In ‘The Choice Theory of Contracts’, we advance a claim about the centrality of autonomy to contract. Since publishing Choice Theory, we have engaged dozens of reviews and responses; here, we reply to Robert Stevens, Arthur Ripstein, and Brian Bix. All this rigorous debate confirms for us one core point: contract’s ultimate value must be autonomy, properly understood and refined. Autonomy is the telos of contract and its grounding principle. In Choice Theory, we stressed the proactive facilitation component of autonomy, (...) in particular, the state’s obligation regarding contract types. Here, we highlight two additional, necessary implications of autonomy for contract: regard for future selves and relational justice. These three aspects of autonomy shape the range, limit, and floor, respectively, for the legitimate use of contract. They provide a principled and constrained path for law reform. (shrink)

There exists a dispute in philosophy, going back at least to Leibniz, whether is it possible to view the world as a network of relations and relations between relations with the role of objects, between which these relations hold, entirely eliminated. Category theory seems to be the correct mathematical theory for clarifying conceptual possibilities in this respect. In this theory, objects acquire their identity either by definition, when in defining category we postulate the existence of objects, or formally by the (...) existence of identity morphisms. We show that it is perfectly possible to get rid of the identity of objects by definition, but the formal identity of objects remains as an essential element of the theory. This can be achieved by defining category exclusively in terms of morphisms and identity morphisms and, analogously, by defining category theory entirely in terms of functors and identity functors. With objects and categories eliminated, we focus on the “philosophy of arrows” and the roles various identities play in it. This perspective elucidates a contrast between “set ontology” and “categorical ontology”. (shrink)

This article outlines the contributions of the Kraków School to the field of science and religion. The Kraków School is a group of philosophers, scientists, and theologians who belong to the milieu of the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies. The members of the group are engaged in inquiries pertaining to the relationship between theology and various sciences, in particular cosmology, evolutionary theory, and neuroscience. The article includes a presentation of the historical background of the School, as well as its main (...) original contributions pertaining to the history of the interactions between science and religion, the rationality and mathematicity of the universe, theology of science, and the role of logic in theology. (shrink)

The first task of the philosophy of nature -- The problem of elementarity -- The philosophical myth of creation : the Platonic philosophy of nature -- Aristotle's Physics -- Aristotle's method of cosmological speculation -- Descartes' mechanism -- Isaac Newton and the mathematical principles of natural philosophy -- The world of Leibniz : the best of all possible worlds -- Immanuel Kant : the a priori conditions of the sciences -- The romantic philosophy of nature -- The cosmology of Whitehead: (...) the universe as process -- Popper's open universe -- Science as philosophy -- Problems and methods of the philosophy of nature. (shrink)

In “The Choice Theory of Contracts,” we explain contractual freedom and celebrate the plurality of contract types. Here, we reply to critics by refining choice theory and showing how it fits and shapes what we term the “Contract Canon”. I. Freedom. (1) Charles Fried challenges our account of Kantian autonomy, but his views, we show, largely converge with choice theory. (2) Nathan Oman argues for a commerce-enhancing account of autonomy. We counter that he arbitrarily slights noncommercial spheres central to human (...) interaction. (3) Yitzhak Benbaji suggests that choice theory’s commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist. Happily, in response to Benbaji, we can cite with approval Charles Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our liberties.” II. Choice. (4) Aditi Bagchi criticizes our inattention to impediments to choice. We show how choice theory’s commitments to both multiplicity and relational justice ameliorate these impediments. (5) Gregory Klass explores parol evidence to highlight the mechanisms of choice. We substantially concur with his position, and show how such mechanisms can ensure voluntariness, an essential element of choice. (6) Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette question the institutional capacity of existing legal actors to implement choice theory. Working from the example of cohabitation, we offer a somewhat more optimistic view. III. Contracts. (7) Peter Benson contends our focus on the rational slights the reasonable. Although we did not use this Rawlsian vocabulary, choice theory complies with its strictures — more so than transfer theory. (8) Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz claim provocatively that contract theory must: capitulate before pluralism (as they endorse); leverage it; or fall victim to a so-called “embracing” approach (their charge against us). We reject the charge that choice theory is foundationally value-pluralist. Instead, we cabin pluralism and put it to work. (9) The Contract Canon starts on the next big step for choice theory by explaining existing doctrine (rebutting Benson on lack of fit) and helping adjudicate contract practice (countering Markovits and Schwartz on the vices of our pluralism). Each Article in this Issue advances the field; each prompts us to refine choice theory — all steps, we hope, toward a more just and justified law of contract. (shrink)

