Name der Zeitschrift: Paragrana Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 373-399.

Against the backdrop of Walter Benjamin's famous essay, “Unpacking My Library”, this article, by the Librarian of the Warburg Institute, tells the story of the many times that the Warburg Library has been packed and unpacked. First it was the private collection of Aby Warburg, later a public institution, originally in Hamburg and then in London from 1933 to the present. This essay also explores the various ways in which books have been — and continue to be — acquired by (...) the Warburg Library, including publication, donation, recommendation, and purchase. Each of these methods is not only discussed but also examined in light of Benjamin's account of the acquisition of his own library. Moreover, Benjamin's view that collections lose their meaning when they cease to be personal is challenged by the example of the Warburg Library, which has been transformed from a private collection containing around 15,000 books in 1911 to a public institution today housing over 350,000 volumes, while still maintaining its unique character. (shrink)

For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene. Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced authors working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (Kausales Schliessen. Eine Untersuchung über kausale Erklärungen und Theorienbildung. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1999), Ragin (Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Graßhoff and May (Causal regularities. In W. Spohn, M. Ledwig, & M. Esfeld (Eds.), Current issues in (...) causation (pp. 85–114). Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), Swartz (The concept of physical law (2nd ed.). http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/, 2003), Halpin (Erkenntnis, 58, 137–168, 2003) – to direct their attention back to regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity theories, the paper at hand therefore reassesses the criticism raised against regularity accounts since the INUS theory of causation of Mackie (The cement of the universe. A study of causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). It is shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches. By outlining ways to refute these objections it is argued that the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty. (shrink)

The article examines the historical and cultural background for the blatantly anti-Jewish argumentation of the political agitator and writer William Marr in his programmatic pamphlet,,Der Judenspiegel". Attention will be paid in particular to the events and procedures within the contemporary Jewish community in Hamburg. The,,Judenspiegel" clearly exhibits the close relationship between the struggle for the equal civil rights of the German Jews and the development of the modern anti-Semitic ideology.

Visitenkarte -- Liebesgrüsse aus Hamburg: Der Spion den ich liebte -- Abgerechnet wird zum Schluss! -- Situationen sind Prinzipienschredder -- Kennen lernen heisst unbekannt lassen -- Wer döst, nimmt wahr -- Staunen kann man nur durch Fenster -- Gnadenlos wertschätzen -- Bin ich ein Typ? -- Takt oder Wahrheit: Jemanden beraten -- Hirntot durch Deutschland -- Ich will mich selbst bestimmen - wie mache ich das bloss? -- Der Handelnde trägt immer Schuld -- Wer guckt mich denn da im Spiegel (...) an? -- Der andere stört - Differenzfähigkeit -- Das ist eine Frage der Selbstachtung -- Erschrockene Gleichgültigkeit -- Müssen wir uns um den Teufel Sorgen machen? -- Es lebe die Grenze - nieder mit allen Grenzen! -- Ich werde gestorben sein -- An etwas glauben oder glauben -- Gott, Grund eines Geheimnisses -- Über den Versuch, sein Leben in Situationen zu reflektieren -- Philosophie anhand von Themen, Problemen und Situationen -- Nachwort. (shrink)

Die gegenwartigen Herausforderungen des internationalen Verhaltnisses sind Gemeingut: Gewalt zwischen und in Staaten, Bedrohung durch Massenvernichtungswaffen, der zunehmende globale Wirtschaftsverkehr. Durch sie ist souverane Staatlichkeit als Kern politischer Handlungsoptionen, rechtlicher Begriffsbildung und ihrer wissenschaftlichen Erfassung problematisch geworden. Oft erscheint der Ruckzug auf staatliche Selbstbehauptung oder die Einrichtung einer globalen Zwangsgewalt als einzige Losung. Welches Potential im Gegensatz dazu in dem auf Kant zuruckgehenden Gedanken internationaler Kooperation liegt, untersuchten Vertreter verschiedener Fachrichtungen im Rahmen der im Band dokumentierten interdisziplinaren Tagung des Seminars (...) fur Rechtsphilosophie an der Universitat Hamburg.". (shrink)

