Contents: PART I: AESTHETICS OF ARCHITECTURE: QUESTIONS. Francis SPARSHOTT: The Aesthetics of Architecture and the Politics of Space. Arnold BERLEANT: Architecture and the Aesthetics of Continuity. Stephen DAVIES: Is Architecture Art? PART II: NATURE OF ARCHITECTURE. B.R. TILGHMAN: Architecture, Expression, and the Understanding of a Culture. David NOVITZ: Architectural Brilliance and the Constraints of Time. Michael H. MITIAS: Expression in Architecture. Ralf WEBER: The Myth of Meaningful Forms. Michael H. MITIAS: Is Meaning in Architecture a Myth? A Response to Ralf (...) Weber. PART III: AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE. Allen CARLSON: Existence, Location, and Function: The Appreciation of Architecture. Martin DONOUGHO: Spaced Out or Folded In? Trends in Architectural Choreography. Tom LEDDY: Dialogical Architecture. Roy T. DECKER: Tactility and Imagination: Considerations of Aesthetic Experience in Architecture. Robert GINSBERG: Aesthetics in Hiroshima. The Architecture of Remembrance. (shrink)

Friendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, (...) modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing. (shrink)

Oleg Grabar has argued that there was not a system of visual symbols in Islamic culture; consequently it is difflcult to hold that an Islamic architecture exists; that is, if we were to stand before a mosque and try to experience it aesthetically or see what kind of building it is we would not be able to say that it is a mosque. In this paper we argue against this proposition. We, first, present a brief analysis of Grabar's view. Second, (...) we critically evaluate this view. Third, we explicate how the mosque as an architectural type embodies uniquely Islamic symbols. We shall illustrate this point by an analysis of one basic Islamic symbol: the Mihrab. The thesis we defend is that there are basic Islamic symbols and that these symbols inhere in the mosque. It is this fact that lends credibility to the claim that an Islamic architecture exists. /// Oleg Grabar defendeu a tese de que não existe um sistema de símbolos visuais na cultura islâmica; consequentemente, é difícil defender a existência de uma arquitectura islâmica; ou seja, se estivéssemos diante de uma mesquita e tentássemos fazer uma experiência estética da mesma ou analisar que tipo de edifício se trata, não seríamos capazes de dizer que se trata de uma mesquita. No presente artigo, os autores argumentam contra esta proposição. Em primeiro lugar, os autores começam por apresentar uma breve análise do ponto de vista de Grabar. Em segundo lugar, avaliam criticamente esta posição. Em terceiro lugar tentam explicar até que ponto a mesquita como tipo arquitectónico apenas incorpora símbolos islâmicos. Os autores exemplificam este ponto mediante a análise de um dos símbolos básicos do Islamismo: o Mihrab. O artigo defende, portanto, a tese de que existem símbolos islâmicos básicos e de que estes símbolos estão presentes na mesquita. Ora é precisamente este facto que dá credibilidade à afirmação de que existe uma arquitectura islâmica propriamente dita. (shrink)

PREFACE One of the most difficult yet sadly neglected questions in the extant spectrum of contemporary aesthetic analysis is the relationship between ...

The proposition I elucidates and defend in this paper is that the Transcendent can be an object of genuine knowledge and that the knowledge the philosophical mystic claims of it is symbolic in nature. In my endeavor to achieve this aim I rely on Małgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth as a model of explanation. I am inclined to think that, as a model of explanation, this conception sheds ample light on the possibility of having a cognitive experience of the (...) Transcendent. The paper is composed of four parts. The first part raises the question of the Transcendent as an object of knowledge. The second part advances a brief analysis of the main elements of Czarnozka’s conception of symbolic truth with special emphasis on her view of human nature. The third part explicates the sense in which the conception of symbolic truth functions as a model of explanation. The fourth part analyzes the conditions under which the Transcendent can be an object of knowledge. (shrink)

The proposition I elucidate and defend in this paper is that the explanatory power of Malgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth extends beyond our knowledge of empirical reality and includes our knowledge of human nature and human values. The paper is composed of two parts. In the first part I present a detailed analysis of the conception of symbolic truth. The focus in this analysis is on the nature of the correspondence relation which connects a true statement and the cognitive (...) object. Czarnocka persuasively argues that this relation is neither isomorphic nor homomorphic in character. She advances a detailed analysis of sensual perception as the locus of the cognitive act. The outcome of this analysis is that the structure of the statement which is articulated in this act does not copy or mirror the structure of the object but is a linguistic representation. In the second part of the paper I argue that empirical reality is not the paradigm of reality and that scientific knowledge is not the paradigm of knowledge. The domain of humanity is as real as the domain of empirical reality, and our knowledge of this domain is as central to our life as scientific knowledge is. Moreover, I argue that Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth functions adequately in explaining the possibility of knowledge of human nature and human values with special focus on the literary work of art. (shrink)

PREFACE It became clear to me in the past few years that any human quest or endeavor — whether it is in art, religion, business, politics, science, ...

