Blumenbergs Philosophie ist eine Philosophie der Umwege und des Neuansetzens. Sie stellt einen Versuch dar, sich unter den Bedingungen der Moderne produktiv einzurichten, ohne ethische Ansprüche aus dem Blick zu verlieren. Das Provisorische kehrt bei Blumen-berg implizit wie explizit wieder. Als Beschreibungskategorie macht es die Welt erklärbar und stiftet eine Orientierungsleistung. In Kombination mit einer positiven Umdeutung des Umweges erlaubt es Distanzierung von einem unübersichtlichen Verstricktsein in Weltzusammenhänge sowie ein Handeln als ob wir wüssten, was wir tun. Ziel ist ein (...) Nachdenken, das der Vorläufigkeit moderner Wirklichkeiten gerecht wird. Der Band widmet sich der Figur des Provisorischen und der Umwegskultur und verbindet eine systematische Perspektive auf das Werk Blumenbergs mit philoso-phiehistorischen Einordnungen und der Diskussion bisher unbeachteter Anknüpfungspunkte. (shrink)

The repertoire of acceptor glycoproteins for concanavalin A expressed by a cultured tumour cell reflects the normal developmental lineage from which it was derived, as well as the degree of maturation along that lineage. Antibodies to this particular set of glycoproteins show a considerable specificity towards normal differentiation antigens which are often preferentially associated with the less mature intermediates of the corresponding pathway. In addition, comparisons between ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ tumour cells can be used to identify glycoproteins associated with specific (...) differentiated functions such as secretion. Thus tumour cell glycoproteins provide useful probes for analysis of the molecular biology of development and differentiation. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: W. Bartuschat: Recht, Vernunft, Gerechtigkeit H. Ruessmann: Normative Begruendungsmoglichkeiten jenseits der Gesetzesbindung G. Luf: Gerechtigkeitstheorie zwischen Gemeinsinn und transzendentaler Reflexion: Uberlegungen im Anschlua an Rawls' Theorie der Gerechtigkeit R. Trapp: Politisches Handeln im wohlverstandenen Allgemeininteresse P. Koller: Soziale Gueter und soziale Gerechtigkeit R. Zaczyk: Gerechtigkeit als Begriff einer kritischen Philosophie im Ausgang von Kant U. Steinvorth: Gerechtigkeit in einer Weltgesellschaft R. Knieper: Versuch ueber die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Nationalstaates B. Sitter-Liver: Natur als Polis R. Wolf: Gerechtigkeit (...) und Umweltschutz G. Haney: Gerechtigkeit bei Marx H. Rottleuthner: Gerechtigkeit bei und nach Marx G. Lohmann: Soziale Gerechtigkeit und soziokulturelle Selbstdeutungen. (shrink)

Is the assessment of motor milestones valid and scaled equivalently for all infants? It is not only important to understand if the way we use gross and fine motor scores are appropriate for monitoring motor milestones but also to determine if these scores are confounded by specific infant characteristics. Therefore, the aim of the study is to investigate the latent structure underlying motor milestone assessment in infancy and measurement invariance across sex, birth weight, and gestational age. For this study, the (...) birth cohort data from the United Kingdom Millennium Cohort Study was used, which includes the assessment of eight motor milestone tasks from the Denver Developmental Screening Test in 9-month-old infants, depicting early motor development of the first children of generation Z. Confirmatory factor analyses showed a better model fit for a two-factor structure compared to a one-factor structure, and multiple indicators multiple causes modeling revealed no differential item functioning related to sex, birth weight, and gestational age. The study provides support for the use of gross and fine motor scores when assessing motor milestones in infants—both boys and girls with different birth weights and of varying gestational ages. Further investigation into widely adopted assessment tools is recommended to support the use of valid composite scores in early childhood research and practice. (shrink)

Analogy (Latin: proportio) is the epistemological principle par excellence for the ancient world. Plato calls it the "most beautiful bond" that holds the cosmos together. For Aristoteles, analogies between different species and genera should enable a better understanding of structural features in biology. The most powerful relationship, however, is the one known as Pros-hen, which forms the basis of all being-analogy teachings in the Middle Ages. In the 20th century, analogical thinking finds its way into phenomenology and psychoanalysis. This volume (...) presents analogy starting from antiquity through the Middle Ages and modern times and explores its potential in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions. With contributions by Prof. Dr. Damir Barbarić, Dr. Marcel Bodea, Prof. Dr. Johannes Brachtendorf, Dr. Elenio Cicchini, Prof. Dr. Virgil Ciomoș, Prof. Dr. Ion Copoeru, Dr. Nicoletta Di Vita, Prof. Dr. Karen Gloy, Prof. Dr. Michael Heidelberger, Dietmar Koch, Dr. Dalia Nassar, Dr. Alina Noveanu, Dr. Manuel Schölles, Dr. Simon Schüz and Dr. Niels Weidtmann. (shrink)