Mathematical tools of category theory are employed to study the syntax-semantics problem in the philosophy of mathematics. Every category has its internal logic, and if this logic is sufficiently rich, a given category provides semantics for a certain formal theory and, vice versa, for each formal theory one can construct a category, providing a semantics for it. There exists a pair of adjoint functors, Lang and Syn, between a category and a category of theories. These functors describe, in a formal (...) way, mutual dependencies between the syntactical structure of a formal theory and the internal logic of its semantics. Bell’s program to regard the world of topoi as the univers de discoursof mathematics and as a tool of its local interpretation, is extended to a collection of categories and all functors between them, called “categorical field”. This informal idea serves to study the interaction between syntax and semantics of mathematical theories, in an analogy to functors Lang and Syn. With the help of these concepts, the role of Gödel-like limitations in the categorical field is briefly discussed. Some suggestions are made concerning the syntax-semantics interaction as far as physical theories are concerned. (shrink)

One of the most important and most frequently discussed theological problems related to cosmology is the creation problem. Unfortunately, it is usually considered in a context of a rather simplistic understanding of the initial singularity (often referred to as the Big Bang). This review of the initial singularity problem considers its evolution in twentieth‐century cosmology and develops methodological rules of its theological (and philosophical) interpretations. The recent work on the “noncommutative structure of singularities” suggests that on the fundamental level (below (...) the Planck's scale) the concepts of space, time, and localization are meaningless and that there is no distinction between singular and nonsingular states of the universe. In spite of the fact that at this level there is no time, one can meaningfully speak about dynamics, albeit in a generalized sense. Space, time, and singularities appear only in the transition process to the macroscopic physics. This idea, explored here in more detail, clearly favors an atemporal understanding of creation. (shrink)

We discuss the following problems, plaguing the present search for the “final theory”: (1) How to find a mathematical structure rich enough to be suitably approximated by the mathematical structures of general relativity and quantum mechanics? (2) How to reconcile nonlocal phenomena of quantum mechanics with time honored causality and reality postulates? (3) Does the collapse of the wave function contain some hints concerning the future quantum gravity theory? (4) It seems that the final theory cannot avoid the problem of (...) dynamics, and consequently the problem of time. What kind of time, if this theory is supposed to be background free? (5) Will the dynamics of the “final theory” be probabilistic? Quantum probability exhibits some essential differences as compared with classical probability; are they but variations of some more general probabilistic measure theory? (6) Do we need a radically new interpretation of quantum mechanics, or rather an entirely new theory of which the present quantum mechanics is an approximation? (7) If the final theory is to be background free, it should provide a mechanism of space-time generation. Should we try to explain not only the generation of space-time, but also the generation of its material content? (8) As far as the existence of the initial singularity is concerned, one usually expects either “yes” or “not” answers from the final theory. However, if the mathematical structure of the future theory is supposed to be truly more general that the mathematical structures of the present general relativity and quantum mechanics, is a “third answer“ possible? Could this third answer be related to the probabilistic character of the final theory? We discuss these questions in the framework of a working model unifying gravity and quanta. The analysis reveals unexpected aspects of these rather wildly discussed issues. (shrink)

Contract and employment law have grown apart. Long ago, each side gave up on the other. In this Article, we reunite them to the betterment of both. In brief, we demonstrate the emancipatory potential of contract for the law of work. Today, the dominant contract theories assume a widget transaction between substantively equal parties. If this were an accurate description of what contract is, then contract law would be right to expel workers. Worker protections would indeed be better regulated by—and (...) relegated to—employment and labor law. But contract law is not what contract theorists claim. Neither is contract law what the dominant employment theorists fear—a domain that necessarily misses the constitutive place of work in people’s life-plans and overlooks the systemic vulnerability of workers to their employers. Contract, we contend, is not work law’s canonical “other.” Rightly understood, contract is an autonomy-enhancing device, one founded on the fundamental liberal commitment of reciprocal respect for self-determination. From this “choice theory” perspective, the presumed opposition between employment and contract law dissolves. We show that many employment law doctrines are not external to contract, but are instead entailed in liberal contract itself. Grounding worker protections in contract theory has two salutary effects. First, it offers workers more secure protection than that afforded by their reliance on momentary public-law compromises. Second, it reveals contract’s emancipatory potential for all of us—not just as workers, but also as widget buyers. Contract can empower, and employment can show the way. (shrink)

Written by philosophers, cosmologists, and physicists, this collection of essays deals with causality, which is a core issue for both science and philosophy. Readers will learn about different types of causality in complex systems and about new perspectives on this issue based on physical and cosmological considerations. In addition, the book includes essays pertaining to the problem of causality in ancient Greek philosophy, and to the problem of God's relation to the causal structures of nature viewed in the light of (...) contemporary physics and cosmology. [Subject: Philosophy, Cosmology, Physics, Religious Studies]. (shrink)

Shahn Majids philosophy of physics is critically presented. In his view the postulate that the universe should be self-explaining implies that no fundamental theory of physics is complete unless it is self-dual. Majid shows that bicrossproduct Hopf algebras have this property. His philosophy is compared with other approaches to the ultimate explanation and briefly analyzed.

