We distinguish the question whether only human minds are equipped with a language of thought (LoT) from the question whether human minds employ a single uniquely human learning mechanism. Thus separated, our answer to both questions is negative. Even very simple minds employ a LoT. And the comparative data reviewed by Penn et al. actually suggest that there are many distinctively human learning mechanisms.

Das Verhältnis von westdeutscher Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Indien veränderte sich ab den frühen 1950ern auf besondere Weise. Nach einem kräftigen Wirtschaftswachstum sahen deutsche Politiker und Unternehmer den Handel mit Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländern als Unterstützung für einen anhaltenden Wirtschaftsaufschwung. In einer programmatischen Schrift trug Wirtschaftsminister Ludwig Erhard 1953 diesem Gedanken mit Bezug zum währungspolitisch wichtigen Sterling-Raum und Indien als seinem größten Wirtschaftsblock Rechnung. In ordnungspolitischer Tradition sollte der Export deutscher technischer Hilfe und Kapitalgüter die indische Wirtschaftskraft erhöhen und so langfristig (...) einen neuen Markt für deutsche Konsumgüter erschließen. Dieses neue Verständnis von Außenwirtschaftspolitik war gewissermaßen symptomatisch für die Zeit, stand aber auch der späteren Herausbildung einer Entwicklungshilfepolitik nicht entgegen. Auswirkungen dieser Politik fanden sich nicht nur im deutschen Handelsregelwerk für Indien, sondern vor allem in der staatlichen Durchsetzung privatwirtschaftlicher Initiativen in Indien. Hilfeleistungen und Investitionen etablierten die BRD als führende Wirtschaftsnation in Indien. Allerdings war das westdeutsche Ringen um neue Märkte in blockfreien Staaten wie Indien vornehmlich Ausdruck wachsender politischer Konkurrenz mit Ländern des Ostblocks. Für die BRD war Indien aufgrund des Alleinvertretungsanspruchs gegenüber der DDR und aufgrund des Ost-West-Konflikts gegenüber anderen Ostblock-Staaten wichtig. -/- Trotz dieser prägnanten Entwicklung im deutsch-indischen Wirtschaftsaustausch in der Frühzeit des Kalten Krieges gibt es wenige historische Betrachtungen über das Gesamtbild und über einzelne Unternehmensinitiativen. Bisherige Arbeiten behandeln die Entwicklung der bundesdeutschen Südasienpolitik und die von Wirtschaftsinteressen geleiteten Grundlagen westdeutscher Entwicklungshilfe in Indien. Überblicksbetrachtungen thematisieren beide Aspekte selten zusammen. Zudem benennen die genannten Arbeiten bundesdeutsche und privatwirtschaftliche Initiativen, diskutieren dann aber hauptsächlich staatliche Interessen. Für das deutsch-indische Wirtschaftsgeschehen war aber gerade das Verhältnis von Akteuren und Institutionen der deutschen Politik und Wirtschaft relevant. Gab es hier ein Ungleichgewicht der Kräfte oder traten gar Konflikte auf? Für andere Weltregionen streicht die Literatur beispielsweise besondere Fürsprecher innerhalb der deutschen Industrie heraus. Gab es auch einen direkten Fürsprecher für Indien? Obwohl die indische Wirtschaft nach 1947 neuerdings als dynamischer und offener betrachtet wird, gehen lokale und globale Wirtschaftsentwicklungen und der Einfluss ausländischer Politik- und Wirtschaftsinteressen auf die indische Wirtschaftsentwicklung bisher kaum in die Analysen ein. -/- Diese Forschungslücken nimmt der vorliegende Beitrag zum Anlass, die Entwicklung deutsch-indischer Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Frühzeit des Kalten Krieges genauer zu untersuchen. Dabei wird insbesondere gefragt, wie sich westdeutsche Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Indien zwischen den 1950er und 1970er Jahren unter dem Einfluss außenwirtschaftspolitischer Maßgaben veränderten. Wie einleitend erwähnt, waren diese Wirtschaftsbeziehungen das Resultat einer dynamischen Beziehung von Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsinteressen während des Ost-West-Konflikts. Da sich politische und wirtschaftliche Umstände auf besondere Weise in der Förderung dieses Wirtschaftsaustausches niederschlugen, fokussiert der Artikel vor allem auf die Verschränkung verschiedener für den Wirtschaftsaustausch wichtiger Themen und Akteure auf der höheren Ebene von Politik und Wirtschaft als auch auf der Mikroebene bestimmter Unternehmensinitiativen. -/- Der Artikel gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Der erste Teil betrachtet den größeren politischen und wirtschaftlichen Rahmen deutsch-indischer Wirtschaftsbeziehungen vor dem Hintergrund neuer lokaler, globaler und transnationaler Verschiebungen. Dabei wird Entwicklungshilfe als Kristallisationspunkt von westdeutscher Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Indien verstanden. Im zweiten Teil fokussiert der Artikel auf das damals größte westdeutsche Industrieprojekt in Indien – den Aufbau des Hüttenwerks in Rourkela. An diesem Beispiel wird sowohl das steigende deutsche Interesse an Indien als auch die Veränderungen außenwirtschaftspolitischer Leitlinien und wirtschaftlicher Interessen behandelt. (shrink)