How should pragmatists respond to and contribute to the resolution of one of America's greatest and most enduring problems? Given that the most important thinkers of the pragmatist movement—Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead—said little about the problem of race, how does their distinctly American way of thinking confront the hardship and brutality that characterizes the experience of many African Americans in this country? In 12 thoughtful and provocative essays, contemporary American pragmatists connect ideas with (...) action and theory with practice to come to terms with this seemingly intractable problem. Exploring themes such as racism and social change, the value of the concept of race, the role of education in ameliorating racism, and the place of democracy in dealing with the tragedy of race, the voices gathered in this volume consider how pragmatism can focus new attention on the problem of race. Contributors are Michael Eldridge, Eddie S. Glaude, Jr., Judith M. Green, D. Micah Hester, Donald F. Koch, Bill E. Lawson, David E. McClean, Gregory F. Pappas, Scott L. Pratt, Alfred E. Prettyman, John R. Shook, Paul C. Taylor, and Cornel West. (shrink)

Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment. Michael Della Rocca considers the conundrum a hopeless aporia that we must avoid by embracing Parmenides' radical monism of being and in a (...) recent article (“Parmenides' insight and the possibility of logic”) aims to show that Kimhi is confronted with exactly the kind of insoluble difficulties that he that finds in Frege. The present article agrees with Kimhi that we can think about what is not the case, although thinking reaches all the way to what IS the case. But Della Rocca is right that Kimhi cannot explain by virtue of what we are able to do this. The counter‐proposal says: (1) Thinking reaches to being in that we have learned to read things in the intersubjective spatial field of consciousness as model tokens of singular propositions about them. (2) Negation can be thought of because thinking has its very origin in absolute, non‐well‐founded negation. (shrink)

In this paper, we present and discuss the findings of two experiments about reference change. Cases of reference change have sometimes been invoked to challenge traditional versions of semantic externalism, but the relevant cases have never been tested empirically. The experiments we have conducted use variants of the famous Twin Earth scenario to test folk intuitions about whether natural kind terms such as ‘water’ or ‘salt’ switch reference after being constantly (mis)applied to different kinds. Our results indicate that this is (...) indeed so. We argue that this finding is evidence against Saul Kripke’s causal-historical view of reference, and at least provisional evidence in favor of the causal source view of reference as suggested by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt. (shrink)

That there was a ‘Bacteriological Revolution’ in medicine in the late nineteenth-century, associated with the development of germ theories of disease, is widely assumed by historians; however, the notion has not been defined, discussed or defended. In this article a characterisation is offered in terms of four linked rapid and radical changes: a series of discoveries of the specific causal agents of infectious diseases and the introduction of Koch’s Postulates; a reductionist and contagionist turn in medical knowledge and practice; (...) greater authority for experimental laboratory methods in medicine; the introduction and success of immunological products. These features are then tested against developments in four important but previously neglected diseases: syphilis, leprosy, gonorrhoea and rabies. From these case-studies I conclude that the case for a Bacteriological Revolution in late nineteenth-century medicine in Britain remains unproven. I suggest that historians have read into the 1880s changes that occurred over a much longer period, and that while there were significant shifts in ideas and practices over the decade, the balance of continuities and changes was quite uneven across medicine. My argument is only for Britain; in other countries the rate and extent of change may have been different. (shrink)

Das Argument gegen den Brauch[Brauch: die im Ereignis ereignete Zugehörigkeit des Wesens der Sterblichen in das.]Metaphysisch und das heißt zugleich...

Preface : consciousness redux -- What is consciousness? -- Who is conscious? -- Animal consciousness -- Consciousness and the rest -- Consciousness and the brain -- Tracking the footprints of consciousness -- Why we need a theory of consciousness -- Of wholes -- Tools to measure consciousness -- The uber-mind and pure consciousness -- Does consciousness have a function? -- Computationalism and experience -- Computers can't simulate experience -- Consciousness : here, there but not everywhere -- Coda : why this (...) matters -- References -- Notes. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of our concepts. But how can proposals to engineer concepts be implemented in the real world? This is known as the implementation challenge to conceptual engineering. In this paper, I am concerned with the meta-philosophical implications of the implementation challenge. Specifically, must we overcome the implementation challenge prior to undertaking conceptual engineering? Some critics have recently answered this question affirmatively. I intend to show that they are mistaken. I argue as follows. First, successful (...) implementation is not an integral part of conceptual engineering. Second, the idea that the value of conceptual engineering relies on successful implementation is in tension with widespread assumptions about normative theorizing. (shrink)