The author presents here the “Crystal palace” as a symbol of the unity of human beings with each other and also with nature. In this unity beauty, truth and love find their highest actuality. The universality of human nature is the basis and impetus for creating a bond of community between the peoples of the world. Hence follow the author’s reflections on the conditions for developing universal society.

This article is a critical response to the claim advanced by Robert Elliott Allinson in three issues of Dialogue and Universalism that we need a new Enlightenment for the 21st century. In contradistinction to this claim, I argue that what we really need is a new interpretation of the ideals of the European Enlightenment. This assertion is based on the assumption that the basic beliefs and values that constitute the heart and soul of the European Enlightenment are founded in human (...) nature and that this nature is one and the same among all human beings. My discussion is composed of two parts, the first is formal, and the second is analytical. In the first part, I present general observations on the cultural and historical dynamics of the European Enlightenment. In the second part, I advance an analysis and a critical evaluation of the arguments Allinson advances in the editorial he wrote for the three issues of Dialogue and Universalism. The proposition I defend is that we need not a new Enlightenment but an interpretation and a comprehensive, efficacious implementation of the ideals of reason, science, and humanism. (shrink)

A large number of scholars have argued that a) Islamic architecture is hidden, in the sense that its interior is not articulated on the basis of its exterior; b) the form of Islamic buildings neither expresses nor embodies its function; and c) Islamic architecture is not tectonic or structural, but iconic in character. In this paper, we use Ernst Grube’s analysis of these three claims and focus our attention on the design of the congregational mosques. This paper presents informed arguments (...) against these claims. We begin the discussion with a clarification of the meaning of ‘form follows function’. A clear understanding of the relationship between these two concepts is indispensable for evaluating the claims that Grube makes in his analyses. Then we argue that the form of the congregational mosque embodies its function in a significant manner. Finally, the paper explains in some detail how the function of a mosque is the basis on which its formal structure is designed. The proposition that we defend in this paper is that Islamic architecture exists and expresses the spirit of Islamic culture. (shrink)

Intercultural dialogue is the surest method for the transformation of humankind from as an agglomeration of states into a human community. Any attempt to engage in intercultural dialogue short of this ultimate goal will be superficial and vacuous. Working together toward this goal is an imperative, and it is an imperative because in spite of their diversity human cultures are various expressions of one nature: human nature. Their existence is an indication of the creativity and resourcefulness of this nature. They (...) show how humanity can express itself under different geographical, religious, technological, educational, and historical circumstances. Accordingly their difference cannot be viewed as a sign of weakness but as a sign of strength. Acknowledging this fact should be considered a basis of intercultural dialogue. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of the conditions under which a decent world order is possible, an order in which the different peoples of the world can thrive under the conditions of peace, cooperation, freedom, justice, and prosperity. This analysis is done from the standpoint of Janusz Kuczyński’s philosophy of universalism as a metaphilosophy. More than any other in the contemporary period, this philosophy has advanced a focused, systematic, and comprehensive analysis of these conditions on the basis of a (...) universal vision of nature, human nature, and the meaning of human life and destiny. The paper is composed of three parts. The first part is devoted to a short overview of activism in the history of philosophy. The second part is devoted to an analysis of the main elements of universalism as a metaphilosophy, especially the theoretical conditions of establishing a decent world order. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the practical steps that should be taken to establish a decent world order. (shrink)

This book is an in-depth discussion that seeks to answer two main questions: what is the nature of romantic love? What is the meaning of human life? The author argues that the longing for romantic love is part of the quest for meaningful life and human fulfillment.

Some philosophers and theologians have argued that God-centeredness cannot be a condition of inter-religious dialogue for at least four reasons. First, it is an existential fact that all religions tend to view the truth of their beliefs and values as absolute. Second, all religions are embedded in radically different cultural contexts; this kind of difference undercuts the possibility of inter-religious dialogue. Third, grounding all the religions in a transcendent reality relativizes their beliefs and values. Moreover, people worship “their” God, not (...) a neutral reality. Fourth, it is difficult to ground all the religions in a transcendent, neutral realty. This paper critically evaluates these arguments and defends the proposition that the mystical experience provides a justifiable basis for the claim that the transcendent is not only a wealth of being but also an infinite wealth of being and that the same transcendent is “revealed” in the mystical experience which underlies all the major religions. The transcendent is the common ground on which all the religions stand in inter-religious dialogue qua religions. (shrink)

In both Marx and Schaff, Marxism does not provide an adequate interpretation of the individual. The main reason for this is that there is no satisfactory analysis of autonomy.

In both Marx and Schaff, Marxism does not provide an adequate interpretation of the individual. The main reason for this is that there is no satisfactory analysis of autonomy.

Anatomy of an Argument Michael H. Mitias. FOUR LOVE AS THE BASIS OF THE FAMILY Let us grant, for the sake of argument, my critic would object, that Hegel has made a distinction between a universal or natural law and a human law, ...