and therefore occupied with an a priori analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions that a belief must fulfill to be acceptable as knowledge. But such an approach makes sense only if human knowledge has some normative features, which conceptual analysis is able to disclose. As it turns out, philosophers have not been able to find such features unless they are very selective in their choice of examples of knowledge. Much (...) of what we intuitively think functions as knowledge, both in human and non-human animals, does not share these normative features. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate that natural selection has adapted human sense impressions to deliver reliable information without meeting the traditional commitments for having knowledge. In connection with memory, sensory and bodily information provides an animal with experiential knowledge. Experiential knowledge helps an animal to navigate its environment. Moreover, experiential knowledge has different functions depending on whether the deliverance of information stems from the organism’s external or internal senses. (shrink)

In einer Mixed-Methods-Studie werden elf neu zugewanderten Schüler*innen in der Jahrgangsstufe Einführungsphase am Gymnasium im Rahmen einer Unterrichtsreihe Texte in Easy-to-Read-Versionen (Deutsch: Leichte Sprache) vorgelegt und sowohl sprachliche/fachliche als auch emotionale/soziale Auswirkungen auf die Lernenden untersucht. Außerdem wird ein auf die Zielgruppe angepasstes, zweifach gestuftes Regelwerk für die Erstellung solcher Textversionen entwickelt und Rahmenbedingungen für dessen Einsatz konkretisiert. Ziel ist es, dass neu zugewanderten Schüler*innen, die u.U. wenig oder kaum Englisch können, aber aufgrund ihres Alters in eher fortgeschrittene Englischlerngruppen eingegliedert (...) werden, dennoch die Möglichkeit haben, sich im Englischunterricht einzubringen und mit der peer group zu lernen. Dabei übernimmt das Easy-to-Read eine Brückenfunktion, bis dem Englischunterricht auf Regelniveau gefolgt werden kann. Die AutorinMichaela Quast ist seit 2016 abgeordnete Studienrätin in der fachdidaktischen Abteilung des Englischen Seminars I der Universität zu Köln. (shrink)

Kompetenzorientierung in der Beschreibung von Handlungsmoglichkeiten, Haltungen und Einstellungen, die in Lernprozessen erworben werden, erweist sich als zentraler Anspruch in der Erstellung von Lehrplanen und Curricula im padagogischen Feld - gleichgultig ob im Primar-, Sekundar- oder Tertiarbereich. DAmit verbunden ist fur Lehrende die Herausforderung, "asthetische Kompetenz" zu definieren. DIeser Aufgabe stellten sich Vertreterinnen und Vertreter aus Musik- und Kunstpadagogik, Musik-, Literatur- und Kunstwissenschaft, Philosophie und Psychologie in einer Tagung in Salzburg.

The philosophy of the humanistic sciences has been a blind-spot in analytic philosophy. This book argues that by adopting a pragmatic analysis of explanation and interpretation it is possible to show that scientific practice of humanistic sciences can be understood on similar lines to scientific practice of natural and social sciences.

The purpose of this paper is to advance research on CSR beyond the stalemate of economic versus ethical models by providing an alternative perspective integrating existing views and allowing for more shared dialog and research in the field. It is suggested that we move beyond making a normative case for ethical models and practices of CSR by moving beyond the question of how to manage organizational self-interest toward the question of how accurate current conceptions of the organizational self seem to (...) be. Specifically, it is proposed that CSR is not a question of how self-interested the corporation should be, but how this self is defined. Economic and ethical models of CSR are not models of opposition but exist on a continuum between egoic and post-egoic, illusory and authentic conceptions of the organizational self. This means that moving from one to the other is not a question of adopting different paradigms but rather of moving from illusion and dysfunction to authenticity and functionality, from pathology to health. (shrink)

I explore the view that metaphysics is essentially imaginative. I argue that the central goal of metaphysics on this view is understanding, not truth. Metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative provides novel answers to challenges to both the value and epistemic status of metaphysics.

I first quickly outline what I think grasping is, and suggest that it is both among our basic aims of inquiry and not essentially tied to belief, justification, or knowledge. Then, I briefly look at some places in the metaphysics of science in which it looks like our aim of grasping and our aim in knowing—or perhaps more specifically in knowing the explanations for things—might seem to conflict. I will use this conflict to support a broader view: sometimes, we might (...) develop philosophical views or theories—and even endorse them—in order to better grasp them, regardless of whether we genuinely believe them, or are justified in so doing. At other times, we may be aiming at propositional knowledge. These aims can come apart, and perhaps even systematically come apart. A pluralism about the value of those aims doesn’t entail an “anything goes” attitude with respect to how we think about what philosophical views to put forward, defend, or endorse, however—far from it. Instead, it suggests that what counts as a virtue of a philosophical theory depends on our aims in espousing it. If philosophers have distinct aims at the meta-level, it will be hard for them to engage in joint theory evaluation at the first-order level. At least all three of theoretical virtues, evaluative judgments of philosophical views, and what attitudes we ought to have towards the views we ourselves espouse will vary according to our guiding metaphilosophical aims. (shrink)

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground ) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even (...) on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground. (shrink)

Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.

Abstract‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘One True Logic’; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind‐and‐language‐independent world; and third, that the mind‐and‐language‐independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, (...) I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism. (shrink)

N'y a-t-il pas une contradiction dans l'oeuvre d'Arendt? On y trouve une description critique du totalitarisme national-socialiste, mais aussi l'apologie de Heidegger érigé, malgré son éloge de la "vérité interne et grandeur" du mouvement nazi, en roi secret de la pensée. L'étude des Origines du totalitarisme montre qu'Arendt développe une vision heideggérienne de la modernité. Dans Condition de l'homme moderne, la conception déshumanisée de l'humanité au travail et le discrédit jeté sur nos sociétés égalitaires procèdent également de Heidegger. En outre, (...) des lettres inédites montrent qu'Arendt a décidé de marcher sur les pas de Heidegger avant leurs retrouvailles de l'année 1950. Il s'agit d'une adhésion intellectuelle, irréductible à la seule passion amoureuse, et qui mérite d'être prise au sérieux. Certes, Arendt ne partage pas l'antisémitisme exterminateur de Heidegger confirmé par ses Cahiers noirs. Que devient cependant la pensée, instrumentalisée dans l'opposition - nouveau mythe moderne - entre Heidegger, le "penseur" retiré sur les hauteurs neigeuses de sa hutte de Todtnauberg, et Eichmann, l'exécutant sans pensée, le "clown" muré dans sa cage de verre? (shrink)

Forms of understanding -- Understanding as organized beliefs -- On interpretation -- Representations -- Scientific explanation -- Causal explanations -- Other types of explanations -- The pragmatics of explanation -- Not just why-questions -- A rhetorical approach to explanation -- Pluralism and the unity of science.

Forms of understanding -- Understanding as organized beliefs -- On interpretation -- Representations -- Scientific explanation -- Causal explanations -- Other types of explanations -- The pragmatics of explanation -- Not just why-questions -- A rhetorical approach to explanation -- Pluralism and the unity of science.

Jean-Pierre Faye analyse la conférence méconnue de Carl Schmitt : « Economie saine dans un Etat fort », tenue le 23 novembre 1932 devant les membres de « L’Union au Long Nom » (ou « Union pour la conservation des intérêts économiques communs en Rhénanie et Westphalie »). Schmitt y énonce la nécessité pour l’Allemagne d’un « Etat total », équivalent allemand à ses yeux de « l’État totalitaire » de l’Italie fasciste. Cette prise de parole aura un effet décisif (...) : trente-cinq représentants de la finance et de l’industrie allemandes, auditeurs de la conférence, adresseront une pétition à Hindenburg, président du Reich. Ils l’inciteront à appeler le « chef du grand mouvement » au poste de chancelier du Reich. Ce « mouvement » est le déjà criminel NSDAP : le Parti national-socialiste ouvrier allemand, le parti « nazi ». Le 30 janvier 33, Hitler sera chancelier. En neuf semaines, la conférence de Schmitt aura eu pour effet d’abattre tous les obstacles à l’avènement du Troisième Reich. La formule de « l’Etat total » a donc su transmettre aux temps et aux langages une charge à l’énergie insoupçonnée, porteuse des plus grands crimes. Ainsi est révélée la responsabilité centrale de Schmitt dans la mise en place du nazisme. Ce juriste, qui étrangement apparaît pour beaucoup aujourd’hui comme un penseur politique de référence, n’a d’abord avancé qu’une seule carte d’un jeu mortifère. Mais c’était une carte maîtresse, elle était dangereusement efficace pour faire passer le pire dans l’Histoire. Il était intéressant de lire en parallèle les « Journaux » de Schmitt et de mesurer l’attention portée par le juriste aux événements, dans les semaines qui précèdent et suivent l’arrivée d’Hitler à la chancellerie du Reich. Ce qui frappe est cependant la banalité quotidienne qui transparaît dans ces notes. Si ce n’est, peut-être, qu’un mot va lui paraître acquérir un poids nouveau : « Jude », « juif ». C’est son propre rôle, dans le nazisme, à lui Carl Schmitt, qu’il va découvrir par là... (shrink)

Event of Signature formulates a new philosophical problem which focuses on the handwritten signature as sign of legal identification. Author Michaela Fišerová works with three metaphysical expectations, which are shared in discourses of graphology and forensic analysis. The first expectation tends to reveal the signer's soul: a handwritten signature "naturally" mirrors the unique psychological qualities of the signer. The second expectation tends to guarantee the originality of the signer's trace: a handwritten signature proves physical contact between the signed document (...) and the writing tool "authentically" moved by the signer's hand. The third expectation tends to recognize the signer's legal identity: a handwritten signature is expected to reproduce the signer's personal style, which enables identification by legal authorities. In a methodologically inventive and semiotically-based dialogue with Derrida's deconstruction, Fišerová situates this triple expectation in the interval between life and law. Challenging coverage of this topic finally shows that none of the metaphysical expectations will ever be fulfilled in the event of manual signing. Legal uses of handwritten signature are characterized by the complex aporia of repeating the unrepeatable. (shrink)

Bien au-delà de la seule philosophie, le débat à Davos en 1929 entre Cassirer et Heidegger a marqué l'histoire des idées. Il a même donné naissance à des récits passablement légendaires qui négligeaient le contexte historique précis. Un nouveau regard s'impose, à la lumière des œuvres publiées depuis lors. Les vingt-cinq tomes de l'édition allemande de référence de Cassirer ne sont disponibles que depuis 2007.0S'y s'ajoutent les dix-sept tomes du Nachlass depuis 2017. Des 102 volumes de la Gesamtausgabe de Heidegger, (...) édition de référence mais sans garantie scientifique, moins d'une dizaine reste programmée, mais d'ores et déjà la publication des cinq premiers volumes des Cahiers noirs a permis d'engager une relecture critique de l'ensemble. C'est donc à présent seulement que l'on peut véritablement évaluer les projets contrastés des deux auteurs.0Leurs enjeux intéressent notamment le statut de la rationalité et des sciences, en particulier celles de la culture, aussi bien que le statut de la technique parmi les formes symboliques. Et tout autant, l'opposition entre la démocratie et la théologie politique ; entre la légitimité du cosmopolitisme et l'ontologie identitaire ; enfin, entre la possibilité même d'une éthique ou son rejet de principe.0Tous ces thèmes contradictoires exigent aujourd'hui une révision critique, non seulement rétrospective, mais aussi ancrée dans le présent. Car au-delà même de la philosophie, des courants de pensée et des forces politiques en Europe et dans le monde poursuivent ces deux voies qui s'opposent aujourd'hui. (shrink)

While the technical aspects of engineering are emphasized in education and industry, the ethical aspects are, in some ways, just as vital. Engineering instructors should teach undergraduates about their ethical responsibilities in the realm of engineering. Students would then be more likely to grasp their responsibilities as professionals. For many students, undergraduate study is a time of growth and change, with their ethical development just beginning to take shape. In this study, we aim to understand the progression of ethical development (...) for engineering undergraduate students and identify key factors that may contribute to their development. To help us assess ethical development, we deployed in Fall 2020 a survey to undergraduate engineering students at two universities; the survey entailed the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2). The DIT-2 evaluates ethical development based on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development; the test recognizes three levels of morality—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional. This study evaluates the associations between students’ university and class year and their Personal Interest, Maintaining Norms, and N2 scores. We utilized the results of a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to address the following research question: _Is a student’s ethical development associated with their university and class year?_ The results of the analysis reveal that students’ ethical development appear to differ between universities and to lie along a continuum, changing from first-year students to seniors of engineering undergraduate study. (shrink)

This primer of research on how television affects children and families is organized around the perceptions and insights of four ordinary families who are raising their children without any television in their homes. Readers will learn about the methods and findings of over 40 years of research on TV and, in the process, may change the way they look at television forever.

This paper compares two explanations of the process by which human communication systems evolve: iterated learning and social collaboration. It then reports an experiment testing the social collaboration account. Participants engaged in a graphical communication task either as a member of a community, where they interacted with seven different partners drawn from the same pool, or as a member of an isolated pair, where they interacted with the same partner across the same number of games. Participants’ horizontal, pair‐wise interactions led (...) “bottom up” to the creation of an effective and efficient shared sign system in the community condition. Furthermore, the community‐evolved sign systems were as effective and efficient as the local sign systems developed by isolated pairs. Finally, and as predicted by a social collaboration account, and not by an iterated learning account, interaction was critical to the creation of shared sign systems, with different isolated pairs establishing different local sign systems and different communities establishing different global sign systems. (shrink)

I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a (...) way to rule out theses like quantifier variance without appealing to fundamentality, grounding, or "levels" of reality. (shrink)

Adolescents, in many jurisdictions, have the power to consent to life saving treatment but not necessarily the power to refuse it. A recent defence of this asymmetry is Neil Manson's theory of ‘transitional paternalism’. Transitional paternalism holds that such asymmetries are by-products of sharing normative powers. However, sharing normative powers by itself does not entail an asymmetry because transitional paternalism can be implemented in two ways. Manson defends the asymmetry-generating version of transitional paternalism in the clinical context, arguing that it (...) maximizes respect for adolescent autonomy. This article offers an alternative argument in favour of the asymmetry-generating form of transitional paternalism, one that makes appeal to obligations that individuals have to develop self-governance in others. We should share normative powers asymmetrically in the clinical context for three reasons. First, the asymmetric version of transitional paternalism takes seriously duties to support adolescents’ developing autonomy, alongside other duties that adults have to young people. It does so by enabling young people to be involved in important decisions that they would otherwise be excluded from. This is of value because participation of this sort is central to the cultivation of their self-governance. Second, only the asymmetric version gives young people a voice in respect of all clinical actions, and only the asymmetric version leaves open the possibility that the coarse lines of legislation might be ‘fine-tuned’ in individual cases. Third, the asymmetric sharing of normative powers is consistent with the kind of social arrangements that best support autonomy. (shrink)

Dans cette longue lettre à Benoît Peeters, Jean-Pierre Faye revient sur les péripéties de la fondation du Collège international de philosophie, sous l’égide de Jean-Pierre Chevènement alors ministre de la recherche, dans les années 1981-1982. Il laisse entendre quel rôle ambigu – et relativement peu élégant - a joué Derrida dans cette affaire de fondation. Mais la lettre pousse plus loin. Ces circonstances relatives à la création du Collège international de philosophie ne sont qu’un cadre narratif. Il s’agit en fait (...) de questionner l’origine des fameux concepts derridiens de « déconstruction » et de « logocentrisme ». En ce qui concerne « déconstruction », qui traduit l’usage du mot « Abbau » chez Heidegger, Jean-Pierre Faye en montre le contexte inquiétant : la pensée féroce de la « race » sous le Reich nazi. Quant au « logocentrisme », le nom et l’idée d’un combat à mener contre les prétentions de la raison (« logos ») naissent dans les feuilles d’un certain Ludwig Klages, psychiatre désigné par Goering lui-même comme « Reichsführer der Psychotherapie ». Führer de la psychothérapie... (shrink)

The publication aims to make suggestions for a 'decolonisation of aesthetics' within an Afro-European framework. The texts (whose authors come from different cultural contexts between Germany, France, Senegal, Benin, Nigeria and Tunesia) do not only refer to heterogenous aesthetic practices understood as subversive and decolonial strategies, but also discuss philosophical questions of a renewed (non-in)dividual humanism. The artistic practices analyzed include artistic installations and ensembles as well as actions in urban and rural space, deceptive manœuvres at the borders and their (...) photographic documentation, and many more. (shrink)

The present article deals with specific normative concepts of Spinoza’s ethical system and compares them to certain aspects of the theory of ethics of social consequences. At first, a way to approach the problem of normativity in Spinoza is presented, concentrating on the obligatory character of rational - or intellectual - motives. Then, theoretical evidence is presented which links Spinoza to normative-ethical consequentialism. The basis for a consequentialist model of Spinoza’s ethics is the concept of perfection, and on this basis (...) it seems possible to consider its compatibility with non-utilitarian forms of consequentialism, such as ethics of social consequences. Conclusively, the paper’s aim is to present the possibility of considering Spinozian consequentialism as a non-utilitarian consequentialism, while considering ethics of social consequences as a contemporary form of Spinozian consequentialism. (shrink)

Recent advances in spatially resolved transcriptomics have greatly expanded the knowledge of complex multicellular biological systems. The field has quickly expanded in recent years, and several new technologies have been developed that all aim to combine gene expression data with spatial information. The vast array of methodologies displays fundamental differences in their approach to obtain this information, and thus, demonstrate method‐specific advantages and shortcomings. While the field is moving forward at a rapid pace, there are still multiple challenges presented to (...) be addressed, including sensitivity, labor extensiveness, tissue‐type dependence, and limited capacity to obtain detailed single‐cell information. No single method can currently address all these key parameters. In this review, available spatial transcriptomics methods are described and their applications as well as their strengths and weaknesses are discussed. Future developments are explored and where the field is heading to is deliberated upon. (shrink)

Drugged bodies are commonly depicted as passive, suffering and abject, which makes it hard for them to be known in other ways. Wanting to get closer to these alternative bodies and their resourcefulness for living, I turned to body-mapping as an inventive method for telling different kinds of drug-using stories. Drawing on a research project with people who inject heroin and crack cocaine in London, UK, I employed body-mapping as a way of studying drugged bodies in their relation to others, (...) human and non-human, in the injecting event. I invited participants to draw their bodies in describing these otherwise hard-to-articulate experiences. Following Donna Haraway, I conceptualise body-mapping as a more-than-human mode of storytelling where different kinds of bodies can be known. Here, I look at three such bodies – sensing-bodies, temporal-bodies and environment-bodies – and argue that it is through being able to respond to such bodies that more hospitable ways of living with drugs can become possible. (shrink)

In Koriat's paper ''The Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control,'' he asserts that the feeling of knowing straddles the implicit and explicit, and that these conscious feelings enter into a conscious control process that is necessary for controlled behavior. This assertion allows him to make many speculations on the nature of consciousness itself. We agree that feelings of knowing are produced through a monitoring of one's knowledge, and that this monitoring can affect the control of behavior (...) such as whether or not to search memory for an answer. Further, we believe that monitoring of performance with a strategy can also affect cognition control and strategy selection; however, we also believe that frequently this monitoring and control occurs without conscious awareness. Feeling of knowing has received an inordinate amount of attention because it lies behind the highly recognizable tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon that represents one of the rare cases of conscious monitoring. There are other feelings of knowing which are much more common and are not accompanied by conscious awareness. These are evident in the early selection of a strategy for answering a problem. In our view, the research on feeling of knowing will not resolve the question of whether consciousness is merely epiphenomenal. (shrink)