Speakers’ perception of a visual scene influences the language they use to describe it—which objects they choose to mention and how they characterize the relationships between them. We show that visual complexity can either delay or facilitate description generation, depending on how much disambiguating information is required and how useful the scene's complexity can be in providing, for example, helpful landmarks. To do so, we measure speech onset times, eye gaze, and utterance content in a reference production experiment in which (...) the target object is either unique or non-unique in a visual scene of varying size and complexity. Speakers delay speech onset if the target object is non-unique and requires disambiguation, and we argue that this reflects the cost of deciding on a high-level strategy for describing it. The eye-tracking data demonstrate that these delays increase when speakers are able to conduct an extensive early visual search, implying that when speakers scan too little of the scene early on, they may decide to begin speaking before becoming aware that their description is underspecified. Speakers’ content choices reflect the visual makeup of the scene—the number of distractors present and the availability of useful landmarks. Our results highlight the complex role of visual perception in reference production, showing that speakers can make good use of complexity in ways that reflect their visual processing of the scene. (shrink)
We provide a retrospective of 25 years of the International Conference on AI and Law, which was first held in 1987. Fifty papers have been selected from the thirteen conferences and each of them is described in a short subsection individually written by one of the 24 authors. These subsections attempt to place the paper discussed in the context of the development of AI and Law, while often offering some personal reactions and reflections. As a whole, the subsections build into (...) a history of the last quarter century of the field, and provide some insights into where it has come from, where it is now, and where it might go. (shrink)
The thesis of the paper holds that some future developments of argumentation theory may be inspired by the rich logico-methodological legacy of the Lvov–Warsaw School (LWS), the Polish research movement that was most active from 1895 to 1939. As a selection of ideas of the LWS which exploit both formal and pragmatic aspects of the force of argument, we present: Ajdukiewicz’s account of reasoning and inference, Bocheński’s analyses of superstitions or dogmas, and Frydman’s constructive approach to legal interpretation. This paper (...) does not aim at exhaustive elaboration of any of these topics or their usefulness in current discussions within argumentation theory. Rather, we intend to indicate chosen directions of a potentially fruitful research program for the emerging Polish School of Argumentation which would consist in application of methods and conceptions elaborated by the LWS to selected open problems of contemporary research on argumentation. (shrink)
Is the theory of evolution by means of natural selection a tautology? This book explores the explanatory structure of Darwin’s theory at a time when selectionist explanations are being brought forward to explain a wider and wider range of phenomena.
Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)
Introduction: Philosophy in Mind / Michaelis Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne -- AI and the Synthetic A Priori / Jose Benardete -- Armchair Metaphysics /Frank Jackson -- Doubts About Conceptual Analysis /Gilbert Harman -- Deflationary Self-Knowledge / Andre Gallois -- How to Get to Know One’s Own Mind: Some Simple Ways / Annette Baier -- Psychology in Perspective / Huw Price -- Can Philosophy of Language Provide the Key to the Foundations of Ethics? /Karl-Otto Apel --Unprincipled Decisions / Lee Overton -- (...) Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will / Jeanette Kennett and Michael Smith -- Reasoning and Representing / Robert Brandom -- The Problem of Consciousness / John Searle -- Godel’s Theorem and the Mind... Again / Graham Priest -- Epistemology and the Diet Revolution / Gilbert Harman -- Truth-Aptness and Belief / John O’Leary-Hawthorne -- Cubism, Perspective, Belief / Michaelis Michael. Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What is The Question? / Gideon Rosen. (shrink)
The article reviews the various ramifications in the discussion on leadership, focusing on the view of leadership as relationships between leaders and followers. Three main types of leader-follower relations are discussed, and their specific characteristics are described: regressive relations, symbolic relations, and developmental relations. After analyzing the major implications, as well as the conceptual limitations, of these perspectives, the article suggests directions for a more integrative conceptualization of leader-follower relations.
The book introduces a conception of discourse ethics, an intersubjectivist version of Kantian ethics. Analyzing contributions from Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Albrecht Wellmer, Robert Alexy, Klaus Günther, Rainer Forst, Marcel Niquet and others, it reconstructs critical discussions on the justification of the principle of morality (part I) and on the various proposals on how to apply it (part II). It defends an alternative model of how discourse ethics can provide guidance under non-ideal circumstances and avoid both arbitrariness and (...) rigorism. (shrink)
Two questions are addressed in this article: 1. Why are people attracted to leaders? 2. How are leaders' images construed? The first question is analyzed by using the concept of “deity” as a frame of reference for an “ideal model” of leadership. God as a “screen of projections” can satisfy the believer's fundamental needs and desires, as well as serving as a reference for causal attributions and a provider of transcendental meaning. Using Construal Level Theory, deity, as a frame of (...) reference, also facilitates analysis of the second question. This analysis explains universal principles underlying the leadership construal, and the psychological principles and culture-bound processes relevant to construing different images of leadership in different collectives. (shrink)
A history of logic -- Patterns of reasoning -- A language and its meaning -- A symbolic language -- 1850-1950 mathematical logic -- Modern symbolic logic -- Elements of set theory -- Sets, functions, relations -- Induction -- Turning machines -- Computability and decidability -- Propositional logic -- Syntax and proof systems -- Semantics of PL -- Soundness and completeness -- First order logic -- Syntax and proof systems of FOL -- Semantics of FOL -- More semantics -- Soundness and (...) completeness -- Why is first order logic "First Order"? (shrink)
Two questions are addressed in this article: 1. Why are people attracted to leaders? 2. How are leaders' images construed? The first question is analyzed by using the concept of “deity” as a frame of reference for an “ideal model” of leadership. God as a “screen of projections” can satisfy the believer's fundamental needs and desires, as well as serving as a reference for causal attributions and a provider of transcendental meaning. Using Construal Level Theory, deity, as a frame of (...) reference, also facilitates analysis of the second question. This analysis explains universal principles underlying the leadership construal, and the psychological principles and culture-bound processes relevant to construing different images of leadership in different collectives. (shrink)
Floridi’s Theory of Strongly Semantic Information posits the Veridicality Thesis. One motivation is that it can serve as a foundation for information-based epistemology being an alternative to the tripartite theory of knowledge. However, the Veridicality thesis is false, if ‘information’ is to play an explanatory role in human cognition. Another motivation is avoiding the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap paradox. But this paradox only seems paradoxical, if ‘information’ and ‘informativeness’ are synonymous, logic is a theory of inference, or validity suffices for rational inference; (...) a, b, and c are false. (shrink)
Famously, David Lewis argued that we can avoid the apparent paradoxes of time travel by introducing a notion of personal time, which by and large follows the causal flow of the time traveler's life history. This paper argues that a related approach can be adapted for use by three-dimensionalists in response to Ted Sider's claim that three-dimensionalism is inconsistent with time travel. In contrast to Lewis (and others who follow him on this point), however, this paper argues that the order (...) of events captured by so-called "personal time" should be thought of as causal, rather than temporal. (shrink)
We say that a semantical function is correlated with a syntactical function F iff for any structure A and any sentence we have A F A .It is proved that for a syntactical function F there is a semantical function correlated with F iff F preserves propositional connectives up to logical equivalence. For a semantical function there is a syntactical function F correlated with iff for any finitely axiomatizable class X the class –1X is also finitely axiomatizable (i.e. iff is (...) continuous in model class topology). (shrink)
In der Technikethik spielt das Konzept der Verantwortung eine zentrale Rolle. ›Verantwortung‹ ist ein Basiskonzept, das, ähnlich wie die Konzepte ›Pflicht‹ oder ›Schuld‹, in vielfältigen Kontexten gebraucht wird. Dennoch lassen sich einige allgemeine Aussagen über seine Bedeutung treffen. Gerade Autoren, die im Bereich der Technik- und Wissenschaftsethik aktiv sind, haben sich nachdrücklich um eine Klärung des allgemeinen Verantwortungsbegriffs und seiner verschiedenen Aspekte und Gebrauchsweisen bemüht.
Methods and equations for analysing the kinetics of enzyme-catalysed reactions were developed at the beginning of the 20th century in two centres in particular; in Paris, by Victor Henri, and, in Berlin, by Leonor Michaelis and Maud Menten. Henri made a detailed analysis of the work in this area that had preceded him, and arrived at a correct equation for the initial rate of reaction. However, his approach was open to the important objection that he took no account of the (...) hydrogen-ion concentration (a subject largely undeveloped in his time). In addition, although he wrote down an expression for the initial rate of reaction and described the hyperbolic form of its dependence on the substrate concentration, he did not appreciate the great advantages that would come from analysis in terms of initial rates rather than time courses. Michaelis and Menten not only placed Henri's analysis on a firm experimental foundation, but also defined the experimental protocol that remains standard today. Here, we review this development, and discuss other scientific contributions of these individuals. The three parts have different authors, as indicated, and do not necessarily agree on all details, in particular about the relative importance of the contributions of Michaelis and Menten on the one hand and of Henri on the other. Rather than force the review into an unrealistic consensus, we consider it appropriate to leave the disagreements visible. (shrink)
Quine’s general approach is to treat ontology as a matter of what a theory says there is. This turns ontology into a question of which existential statements are consequences of that theory. This approach is contrasted favourably with the view that takes ontological commitment as a relation to things. However within the broadly Quinean approach we can distinguish different accounts, differing as to the nature of the consequence relation best suited for determining those consequences. It is suggested that Quine’s own (...) narrowly formal account fails. Then a consideration of the necessitation approach championed by Jackson and Lewis shows that it does not do justice to the role of acknowledging consequences in determining rationality. I suggest that an approach which puts a priori consequence as the key relation does a better job. The task of spelling out the nature of a priori consequence is sketched, along with reasons to doubt the adequacy of the double indexing approach to analysing the a priori. The sorts of relations we can stand in to theories which allow us to inherit ontological commitments are touched on with a number of important philosophical strategies for introducing belief-like attitudes which nevertheless avoid ontological commitment. (shrink)
Priest and others have presented their “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic: that only paraconsistent logics allow non-trivial inconsistent theories. This is a very prevalent argument; occurring as it does in the work of many relevant and more generally paraconsistent logicians. However this argument can be shown to be unsuccessful. There is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of non-triviality. Disambiguated the most telling reason for paraconsistent logics is either question-begging or mistaken. This highlights an important confusion about the role (...) of logic in our development of our theories of the world. Does logic chart good reasoning or our commitments? We also consider another abductive argument for paraconsistent logics which also is shown to fail. (shrink)
Simple formula should contain only few quantifiers. In the paper the methods to estimate quantity and quality of quantifiers needed to express a sentence equivalent to given one.
At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures ‘wrong’. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are ‘wrong’ when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason (the pleasures are fleeting) corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason (the pleasant things “give pleasure in whatever way and for whatever reason”) is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.