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  1. On the explanatory power of hallucination.Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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    Aristotle’s Perceptual Objectivism.Michael Arsenault - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    Objectivism about perceptible qualities like colors and sounds is the view that perceptible qualities are ontologically and conceptually independent from perception. We ordinarily think of Aristotle as an objectivist about perceptible qualities – even the arch-objectivist. Yet this consensus has long been threatened by various thorny passages, including especially De anima III.2, 425b26–426a28, which appear to suggest that Aristotle is no objectivist, but a subjectivist. I show that recent attempts to make sense of these passages by appeal to Aristotle’s three-stage (...)
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  3. Aha! Trick Questions, Independence, and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Michael Arsenault & Zachary C. Irving - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):185-194.
    We present a family of counter-examples to David Christensen's Independence Criterion, which is central to the epistemology of disagreement. Roughly, independence requires that, when you assess whether to revise your credence in P upon discovering that someone disagrees with you, you shouldn't rely on the reasoning that lead you to your initial credence in P. To do so would beg the question against your interlocutor. Our counter-examples involve questions where, in the course of your reasoning, you almost fall for an (...)
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