In an attempt to precisely model Foucault's concept of heterotopy in the context of literary studies, this book describes its application to the paradigm of textuality. Drawing on Roman Jakobson's two-aspects theory, it reveals the cross-epochal process of heterotopy as paradigmatic deviation, and shows epoch-specific variations in the example of romantic-metaphoric versus realistic-metonymic logics of space.

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

Zusammenfassung Die „romantische Liebe“ bildet unter modernen Bedingungen eine zentrale Quelle sozialer Anerkennung. Ihr nicht selten durch die Verwendung religiöser Semantik signalisierter Bedeutungszuwachs sorgt aber zugleich für eine Steigerung der Verletzlichkeit des einzelnen. Der damit beschriebenen spannungsvollen Eigenart, die der Anerkennungssphäre der Liebe unter modernen Bedingungen zukommt, wird in diesem Text nachgegangen. Dabei stehen zwei Autorinnen der Gegenwart, die sich mit den Ambivalenzen heutiger Liebesbeziehungen besonders eindrücklich auseinandergesetzt haben, im Fokus: die Kultursoziologin Eva Illouz und die Schriftstellerin Sally Rooney. Nach (...) einem einführenden Blick auf die den beiden Autorinnen gemeinsame Thematik, geht es um spezifische Unsicherheitserfahrungen, die sich mit dem Aufstieg der Liebe zu einer zentralen Anerkennungssphäre verbinden. Dann wird die für romantische Beziehungen ebenfalls charakteristische Spannung zwischen Anerkennung und Autonomie ins Auge gefasst. Es folgen schließlich theologische Überlegungen, die an Illouz‘ eigene Ausführungen zur religiösen Dimension der Liebe anknüpfen. (shrink)

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.

This paper presents three interpretations of the infamous “sailor / ship” sentence that concludes Aristotle’s De Anima II.1. The first two interpretations represent the ones most popular in contemporary scholarship; the final is the author’s original. The interpretations are then evaluated with respect to grammatical plausibility and explanatory strength. The paper makes a case that the new reading answers to both points of evaluation and contributes to an interpretive approach to Aristotle that values the coherence and cogency of his De (...) Anima as a whole. (shrink)