Property concerns conflicts — both conflicts between individuals and conflicts of interest. Conflicts between individuals have long been the paradigmatic property focus. According to this view, property debates circle around issues of autonomy and productive competition. But this is an impoverished view. In this Article, we shift attention to conflicts of interest. By helping people manage conflicts of interest, a well-governed property system balances interdependence with autonomy and productive cooperation with productive competition. We identify three mechanisms woven throughout property law (...) that help manage conflicts of interest: internalization of externalities; democratization of management; and de-escalation of transactions. We show that property law predictably selects among these mechanisms depending on the ratio of economic to social benefits that people seek from a group resource. When economic concerns predominate, property law typically uses contribution-based allocations of rights and responsibilities mediated by formal, foreground procedures, while at the social end of the spectrum we tend to see more egalitarian substantive rules operating as an informal, background safety net. (shrink)

The problem at stake: Can the scholastic notion of contingency be put in correspondence with a concept drawn from the conceptual equipment of the modern sciences in such a way that this time-honoured concept may be useful in our thinking about the world? It appears that the evolution of the idea constitutes something of a bridge connecting the medieval idea of contingency with the current scientific context, namely thinking about the place of humankind in the universe and the problem of (...) the beginning of the universe. The current scientific context in this respect is shaped by the concept of the multiverse. One can say that in current cosmological speculations, a single universe can be regarded as contingent, because it has no explanation, while the multiverse can be regarded as non-contingent, because it does not need any explanation. We discuss the correctness of this reasoning together with certain connected theological aspects. (shrink)

In the 20th century the infiltration of scientific elements into philosophical currents not only reached its maximum, but also science itself became a "philosophical factor". We look at these processes in physics starting from the fall of mechanistic philosophy. The advent of relativity theory and quantum mechanics has changed physics as science and raised a host of philosophical questions. Traditionally philosophical questions concerning space, time and causality cannot be any longer considered with no help of these theories. Relativistic cosmology and (...) its observational successes in the last decades of the century, for the first time in the history of human thought, provided a global framework for both science and philosophy. And the current search for the final unifying theory of physics leads directly to the most foundational questions of an ontological character. We argue that the success of the 20th century physics strongly suggests a kind of structuralist ontology. /// No século XX, a infiltração de elementos científicos nas correntes filosóficas não só alcançou o seu máximo, mas também é verdade que a própria ciência se tornou um "factor filosófico". O presente artigo considera estes processos na física, a começar com a decadência da filosofia mecanicista. O advento da teoria da relatividade e da mecânica quântica transformou a física enquanto ciência e levantou uma plêiade de questões filosóficas. Questões tradicionais acerca do espaço, do tempo e da causalidade não podem mais ser consideradas sem o contributo destas teorias. A cosmologia relati-vista e os seus sucessos observacionais nas últimas décadas do século passado, e isso pela primeira vez na história do pensamento humano, fornecem um esquema global tanto para a ciência como para a filosofia. Além disso, a busca corrente de uma última teoria unificadora da física conduz directamente às questões mais fundacionais de carácter ontológico. O autor do artigo defende que os sucessos da física do século XX sugerem fortemente uma espécie de ontologia estruturalista. (shrink)

The standard property trilogy of private, commons, and state has become so outdated that it now impedes imagination and innovation at the frontiers of ownership. This essay suggests two approaches - creating new ideal types and synthesizing existing ones - that may help update our static property metaphors. Using these dynamic approaches to property analytics, legal theory can move beyond polarizing oppositions that have made jurisprudential debates unsolvable and rendered concrete problems invisible.

Some physical aspects of Teilhard's synthesis are focused upon and confronted with the recent achievements of physics and cosmology. The stuff of the universe, according to modern physical theories, has become something more similar to a structure or form than to inert pieces of material substratum. Directedness of time and history no longer seems to be an ontological a priori of any existence, but rather an outcome of finely tuned initial conditions. And the growth of complexity is now regarded as (...) a process emerging out of physical laws rather than a foreign element in the body of physics. The question is considered of how these results affect Teilhard de Chardin's vision of the world. (shrink)

The dark matter and dark energy problem, that is now dominating the research in cosmology, makes the question of the origin of mass-energy content of the universe more urgent than ever. There are two philosophies regarding this question: according to Mach’s principle it is matter that generates geometry of space-time, and according to Wheeler’s geometrodynamics some configurations of space-time geometry are to be interpreted as its material content. Neither of these philosophies has led to success. In the present paper, we (...) show that there exists an algebraic generalisation of geometry that reconciles, in a sense, these two seemingly opposite standpoints. The geometry is constructed with the help of a noncommutative algebra of smooth functions on a groupoid and its derivations. The groupoid in question has a nice physical interpretation: it can be regarded as a space of Lorentz rotations. In this way, Lorentz symmetries are inherent to the generalised geometry of space-time. We define the action for this geometry and, by varying it, obtain generalised vacuum Einstein equations. It turns out that these equations contain additional terms which are naturally interpreted as the components of the energy-momentum tensor. Matter is thus created out of purely geometric degrees of freedom. We find two exact solutions. We argue that the creation of matter, being a global effect, makes the contrast between Mach and Wheeler philosophies ineffective. (shrink)

We propose to model spacetime by a differential space rather than by a differential manifold. A differential space is the pair (M, C), where M is any set, and C a family of real functions on M, satisfying certain axioms; C is called a differential structure of a corresponding differential space. This concept suitably generalizes the manifold concept. We show that C can be chosen in such a way that it contains all information about the causal structure of spacetime. This (...) information can be read out of C with the help of only one postulate, namely that physical signals travel along piecewise smooth curves in (M, C). We effectively construct the Minkowski spacetime, with its cone structure, in this way. Some comments are made. (shrink)

The author focuses on the tension "realism - idealism" in the philosophy of mathematics, but he does that from the perspective of a theoretical physicist. It is not only that one's standpoint in the philosophy of mathematics determines our understanding of the effectiveness of mathematics in physics, but also the fact that mathematics is so effective in physical sciences tells us something about the nature of mathematics.

The author's transition from physics to the history of science was caused in a large part by his desire "to know more about the relativity paper and its author". Indeed, the entire book could be considered as an exegesis of the Einstein paper "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies" and its broad physical and philosophical background. The special theory of relativity not only opened a new era in physics but it also changed the philosophical perspective from which man looks at (...) the universe. Intellectual struggles around the foundations of physics in the first decade of our century throw a new light on the "drama of science": "The drama of science in the making centered on the interplay between empirical data and physical theory, the clinging to notions that were neither always articulable nor clearly testable, the great investment of effort in empirical data and in already existing physical theories, and the irresistible drive toward the long-sought-after unification of the sciences". (shrink)

The work under consideration gives a thorough analysis of different kinds of skepticism and a very laborious chain of reasoning leading to skepticism's refutation. Many important problems, such as principles of justification and explanation, tests for economy and simplicity, and so on, appear as side issues of the main stream of reasoning. This stream is called by the author the "master argument." Its objective is to refute the form of skepticism which asserts that it is unreasonable for human beings "to (...) believe any claim entailing there are particular unperceived physical objects, past events, future events, or mental phenomena of others." The most important products of this "long, tortuous route to the conclusion" are--in the author's eyes--a particular theory of empirical justification, and a refutation of the "skepticism about induction.". (shrink)

The phenomenon of philosophizing scientists is well known in the twentieth century literature; one need mention only Arthur Eddington, James Jeans or Edmund Whittaker. Even the wide spread of neopositivistic ideology was not able to stop the best among scientists from publicly expressing their philosophical views. The writings of Einstein, Schrodinger, Heisenberg and of many other outstanding physicists have significantly shaped our way of understanding the Universe and our place in it. The fall of neopositivism and recent advances in theoretical (...) physics, which seem to touch extremities of the empirical method and to demand some sort of philosophical justification, have strengthened this tendency. The gap between philosophy and science may not exist any longer, but the gap between philosophers and scientists continues to exercise its deplorable influence on science and philosophy. The book by Barrow and Tipler testifies to both of these things: it shows how the far-reaching horizons of modern physics and cosmology could be open for philosophical thinking, and simultaneously it demonstrates how this thinking, when done by physicists, is far away from that to which professional philosophers are accustomed. I. (shrink)

"The 'new' often consists not in the invention of new categories of thought but rather in surprising employment of existing ones". The book proves this thesis, in an ingenious manner, as far as the origins of modern science are concerned. For a contemporary historian of science, the idea that the sciences had their roots in philosophical and theological thinking of the Middle Ages is hardly a surprise, but to know exactly how this did happen makes a profound difference. The book (...) is not based on new texts or new findings in the history of science--the author calls it "an interpretative essay only"--but it offers a deep insight into the evolution of concepts and ideas. The reader, under the author's guidance, can trace some evolutionary paths in a very detailed manner. In spite of being "an interpretative essay," it is the solid work of a historian. (shrink)