Proportionality has long been considered a pillar of just war theory, requiring that the goods achieved in an action outweigh the collateral harms it causes. In this article, I argue that the in bello principle of proportionality cannot serve its intended function of limiting the destructiveness of actions during war. I illustrate the features of war that make the in bello proportionality constraint not merely impossible to follow, but perhaps even self-defeating. I conclude by suggesting ways in which theorists and (...) policymakers concerned with justice in war might attempt to respond to this dilemma. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article, I explore the complex and unappreciated relationship between the moral and political thought of Cicero and Adam Smith. Cicero’s views about justice, propriety, and the selfish love of praise find new expression in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. I illustrate the important ways in which Smith adopts – often without attribution – Cicero’s precepts and moral judgments. I then go on to demonstrate how Smith strips those Ciceronian conclusions from their original justifying grounds in teleology and natural (...) law. In their place, Smith injects his own psychology based in sentiments as a new account of why it is that we prefer virtue and justice to their opposites. By exploring this relationship, I hope to shed light on an important dynamic whereby modern thought has creatively adapted classical moral and political concepts. (shrink)

This essay explores a creative argument that Cicero offers to answer a fundamental question: how are we to judge among different ways of life? Is there a natural hierarchy of human types? In respon...

This essay explores a creative argument that Cicero offers to answer a fundamental question: how are we to judge among different ways of life? Is there a natural hierarchy of human types? In response to this problem, Cicero gives an account of a person’s possessing two natures. All of us participate in a general human nature, the characteristics of which provide us with certain universal duties and a natural moral hierarchy. But, we also each possess an individual nature, qualities that (...) make us unique and which we have an obligation to cultivate. By employing different concepts of natura to refer either to common human nature or to particular individual nature, Cicero establishes a basis for a normative standard that manages to affirm the superiority of certain especially valuable types of life, such as the philosopher and the statesman. At the same time, he advances a coherent account of individuality that places high value on natural human diversity. (shrink)

John Henry Newman's theological arguments against the mixture of liberal philosophy and Christian religion have drawn a great deal of scholarly attention. Comparatively underappreciated is Newman's rebuttal of liberal ideas on the philosophical plane. In this line of argument, which runs parallel to his more purely theological critique, Newman uses some of liberalism's own foundational philosophical premises to undermine the conclusions put forth by the exponents of liberal religion. This immanent critique of liberal religion is important not merely because it (...) shows Newman's capacity to engage his opponents on their own terms, but also because it provides an argument against liberal religion that merits consideration even for those who reject Newman's particular theological beliefs. (shrink)

Contemporary normative theory is understandably reluctant to consider how a hegemonic power ought to conduct itself. After all, a truly just international order, characterised by principles of freedom and equality among nations, would not include one polity so able to dominate others. The natural impulse of normative theorists then is to seek to eliminate such an imbalance. Yet, a sober assessment of political reality provides little prospect for such aspirations. The more modest alternative is to examine how hegemonic power might (...) be wielded responsibly. For most of the history of Western political thought, the problem of just hegemony was more theoretical than real, leaving few serious philosophical precedents. Yet for Roman thinkers, of both the late Republic and the early Empire, the issue presented a real and urgent problem. In this article I explore some of the attempts of Roman philosophers and historians to grapple with the unique position of the Roman state. In many cases, their theories depend in some way on Rome’s alleged special moral or constitutional qualities – and yet, they often recognised that the realities of Rome’s use of power undermined those claims to exceptionalism. I examine the Romans’ responses to this problem as they sought to think through the moral dilemmas of their situation. In classical Roman thought, we might find an interlocutor for our own attempt to think through the ethics of superpower. (shrink)