Infrastructure-making in interwar India was a dynamic, multilayered process involving roads and vehicles in urban and rural sites. One of their strongest playgrounds was Bombay Presidency and the Central Provinces in central and western India. Focusing on this region in the interwar period, this paper analyzes the varied relationship between peasant households and town-centred modernizing agents in the making of road transport infrastructures. The central argument of this paper is about the persistence of bullock carts over motor cars in the (...) region. This persistence was grounded in the specific regional environment, the effects of the 1930s economic depression, and the priorities of social classes. Pinpointing these connections, the paper highlights that “modernization” of infrastructure was not a simple, linear process of progressivist change, nor did it mean the survival of apparently “old” technologies in the modern era. Instead, the paper pays attention to conflicting social complexities, implications, and meanings of the connection between infrastructure and modernity that modernization assumptions often overlook. Here, the paper shows how technological change occurred as a result of real, material class interests pulling infrastructural technology in different directions. This was where and why arguments of road-motor lobbyists and cart advocates eventually clashed, and Gandhian social workers resisted motor transport in defense of peasant interests. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Am Beispiel der häufig zum Symptom eines narzisstischen Zeitalters erklärten Selfie-Praxis wird in diesem Text das Verhältnis von Selbstdarstellung und Verkündigung bedacht. Das in den Sozialen Medien verbreitete Phänomen, sich selbst zum Bild zu machen und anderen Bilder von sich selbst zu präsentieren, tritt dabei als ein religiös grundiertes Unterfangen vor Augen. Eine Sehnsucht nach unvergänglicher Gegenwart lässt sich in der Selfie-Praxis ebenso artikuliert finden wie ein Bewusstsein für die undarstellbare Dimension des individuellen Selbst. Beide Aspekten werden zudem als (...) Versuch eines produktiven Umgangs mit herausfordernden Entwicklungen der Moderne verstanden: mit der durch den sozialen Beschleunigungsdruck hervorgerufenen Gegenwartsschrumpfung auf der einen und dem Zwang zur digitalen Selbstpräsentation auf der anderen Seite. Mithin lässt sich das im Selfie zum Ausdruck kommende Bewusstsein auf die Rede von Gott beziehen: auf Gott als Korrelat jener Sehnsucht nach unvergänglicher Gegenwart und als Inbegriff einer dem menschlichen Selbst unsichtbar eingeschriebenen Lebendigkeit. In dieser ihm innewohnenden Verweisstruktur lässt sich das Selfie selbst als verkündigungsförmig ansehen, was den auch in der Theologie verbreiteten Narzissmusvorwurf gegenüber religiösen Selbstdarstellungspraktiken nicht nur in der Predigtarbeit entkräften sollte. (shrink)

At the end of Book III, chapter 4 of Aristotle’s Politics, Aristotle identifies the virtue peculiar to the excellent ruler as prudence. The ruled’s complementary virtue is true opinion. All the other virtues are held in common, albeit in different forms. Why these habits? The answer to this question lies in Aristotle’s discussion of the good man and the serious citizen in III.4, and of the rule of law in III.16.

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...) on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. (shrink)

Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.

At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, (...) and Stereotype Threat,” and “Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.” The first part contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and “dual process” models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second part contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. (shrink)

In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.

Dignity plays a central role in current thinking about law and human rights, but there is sharp disagreement about its meaning. Combining conceptual precision with a broad historical background, Michael Rosen puts these controversies in context and offers a novel, constructive proposal. “Penetrating and sprightly...Rosen rightly emphasizes the centrality of Catholicism in the modern history of human dignity. His command of the history is impressive...Rosen is a wonderful guide to the recent German constitutional thinking about human dignity...[Rosen] is in (...) general an urbane and witty companion, achieving his aim of accessibly written philosophy.” —Samuel Moyn, The Nation “[An] elegant, interesting and lucid exploration of the concept of dignity...Drawing on classical, liberal and Catholic traditions, Rosen hopes to rehabilitate dignity to its rightful place near the centre of moral thought...Rosen's admirable book deserves wide attention from political theorists, jurisprudes and political philosophers.” —Simon Blackburn, Times Higher Education “Dignity deserves to be widely read, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also as a corrective to the habit of discussing such topics in abstraction from their social context. Whether or not one agrees with Rosen's arguments, there can be no doubt he has widened our horizons.” —Rae Langton, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.

edition (unseen), $12.95. traditions, bringing into being new modes of understanding. Paper Anthropology, and particularly ethnography, is torn between two quests, one to capture the diversity of social life and the other to discover universal principles structuring that diversity. Jackson examines these quests within the context of ethnographic fieldwork, focusing on the relationship between ethnographers and the people they study. He is concerned with defining the anthropological project as something more than the projection of the anthropologist's traditions and concerns onto (...) an alien culture. Rather, he would have the project open a genuine dialogue between people from different cultures or Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other types of value (...) may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. This book investigates the nature of intrinsic value: just what it is for something to be valuable for its own sake, just what sort of thing can have such value, just how such a value is to be computed. In the final chapter, the fruits of this investigation are applied to a discussion of pleasure, pain, and displeasure and also of moral virtue and vice, in order to determine just what value lies within these phenomena. (shrink)

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)

In previous work I have argued against internalism by means of a dilemma intended to force all internalists to accept one of two undesirable options: either their internalism is unmotivated or it is saddled with vicious regress problems. Recently it has been argued that Phenomenal Conservatism—a theory of justification according to which justification depends on seemings—is a kind of internalism that can escape this dilemma. In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism cannot escape my dilemma for internalism. In order (...) to do this, it is helpful to get clear on what Phenomenal Conservatism is saying, and for that reason I begin, in section I, by examining in some detail what seemings are. I then argue, in the remainder of the paper, that, whichever horn of the dilemma for internalism they take, Phenomenal Conservatives are in trouble. (shrink)

Can an ugly experiment be a good experiment? Philosophers have identified many beautiful experiments and explored ways in which their beauty might be connected to their epistemic value. In contrast, the present chapter seeks out (and celebrates) ugly experiments. Among the ugliest are those being designed by AI algorithms. Interestingly, in the contexts where such experiments tend to be deployed, low aesthetic value correlates with high epistemic value. In other words, ugly experiments can be good. Given this, we should conclude (...) that beauty is not generally necessary or sufficient for epistemic value, and increasing beauty will not generally tend to increase epistemic value. (shrink)

Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are, in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how best to respond to the challenge it presents. In the tradition of the 18th century Scottish (...) philosopher, Thomas Reid, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition joins this discussion by taking up four main tasks. First, it identifies the strongest arguments for radical skepticism, namely, underdetermination arguments, which emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Second, it rejects all inferential or argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to lay out good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are probably true. Third, it develops a commonsense noninferential response to radical skepticism with two distinctive features: it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and rationality, and it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Fourth, and finally, it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity, disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way. (shrink)

A paradigm-shifting work that revolutionizes our understanding of the origins and structure of science. Captivatingly written, interwoven with tantalizing illustrations and historical vignettes ranging from Newton's alchemy to quantum mechanics to the storm surge of Hurricane Sandy, Michael Strevens's wholly original investigation of science asks two fundamental questions: Why is science so powerful? And why did it take so long, two thousand years after the invention of philosophy and mathematics, for the human race to start using science to learn (...) the secrets of nature? The Knowledge Machine's radical answer is that science calls on its practitioners to do something irrational: by willfully ignoring religion, theoretical beauty, and, especially, philosophy-essentially stripping away all previous knowledge-scientists embrace an unnaturally narrow method of inquiry, channeling unprecedented energy into observation and experimentation. Like Yuval Harari's Sapiens or Thomas Kuhn's 1962 classic, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The Knowledge Machine overturns much of what we thought we knew about the origins of the modern world. (shrink)

Imagination is important for many things in science: solving problems, interpreting data, designing studies, etc. Philosophers of imagination typically account for the productive role played by imagination in science by focusing on how imagination is constrained, e.g., by using self-imposed rules to infer logically, or model events accurately. But the constraints offered by these philosophers either constrain too much, or not enough, and they can never account for uses of imagination that are needed to break today’s constraints in order to (...) make progress tomorrow. Thus, epistemology of imagination needs to make room for an element of epistemological anarchy. (shrink)

Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings is a comprehensive anthology that draws together leading philosophers writing on the major themes in Metaphysics. Chapters appear under the headings: Universals Particulars Modality and Possible Worlds Causation Time Persistence Realism and Anti-Realism Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay by the editor which guides students gently into each topic. Articles by the following leading philosophers are included: Allaire, Anscombe, Armstrong, Black, Broad, Casullo, Dummett, Ewing, Heller, Hume, Kripke, Lewis, Mackie, McTaggart, Mellor, Merricks , Parfit, Plantinga, (...) Price, Prior, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Smart, Swinburne, Taylor , Van Cleve, van Inwagen, Williams Featuring a new section on causation, this new edition is highly accessible and provides a broad-ranging exploration of the subject. Ideal for any philosophy student, this reader will prove essential reading for any metaphysics course. The sections and selections of readings have been updated to complement Michael Loux's textbook Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , third edition. (shrink)

