Human beings are essentially vulnerable in the view that their existence qua humans is not given but construed. This vulnerability receives basic protection from the State, expressed in the form of the universal rights all citizens are meant to enjoy. In addition, many individuals fall prey to destitution and deprivation, requiring social action aimed at recognising the specific harms they suffer and providing remedial assistance to palliate or remove their plights.Citizens receive protection against their biologic vulnerability by means of an (...) in rem right to health [care], which is more an attitude of protection than a specific programme. When individuals become susceptible, that is, biologically weak or diseased, they also increase their predisposition to additional harm, and require social actions to treat their demeaned condition. Such assistance takes the form of positive healthcare rights.Research on human beings has been slow to observe that the subjects recruited are susceptible, especially so if research is done in less developed countries. By mislabelling them as vulnerable – a characteristic they share with all humans – sponsors avoid registering the deprivation these people suffer, and the ethical obligation to offer them remedial help.The distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility also marks the difference between being intact but fragile – vulnerable – and being injured and predisposed to compound additional harm – susceptible. Awareness of this difference should give additional force to the rejection of double standards in research ethics. (shrink)

The so-called European principles of bioethicsare a welcome enrichment of principlistbioethics. Nevertheless, vulnerability, dignityand integrity can perhaps be moreaccurately understood as anthropologicaldescriptions of the human condition. Theymay inspire a normative language, but they donot contain it primarily lest a naturalisticfallacy be committed. These anthropologicalfeatures strongly suggest the need todevelop deontic arguments in support of theprotection such essential attributes ofhumanity require. Protection is to beuniversalized, since all human beings sharevulnerability, integrity and dignity, thusfundamenting a mandate requiring justice andrespect for fundamental human (...) rights.Being a feature of all humanity, vulnerabilityis improperly extended to designatedestitute individuals and populations. Rather,they are in a state of fallen vulnerability,for they already are harmed in some way, andhave become deprived of their range ofcapabilities. These individuals are destituteand are no longer in command of theirfundamental human rights. They have lost thestatus of unharmed vulnerability;identifying them as susceptible – vulnerated andno longer only vulnerable – stresses thepoint that bioethics demands specific socialaction to palliate or remove their distress.When harm does occur – in the form of disease,for example –, individuals are no longervulnerable – for they have ceased to be intact–, they become susceptible to additionaldeprivations and sickness; integrity isdemeaned and dignity is offended, leading tostates of dysfunction that require specificremedial social practices, aimed at treatingand removing injuries.The main point this paper addresses is thatvulnerability – as well as dignity and integrity – are descriptive characteristics ofhuman beings qua humans, which are not normative in themselves, but fundamental enoughto inspire bioethical requirements of protection and respect for human rights in thewake of social justice. A clear distinction must be made in regard to human beings who areinjured by poverty, sickness, discriminating deprivations or suffer otherdestitutions, having ceased to be only vulnerable for they are no longer intact. Theseindividuals and populations require more than protection, their needs must be met byspecific care and remedial measures to be identified and instigated by bioethics quaapplied ethics. (shrink)

Summary Care and cure have been described as different kinds of ethical approaches to clinical situations. Female concerns in nursing care have been contrasted with masculine, cure orientated physician's attitudes. Ethics in such different voices may have sociologic determinants, but they do not represent intrinsic distinctions. Medicine has shown a divergent development, on the one hand stressing cure in a deterministic and instrumental way, on the other hand being aware that disease is as much a pathographic as a biographic, care‐requiring (...) existential situation. Disease is a breakdown of the living organism, to be cured by therapeutic efforts, but it is also the distressing failure of the lived body, requiring concern and care. Based on Lévinas’ ethics of encounter, it is suggested that any interpersonal relatedness is based on concern for the other, being grounded on an essentially ethical interaction. The clinical encounter is a paradigm of such ethics‐based relationships, which necessarily builds on awareness of the other qua other, and is concerned with fulfilling the therapeutic mandate. Caring for the other means doing one's best to help her/him, so that care and cure are inextricably interwoven, although care is the more fundamental form of human relatedness. Thus, neither gender nor professional tasks can allow for a caring attitude to develop without curing concerns, just as trying to cure without caring is unthinkable. (shrink)

Based on the distinction between living body and lived body, we describe the disease-subject as representing the impact of disease on the existential life-project of the subject. Traditionally, an individual's subjectivity experiences disorders of the body and describes ensuing pain, discomfort and unpleasantness. The idea of a disease-subject goes further, representing the lived body suffering existential disruption and the possible limitations that disease most probably will impose. In this limit situation, the disease-subject will have to elaborate a new life-story, a (...) new character or way-of-being-in-the-world, it will become a different subject. (shrink)

Medical ethics could be better understood if some basic theoretical aspects of practices in health care are analysed. By discussing the underlying ethical principles that govern medical practice, the student should also become familiar with the notion that medical ethics is much more than the external application of socially accepted moral standards. Professions in general and medicine in particular have internal values that command their moral virtuosity at the same time as their technical excellence. Three examples where clinical practice can (...) be clearly shown to require an ethical analysis are given: medical praxiology illustrates the motives, means and aims of physicians and patients; clinical decision-making as a practical syllogism that reaches prescriptive conclusions based on medical knowledge and the patient's wishes/intentions. Finally, diagnostics as an ethical bayesian approach is discussed, where the patient informedly decides the benefits and risks of further testing. (shrink)