What exactly do we need to do in order to make a promise, or to exercise some other normative power? On a view relied on by many philosophers writing on promising, consent, and related phenomena, the answer is that we must communicate a suitable kind of intention. On this view, power-conferring principles assert that specific normative consequences, determined in part by the content of the communicated intention, attach to such communicative acts, and these principles need not be socially practised or (...) accepted to be true. The paper offers a defense of this convention-independent view against the forceful challenge developed by Jed Lewinsohn in ‘The “Natural Unintelligibility” of Normative Powers’. Lewinsohn appeals to action-theoretic considerations to show that the relevant type of communicative act could not be performed under conditions of rationality and full information, and that therefore promissory power and other normative powers require the existence of social rules conferring such powers. The defense of the view targeted by Lewinsohn turns partly on the exact content of plausible constraints on the intelligibility of actions done with a particular aim, and partly on the question just how the social acceptance of power-conferring rules should be thought to matter. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren ist der Begriff der ›Person‹ zu einem Schlüsselbegriff des philosophischen wie des gesellschaftlichen Diskurses geworden. Eine systematisch interessante und bisher vernachlässigte historische Rückversicherung in der Personendebatte bieten die Überlegungen Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis (1743–1819) und Johannes Paul Richters (1763–1825), genannt Jean Paul. Jean Paul ist um 1800 nicht nur ein erfolgreicher Autor humoristischer Romane, sondern auch ein gut informierter Beobachter der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und philosophischer Vertrauter Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis. Wie Jacobi in einer konstitutiv doppelsinnigen Bewegung Spinozas Ethik (...) und Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre als unwiderlegbare Entwürfe einer streng rationalen Immanenzphilosophie dechiffriert, um sie im Namen der ›Vernunft‹ zu überwinden, so verbindet auch Jean Pauls philosophisches und poetisches Werk die Wertschätzung der Transzendentalphilosophie unmittelbar mit einem transrationalen Widersprechen gegen die Ansprüche der neuen Systemphilosophie. Um Individualität, Zeitlichkeit und Handlungsfreiheit als Grunderfahrungen menschlichen Daseins philosophisch zureichend zu würdigen, bedarf es für Jean Paul wie für Jacobi einer grundsätzlichen Umwertung des Verhältnisses von individuellem personalem Dasein und rationaler Welt- und Selbsterklärung. (shrink)

In den Aufsätzen dieses Bandes präsentiert Anton Friedrich Koch Hegels theoretische Philosophie als diejenige Nichtstandard-Metaphysik, in der sich die Metaphysik, nicht aber die Philosophie vollendet. Jenseits von Hegels Evolutionstheorie des Absoluten gilt es von einem Standpunkt der Endlichkeit aus neu zu philosophieren.

The continental tradition in philosophy has gotten more "materialistic" over the last two hundred years. This has resulted from a combination of some very specific moves with regard to the epistemological parameters of understanding and the assertion that ideas may have material force in history. Therefore, the materialism within the continental tradition is not a materiality of being, but a materiality of understanding and action. Such an inquiry opens up space between the activities of sensation and the mental faculty of (...) cognition. 'I think, therefore I am,' is not an empirical statement, but a statement of cognition. It is assumed that this distinction is at the core of continental philosophy. Cognition is always interpretive. Experience is the start of cognition, but not its final product. Our cognitions cannot be separated from our experience of the physical, social, and cultural environment around us. The symbolic nature of language reinforces the interpretive nature of our thoughts and ideas. Our language is, therefore, always projecting an implicit image of the world. Language is, therefore, always political. The materiality of these cognitive world-views is manifested in two ways. First, in their formation. They are the products of sensual contact with the world. Second, in their effects. They move people. It is a picture of the world which serves to shape the content and character of human behavior. Whether we want to call these phantoms of the mind, world-view, ideas, thoughts, cognitions, or any other term, the dual character of their materiality is secure. This work examines the threads of materialist ideas running through the efforts of some major authors in the continental tradition in philosophy. A model of materialism is constructed in Chapter One and used to assess the materialist elements in works from Kant, Marx, Weber, Nietzsche, and contemporary poststructuralism. The work demonstrates the evolution of materialist thinking within the tradition and asserts an evolving and developing articulation of materialism in relation to the thoughts and activities of human beings." -- Publisher's description. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

Dans le De fato, Alexandre construit une théorie péripatéticienne du destin et réfute les Stoïciens, partisans dune conception dure du destin. Par là il offre un document majeur sur le déterminisme dans lAntiquité. Louvrage montre comment lexégèse dAristote lui permet de proposer une conception nouvelle de la responsabilité.

In so far as the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu are life-philosophies, they are philosophies of solitude. My aim in the following pages is to explain and defend this claim, clarifying the distinctive kind of solitude that is taught by Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu.