This paper deals with Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought styles and Michael Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge. Though both concepts have been very influential for science studies in general, and both have been subject to numerous interpretations, their accounts have, somewhat surprisingly, hardly been comparatively analyzed. Both Fleck and Polanyi relied on the physiology and psychology of the senses in order to show that scientific knowledge follows less the path of logical principles than the path of accepting or rejecting specific (...) conventions, where these may be psychologically or sociologically grounded. It is my aim to show that similarities and differences between Fleck and Polanyi are to be seen in the specific historical and political context in which they worked. Both authors, I shall argue, emphasized the relevance of perception in close connection to their respective understanding of science, freedom, and democracy. (shrink)

ArgumentIn this paper I will argue that the scientific investigation of skulls and brains of geniuses went hand in hand with hagiographical celebrations of scientists. My analysis starts with late-eighteenth century anatomists and anthropologists who highlighted quantitative parameters such as the size and weight of the brain in order to explain intellectual differences between women and men and Europeans and non-Europeans, geniuses and ordinary persons. After 1800 these parameters were modified by phrenological inspections of the skull and brain. As the (...) phrenological examination of the skulls of Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Heinse, Arthur Schopenhauer and others shows, the anthropometrical data was interpreted in light of biographical circumstances. The same pattern of interpretation can be found in non-phrenological contexts: Reports about extraordinary brains were part of biographical sketches, mainly delivered in celebratory obituaries. It was only in this context that moral reservations about dissecting the brains of geniuses could be overcome, which led to a more systematic investigation of brains of geniuses after 1860. (shrink)

Die Vergangenheit ist unwiederholbar, zugleich bleiben aber Bilder und Spuren von ihr zurück. Neben solchen Formen des Nachlebens können Darstellungen des Vergangenen aber auch nachträgliche Rekonstruktionen sein, d. h. Formen der Sichtbarmachung, die selbst nicht alt sind, sondern, aus der jeweiligen Sicht einer Gegenwart heraus, Vergangenes nachstellen, simulieren oder anschaulich machen. Beide Formen der Vergegenwärtigung - Nachleben und Rekonstruktion - ermöglichen es einer Kultur, sich mit ihrer eigenen Vergangenheit in Beziehung zu setzen. Zugleich bleibt diese Aneignung des Vergangenen aber zwangsläufig (...) unvollständig und von den Möglichkeiten und Motiven der jeweiligen Gegenwart bestimmt. Am Beispiel konkreter Fallstudien aus dem Bereich der historischen Wissenschaften, der bildenden Kunst, des Dokumentar- und Spielfilms, der Fotografie und der Literatur untersuchen die Beiträge des Bandes dieses besondere Zusammenwirken von Zeugenschaft und Imagination, Wiederholung und Entzug des Vergangenen. (shrink)

Views on History of Science II. This essay makes a claim for a new political awareness in the history of science, which goes beyond the practical turn that shaped the field in the last 25 years. This revision should take into consideration both new hostile political circumstances and new conditions for academic publishing after the digital revolution.