Centering on his relationship with Gertrud Bing from 1958 until her death in 1964 — as well as, to a lesser extent, on his relationship with Ernst Gombrich — the author recalls his informal induction during those years into a tradition of thought and an intellectual climate that Aby Warburg had embodied in the Institute and Library that he founded in Hamburg. The Institute is described as existing, during the late 1950s and early 1960s in London, less as a formal (...) institution than as the interaction of some two dozen émigrés with what the author describes as “the intention of the books” and the Library's “frame of mind.” The essay — which is a somewhat revised excerpt from the author's memoir Episodes: A Memorybook (2010) — goes on to detail various habits of classification in the Warburg Library's arrangement and to show how these have entailed assumptions about how the human world works. (shrink)

[The review is in German] Theunissen has developed an interesting account of metaphilosophy that–as a discipline–does not start in 1960s, but already and especially with Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The constant growth of philosophical theories around 1800 (what Koselleck called “Sattelzeit”) made metaphilosophical constructions necessary. He reads–and is not the first author who does so–Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a metaphilosophical theory. Although I like and share many ideas with Theunissen, there are three objections that I raise in my review: (...) (i) His account of isosthenia as a basic problem behind all philosophical positions (which makes metaphilosophy necessary) undermines the importance of dissent, dogmatism and intra-philosophical struggles; (ii) Theunissen’s understanding of metaphilosophy is not neutral (just as any account of metaphilosophy): it is predetermined by Hegel’s thought and the author’s understanding of Phenomenology of Spirit; (iii) Therefore, it fits well to this particular work of Hegel, but not (a) to the overall system of Encyclopedia and (b) Kant’s metaphilosophical deliberations (which Theunissen misses). I end the review with the statement that we need to ask ourselves how metaphilosophy is possible as a unified discipline despite of different philosophical backgrounds of authors–we need a meta-metaphilosophy or a critique of metaphilosophical reason. (shrink)

The ArgumentErnst Cassirer's fundamental conception of symbolism (symbolic pregnance) derives from what may be called a bio-medical model of semiotics, not a linguistic one. He employs both models in his philosophy of symbolic forms, but his notion of the “prototype and model of symbolism” was not derived from linguistics. The sources for his conception of symbolism include the ethnographic and anthropological literature he discovered in Aby Warburg's (1866–1929) Hamburg research library, findings of medical research on aphasia and related conditions, particularly (...) the work of Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965) and the theoretical biology of Jacob von Uexküll (1864–1944). The linguistic model of semiotics regards the bond between the signifier and the signified as purely arbitrary and conventional, but Cassirer traced meaning back to a “natural symbolism” of image-like configurations in bodily feeling and perception. In this way, his doctrine of symbolism assumed a form that undercut the distinction between philosophical Naturalism and Idealism. This helps to explain why in later years Cassirer developed his theory of Basic Phenomena. Cassirer's notion of the “prototype and model of symbolism” illustrates his method of thought, which eschews pure argument in favor of interaction with empirical research. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: W. Bartuschat: Recht, Vernunft, Gerechtigkeit H. Ruessmann: Normative Begruendungsmoglichkeiten jenseits der Gesetzesbindung G. Luf: Gerechtigkeitstheorie zwischen Gemeinsinn und transzendentaler Reflexion: Uberlegungen im Anschlua an Rawls' Theorie der Gerechtigkeit R. Trapp: Politisches Handeln im wohlverstandenen Allgemeininteresse P. Koller: Soziale Gueter und soziale Gerechtigkeit R. Zaczyk: Gerechtigkeit als Begriff einer kritischen Philosophie im Ausgang von Kant U. Steinvorth: Gerechtigkeit in einer Weltgesellschaft R. Knieper: Versuch ueber die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Nationalstaates B. Sitter-Liver: Natur als Polis R. Wolf: Gerechtigkeit (...) und Umweltschutz G. Haney: Gerechtigkeit bei Marx H. Rottleuthner: Gerechtigkeit bei und nach Marx G. Lohmann: Soziale Gerechtigkeit und soziokulturelle Selbstdeutungen. (shrink)

Michael Quante, Menschenwürde und personale Autonomie. Demokratische Werte im Kontext der Lebenswissenschaften Content Type Journal Article Pages 601-603 DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9278-7 Authors Claudia Wiesemann, Department of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine, University Medical Center Göttingen, Humboldtallee 36, 37073 Göttingen, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820 Journal Volume Volume 14 Journal Issue Volume 14, Number 5.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 313-318.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 3 Seiten: 480-484.

The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget devoted his life to following, step by step and lovingly, the development in children of the art of reasoning. In the course of the successive stages of this development, the child's view of the world changes in nature. Similarly, from its earliest infancy, medicine has viewed living things in successively different manners. For medicine, it is true, the stages overlap; one may still be using an ancient discourse from which another has daringly freed itself. Nevertheless, (...) for the sake of clarity in this analysis, I will try to define successive epistemological attitudes as if they had represented a regular progression of medical thinking. (shrink)

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.