At the University of Sheffield between 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume II: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three parts. “Moral Responsibility for Implicit (...) Bias” contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second part—“Structural Injustice”—explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third part—“The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice”—contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combating implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law. (shrink)

Begins by explaining then proving a generalized language dependence result similar to Goodman's "grue" problem. I then use this result to cast doubt on the existence of an objective evidential favoring relation (such as "the evidence confirms one hypothesis over another," "the evidence provides more reason to believe one hypothesis over the other," "the evidence justifies one hypothesis over the other," etc.). Once we understand what language dependence tells us about evidential favoring, our options are an implausibly strong conception of (...) the a priori, a hard externalism on which agents are unable to determine what their evidence favors, or a subjectivist view that makes evidential favoring relative to features of the agent. (shrink)

Chapter 1 addresses some preliminary issues that it is important to think about in formulating arguments from evil. Chapter 2 is then concerned with the question of how an incompatibility argument from evil is best formulated, and with possible responses to such arguments. Chapter 3 then focuses on skeptical theism, and on the work that skeptical theists need to do if they are to defend their claim of having defeated incompatibility versions of the argument from evil. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses (...) evidential arguments from evil, and four different kinds of evidential argument are set out and critically examined. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Der Andere" verfügbar.

Introduction : from victims and perpetrators to implicated subjects -- The transmission belt of domination : theorizing the implicated subject -- On (not) being a descendant : implicated subjects and the legacies of slavery -- Progress, progression, procession : William Kentridge's implicated aesthetic -- From Gaza to Warsaw : multidirectional memory and the perpetuator -- Under the sign of suitcases : the Holocaust internationalism of Marceline Loridan-Ivens -- "Germany is in Kurdistan" : Hito Steyerl's images of implication -- Conclusion : (...) transfiguring implication : eleven theses. (shrink)

This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s book What’s the Use of Philosophy? addresses two questions. First, must philosophers be methodologically self-conscious to do good work? Second, is there value in the questions pursued in the traditional areas of analytic philosophy?

Imagination is necessary for scientific practice, yet there are no in vivo sociological studies on the ways that imagination is taught, thought of, or evaluated by scientists. This article begins to remedy this by presenting the results of a qualitative study performed on two systems biology laboratories. I found that the more advanced a participant was in their scientific career, the more they valued imagination. Further, positive attitudes toward imagination were primarily due to the perceived role of imagination in problem-solving. (...) But not all problem-solving episodes involved clear appeals to imagination, only maximally specific problems did. This pattern is explained by the presence of an implicit norm governing imagination use in the two labs: only use imagination on maximally specific problems, and only when all other available methods have failed. This norm was confirmed by the participants, and I argue that it has epistemological reasons in its favour. I also found that its strength varies inversely with career stage, such that more advanced scientists do (and should) occasionally bring their imaginations to bear on more general problems. A story about scientific pedagogy explains the trend away from (and back to) imagination over the course of a scientific career. Finally, some positive recommendations are given for a more imagination-friendly scientific pedagogy. (shrink)

Drawing on work from Marina Sbisà’s “Ideology and the Persuasive Use of Presupposition” (1999), Rae Langton has developed a powerful account of the subtle mechanisms through which hate speech and propaganda spread. However, this model has a serious limitation: it focuses too strongly on individual speech acts isolated from their wider context, rendering its applicability to a broader range of cases suspect. In this chapter, I consider the limits of presupposition accommodation to clarify the audience’s role in helping hate speakers, (...) and claim the necessary mechanisms are much more active and social than Langton suggests, with effects not capturable in the analysis of isolated speech acts. I revisit Sbisà’s work on presupposition and develop an alternative model that (1) improves upon the Langtonian model for explaining the power of hate propaganda, and (2) is more in line with Sbisà’s original approach to ideology and the normative aspects of presupposition. (shrink)

How does a poet repeatedly over a lifetime make art out of an arbitrary assignment of fate? By asking this question of the work of four American poets - two men of the postwar generation, two young women writing today - Helen Vendler suggests a fruitful way of looking at a poet's career and a new way of understanding poetic strategies as both mastery of forms and forms of mastery.