“The composition of the lectures of which Aristotle's extant works are the notes probably belongs in the main to the twelve or thirteen years of tail headship of the Lyceum, and the thought and research implied, even if we suppose that some of the spadework was done for him by pupils, implies an energy of mind which is perhaps unparalleled. During this time Aristotle fixed the main outlines of the classification of the sciences in the form which they still retain, (...) and carried most of the sciences to a further point than they had hitherto reached; in some of them, such as logic, he may fairly claim to have had no predecessor, and for centuries no worthy successor…one of the greatest of analytic thinkers. “SIR W. DAVID ROSS, Aristotle. (shrink)

Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...) on scientific or theoretical beliefs as the ideal, insist that such awareness is required for justification. Externalists, who think children's ordinary beliefs in obvious facts are paradigm cases of justified belief, say it isn't required. Michael Bergmann's book offers a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism. (shrink)

Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances.

Die Gedächtnisschrift ist dem am 20. Dezember 2005 verstorbenen Michael Gruson gewidmet, der weltweit einer der führenden Anwälte im Bereich des internationalen Bank- und Kapitalmarktrechts gewesen ist. Er war Partner der internationalen Anwaltssozietät Shearman & Sterling in Frankfurt und New York. Michael Gruson war mit seiner internationalen bank- und kapitalmarktrechtlichen Praxis ein früher Wegbereiter für die heute allgemein anerkannte Strategie einer global tätigen Anwaltskanzlei. Als Gastprofessor der University of Illinois, der Columbia University School of Law, der Universität Osnabrück (...) und der Bucerius Law School in Hamburg hat sich Michael Gruson stets auch für angehende Juristen und ihre Ausbildung engagiert. (shrink)

At the University of Sheffield during 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology is comprised of two parts: “The Nature of Implicit Attitudes, Implicit Bias, (...) and Stereotype Threat,” and “Skepticism, Social Knowledge, and Rationality.” The first part contains chapters examining the relationship between implicit attitudes and “dual process” models of the mind; the role of affect in the formation and change of implicit associations; the unity (or disunity) of implicit attitudes; whether implicit biases are mental states at all; and whether performances on stereotype-relevant tasks are automatic and unconscious or intentional and strategic. The second part contains chapters examining implicit bias and skepticism; the effects of implicit bias on scientific research; the accessibility of social stereotypes in epistemic environments; the effects of implicit bias on the self-perception of members of stigmatized social groups as rational agents; the role of gender stereotypes in philosophy; and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning. (shrink)

In this engaging and spirited text, Michael Lynch argues that truth does matter, in both our personal and political lives. He explains that the growing cynicism over truth stems in large part from our confusion over what truth is.

Dignity plays a central role in current thinking about law and human rights, but there is sharp disagreement about its meaning. Combining conceptual precision with a broad historical background, Michael Rosen puts these controversies in context and offers a novel, constructive proposal. “Penetrating and sprightly...Rosen rightly emphasizes the centrality of Catholicism in the modern history of human dignity. His command of the history is impressive...Rosen is a wonderful guide to the recent German constitutional thinking about human dignity...[Rosen] is in (...) general an urbane and witty companion, achieving his aim of accessibly written philosophy.” —Samuel Moyn, The Nation “[An] elegant, interesting and lucid exploration of the concept of dignity...Drawing on classical, liberal and Catholic traditions, Rosen hopes to rehabilitate dignity to its rightful place near the centre of moral thought...Rosen's admirable book deserves wide attention from political theorists, jurisprudes and political philosophers.” —Simon Blackburn, Times Higher Education “Dignity deserves to be widely read, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also as a corrective to the habit of discussing such topics in abstraction from their social context. Whether or not one agrees with Rosen's arguments, there can be no doubt he has widened our horizons.” —Rae Langton, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.

edition (unseen), $12.95. traditions, bringing into being new modes of understanding. Paper Anthropology, and particularly ethnography, is torn between two quests, one to capture the diversity of social life and the other to discover universal principles structuring that diversity. Jackson examines these quests within the context of ethnographic fieldwork, focusing on the relationship between ethnographers and the people they study. He is concerned with defining the anthropological project as something more than the projection of the anthropologist's traditions and concerns onto (...) an alien culture. Rather, he would have the project open a genuine dialogue between people from different cultures or Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)